

(in progress) Strauss: Now let us read a few passages from the Topics to get an access to this. Begin here at Topics 101 a 25:

Student: "After the above remarks the next point is to explain for how many and for what purposes this treatise is useful. They are three in number: mental training, conversation, and the philosophic sciences."

Strauss: The philosophic sciences means for Aristotle, includes for Aristotle, what we now call natural sciences. Continue.

Student: "That it is useful for mental training is obvious on the face of it, for if we have a method we shall be able more easily to argue about the subject proposed. It is useful for conversations because having enumerated the opinions of the majority we shall be dealing with people on the basis of their own opinions."

Strauss: Aristotle actually says "the opinions of the many." That is not quite the same as "the opinions of the majority." Can you read the sentence again?

Student: "It is useful for conversations because having enumerated the opinions of the many we shall be dealing with people on the basis of their own opinions, not on those of others, changing the course of any argument which they appear to us to be using wrongly."

Strauss: But you take out one part that makes it somewhat clearer. "Every argument ad hominem (inaudible)" Now what is an argument ad hominem? Some of you will know this.

Student: An argument directed against an individual, rather than a topic.

Strauss: That is not precise enough. The premise from which you start is granted by the (inaudible) of the conversation. You argue from these premises and it is irrelevant for this argument whether these premises are true or not. But it is sufficient, however, for refuting it, if he grants you something. What he grants you is the premise. And then you will draw inferences from it and if the inferences are destructive of his position then it is refuted. To that extent argument can be very valuable, but it is not of course an argument, a scientific argument proper, because it does not start from premises that are true. And therefore we see how (inaudible) the connection with the Platonic dialogues. Is an argument within an individual, or a kind of individual, (inaudible) of a give and take? In a scientific exposition there is not necessarily a give and take. There can be a coherent exposition without any exchange. Please go on.

Student: "For the philosophic sciences it is useful because if we are able to raise difficulties on both sides we shall more easily discern both truth and falsehood on every point. Further, it is

useful in connection with the ultimate bases of each science, for it is impossible to discuss them at all on the basis of the principles peculiar to the science in question, since the principles are primary in relation to everything else, and it is necessary to deal with them through the generally accepted opinions of each (inaudible). This process belongs peculiarly, or most appropriately, to dialectic, for being of the nature of an investigation it lies along the path to the principles of all methods of inquiry."

Strauss: Now let us try to understand that. The scientific syllogism is the one which starts from two premises without any (inaudible) authority. But how do you arrive at the true premises? More radically stated: how do you arrive at the highest principles of the sciences? You cannot possibly derive them from something higher. You can arrive at them only by ascending from what is generally accepted. Not that what is generally accepted is simply true, but is the (inaudible). The argument leading up from generally accepted truths on the subject to the true principles is also DIALECTICS. And, therefore, there is this fundamental ambiguity. In one sense, take the enterprise as a whole, it is lower than science, it doesn't make use of scientific syllogisms; but in another sense it is higher than science because it is the way to arrive at the highest principles. This ambiguity is essential to (inaudible). One can also say what Aristotle means by DIALECTICS is not identical, but has much in common in what in the Middle Ages the art of disputation. The art of disputation is also one which argues on the basis of what the other disputant admits and therefore the famous negative principle: you cannot dispute against him who denies the premise. We will find already in the beginning of the Rhetoric some references to the art of DIALECTICS because for Aristotle DIALECTICS and rhetoric are closely akin and one cannot understand right rhetoric properly if one does not consider (inaudible) DIALECTICS. We could read a few more passages to give some explanation. At first I would like to know far . . .
Mr. _____.

Student: Is dialectic the only way of getting to the principles?

Strauss: If scientific, superficially stated, if all science starts from premises, then there must be something else by which you arrive at those premises. This is clear. But that is too general to be helpful, but only provisional. Now, let us look at political things, at political matters. There, how do you proceed, even today? Anybody? Where do you begin according to the (inaudible)? I mean, I'm not speaking now about the man who studies elections in this country because it is not necessary (inaudible) the whole enterprise. Where do we start?

Student: The average man?

Strauss: No, no! In political science. We can also come back to consider the average man later.

Student: In this country we start by looking at the Constitution.

Strauss: Yes, but still, if someone studies the electoral process,

sure you have to know the general framework within which the elections take place. But then the questions which the Constitution raises don't apply to the questions which the student of elections is studying. Or do they?

Student: No

Strauss: The mere signs of the Constitution (inaudible), but you have to go beyond the Constitution. Now what is the (inaudible)? If we (inaudible) from definitions, how do we get the definitions? What is the meaning of definitions? Now according to one view definitions are fundamentally arbitrary, but the only thing is you must never use the term later on in your reasoning except in the same (inaudible). There is a book by (inaudible), I forgot now the title, which supplies such definitions. It was written about ten years ago. But still, how do we arrive at such definitions? How do we arrive at them? Must we not start from usage? So in other words that the definition of (inaudible) must not be made in such a way that it is the definition rather of roofs of houses. So that everyone would be reminded of roofs of houses when in fact you say (inaudible). It would be absurd. So you start, in fact, from usage. Good, but usage is of course covered, and this is the trouble, by a certain ambiguity, ambiguities of various kinds. Do you think only of such a key word, not to go into any detail, when you say the subject matter of political science is power? Now what is power? There is electric power, and other kinds of power. Obviously that is not what the political scientist is concerned with. What is it? How do we go from here after we have said the word "power"? I mean how do we go from here? If we wanted to know what "to rule" should be understood to mean?

Student: If we want to know what "power" means in any particular instance, we should look for a common element of the various uses of "power."

Strauss: Electric power?

Student: No.

Strauss: Why do you exclude electric power?

Student: Well, a common sense judgment.

Strauss: I see. And I think one would also say that in addition to electric power there are other kinds of power among human beings, like that of the loan shark over his debtor. This is definitely a form of power of one human being over another human being. We also would not think particularly of that, I think, or of the power which a bully in a schoolyard or elsewhere has over others. Somehow we have in mind political power, unless all power which men have over men is political. Good, but then what is political (inaudible)? How do we go from here? We could not possibly begin to speak clearly about political matters without knowing what "political" is. Well since we are in great trouble, how did Aristotle proceed?

Student: He proceeded by first looking at smaller relationships (inaudible) . . . and then shows that this grew into a relationship among men that was self-sufficient for their needs. And that this particular relationship between men was a political relationship. And so it was around the experiences of something called a "polis" that he identified what is political.

Strauss: Yes, of course, you forgot to say "tribe," but I would say it much more simply as follows: He started with the fact that "political" is an adjective derived from the noun "polis" which we translate as the "city." And then he said I can't answer the question what the political is if I don't know what the city is because political must be something that belongs to the city in one of the various ways of belonging, in one way or the other. Now you see this throws some light on our difficulties. We still use the adjective, as a matter of course. And these people who speak of a department of government and others of a department of political science . . . (inaudible). Why cannot one replace political by government? Political has very much to do with government and perhaps government is a (inaudible) of political. But why cannot one agree with this? Is there some simple reflection?

Student: Government should be understood as a restriction of political.

Strauss: In what sense?

Student: In the sense that government usually pertains to a legislative-executive relationship, whereas political still gives, (inaudible), what makes up the civic relationship.

Strauss: Well in other words everything leading, well if one could say for example, elections are related because they are the form in which the legislative and executive are (inaudible). But still what you say I think points in the right direction. Let me take the simplest example. I think everyone would admit that a war is a political phenomenon. Can it be called a relationship between governments? Is this sufficient for describing a war? No, I think it wouldn't work. I mean, you know that a declaration of war, breaking off of diplomatic relations, and so on and so on is simply not sufficient. War is between the two nations, or more nations. So while government may be the core of political, it is not the whole. So now this kind of reflections which we make, which are very provisional, are the ones which are in a way pre-scientific. We start from what everyone, or everyone who is of sound mind, would admit, and then we go on until we reach something where we have the feeling this is now the core of the issue and here we concentrate. And then we must raise the question, we cannot avoid raising the question, since we do not have any longer any polis what is the present day equivalent of the polis -- to find our way . . . (inaudible). Clearly, there is some kinship between what we talk about when we speak of political and what Aristotle is talking about. But the core, the polis, is no longer here. There must be some equivalent. And we would have to discover it and then we could go on from here. This kind of reflections are pre-scientific but obviously not rhetorical.

(inaudible) And this is what Aristotle means by (inaudible). And this is in agreement with the Platonic procedure in the dialogues, only in the Platonic dialogues almost always linked up with another kind of DIALECTICS into which I do not now go in order not to confuse. I wonder whether there is someone here who would defend the thesis, regardless whether he believes in it or not, whether it is possible to do away entirely with the need for rhetoric in particular because otherwise there is no access to Aristotle's Rhetoric. Whether it would not be possible, not now of course as everyone would admit, but in a better future to have a society in which rhetoric, as rhetoric, is wholly superfluous, in which all argument would be of a scientific or technical -- You know this notion is somehow in the world, the expectation is in the world. Mr. _____

Student: (inaudible) are pointed in that direction. Eventually through science and proper education, we will solve the problem.

Strauss: What is proper education?

Student: Using facts.

Strauss: I think that, but not only that. I mean after all, did you ever read Human Nature and Conduct?

Student: Yes.

Strauss: This is not too narrow a view (inaudible). Dewey is not a present day positivist. Dewey has an ethics. This ethics may not be satisfactory, but it is an ethical teaching. Whereas what you have today is merely a theory about the logical stages of ethical propositions, but no ethical teaching, no teaching about the good life. Dewey has a teaching about the good life. The present day view is that there can only be a teaching about the various conceptions of the good life, or how to talk about the good life, but not about the good life itself. Dewey has such a teaching.

Student: Couldn't one say, Mr. Strauss, that you sell modern day social science much too short. You do not appreciate it ...

Strauss: That is what I mean, that is what I mean . . .

Student: You do not appreciate it because you want modern social science to know now what modern day natural science has known after only 500 years of work.

Strauss: Yes, this is exactly the argument against . . .

Student: Not only that, but if you read Rousseau, as I'm sure you have, you realize what progress (inaudible) the noble savages to when -- take their own beliefs, their own beliefs about (inaudible) the normal way of getting things done. And how we've progressed today to where people are released, some abject criminal is released on some little technicality of being pushed by a police officer,

or something like that. Look how far we've come today. (Inaudible)

Strauss: But in such a situation rhetoric would have no place whatever.

Student: Can I make another contribution to the devil? Some forms of psychoanalysis are not rhetoric, but client centered therapy where you just pay somebody to sit around and nod understandingly and the criminal talks out all his difficulties, and this is not rhetoric, but science.

Strauss: I don't know about the criminal, but how about the patient?

Student: Well he just talks and comes to remember everything, like a good Platonic soul he remembers his earliest childhood and he's so liberated from his fears and goes and sins no more. And failing that we give him tranquilizers.

Strauss: But still, however that may be true, no modern man would say that a man of the cross (?) is a scientist. He is only an object of science. And with psychoanalysis, it is true, scientists have their correct way of getting data which were hitherto unknown and on the basis of the knowledge of this data he can make a proper diagnosis and (inaudible). And so this would only confirm it. In other words, this is what you say. New provinces of life have been discovered, or are in the process of being discovered, and we cannot begin to know, there may be some other individuals like Freud in the future who, not exactly in this sphere, but in other spheres, make such radical discoveries. No one can predict them. It will not be possible, there will not be any need for rhetoric, and all speech will be scientific speech. Now I believed you implied this poor fellow who has his troubles is wholly unable to speak scientifically about his troubles, he is only an object of science.

Student: He is in effect brought to scientific speech. Instead of being given the pep talk by the social worker, which would be persuasive, he is brought through unemotional speech to understand his own emotions dispassionately.

Strauss: By the way, do you know what I think some scientists know that the core of this thought is that exhortation, or any other exhortatory devices, are much less good for liberating us from the power of our passions than the scientific analysis of our passions. If someone is in the grip of a passion, and then the traditional (inaudible) is this: Remember that you are a human being. Think of the dignity of men. What a disgraceful thing to be a slave of your rage! (inaudible) But then people say no, simply analyze it. Work out the efficient causes of your rage now, and by making this process of the genesis of your rage fully conscious, have a clear and distinct idea of your rage instead of the confused idea. That was Spinoza. Some people know this already, that this whole idea is much older than Freud, and that there is no place to speak of in Spinoza for rhetoric. And I do not remember off hand any passage where he affirms the necessity.

But I wish only that we could (inaudible) that there is on the basis of the now prevailing notions it is hard to see how rhetoric can at all be legitimate. There is only one difficulty, and that is as is also admitted by social science today the value judgments can ultimately not be established by scientific reasoning.

Student: Yes, but what if the time comes when they're putting little things in the brain and using electric currents, they can make all men do what they want them to do?

Strauss: Yes, sure, but, I have no doubt, I adopt it as a perfect possibility that (inaudible) compared to which what we have seen is child's play. But the question is, these fellows who brainwash you, super brainwash you, will do this for some values, whatever they may be. These values cannot be established rationally, or else social science would have to undergo a radical reform and much greater than what Freud and such people (inaudible). So that value judgments, the highest value principles, are again capable of being rationally validated. I believe, therefore, that the ordinary view that let only psychology and such sciences catch up with physics and chemistry then we have got into trouble by the atomic bomb and similar things and the trouble exists only because psychology has not yet caught up with physics and chemistry. The same limitation of physics and chemistry, that they cannot say how to use the powers supplied by physics and chemistry, applies of course also to psychology and sociology. I mean, these famous conclusions of social science regarding discrimination and integration were of course not simply scientific, but were based on certain value premises which they cannot validate. I mean if someone would simply say (inaudible) which has vigorous prejudices and then if something is proven to be based on a prejudice . . . (inaudible). The very principle that the society should be rational cannot be established by reason given the present day view of the difference between factual and value assertions. Mr. _____

Student: Is your criticism of the impossibility of modern social science to rationally validate its value judgments . . .

Strauss: That it is only assertion.

Student: Yes. Is your criticism so clear against a man like Dewey?

Strauss: It would be entirely different. (inaudible) which came to this country from Europe and probably more via Max Weber than by anybody else, though Max Weber did not originate it. And Dewey is pre-Weberian, to use another language, Dewey is pre-critical. Dewey's ethical doctrine is in one respect a modification of a (inaudible), in one respect, but I think more clearly a modification of Aristotle. I mean the content is entirely different, but the formal structure reminds (?) that the good life is a virtuous life. And the virtuous life is defined (inaudible). He makes the fundamental distinction between custom and impulse. Now custom is the inherited. We always (inaudible) the inherited as proper. But on the basis of custom, and the idea of the specific inheritance of a given society, there are always individual impulses

which are, which differ from the merely custom and what we would call (inaudible). Now to take the side of custom against impulse is reactionary. To take the side of the impulse against custom and the mores is anarchistic. So you must strike a balance between custom and impulse and this balance will differ for different individuals in different situations. This is very crudely the Deweyan view. So reason, judgment, is very important, striking the balance. And it is not very clear that this striking the balance is essentially the affair of science. As though one could very well say that Dewey might admit that there are men of judgment and men lacking judgment, and the men lacking judgment must go then to some technician. For example, should they marry this girl? Some people say that I am the best judge of whom I should marry and others would have no faith in their judgment and they go to a marriage counselor, who would on the basis of the results of science on happy and unhappy marriages hand down an advice. But the key point in Dewey's (inaudible) seems to me to be this: There is no prohibition (?) in Dewey that there could be something like evil in men. The place of evil is rather taken by the vested interests, meaning the non-impulsive, the mere custom, the inherited. And this I believe is a serious defect. Aristotle took this into serious consideration, that there is an evil and therefore there are kinds of problems that cannot be solved by mere judgment alone, whether it is that of a (inaudible) of oneself, where you simply have to put your foot down. And whether you have the will power to do it or not, not much can be said about it. Not much can be done about it.

Student: My reflection on this was that if the assertion that was discussed is true, then the tendency of a teaching like Dewey's would be to do away ultimately with the necessity for rhetoric. If that is true it's very interesting that it would be advanced by a man who would be considered a rhetorician of the first class.

Strauss: I believe that even the greatest admirers of Dewey have never said that he is a rhetorician of the first class. He is a singularly ineffective writer. In Human Nature and Conduct, which gives Dewey's ethics, there is, if I remember correctly, not a single example. You know, in matters of conduct examples are absolutely necessary to (inaudible). No I think Dewey never was regarded as a great stylist by anyone, and style and rhetoric have something in common. Mr. ____

Student: I think that in talking about the study of psychology or psychiatry, we have to beware of attributing to psychology, or psychiatry, or psychoanalysis the views that are prevalent among only some practitioners in these fields. I had a conversation about a week ago with a very prominent psychiatrist who went out of his way in the course of the conversation to deny any belief at all remotely approaching the assertion that psychoanalysis was omnipotent, and regarded it as a rather perverse use of the methods or techniques of the field to do away with the notion of the criminal, or to do away with the need^{for} rhetoric,

coercion, and asserted very strongly that psychoanalysis in his view was a method that could work only within a certain set of assumptions or beliefs about what's good, and such things.

Strauss: And also certain institution.

Student: Yes, and could not be used with just anybody. The mere fact that someone submits to that method of therapy is a sign of having accepted a whole host of institutions and attitudes without which the method just couldn't work.

Strauss: The institutions most obvious, of course -- if some psychiatrist tried to set up shop in Moscow he would find it (inaudible). So in other words you must have negatively a kind of government which is willing to accept the basic premises of psychoanalysis, which is not peculiar to psychoanalysis, which can be stated as follows: that the solution of the social problem, of the society, is not the solution of the problem of the individual. This Marxism asserts (?), asserts it, and the Marxist would simply say, of course there is no guarantee that if there is a world of communism there would be no unhappy love, but they would simply say that if a man or a woman take unhappy love too seriously then this is a sign of a very great imperfection. There was a (inaudible) about Siberia, I do not know whether some of you have seen it, but they presented this problem and quite impressively, of how a communist would get rid of this kind of problem, reminding himself of the duty to society and that this was a merely private problem. So surely, you know that in Freud himself there is this famous premise, Freud was the opposite of an optimist regarding the future, as you know, and especially (inaudible) that there is in man a death urge which as someone conversant with this kind of thing has told me has not been accepted by any of Freud's students. The existence of such a self-destructive thing which cannot be (inaudible) to broken homes, or any thing of this kind, shows of course that Freud did not believe in the omnipotence of any technique.

Student: This man was shocked by (inaudible) people who are students of political science who thought that the aim of political science was a reduction of the subject matter to psychology, or psychiatry.

Strauss: But you see then he should address his shock, or his complaint, to the men who did it. And I know only one thing. No one I believe has a greater significance in this respect than HAROLD Lasswell, and I heard to me great surprise from my colleague, Leites, that he agrees fundamentally with Lasswell in this respect, and he had made a study along these lines, . . . (inaudible). And I said I'm so surprised to think that Lasswell . . . (inaudible). He said that Lasswell does no longer have this belief, that belief in psychoanalysis which he had 20 or 30 years ago. So today, I believe, who is there in social science, especially in political science, who has this great belief in psychoanalysis? In his earlier period that was shown very well by Robert Horwitz in his critical analysis of Lasswell. Lasswell's view amounted to this, that strictly speaking the people who

should rule society would be psychoanalysts, because they are the only ones who can judge whether someone is sane and sober and balanced, or not. And this, of course, is incompatible with democracy and it's a certain ultimate step with which Lasswell seems to have (inaudible) that every citizen should be put under psychoanalysis, or otherwise you have psychoanalytocracy, and not democracy. But if every citizen was a psychoanalyst you have of course a synthesis between psychoanalysis and democracy. I believe that no where has Lasswell ever entertained this, but one must also consider not what a reasonable psychoanalyst or sociologist says, but also what is implied in the general style or trend of modern science as a whole, and that was quite well stated by (inaudible) who seemed to think we have science for the sake of power. That science has increased man's power tremendously I think is an empirically fact. And therefore since sociology and psychology can not possibly compete in success with physics and chemistry, one can argue that they started much later -- you know how long it took for laboratory psychology to replace arm chair psychology -- therefore it is only a matter of one or two centuries, or three centuries at the most, when psychology and sociology will have caught up.

This is a perfectly legitimate way of reasoning, regardless of what the sane and sober individual psychologists and sociologists (inaudible), that remains. And the question is whether this reasoning by analogy is valid, or whether it is not undercut radically by the other consideration that the old notion, science is for the sake of power, presupposed that the man who acquires that power, produces power, has knowledge of the legitimate uses of power. When Francis Bacon, Descartes, and such people, spoke of the use of science, they were sure that there is knowledge that health is good, long life is good. There is no question, this is not merely an arbitrary value judgment. This is known to be good. In the moment, however, when Rousseau, to whom some one of you referred, when Rousseau raised this question against his older social science: You older men, you assumed that there is an unchangeable human nature, and (inaudible) the means of satisfying the needs of this unchangeable human nature vary infinitely. The needs do not change as such. Now when Rousseau said that there is no unchangeable human nature, well then it is impossible to have any knowledge of the unchangeable needs of men, and the ultimate outcome of this is the fact-value distinction. So I believe the analogy is not good, but it has a great prima facie rhetorical (inaudible).

So we will meet next Wednesday.

Lecture II
Aristotle's Rhetoric, April 1, 1964

(in progress) Student: Well I have some difficulty understanding what he means when he says that artificial persuasive appeals, artificial proofs, are things that the current teachers of rhetoric ignore. I don't quite understand the relationship between those and enthymeme. The first time he makes the argument he says that it is enthymeme that they ignore. The second time he broadens the argument, he says . . .

Strauss: Yes, but he means the same. The core of rhetoric is enthymeme, whatever that may be, and we have to take it up, and this has been neglected by all these men. Whether Aristotle is right or wrong is hard for us to know, since nothing of this rhetoric has come down to us, but knowing Aristotle as an honest man I would assume that he is right and wouldn't accuse his predecessors of a defect they did not have.

Student: One other, perhaps, (inaudible) problem is that in so far as Aristotle criticizes the then existing arts of rhetoric for putting too much emphasis on ways of appealing to the passions, there is something of a problem in reconciling this with Aristotle's own teaching that most men, the many, do live in accord with passion. I tried to reconcile this to some extent, but it would seem that an initial reaction to Aristotle's statement is that if rhetoric is simply the art that intends to persuade, and if those who are to be persuaded live most by their passions, then the true center of rhetoric would be appeal to passions.

Strauss: I see. Well I was satisfied with your (inaudible). In the first chapter he overstates the case somewhat and says that it is wholly irrelevant and then he says, after having made this point, of course other rules (?) are not wholly irrelevant, they are relevant, but not as relevant as the question of (inaudible).

Now let me restate my question. I hope you make the effort, I've stated it more than once, to look at what you study from the point of view of present day social science. Why do you not have teachers of rhetoric in political science departments, as we should have if Aristotle had his way? In other words, what would be the objection by present day political scientists?

Student: Rhetoric is a form of deception. In so far as it can be said that the dominant assumptions of our age are that there is not the permanent and inherent inequality of men such that deception is necessary for political leadership, that all truth all the time should be the concern of students of politics.

Strauss: For students of politics, all right, but what about the objects of politics? Subjects, citizens, comrades, however you call it?

Student: It would be fair to say that, it is fair to say that political science departments do not address themselves to the pro-

blem of political leadership. They address themselves only to political understanding, and thus do not teach the art of rhetoric.

Strauss: Surely, but political leadership is a theme of behavioral social science, just as propaganda is. And I think a strict and correct orthodox political scientist would not say these are immoral (inaudible), and would say we have to study the methods by which Mao or Stalin or Khrushchev ruled their subjects as well as those used by the (inaudible) ones. This, of course, should also include rhetoric.

Student: But professors of rhetoric, if we had professors of rhetoric, they would not study the phenomenon of rhetoric. They would teach rhetoric.

Strauss: No, no, I mean that. All right, it would not be a normative science, as in Aristotle teaching one how to be the best rhetorician, but strictly a descriptive one, analytical. How do democratic governments influence the governed, how do totalitarian governments influence the governed? You know, there are various kinds of propaganda. Perhaps, if someone takes the larger view, as I think we ought to even from this point of view, see how . . . (inaudible). You know, you cannot limit yourself to twentieth century phenomena. So, I mean, an analytical, descriptive analysis, of rhetoric is essential from the point of view of behavioral social science. What would be the objection from this point of view? One I said implicitly. It would not be a normative science. Yes?

Student: I don't say that all political scientists hold this, but if you take the view that political decisions are merely the product of the various conglomeration of interests and so on, then it would be the case that speech is not very important.

Strauss: In other words, it is not very important whether a particular interest group has a good orator or not, this is trivial. The main point is that (inaudible). Is that not the point?

Student: Yes, I think so.

Strauss: Yes, I think that makes sense. Now if we try to understand it somewhat more (inaudible), we would be led back to the question what are the factual stages of speech or reason. I mean not necessarily going to the question what is its rightful place, but what is its rightful place. And as social science is now constructed, it generally says that it is something derivative, as is indicated by a term like "rationalization." The real thing has nothing to do with reason, but for some reason or other, perhaps for sheer shame, people do not spell out what impels them and rationalize. If we go back to the root of it I believe we would reach the following point. If I'm not mistaken this is the point we discussed in the seminar on Hobbes last time: the two fundamentally different views of reason. Because needless to say social science is very much concerned with reason. Afterall, it claims itself to be a rational enterprise. But it is reason dealing with non-

rational conduct. I mean, reason doesn't exist, I stated it very crudely but not misleadingly, reason doesn't play any role on the political plane. Reason is present in the observer. Now this is not a matter which came up only in the last decade, or so, last generation or so. It has to do with the very origins of modern political (inaudible).

In order to understand Aristotle or Plato one should always start from the simile of the charioteer. Reason is the charioteer. The body is the chariot. And then there are two horses: a noble and a base horse. That is the simile used by Plato in the Phaedrus. So reason is the charioteer. This is the primary work of reason. And whether it is in the individual or in the city, that is a secondary distinction. Now what is the radically different view that Hobbes implies, because in Hobbes I think the change is particularly clear, although we can also see it in other modern thinkers. I mean, the ideal case would be to induce every citizen, if possible, to be such a charioteer, i.e., to control his horses, his passions, reasonably. But since this is unfortunately not possible, we have need in addition laws, but then the laws should be reasonable, rational, and so on. Now what is the Hobbian picture of this situation. Hobbes is as much concerned with reason as Plato and Aristotle, but in a radically different way. Yes?

Student: The passions are the charioteer, and the reason (inaudible).

Strauss: Yes, but where does reason come in?

Student: Reason becomes . . . (inaudible), driven by the passions.

Strauss: Not quite. That is not fair at all. That may be true in some stage of the argument, but it is not the overall picture. When Hobbes says when commonwealths are destroyed by intestine disorder this is due not to man as the matter but man as a maker of conduct. Reason is present in man as a maker of commonwealths, or of institutions. Reason must establish the tracks within which the horses run. This cannot be done by horses, nor can it be done by the charioteer in the Platonic- Aristotelian sense. It is done by a kind of super engineer, who establishes the framework within which the passions can have their sway without ruining everything. And that is an outside reason, outside of the whole realm of politics, an outside reason which establishes the framework within which the passions can do what they like without doing any harm. There is no need for reason being present in the individuals within the race. One further step, even this cannot be done, even the establishment of the framework cannot be done, reason can only be present as the outside observer, just as you have in physics or chemistry. Yes?

Student: Isn't it also in Hobbes . . . (inaudible) to set up one passion against another.

Strauss: Yes, but the practical meaning of that is the institution. It means you set up a sovereign according to the prescriptions of the political art. And then you have this sovereign generate all the time that fear which keeps people within certain (inaudible).

Now let me go on to one other point. You made a distinction between rhetoric and dialectics, following Aristotle. But you also said the specifically rhetorical argument, the enthymeme, is distinguished from the logical syllogism. Now this would seem to imply . . . (drawing on the board)

Student: I think that it is fair to say for Aristotle that logic is a part of dialectic, (inaudible) dialectic is a part of logic.

Strauss: Yes, there is a certain ambiguity. I mean, when I stated last time the difference between the Platonic discussion is that Plato distinguishes rhetoric from dialectic and the Aristotelian discussion where Aristotle distinguishes rhetoric, dialectic, and scientific demonstration, this is true, but in this introductory discussion Aristotle frequently uses the simple bipartition: rhetoric - dialectic. This creates a minor difficulty, but not much more.

Now you said that Aristotle must show the insufficiency of his predecessors in order to justify his own work. This makes sense, because why does Aristotle speak of the insufficiency of his predecessors if he does not have a good reason for speaking of them. In other words, Aristotle is not a man who would say such things in order to show, look at me, what a wonderful fellow I am. So there must be some substantial reason why he says this. Good, but why did he not do it, that makes sense, but why did he not do the same in his Politics, or did he do that there?

Student: One can say that he did do it in the Politics, because he finds occasions in his Politics, I recall, only two, namely Plato and Hippodamus, the previous theorists on politics, whom he finds inadequate in the course of the book.

Strauss: The whole second book.

Student: Yes.

Strauss: This is where Aristotle excuses himself, as Thomas puts it, for setting forth this book because of the deficiencies of the teachings of his predecessors. And even on the first page there is a key remark. In the Ethics. Do you recall the beginning of the Ethics? Does he say anything about the deficiencies of his predecessors? At the beginning of the Ethics?

Student: When he talks about his friends?

Strauss: At a certain point. When he comes to speak of the good, then he says he must not take up the question of the good in the way in which certain friendly men did it, namely Plato. But still, the whole book doesn't begin with an assertion there is something fundamentally defective in the previous treatments of ethics. Do you have a hypothesis? (no one answers) I have one which may sound crazy, but nevertheless I will say it. In the case of rhetoric there were books which claimed to be treatises on rhetoric. There was no ethics (inaudible). We call certain reflections of Plato and Aristotle (inaudible) ethical, but perhaps this was not so.

There was no ethics. I would like to hear some objections to this suggestion, and I would be very much interested. Another point, the last point: Rhetoric belongs together with dialectic, its (inaudible) somehow, because it doesn't have a specific subject matter. Is that the point?

Student: Yes, that is so.

Strauss: Now when we discussed the Gorgias I suggested tentatively the definition of rhetoric as the politically effective treatment of politically relevant matters, i.e., not of everything, but only of politically relevant matters. Now, does rhetoric deal truly with everything? Is it as universal as say logic is, logic, in fact, dealing with everything kind of argument, regardless of subject matter? Is rhetoric . . .

Student: It is not as universal, but (inaudible) universal, in so far as reason is more universal than speech. Reasoning about matters can go on without speaking about matters.

Strauss: This would not be an Aristotelian view.

Student: Well, if one considers that rhetoric, as Socrates in the Phaedrus defines rhetoric as influencing souls with words, it would seem that that could apply to . . .

Strauss: But you cannot (inaudible) that because . . . (inaudible).

You said, perhaps not quite rightly but plausibly enough, that rhetoric for Plato is dialectic, that is, the true rhetoric.

Student: Yes.

Strauss: Now, and therefore, he doesn't make the distinction. So let me say this only in advance, I believe that it is (inaudible) great difficulty, perhaps not an insoluble one, that rhetoric is, and is not, universal (?). There is a wider sense of rhetoric according to which it applies to every possible subject matter, but this, however, is not the practically important view, because the practically important view of rhetoric is that it deals with politically relevant matter, things discussed before law court, and in deliberative assemblies, rather than everything else. Good.

Now we begin. And I think we should study the first chapter somewhat more carefully in order to have the proper, because according to a proverb liked by Aristotle the beginning is half (?) of the whole. If we have made a proper beginning we can perhaps better the things that come later. Let us begin.

Student: (reading) "Rhetoric is a counterpart of dialectic, for both have to do with matters that are in a manner within the cognizance of all men and not confined to any special science."

Strauss: Good. Aristotle seems here to suggest that rhetoric and dialectics are two unique (inaudible), the only ones which are universal. And the reason is because the subject matter of both

is within the reach of all men, as men. It is universal regarding its subject matter, everything, and regarding the knowing subjects, the knower. Not for example like ontology which deals with everything, with being as being, and yet is therefore also in a sense special, because it a special science, it is with being as being and not with being in other respects -- say with plants as beings, and not with plants as plants which would be a subject of botany. Now the emphasis here on the universality of the knower, all men do this (?). Go on

Student: "Hence, all men in a manner have a share of both, for all up to a certain point endeavor to criticize or uphold an argument to defend themselves, or to accuse."

Strauss: So all men attempt, Aristotle doesn't say that they are very successful in this, and the first example refers to dialectics and the last two to rhetoric. All men attempt to some extent to examine. That means someone makes an assertion, and someone else answers, how can you say that. And there develops an exchange. Or they may be at the receiving point. They are the ones who assert something and they are examined by others. This belongs to dialectic in the somewhat narrower sense and the other two things, defending oneself and accusing, belong obviously to rhetoric.

Student: "Now, the majority of people do this either at random or with the familiarity arising from habit, but since both these are possible it is clear that matters can be reduced to a system, for . . .

Strauss: Well, system is not good. It is manifest that one can do this also methodically, would be somewhat more precise, and more literally, in a way, following a way. "Method" is derived from a Greek word "methodos" which is only a compound of the word for way "hodos." Now, what does he mean by that, since some men argue or deliver a speech at random. Some one who has never opened his mouth in a (inaudible) session suddenly stands up and makes a speech, or attempts to make a speech, at random. And then there is one whom you know is one who will stand up on practically every occasion. He has a certain gift for that, and his gift is the basis, becomes the basis, for a habit. Why is the fact that the two things are possible, at random speaking and speaking on the basis of gifts plus habit, why does this prove that it can be done methodically? Why does this prove it? Now we must consider this, because Aristotle says this: since it can be done in both ways it is possible to reduce it to an art. Both are necessary. If there were only at random, it wouldn't be possible. If there were only the other, it wouldn't be possible. How does Aristotle argue here? It is a characteristic of the Aristotilean argument, but here extremely telescoped, what is the key point? Are the two equal as conditions? At random doing, and habitual doing?

Student: Maybe, if it could only be done you evidently couldn't learn anything about it. If it could only be done systematically,

Strauss: "systematically" is not correct. You mean by habit, by habit on the basis of a specific natural gift.

Student: But again, you couldn't learn anything.

Strauss: But, why not? Why not? Let us assume that only people that have a certain gift and only if they have practiced would stand up and speak. Why would it not be possible then to do it on the basis of method? No, I think Aristotle argues differently, and you can easily see that this is his way of arguing from the beginning of the Metaphysics. Since there is a progress, it is possible at random, and then we see it can be done in a non-random manner. Therefore, it is possible to do it in the highest form, not merely at random nor merely habitual, but in a perfectly conscious way as an art. Now you can look at other examples to see that this is (inaudible), for example, 'seeing. How do men see or hear? Do they do that at random? Do we say, look now he sees? Another man, another day hears. And most of the time they don't see or hear. Or is it that some hear only at random, and others hear because they have a special gift and have practiced? Whatever the case of seeing and hearing, they are neither done at random nor on the basis of an acquired habit. That's perfectly clear. And the empirical proof the other side: Did you ever hear of schools or courses devoted to teaching people to hear or to see? No. People teach sometimes to hear music, but that is a special thing, or to see paintings properly -- but that's of course not hearing and seeing simply. So this kind of thing is presupposed by Aristotle here.

Student: How does it happen that you have a special gift, a habit arising from a special gift? Is that (inaudible), a special gift?

Strauss: A strong nature. It can surely mean that. In the circumstances it must mean it, because you know that (inaudible) it was known in old times that some people do have such a gift. They are the ones most likely to develop it. I mean there are also people who wish to be a speaker and can't do it

Student: (inaudible) such people with a special gift?

Strauss: No, no. Primarily from custom, from custom and practice. But on the basis, starting from a hexis, from a habit. And this habit is, I would take it, is primarily one which is -- you are quite right, it is not here he speaks of nature -- but it is the simplest case would be that, you know, because the one who has the natural gift will not speak merely at random. He will do it more frequently, and therefore a habit will be developed. But just as there was a poet, a very good poet, who wrote only a single poem, there may be a man who made only once in his life a speech under very special circumstances, but there was no practice before, no sign of any particular gift, but at random. At any rate this difference (inaudible) points to the completion. Now what is the difference between the way (inaudible) and the things which are not done in a way, or according to method? Read the immediate sequel.

Student: "Or it is possible to examine the reason why some attain their end by familiarity and others by chance. And such an examination all would at once admit is the function of an art."

Strauss: So in other words, the cause, the cause why this man succeeds and one fails, succeeds to some extent, this alone makes it an art. Neither of the two know why they use this trick, or this kind of argument and so on. So Aristotle has said up to now only that rhetoric and dialectic can be arts, can be reduced to arts, but he goes on to say they are not yet actually arts. And Aristotle will say why what we have as arts of rhetoric are not truly arts of rhetoric. Go on.

Student: "Now previous compilers of arts of rhetoric have provided us with only a small portion of this art, for proofs are the only things in it that come within the province of art. Every thing else is merely an accessory. And yet they say nothing about enthymemes, which are the body of proof, but chiefly devote their attention to matters outside the subject. For the arousing of prejudice, compassion, anger, and similar emotions has no connection with the matter in hand, but is directed only to the DICAST."

Strauss: Now Aristotle has now stated the general defect. The core of the rhetorical art is what he says here, the proofs. We can, perhaps, say the things which convince or which persuade, which truly persuade. And the body of that persuading thing is the enthymeme. This word will occur very frequently. You have to get accustomed to it. (writing on the board) Now the enthymeme is the name for the rhetorical syllogism, as distinguished from other syllogisms. The clearest case of the other syllogisms is the demonstrative syllogism. That is to say a syllogism like: all men are mortal; there is a man; so he is mortal. But that's not the rhetorical syllogism. What is a rhetorical syllogism? Let us take a single example. I remember from a time gone by that at the beginning of World War I the then German emperor said, never was Germany defeated when she was united. That is an enthymeme. It doesn't have the form of a syllogism, but this is the reasoning which convinces. The conclusion is obvious. Everyone draws it. Union, a unitedness, is a necessary and sufficient for Germany not being defeated. Everyone can see that. The emperor didn't say that because everyone knew it. Where the name enthymeme comes from is a dark question. I have a certain guess about it and we may speak about it later. Of course you see also that the moment you begin to think about it then you see the difficulties, because in this case if union is a necessary and sufficient condition for avoiding defeat there have been many nations that have been defeated although they were united. Now the emperor in his wisdom said Germany. So, in other words, the basis of the whole implicit reasoning was the very rapid survey of Germany's history which seemed to confirm it. I deliberately chose a foreign example.

Now Aristotle's chief concern is then (inaudible) the kind of reasoning peculiar to rhetoric and then the (inaudible) by Aristotle is the true (inaudible) of the art of rhetoric. Because this kind of reasoning of (inaudible) cannot be understood if one does not know the other kinds of rhetoric, the other kinds of reasoning. But the science dealing with the kinds of reasoning, the overall science, is called logic, and Aristotle is the father of logic,

however much logic in certain respects might have been prepared by other men. Now he speaks here briefly of the externals with which the previous rhetoricians (inaudible), creating of prejudice, more simply, calumny, debunking someone else. This is one thing. For example, in this case, in the case of a defendant that he is a notorious crook -- that does not belong to the proof, because we are not concerned with whether he is a crook or not, but whether he committed that act of armed robbery or not. And the fact that he was a crook before does not prove, obviously, that he committed this act of armed robbery. And similarly the fact that he was always honest does not prove that he did not commit this particular act. So that is clear. And the second thing are passions of the soul, like compassion and anger. Generally speaking, I think, the external things are things that influence the judge or the jury -- the distinction did not apply to Athenian institutions -- in favor or against the defendant. What the rhetoricians (inaudible) the speaker is that he enables the jury or the judge to pass a just verdict. Anything which deflects from this doesn't belong to the substance of rhetoric. And Aristotle goes on to explain in the sequel.

Student: "The result would be that if all trials are now carried on as they are in some cities, especially those that are well administered, there would be nothing left for the rhetorician to say. For all men either think that all the laws ought so to prescribe, or in fact carry out, the principle and forbid speaking outside the subject, as in the court of *Areopagus*, and in this they are right. For it is wrong to warp the *prosecutor's* feelings, to arouse him to anger, jealousy, or compassion . . .

Strauss: Let us say "envy." Because envy can, of course, influence the jury. This is clear. Let us assume that the defendant is a particularly wealthy man and the jury would ordinarily consist of less wealthy men and (inaudible).

Student: "envy or compassion, which would be like making the rule crooked which one intended to use."

Strauss: You see here that Aristotle's radical reform of rhetoric by virtue of which it becomes for the first time a true art is called for by the requirements of decent jurisdiction. It is not only a theoretical progress, it is also a requirement of sound practice. That's important. If you remember the *Gorgias* and the bad light in which rhetoric could very well appear, then you can see how necessary that was, that rhetoric is not a corrupt art *essentially* used by corrupt and corrupting people, that it is necessary for the ennobling of public life, as is shown by this case. Rhetoric which puts a proper emphasis on proofs, on arguments, as distinguished from appeals to passions will make possible (inaudible). May I say one word for those who have never read Aristotle, that "further" and similar words, these are crucial, a new argument. -- Aristotle likes to have a chain of reasons independent of one another. We have been brought up in the modern tradition not to have this simple addition of arguments which Aristotle likes so much but strictly speaking a chain, one thing following from the proceeding, and so on, and so on. That's not Aristotle. Aristotle

has this way: He makes a certain assertion; that is strange, but look here, and look there, and look there. So without being concerned with producing a systematic unity among the points to which he refers -- that there may be a deeper unity is possible, but Aristotle is not always concerned with bringing that out. So, now what is this new argument?

Student: "It is evident that the only business of the litigant is to prove that the fact in question is or is not so, that it has happened or not. Whether it is important or unimportant, just or unjust, in all cases in which the legislature has not laid down the ruling is a matter for the dicast himself to decide. It is not the business of the litigants to instruct."

Strauss: Dicast is that juryman-judge to which there is no direct modern parallel because we have a distinction between the jury and the judge, the professional judge. Now, this new argument, in addition to the first, that one should not corrupt the judges by appealing to their passions, the litigant should not attempt to teach the judges -- this is the point. This is important, and this is the just thing. We have to say did he, or did he not, commit that act or make that conduct or whatever it may be. The decision whether something is important and just is the judge's, not the litigants. The litigant only has to show that is or has happened, and he has to show this by proving it, but by a certain kind of proof, the rhetorical proof, to which we will come later. Now in the sequel we find a kind of excursus on the relation between judge and law, partly to clarify what he said here but partly in order to show the deeper reason why the litigant must limit himself to the thing which happened or did not happen. Will you read that please.

Student: "First of all, therefore, it is proper that laws properly enacted should themselves define the issue of all cases as far as possible and leave as little as possible to the discretion of the judges. In the first place because it is easier to find one or a few men of good sense capable of framing laws and pronouncing judgments than a large number. Secondly, legislation is the result of long consideration, whereas judgments are delivered on the spur of the moment so that it is difficult for the judges properly to decide questions of justice or expediency. But what is most important of all . . .

Strauss: You see, that's the third point. "First," "then," and this is the most important.

Student: "is that the judgment of the legislator does not apply to a particular case, but is universal and applies to the future. Whereas the members of the public assembly and the dicast have to decide present and definite issues and in their case love, hate, or personal interest is often involved so that they are no longer capable of discerning the truth adequately, their judgment being obscured by their own pleasures or pains. All other cases, as we have just said, should be left to the authority of the judge as seldom as possible, except where it is a question of a thing having happened or not, of its going to happen or not, of being

or not being so. This must be left to the discretion of the judges, for it is impossible for the legislator to foresee such questions."

Strauss: So you see, Aristotle establishes a kind of hierarchy. The legislator, the judge-juryman, and the LITIGANT, and they have certain (inaudible). And this is necessary to understand what the true function of rhetoric is. Aristotle raises the question why the litigants must limit themselves to the matter at hand and why they must not try to teach the judge. That is not longer elaborated because there is a kind of proportion: legislator to judge equal to judge to litigant. Now the litigants can of course still less be presumed to be impartial than the juryman and the judge. For it is very difficult to be impartial in one's own case. The difficulty to be impartial is so great that one ought to leave as little discretion as possible to the very judges let alone to the litigants. Now the difficulties are clear: the rarity of men of judgment. Therefore we leave as much as possible to the legislator, the legislator here not understood as a legislative assembly but preferably the man or men who made a code of law which has been adopted. Secondly, we have long time. Even if this were not true, even if judgment were very common, still when you apply your judgment for a long time to a matter your final judgment is likely to be better than if you judge on the spur of the moment. Men have a long time for preparing a law, and a very short time for passing judgment. Why is that so, why is there only a short time, relatively speaking, for passing judgment? Yes?

Student: The trials only take one day.

Strauss: Yes, but this could be changed. One could say that it was a bad law.

Student: The nature of the Greek . . .

Strauss: Maybe they had bad laws. Why is it necessary that the time for making judgment is short, even if it is three days instead of one day, or five days?

Student: A man's life is at stake.

Strauss: But not all trials are for life. But think of a simple, I use a simple example: When Hamlet complained about the terrible things we suffer he meant, very few things, one of them is the laws delayed. There may be very well delay in passing a bill. It could be a very complicated matter. But people must get their decisions very soon. But the most important thing for Aristotle: the legislator does not think of any individuals in particular. He says he who commits this crime will be punished in a certain way. Or he who made a contract of a certain kind, this contract will not be valid, or whatever it may be. But the judge is concerned with Mr. Miller or Mr. Smith and there there may be personal likes and dislikes, therefore one must leave as little as possible to these personal likes and dislikes. And therefore the judge should have (inaudible) discretion. There are, of course, emotional

attitudes to groups. We know this. There can be class legislation, or race legislation, we know this. But disregarding this complicating fact, other things being equal, it is easier to be impartial when no individuals are involved, but only citizens. Yes?

Student: I don't know if this is still relevant, but why does Aristotle on the first page make emotional arousement so accessory and then later on . . . Why does he overstate the case? Why doesn't he say the truth right away?

Strauss: Because you cannot . . . Rousseau would occasionally do the same kind of crime and he said, you can't say everything at the same time. Now Aristotle wants to make clear first of all that what has never been treated by the rhetoricians, by the teachers of rhetoric, namely the proof is the most important thing. And therefore he said strictly speaking, he takes the most simple case in which there is only the question of fact and where every other consideration is immaterial, impertinent, and should not enter the matter at all. And we all do that in order to drive home something. We ordinarily do not understand these propositions with no footnotes in fine print. You state first the massive thing and then you bring on later preferably not in the form of footnotes but in separate categories you can do that. Mr. — —

Student: How does this statement that the litigant shouldn't do anything except say whether something is or is not so square with the consideration that the litigant may admit that he did something but deny that it was a just or unjust act?

Strauss: Yes, but this is part of the facts. I killed, but I did not murder, that's a defense. Now then this is a matter of fact, because there is a distinction, he can prove perhaps that murder is premeditated, he did not premeditate. They were always getting along very well. He never said, I will kill you -- this famous argument used in order to show that the killing was premeditated. And it was so that he was provoked for the first time in an incredible way by this man, and then he lost his head. That is then homicide and not murder, and it may even have been done in self-defense. These are all part of the facts. And the last point which Aristotle makes is that there is one thing which even in the best case cannot possibly be settled by the legislator, and these are the facts at hand. This the legislator could not possibly have foreseen. That must be established by the judge, but the judge of course depends on the facts, partly on witnesses. But the central point as far as the art is concerned are the speeches of the litigants. Now let us go on where we left off.

Student: "If this is so it is obvious that all those who definitely lay down, for instance, what should be the contents of the exordium or the narrative or of the other parts of the discourse are bringing under the rules of art what is outside the subject. For the only thing to which their attention is devoted is how to put the judge into a certain frame of mind. They give no account of the artificial proofs which make a man a master of rhetorical argument.

Strauss: That is only a restatement of the conclusion. He repeats the previous conclusion. It is not the task of the orator to make the judge a man of a certain kind, Aristotle says, for example, a compassionate, or to make him a knower of right and wrong, but to prove facts in a way that facts are proved to juries. And that means enthymematically. So the core of the orator is that he is an enthymemetician, if I may coin this term, a master of the art of arguing rhetorically. Yes?

Student: "Hence, although the method of deliberative and forensic rhetoric is the same and although the pursuit of the former is nobler and more worthy of the statesman than that of the latter which is limited to transactions between private citizens, they say nothing about the former who without exception endeavor to bring forensic speaking under the rules of art. The reason for this is that in public speaking it is less worthwhile to talk of what is outside the subject, and that deliberative oratory lends itself to ~~TRICKERY~~ less than forensic because it is of more general interest. For in the assembly the judges decide upon their own affairs so that the only thing necessary is to prove the truth of the statement of one who recommends the measure. But in the law courts this is not sufficient. There it is useful to win over the hearers, so the decisions concerns other interests than those of the judges who, having only themselves to consider and ~~LISTENING MERELY FOR THEIR OWN PLEASURE~~, surrender to the pleaders but do not give a real decision. That is why as I have said before in many places the law prohibits speaking outside the subject in the law courts whereas in the assembly the judges themselves take adequate precautions against this."

Strauss: So here Aristotle shows a further improvement which will come as a consequence of the emphasis on the proofs, on the rhetorical proofs as distinguished from the externals. The further improvement consists in the fact that it forces one to do justice to the order of rank among the various kinds of rhetoric. Previous rhetoric was limited to forensic rhetoric, although deliberative rhetoric, as we may call it, is nobler and more political. I will give you an example. Winston Churchill never made any forensic oratory, whereas, as you know, he was quite good at deliberative oratory. And even today, while we admire a marvellous trial lawyer we do not admire him as much, from the point of view of rhetoric, as we do a great speaker on public, political matters. Now Aristotle begins now a strange argument. In deliberative, political oratory where extraneous things, things extraneous to the matter at hand, are obviously less important because the decision makers, the judges, are concerned in political oratory with their own interests while in the capacity of judges or jurymen they are concerned with other people's interests. Whether this . . . (inaudible) is of no interest to them. And therefore they are rather indifferent. Can this be true if we think about the outrageous things done in political assemblies? It sounds very strange, what Aristotle says. How can we understand that, that people in a political, deliberative assembly are less emotional, are more objective, let me say, than as judges, jurymen? Well Aristotle takes the highest case, the ordinary highest case,

and ordinarily speaking we are more concerned with the truth when our own interests are at stake, than when someone else's interests are at stake. But in a political, deliberative assembly our interests are at stake because it concerns the whole polis and therefore every citizen. But if we sit there in judgment on other people who are not our friends or relatives we are not directly engaged and therefore we are less concerned with finding out the truth. That is what he means. Yes?

Student: Doesn't this presuppose a belief that there is, that the political assembly is deciding things that are of common interest to all people and not that the assembly might be the representative of a class interest which would be a particular interest.

Strauss: This is why I said Aristotle was not (inaudible). Read his Politics. He knew that very well. But let us take the best case, in both cases. Generally speaking, we are more concerned with getting sound advice, with getting the truth, when our interest is at stake than when our interests are not at stake. Now in deliberations of the assembly our interest is at stake; whereas when there is a trial of a and b, and a and b are not friends or relatives of ours, we are indifferent or much less concerned. Aristotle doesn't say more. And that one should start in order to find one's bearings with the highest case in that particular field is a sound principle.

Student: Then why do they want disinterested people to decide cases if a person wants the truth more when his interests are involved?

Strauss: Yes, but here his interest radically differs from the interest of another citizen in a forensic case. For example, let us assume the man accused of murder and the man accusing him of murder they have interests of (inaudible). Surely, the man accused of murder has an interest in being acquitted. But this interest differs from the interest of everybody else because his interest in not being killed is (inaudible) anyone else. Everyone may generally be concerned for (inaudible) but this is another matter. This is too abstract. But if they sit there everyone knows that in a decision about war and peace everyone will be affected. Of course there are subtle differences. For example, the old man who has no (inaudible) is less directly affected in a brutal way than a man of (inaudible) age who has five sons. That's clear. But very roughly and broadly speaking there is no difference. The fate of the city does not depend, take a civil case, whether a wins a law suit or b wins the law suit. One may be dissatisfied and may curse the jury but this happens in any case. But in the other case it is different. Mr. _____

Student: Wouldn't Aristotle's teaching about the proper role of the litigant and the relations with the judge have to be greatly modified considering the situation we have in America where there is a tradition of judicial review where the guardianship of the laws in the highest sense takes place in particular adversary situations between individuals, where the court very often doesn't decide the question because the particular haven't brought it out

so that both sides have the benefit of . . .

Strauss: I know very little about American jurisdiction, but I know that Mr. Anastaplo who is sitting behind you pleaded his case up to the Supreme Court. So that would seem to suggest that pleading before a court is not avoided by the fact that you can appeal from a decision of a court to a higher court, but perhaps I did not understand you.

Student: No. What I meant is that Aristotle says that the litigant does not raise the broadest questions . . .

(first side of tape runs out)

Same Student: In a political community where the highest questions of a regime nature are decided in a highest court and where the court itself recognizes the great value of having litigants bring out the highest questions implicit in the very particular matter under consideration, it would seem in the United States anyway the court wants a litigant to do the exact opposite of what Aristotle recommends.

Strauss: I see, that has something to do with the famous difference between the civil laws systems and the common laws systems. The civil laws . . .

Student: adversary . . .

Strauss: No, I mean the discretion of the judges is much more limited, and Aristotle is obviously in favor of, for the reason given, why the discretion of the judges should be limited as much as possible. Mr. Anastaplo I would be grateful for your opinion on this question. You are our greatest expert on . . .

Anastaplo: We can pursue it after class.

Strauss: I see.

Student: A lawyer is technically an officer of the court. He has a dual responsibility: both to his client and to the court. And it is in that aspect that . . .

Strauss: . . . (inaudible) there were speakers, professional orators, elaborate speeches, but only in Greece, if I remember well, the speeches were delivered by the defendants or by the parties to the case, and they were only written out for them by the, what here would be the lawyer. But this would not necessarily affect the fundamental issues. The fundamental issue is, should the judges have the minimum of discretion, the absolute minimum which is obviously necessary, to decide what the legislator could not possibly have foreseen, or should he go beyond this. That is the question. A case, of course, can be made for the other view, but Aristotle starts from the premise, for the reasons given, why judicial discretion should be kept to a minimum. Then, of course, regarding the (inaudible) issue you would have to raise the question is it wise that judges should decide political issues. You

[remainder missing]

pp.1-3 missing

possible to dispense with this kind of reasoning, rhetorical reasoning, altogether? Why can one not treat all subjects scientifically, i.e., non-rhetorically? This is of course what our social science, our modern social science, tries to do. Yet we have, as I have said before, social science asserts that there is a fundamental in the status of factual judgments and of value judgments, and value judgments cannot be reasonably, rationally, validated or invalidated. The only way to make them stick is by propaganda, as they say. But the question is, is "propaganda" a good enough term? Does it mean only a maximum of noise and drums and this kind of thing which doubtless contribute? But still how do they contribute without some rhythm? You know, it's not mere noise. It is a rhythmic noise which would be necessary. But I do not want to go into that. The question is, is what is loosely called "propaganda" not in the more interesting cases a kind of reasoning? Does it not entail a kind of reasoning? And therefore we would have to come back, an analysis of propaganda would have to come back to the question raised by Aristotle in the Rhetoric. What kind of reasoning is this?

Now Aristotle's central argument, literally central argument, proving the usefulness of rhetoric which you find at 1355 a 24ff is very simple. It is impossible to argue scientifically in a public speech, in a speech addressed to the multitude. Of course you can induce experts to address say a town meeting, but the experts are, of course, only advisers. The town meeting itself must make up its mind, and then whether the expert succeeds or fails depends very much on whether he has the power of speaking, of rhetoric, in addition to being an expert say in fluoridation, or whatever it happens to be. The decision is made by political men and political men do not (inaudible) experts. And that applies not only to this special kind of affair. Now we can also put it this way. There are necessarily things in which we depend on trust. Now trust and not trust is clearly not something which is induced by scientific argument. I mean you can listen to a scientific exposition and be fully convinced by it, but that does not mean that you trust the man in question. He may have some ax of his own to grind, although his argument is perfectly convincing, or entirely convincing -- you know this. But can we dispense with trust? If we could then it would be possible to dispense with rhetoric because the trust is established by the way in which he speaks and not in so far as it is a scientifically correct speech. Can we entirely dispense with trust? I believe (inaudible) the true theorem universally applied to every speaker, to every witness, and of course to every defendant as well. So this would be a way to make the trust superfluous by scientific means and therefore to some extent to make rhetoric superfluous. Of course this would naturally require a law that everyone must be willing to have this injection and there would be also a conflict with the fifth amendment obviously were it to be applied to the defendant. In brief, one point which we may take up in another context: The complete rule of science would of course be the destruction of freedom in every sense, in every sense. So freedom and rhetoric are coextensive. On a political basis this was observed very well by Tacitus when he said rhetoric had its flourishing period before the emperor (inaudible). When

Rome was run by the imperial household, including the wives and the mistresses of the emperors there was no more any place for rhetoric to speak of. Perhaps when things were settled in the forum, it flourished. But we should always come back and if I neglect it you should remind the class of it and myself of this question, why is it true, evidently necessary, that there is rhetoric as distinguished from scientific argument. That's absolutely crucial, as I hope I have shown. As long as (inaudible) there will be spheres in which only rhetoric can (inaudible).

Now let me now turn to the sequel and first to chapter 3, where Aristotle distinguishes the three kinds of rhetoric and he does this in a characteristically Aristotelian way. There is the kind of rhetoric dealing with the past, with the future, and with the present. With the past: the judge -- did he kill him, or not. The future: shall we wage war or not. The present: As this is more complicated, I leave it out for the time being. There is a beautiful parallel to this kind of reasoning in the third book of the Politics when Aristotle tries to show, tries to make clear, how many kinds of regimes there can be. Do you remember how he argues there? Yes?

Student: He said there were three true forms and he called them monarchy, aristocracy, and polity.

Strauss: Yes but how does he arrive at that?

Student: At the three true forms?

Strauss: Yes.

Student: According to the number of rulers: one, few, many.

Strauss: Yes, one, few, many. So in other words this purely numerical consideration guarantees completeness, just as here -- present, past, future -- there cannot be a fourth. But what is the limitation of this procedure, as we could also see in the third book of the Politics?

Student: It doesn't say whether these are good . . .

Strauss: No, apart from that. What do we not learn from, by being told democracy is the rule of the many, and oligarchy, or something else, is the rule of the few?

Student: Is that the only way . . .

Strauss: Yes, but apart from that, now. What do we not learn about these three regimes which come obviously out when we make this division? Mr. _____

Student: The politically relevant thing is the wealth or poverty.

Strauss: In other words a democracy is the rule of the poor. This would not have appeared from the fact that democracy is the rule of the many. You have to look at the politically many, and then you see that that is true. That is the point you were going to

make? Good. So Aristotle's procedure here is exactly the same. The tripartition into present, past, and future is in one way wonderful. It makes it certain that there cannot be a fourth. But we do not understand the substance of the three things. This is particularly clear in the case of the third, the present. How can we find out what the subject matter of the kind of rhetoric is that deals with the present. The present must be strictly understood. Now he speaks. What is the subject matter which is now, at present, decided by this speech? If you say the past may be a crime, then that is the subject matter of the past. Or if it is deliberative -- what shall we do? -- that is the future. But what it is that is strictly present? Only the speaker himself! The speech itself. Is it a good speech or a bad speech? So as Aristotle puts it, while the addressee of the speech dealing with the past is a judge or a jurymen, and the addressee of the the speech dealing with the future is the assemblyman, or the member of the deliberative body, the addressee of the third kind of speech is the onlooker, a man who is merely an onlooker and does not make a decision as a judge or an assemblyman makes a decision. In other words the epideictic speech, the showy speech, does not have a practical purpose. It has a purpose simply, surely not (inaudible). In a looser sense, of course it has a practical purpose. But narrowly conceived it has no practical purpose, because nothing is to be decided by that speech. That is, I believe, the simplest example from present day America, or for Aristotle of course, of epideictic speech. Also funeral speeches, funeral speeches have no practical purpose. No one will be condemned by that, by virtue of such a speech, nor will any measure be decided except accidentally. But one question: Is the distinction between present, past, and future sufficient? Is there not a fourth possibility?

Student: Sir, I was wondering, where would you classify, perhaps connected with this question, where would you classify speeches of the kind "what are we doing"? For example people a few months ago would listen to various of Mr. Kennedy's programs and show that they are self-defeating.

Strauss: Which speech?

Student: The speech, "what are we doing"? That is to say, for example, people would take various of Kennedy's programs, like foreign policy, show that they are worthless on the basis of their own data, that is to say, they contradict their own purposes, and then ask the question, "what are we doing." I was just curious ...

Strauss: Well what do you mean? If we discovered that this had nothing to do with rhetoric, it would be in a loose and broad sense a form of dialectics. We are analyzing, so that's not rhetoric.

Student: I see

Strauss: Well, if an orator uses parts of President Kennedy's speeches, that is of course rhetorical, that's clear, either in favor of them or against them. Good. But in Aristotle is the distinction between present, past, and future exhaustive? Is there not something else of which one could think in this con-

nection?

Student: Well, I think most sermons purport to deal with God's ways with man both now, then, and always. So that simply is independent . . .

Strauss: What is always, i.e., present, past, and future, taking the Aristotelian view of the *SEMPITERNAL* which is not identical with the eternal. Then, of course, that would be, where would it belong from Aristotle's point of view?

Student: To philosophy.

Strauss: Yes but, since he cannot exclude the possibility of a rhetoric, of rhetoric being as comprehensive as dialectics is, and Mr. _____ referred to a sermon, something not known to Aristotle but for which there must be some place unless Aristotle's doctrine is deplorably inadequate.

Student: Then it would be under exhortative or (inaudible), wouldn't it?

Strauss: But still, to some extent, but still qua dealing with what is always and with what is not subject to human action I think it would be epideictic. Not every man who makes a sermon will like that but you know also the first reaction is always "this was a fine sermon, or not a fine sermon," a judgment of the quality of the speaker. Now I think it would belong primarily to the epideictic speech, although of course to the extent to which it exhorts and dehort, or condemns or justifies, it would be deliberative and judicial in a modified manner. Now since you refer to Averroes I am reminded of a fact that you surely knew. Mr. _____ must forgive me if I say anything in this respect about Islam, because I know practically nothing of it. But I remember that in Islam one of the truths and (inaudible) of the divine mission of Mohammed was the beauty of the Koran, the beauty of the Koran which would be a subject of the question of rhetoric. This is something which we must keep open, if only to understand our (inaudible). What is the universal notion of rhetoric?

There is another discussion, for example, if you take such a verse from the Psalms 94 as "He who has made the eye, should He not see; He who has made the ear, should He not hear?" Now what kind of reasoning is that, if you apply Aristotelian distinctions? Is this an apodictic reasoning? Why not? If it is apodictic reasoning it would be, he who has made a sense organ possesses the sensing, the corresponding sensing, not necessarily the sense organ. Also, he who has made the nose, must he not have the sense of smelling, for example. And the other premise into which I do not want to go now, but which is implied, the premise that God made the ear, which is not established but simply presupposed. That is an enthymeme in Aristotle's sense. A discussion of this particular subject which is of some interest for the higher reaches of the question of rhetoric you would find in Maimonides' Guide of the Perplexed Part III, Chapter 19. This example incidentally is also helpful for understanding the literal meaning of the term "enthymeme" as

Aristotle used it. It is derived from the Greek word "θυμος" which you know from Plato's Republic usually translated by "spiritedness," but it has a broader meaning in Greek, especially in older Greek. It means simply the heart, what is going on within the man. There is somewhere a discussion, I do not know where, but maybe in Aristotle, that an enthymeme is an incomplete syllogism. But I believe it means this, something remains within the heart, i.e., it is not pronounced. Now a rhetorical syllogism, in order to be transformed into a true syllogism, you would have to bring out the suppressed things, the suppressed things in that argument, and then you would have to examine them. I mention this only in passing.

Student: By way of illustration, you gave the one about a united Germany had never been defeated. Was that the conclusion, or one of the premises of the . . .

Strauss: Well, the enthymeme of that was, never was Germany when united defeated. But the conclusion, if you want to make a distinction is this, then we only have to be united and we will not be defeated. But of course the question is, concerns the (inaudible) that union is a necessary and sufficient condition of victory, a) in general would have to be considered and b) in particular regarding Germany. And then if you have proof that it is true in the case of Germany it would, of course, not yet follow that it will hold true of the future. Perhaps there was never a Germany which was so much threatened by her neighbors as the Germany of 1914, and therefore the issue didn't arise. That would be one consideration. This can never be more than enthymeme, this kind of reasoning.

Student: It must be defective logically by necessity. Is that it? Enthymemes almost by definition are defective logically?

Strauss: Yes, yes. Something is missing.

Student: But what is missing is . . .

Strauss: Yes, yes, that is the point. Something is missing that would have to be established before it would be right. Now I put the emphasis on missing in order to bring us to the possible etymological origin of the term.

Student: You don't mean to say that it's necessarily defective logically. Something, because it isn't articulated . . .

Strauss: But as stated it is defective. But this doesn't mean that (inaudible) after being transformed. Before we can go into this question which was indicated by a remark of Mr. _____ that there is something even of the sophistical in this, we would have to go into that by taking specific examples, and preferably Aristotle's own examples, for example, why is the discussion regarding happiness, chapter 5, why does this necessarily lead to conclusions which while plausible enough are strictly speaking invalid? But we must do that later.

Now a few other points regarding chapter 3: We note here right from the beginning that Aristotle says that deliberation may be private. And it is therefore possible, this must be kept in mind. In other words my simple definition, rhetoric is politically effective speech about politically relevant matters is good enough for most practical purposes, but it is not exact. And in order to show this I remind you only of the scene at the beginning of the Gorgias when Gorgias says he goes to his brother's patients (?) and the patients don't want to undergo any operation. The physician is completely helpless. Then Gorgias steps in with his great rhetorical power and persuades him to undergo the operation. And therefore this is private, private deliberation.

There is one minor difficulty in this chapter. When he speaks about deliberative rhetoric he says deliberative rhetoric deals with what is expedient or harmful for the community. And while the just and the unjust is the theme of forensic rhetoric, but of course that doesn't mean that the question of just and unjust doesn't come up in deliberative rhetoric. Aristotle makes this very clear. Otherwise you could accuse him that he would think that deliberative rhetoric, say about war and peace or civil rights for that matter, would have nothing to do with right or wrong. That's not Aristotle's . . . (inaudible) the overall consideration. We might read one passage which I underlined, 1358 b, that is in chapter 3 still, 29 to 37.

Student: "A sign that what I have stated is the end which each has in view is the fact that sometimes the speakers will not dispute about the other points. For example, a man on trial does not always deny that an act has been committed, or damage inflicted, by him. But he will never admit that the act is unjust, for otherwise a trial would be unnecessary. Similarly, the deliberative orator, although he often sacrifices everything else, will never admit that he is recommending what is inexpedient or is dissuading from what is useful. But often he is quite indifferent about showing that the enslavement of neighboring peoples, even if they have done no harm, is not an act of injustice.

Strauss: This is a characteristically Aristotelian argument. For very great precision, take the key case. Will a forensic speaker ever admit that the man whom he defends is guilty as charged without any extenuation? He may admit all kinds of things. He may admit that what he did was very inexpedient for him and even for the city, but he will not admit that he was guilty as charged. Similarly, the deliberative speaker, he may admit that it is an unjust act but he will simply say (inaudible) and he will say that it is conducive to the city. Aristotle does not of course share this view, but he takes it only as a sign, as sign as he puts it, that the ends of the two kinds of rhetoric are as he has stated.

Now let us turn now to chapter 4. He is still speaking about deliberative rhetoric. Deliberation deals only with such contingent things, which are things that could or could not happen, where the beginning of the thing is with us, i.e., a contingent thing -- what is a contingent thing the beginning of which is not with us, a thing which as well could not be?

Student: For Luxembourg a contingent thing might be nuclear warfare. The beginning would not be with them. They could deliberate about nuclear warfare.

Strauss: Sure, that is true, but it is also very farfetched. There is a much simpler example.

Student: An accident.

Strauss: A tree. This particular tree could or could not be. It is contingent. And yet, at the beginning of its being it's not with us, especially if you take a tree which has never been planted by human hands. And also what happens by accident, by chance. You find gold by digging by trying to plant potatoes in your back yard, the beginning of this find was (inaudible). You didn't dig for this reason. Here in this connection he speaks of the sophistic ingredient in rhetoric of which Mr. ___ already spoke. Now these five things which he mentions here which are the subject of deliberation, this goes back in all probability to Xenophon's Memorabilia Book III, Chapter 6 where Socrates has a discussion with Glaucon, the hero of the Republic, about what a political man would have to know. Now the subjects are slightly different. Legislation is not mentioned as a subject by Xenophon, or by Socrates, whereas it is mentioned here. That is anybody's guess why Socrates did not mention legislation as a subject -- perhaps because he felt legislation should not be a subject. Now let us turn to 1360 a 17. This is the last page or so of the fourth chapter.

Student: "With a view to the safety of the state it is necessary that the orator should be able to judge of all these questions. But an understanding of legislation is of special importance, for it is on the laws that the safety of the state is based. Wherefore he must know how many forms of government there are . . .

Strauss: Of regimes, how many kinds of regimes there are. Why is this necessary? Why is it necessary for the sake of legislation to know how many kinds of regimes there are? It is not explained here.

Student: He has to know how many kinds there are so that he'll know what is proper to the conditions in which he finds himself.

Strauss: But why not more precisely? You are right, but it is not precise enough.

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: All laws are relative to the regime. And therefore you cannot give law . . . In a democracy you must know is a law conducive or compatible with democracy. If it is not compatible with democracy it is rejected on this ground alone. Good.

Student: "What is expedient for each and the natural causes of its downfall whether they are peculiar to the particular form of government or opposed to it. By being ruined by causes peculiar to itself, I mean that with the exception of the perfect form of government all the rest are ruined by being relaxed or strained

to excess. Thus democracy not only when relaxed but also when strained to excess becomes weaker and will end in an oligarchy. Similarly, not only does an aquiline or snub nose reach the mean when one of these defects is relaxed, but when it becomes aquiline or snubbed to excess it is altered to such an extent that even the likeness of the nose is lost. Moreover, with reference to acts of legislation it is useful not only to understand what form of government is expedient by judging in the light of the past but also to become acquainted with those in existence in other nations and to learn what kinds of government are suitable to what kinds of people. It is clear therefore that for legislation books of travel are useful since they help us to understand the laws of other nations and for political debates historical works, literally the investigations of those who write about human actions. All these things, however, belong to politics and not to rhetoric."

Strauss: But still, even if a man would merely be concerned with being a successful public speaker he would have to know these things. You see here how much Aristotle takes as a matter of course that one should study, if one is politically interested, the laws of the nations literally translated, i.e., of non Greeks, barbarians. This must be emphasized with a view to those who still assert that Aristotle identified goodness with Greekness. He did not do that. I mean, he believed he would find more political goodness among Greeks than among barbarians, but by no means all. Now what does this beautiful simile of the of the two kinds of noses mean, the aquiline nose and the snub nose? Is there someone gifted with the pictorial art and can draw the two noses? Are you good at that? Who is? No one, it can't be true. Then I must try. (draws on the board) Now what he says is this, If you have the snub nose which as you know can be very beautiful, especially in girls, but if they are overdone it might no longer be a nose. And similar with an aquiline nose which are more beautiful in men, I believe, again they can be so much overdone that it would no longer be a nose. You would no longer be able to smell with it. Now what is then the right nose?

Student: The mean.

Strauss: I.e., neither snub nor aquiline. Apply it to the political examples.

Student: It would be neither monarchy nor polity.

Strauss: (inaudible) One is like the snub nose. The other is like the aquiline nose. Now in each case, the democrat wants to keep the snubishness of the nose, and the oligarch wants to keep the aquiline character of the nose. Now if they mitigate it then they approach more to the normal nose, to what Aristotle would call aristocracy or polity. But if they overdo it in either direction then it will no longer be not only a democracy or an oligarchy but any polity, any polity. In the one case it will become anarchy if democracy is too much relaxed and if oligarchy is too much concentrated it will become a tyranny. So it is a very nice simile.

Now let us turn to chapter 5 which deals with those subjects from

which you start when building up deliberative enthymemes, enthymemes in deliberation. They deal with the harmful or helpful, the bad or good, and since the sum total of all things good for man is called happiness Aristotle begins with happiness. Now let us read this.

Student: "Let us then define happiness as well being . . .

Strauss: No before.

Student: From the beginning? "Men individually and in common, nearly all have some aim in the attainment of which they choose or avoid certain things."

Strauss: You see again the reference to private as well as public choice. It is possible to deliberate privately. Incidentally, also in a public deliberation you might deliberate about the well being or the opposite of a particular individual. Yes?

Student: Doesn't he say that rhetoric is directed to classes of people.

Strauss: Yes, strictly understood, but not only does rhetoric consist in politically effective speech in a public assembly about politically relevant matters, but there are also other uses or rhetoric. It may not be merely in a public assembly and it may be about subjects that are not narrowly understood as political, that cannot be changed, because rhetoric has this dual character. On the one hand it is simply a parallel to dialectics and therefore all comprehensive; but on the other hand it has one foot in politics.

Student: Would you call the Symposium an example of the earlier . . .

Strauss: (inaudible) as speeches. I mean how do you draw the line? If we have an exchange now, no one would call it a public speech. But if you have two friends with you at home then at a certain moment you say now I must make this clear and you make a speech of ten minutes, is this a public speech? No. But if there are seven and you speak for thirty minutes, is that a public speech? You see the line is hard to draw.

Student: When you talk about the distinction between deliberative and (inaudible) what would you call Cicero's orations against Cataline? This definitely had a political end yet it was accusatory.

Strauss: Yes, but that is a very special case because it was high treason and that is always at the borderline of the forensic and the political. This happens. You cannot change that. But on the other hand if Bobby Baker would be indicted then it would be clearly a forensic case. Although even in this case as you must have seen there are some political implications. But what would go on before the law court as such would be forensic.

Student: Is there any significance to the fact that in this analogy of the nose the two extremes are oligarchy and democracy so the

mean would be polity rather than aristocracy?

Strauss: That happens in the Politics, when he speaks of the (inaudible) in Book IV beginning when he says that people ordinarily say there are two kinds of regimes, democracy and oligarchy. How come? Because the most and obvious perpetual cleavage within a polity is that between the rich and the poor. And this scheme of Aristotle's is very simple. (writing on the board) We have democracy and we have oligarchy, and then you can have (inaudible) and he calls that polity. But you can also have this at a higher level and this is aristocracy. In polity the only virtue considered for citizenship as such is military virtue (inaudible) and the only thing which you omit here is monarchy, kingship, and this didn't fit with the polity as polity, but kingship was rather for nations. Now let us go on.

Student: "This aim, briefly stated, is happiness and its component parts. Therefore for the sake of illustration let us ascertain what happiness generally speaking is and what its parts consist in. For all who exhort or dissuade discuss happiness and the things which conduce or are detrimental to it. For one should do the things which procure happiness or one of its parts or increase instead of diminishing it and avoid doing those things which destroy or hinder it or bring about what is contrary to it. Let us then define happiness as well being combined with virtue . . .

Strauss: Well being means here in the vulgar sense of the word doing well, not in the sense of acting nobly but what we ordinarily call when we say of a fellow he is doing well, with virtue.

Student: "Or independence of life . . .

Strauss: Self sufficiency

Student: "or the life that is most agreeable combined with security or abundance of possessions in slaves combined with power to protect and make use of them. For nearly all men admit that one or more of these things constitutes happiness."

Strauss: Now let us stop here for one moment. What is the one which you like least, Mr. _____?

Student: I had taken literally independence of life, and so I just ...

Strauss: That can be very exacting (?). But you see what Aristotle does here. You see immediately how it is impossible to build a scientific reasoning on happiness in this sense, because happiness is very ill defined. I mean, the emphasis is very different in the four cases, but in a crude way people admit either the one or the other. The thing is somewhat vague what is happiness in the ordinary understanding, but it is sufficient for political deliberation. For example, to be quite cautious, two years ago at least the people in Red China were very unhappy and those in this country happy with (inaudible). But here you don't need a sophisticated notion of happiness. Now let us read a few more lines.

Student: "If then such is the nature of happiness its component parts must necessarily be noble birth, numerous friends, good friends, wealth, good children, numerous children, a good old age, further, bodily excellences such as health, beauty, strength, stature, fitness for athletic contests, a good reputation, honor, good luck, virtue. For a man would be entirely independent provided he possessed all internal and external goods, for there are no others. Internal goods are those of mind and body. External goods are noble birth, friends, wealth, honor. To these we think should be added certain capacities and good luck, for on these conditions life will be perfectly secure. Let us now in the same way define each of these in detail."

Strauss: I think that is one of the many wonderful passages in Aristotle. This enumeration, simple enumeration. He applies his powerful mind to such a subject which is hardly susceptible to philosophic, scientific treatment, and yet does his best. Now is this enumeration good enough?

Student: He omits philosophy.

Strauss: But when do people in assemblies speak about philosophy?

Student: When they condemn it.

Another Student: (inaudible) as a list of happiness . . .

Strauss: But may I say this. That is so deeply true what you say that it is practically almost irrelevant. We will come back to this. But obviously, Aristotle is speaking about what everybody regards as happiness. Wouldn't you say that a man who has all these advantages, incidentally virtue can include of course every, why should it not include theoretical virtue, why should it not include philosophy? Now a man who had all these things, all the virtues moral and intellectual, and all these other things, would you not say I wish I had that life. Would you not envy it, not necessarily in the nasty sense of envy? Would not one say he is an enviable man? What's missing? Is there anything which you would . . . Yes?

Student: A good wife?

Strauss: Very good. That is also what occurred to me. Why not a good wife? I mean if he omitted that would be very grave and show a serious defect of Aristotle. And one would call Proverb 31 against him. Yes?

Student: I think arts are also necessary.

Strauss: That could also be counted among . . . It depends what arts, you know. No one is envied for being a shoemaker.

Student: Some thing of the order of being a good rhetorician.

Strauss: That could be said to be implied in virtue. But what about the wife, since we have here a clear example that Aristotle

neglected something of utmost importance for human happiness. Why did he omit it?

Student: That could be implied from good children, couldn't it?

Strauss: Well yes, but more directly . . . Do you know what the most famous utterance about women in Aristotle's time occurs in the funeral speech of Pericles. What does he say?

Student: I remember in one instance he tells them not to moan to much.

Strauss: I know, but what does he say about wives? What is a good wife?

Student: He says that it is better not to speak about it.

Strauss: Yes, the good wife is about whom men among themselves would not speak much either for good or (inaudible). Now Aristotle follows that. In other words whether a man has a good wife would never be a matter of public knowledge, because if she is a good wife it wouldn't be mentioned. And Aristotle follows that. It's perfectly legitimate. But apart from that it is quite true that when he speaks later on of daughters he speaks . . . (inaudible) indirectly of the virtues of the wife too. So this is really not an omission. If you have any doubt about it look when he speaks later in the section on children when he says about female children. Do you have that? Shortly after the beginning of 1361 a.

Student: "The blessing of good children and numerous children needs little . . .

(first side of tape runs out)

(still reading): for the commonwealth it consists in a large number of good young men, good in bodily excellences such as stature, beauty, strength, fitness for athletic contests. The moral excellences of a young man are self control and courage."

Strauss: Not the others. The others require a much higher degree of discretion which cannot be expected of young men. But that they have self control (inaudible) and are courageous can be expected.

Student: "For the individual it consists in a number of good children of his own both male and female and such as we have described. Female bodily excellences are beauty and stature. Their moral excellences: self control . . .

Strauss: In other words not strength and not athletic prowess. We see what he omits. That would not be so desirable because the girls most famous for athletic prowess were the Spartan girls who had a very bad reputation regarding chastity. And people said, well it's the city of Helen. Helen was after all a Spartan girl. And what about moral qualities of girls?

Student: "self control, and industrious habits free from servility."

Strauss: So in other words not courage or manliness, of course not. But without sordiness. What does he mean by that? Without illiberality would perhaps be a better translation. I suppose less scrubbing floors and more weaving and spinning. And you see, this gives you an idea of what a good wife is by indication.

Student: "The object of both the individual and the community should be to secure the existence of each of these qualities in both men and women. For all those states in which the character of women is unsatisfactory as in Lacedaemon may be considered only half happy."

Strauss: Yes. This is developed at great length in the Politics, Second Book when he speaks about Sparta. So we see then the question of the good wife has been taken care of by implication perfectly by Aristotle and that should not be held against him. Mr. ____?

Student: Isn't this arrangement of stating first the commonwealth's considerations then the individual's considerations . . . (inaudible).

Strauss: In the paragraph we read now?

Student: Yes.

Strauss: That the commonwealth comes first seems to be very reasonable because we are thinking primarily in political terms. But of course you want to have a numerous and good young generation. Now this means of course that since they are supposed to be legitimate children, that the individual citizens have numerous and good offspring. It may be that some have eight children and others two and it gives an average of five which would be good enough for the community as a whole, but still the man who has eight children and good somehow cuts a better figure in the community, other things being equal, than the one who has only two. For example, if there should be some controversy and he . . . (inaudible) say six sons and the other only has one, you know who will be likely to win.

Student: Does Aristotle ever speak anywhere about . . . (inaudible).

Strauss: Well he speaks on love in the chapters on friendship at this point. Friendship would be the word for love. If you mean sex?

Student: No.

Strauss: Friendship.

Student: I mean not sex alone, but the whole character of a man and a woman, a man and his wife . . .

Strauss: You see, that is such a long question. It is good you

bring it up. But, you see, we take for granted, for Aristotle marriage is much more important than love. And that marriage should be based on love in the sense that the two uniting before marriage are in love with each other, Aristotle does not assume. I mean, I do not remember that he discusses it but generally speaking in former times this was not regarded as the most important thing. It was regarded as more important that they fit each other. Now that people in a state of emotional disturbance as love is said to be, you must have read the literature on this subject, are the best judges of mutual fitness for thirty, forty, fifty years is of course a very open question. And therefore this view that love is the basis is a relatively recent view. And the people who write what we call novels and which is called in French and the other Romantic languages "roman" -- romances, romantic -- this was the writer of romances, a certain kind of poetry, that was concerned with this not students of political society. You know, because this was (inaudible) a paramount consideration. I mean, people were aware of this. They only had to read the Bible -- the story of Jacob, one whom he loved and the other whom he did not love -- to see that this is a universal phenomena. But the question what importance to attach to it from a broad political point of view, the well being of society, the well being of the individual household, this is a very long question. If experience and wise parents on both sides, which is of course a big if, would sit together and fix such a match that this should be inferior to these young intoxicated beings is . . . You must be open minded, you know. I mean, the issue is now for practical purposes settled by the mores of this country and the modern world in general, this does not settle it theoretically. You would admit that? Good. Because things might change, you know.

Student: I think the question was raised earlier about this paragraph. I don't know if this is true of the Greek, but the structure of the English seems to be . . . He says you need to explain this point by good and numerous children more, and then he says if you look at it from the point of view of the commonwealth it's very important that the commonwealth has good young men. If we look at it from the point of view of the individual he is interested in both male and female children. And then he concludes by saying, of course the commonwealth has to give some concern to women too because we don't want them to be like the Spartan women.

Strauss: Yes, but even from a strictly military point of view, what will the warriors do if they cannot trust the fidelity of the wives they left at home? In one war novel I read, I've forgotten which, I read the story of some (inaudible) happenings at the western front because one of the captains knew that his wife was not loyal to him and he was very angry and he immediately began to shoot at (inaudible) and the consequences . . . This is important of course.

Student: Yes but it is of secondary importance from the point of view of the commonwealth.

Strauss: It may be secondary importance, but it is important enough, it's important enough. And when you read the Second Book

of the Politics you will see what Aristotle says there about the Spartan women, why this was a real harm to the city of Sparta that the women were no good.

Student: I think a Greek's reaction, however, if he was on the front and he received a letter that his wife was unfaithful he'd probably demand some sort of money compensation. I don't think he'd be too much affected sentimentally.

Strauss: That is hard to say . . .

Student: The laws, especially the earlier Greek laws . . . we see that bloodshed was often prevented because one of the parties was willing to pay, make financial payments.

Strauss: But, after all, adultery was a punishable offense, for both the adulterer and the wife. So it was not so simple. People generally had a certain interest, disregarding everything else, in knowing that the property, that they leave their property to their own offspring and not to somebody else's offspring. This is very natural. But also the fact that Xanthippe was so famous for being a very difficult wife shows that the Greeks were aware of this problem, you know. This was a kind of (inaudible) a man spends his life. So let us return . . . Although this is not irrelevant because the fundamental concern is of course are such notions as those of happiness in all its parts, as Aristotle says, are they fundamentally variable to the extent to which it is now today asserted, or are they not fundamentally the same. I mean, and I would still say that I think we can recognize our lives and our evaluations in those stated by Aristotle. For example, he discusses good old age and that a good old age does not consist in the fact that a man ages when he is forty and lives very well, has all the infirmities of old age when he is forty but bears them well. This you would not call a good old age. If this happened when he was sixty or seventy that would be a different story. These things have not changed. But another little point which has changed, in the paragraph before when he speaks of nobility:

Student: "Noble birth in the case of the nation or state means that its members or inhabitants are sprung from the soil or of long standing, that its first members were famous as leaders and that many of their descendants have been famous for qualities that are highly esteemed. In the case of private individuals noble birth is derived from either the father's or the mother's side, and on both sides there must be legitimacy. And, as in the case of the state, it means that its founders were distinguished for virtue or wealth or any other of the things that men honor and that a number of famous persons both men and women, young and old, belong to the family."

Strauss: Now is this still intelligible? Yes?

Student: If we take it outside of family considerations and say national considerations or something like that . . .

Strauss: No there is a phenomenon in this country for which

Aristotle doesn't seem to have provided but which I believe can be easily integrated into this schema: the Mayflower families. How does this fit in?

Student: Now it fits in because many years have passed and . . .

Strauss: So there is no (inaudible) in this country. People can't say their ancestors and ancestors and ancestors sprung from this soil. No one can say that. Since this is the case, since this is fundamentally an immigration country, the oldest immigrants, the first wave of immigrants, take the place of (inaudible). So there is perfect agreement between what Aristotle says and what is said in this country. Mr. _____

Student: I think it is probably less popular now, the notion of aristocracy in this country, than it was say at the turn of the century when so many debutantes married members of the aristocracy, of the (inaudible). And I think the reason for this is that during the fifties and late forties it was brought out that many of the American aristocracy . . . (inaudible), two or three generations had developed power and so forth, . . . (inaudible). So today there's been an opposite reaction.

Strauss: Sure, but that doesn't affect, in other words what constitutes nobility in a more precise sense there are certain variations, in former times European nobility were in greater demand than they are now.

Student: I can't understand . . .

Strauss: European nobility (inaudible) were in greater demand than they are now. If a descendant of the German emperor marries a girl in Texas . . .

Student: A man in Texas

Strauss: I'm sorry, a man in Texas, and of a family of no particularly old standing, this is a sign that things have radically changed. But still, the difference between . . . For example, in Russia I believe that if Stalin didn't have this unfortunate fate which he did have I suppose to be the son of Stalin would be a distinction. You know that only because of the famous (inaudible) that this is no longer a distinction. That is inevitable. But we must not forget one thing of course, that the kind of society Aristotle has in mind is a much more stable society than the kind of societies we know. Yes?

Student: I was going to say, what about the consideration of Britain. He's talking about what everybody thinks (inaudible) noble birth, etc. will make man happy. Does everybody in Britain today give any consideration to noble birth making a man happier, or not happier?

Strauss: No, it is not whether it makes a man happy, but whether it is regarded as something enviable. In other words, would you prefer it or would you not prefer it, if you could have it?

And this I think is still generally speaking true, in a crude way. But now we come to this question which was raised by Mr. _____ by implication. And this we must answer in order to understand why the reasoning based on these kinds of things cannot be simply true. Now why do people prefer noble birth to ignoble, in the first place? After all there must be a reason for that. These are not simply hard blocks of stupidity or irrationality. There is some imperfect reasoning implied. What is it? Yes?

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: This is a very general . . . Yes, and in addition if there is a serious (inaudible) who has . . . Think of the family of Churchill. The sorry things we know about some of Churchill's children do not matter. We know Winston Churchill, Randolph Churchill, and Marlborough the founder of the family, and in between a poet Churchill in the eighteenth century. Anyway, if a certain stock has been productive of excellent men and women we suppose that it will be productive of this kind of thing, too. We also know that sometimes people without stock so to speak, but out of the (inaudible) better than these men. Abraham Lincoln is the most famous example. This we know. So we could go into all these things and see there is a kind of plausibility in favor of these preferences. But on reflection it proves to be of very questionable (inaudible). But for ordinary purposes these considerations do play a role, therefore you cannot simply disregard them because most men most of the time will attach importance to this. The truth has been stated a long time ago very simply in Plato's Thaetetus when he says someone boasts of fifty ancestors, say a Persian king or (inaudible). We all of us have many more than fifty ancestors and whether these people who are so famous, and so much spoken about, are truly respectable men would need a thorough investigation in each case and many of these celebrities would not survive. Surely, that is perfectly true. But this means that happiness is here understood, and here defined, exists merely in the element of opinion, or to use the technical term of Aristotle is an endoxon, something which exists only in opinion, but it does exist in opinion, otherwise we could not recognize this thing. If someone would say, you can make a similar experiment, in each case replace the Aristotelian thing mentioned by its opposite and see whether people would agree that that is a happy man. Now let us make this simple experiment: what do we say, that someone would be of obscure or ignoble birth, would have no friends or few friends, would be poor, would have no children or only poor ones, would age prematurely, would be sick, ugly, weak, short, of no athletic quality whatever, have no respectability, always be unlucky, and lack virtues altogether -- no one would say that this is my notion of a happy man. So, in other words, an endoxon does not mean that it is simply nonsense, but it is something which is dubious, which is questionable. But it has some crude solidity for many practical purposes. That's good enough therefore to take into consideration by every politically active man. There are of course always specific endoxa peculiar to the particular

society. That's another matter. That is also true, but Aristotle is of course only concerned with the universal, what is universally an endoxon. Surely if a society has abolished private wealth and inheritances and all this kind of thing quite a few things would change and then it would no longer be (inaudible) to be the son or daughter of Khrushchev I believe still carries some weight in Russia. If they want to have a passport or a loaf of bread I believe it is easier for them than for a simple factory worker. I have no evidence but I swear that this is true. But then you would be compelled to raise the question, is it a better arrangement altogether to cut out wealth, inheritance, and the other things which are not required for human happiness in the highest sense of the term. In other words this is not a defective society where these things are completely absent, some of these things.

Student: Your mention of Lincoln calls to mind that Herndon in his biography of Lincoln says that Lincoln's mother had an aristocratic . . .

Strauss: Well, if there are any reactionaries in this class, they would say "of course." But, I'm sure there are not.

Student: It's also true that he didn't have a legitimate birth.

Strauss: Yes, that is something grave. On the other hand, as you might learn from Shakespeare's King John it is possible to be a born ruler while being an illegitimate child. But, of course, he had the right kind of father, Richard the Lion Hearted. Good. Now, I hope that one simple point which is crucial to the whole Rhetoric is now clear. Rhetorical arguments, generally speaking, start from such premises like these, things which are sufficiently clear and solid for most practical purposes, and you would make capital errors if you disregarded these, for example, if you started from the premises that most men are concerned, should I repeat my list, would love to be of obscure birth, with no friends or only bad ones, poor, with no children or only bad ones, age prematurely, be sick, and so on. Then you would make gross mistakes without any question. The wisest thing is to start from this but not to be deceived by it. And the simplest case which was indicated by Mr. _____, I mean Aristotle has made it perfectly clear that this is not true (inaudible). If Aristotle were confronted with a man who had a first rate mind, a first rate mind, and of obscure birth, no friends, was poor, no children, and so on and so on he would of course prefer this man to a man who was happy in this sense. Or, differently stated, this one little thing here not elaborated, virtue, is from Aristotle's point of view much more important than the whole galaxy of other things taken together. Is this not clear? Sure. This is so, and a man who is not aware of that will be a very poor fish. But still he cannot ordinarily act on this because the other goods are very much desired by men and not unreasonably desired by men, not unreasonably. And there is no better word as far as I know for the cognitive status of these things but "endoxa," things existing in opinion wherever there are human beings and not to be disregarded but also cannot be taken as the premises for a truly theoretical syllogism. And especially if you assigned equal weight to each of the things enumerated then you would make fatal

errors, if you would not assign its proper weight to virtue in particular. So is this point now clear? Because all the arguments which you will find later on have this character. But it is also important to realize that we cannot do without that, we cannot do without that. We find this even in something like welfare legislation. Part of them come of course up. You know, I mean how could there be this concern with care for the senior citizens, as they are now called, unless there were not something that a good old age is generally desired, to say nothing of housing and the other things. Mr. _____

Student: What you just said now about how all the arguments that we will encounter later will have the same character, and just considering the whole of this chapter, the fact that's it is introduced, being given as an example, is it fair to say that we encounter here a rhetorical account of rhetoric? That it's not a demonstration of rhetoric but it's a rhetorical account?

Strauss: Yes, that is a very important question. In other words what is the cognitive status of that doctrine regarding rhetoric? While rhetorical speech is clearly, essentially, rhetorical, is Aristotle's *Rhetoric* rhetorical? What do you think?

Student: I thought I saw one other index that it might be, where he in chapter 4 says I give a sign.

Strauss: Signs can be used in science as well as in rhetoric.

Student: Except that he stressed so much that the enthymeme is made up of signs and probabilities.

Strauss: Yes, that applies to the rhetorical speech, but what about Aristotle's speech about rhetoric? Is this rhetorical? Is this not clear? For example, a lyrical poem is a lyrical poem; but an analysis of a lyrical poem is obviously not a lyrical poem but God knows what. And so there is no reason whatever Aristotle's speech about rhetoric should be itself rhetorical. I would say it is not a talk. I mean there may be some minor concessions to rhetoric here and there, but that's another question. The simple fact that Aristotle begins with the simple sentence of the correspondence of rhetoric and dialectics and takes his time to let us in to the obvious secret that rhetoric has also one foot in politics, this is a kind of rhetorical device that every teacher does, you know. Teaching means, of course, (inaudible). But I would say, no Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is a scientific speech about non-scientific speech, scientific now not in the sense in which it is defined at present by logical positivism, of course, but scientific from Aristotle's point of view. It tries to make as clear and lucid as possible what this is, rhetoric.

Student: One reason why I thought it would be, if it could be shown that it was rhetorical in any way, would be that this would be a definite and vivid example of how a rhetorician would proceed. And here he is proceeding about an important subject, about rhetoric itself.

Strauss: No, I do not think that he does. I mean, I do not agree that, on the contrary, what is so wonderful in Aristotle and I believe which has never been surpassed and probably never rivaled that is Aristotle's exactness regarding the inexact. You know what I mean, such a thing like many good friends. This is a very inexact concept. And Aristotle tries to make it as clear and not to distort it, not to touch it with clumsy hands that something else comes out of it, to leave it as it is and yet to state it exactly as it is. In our century a word was invented for this kind of deliberative and cautious treatment of things which are not susceptible of mathematical treatment. It was called "phenomenology" (?). You may have heard of that word. This is (inaudible) what remains and what Aristotle had done in an absolutely marvellous way before. There was a historical connection between the emergence of phenomenology and Aristotle.

Student: "Phenomenology"?

Strauss: Yes, Husserl's "phenomenology," and mediated by (inaudible) who was a kind of strange scholastic and so knowing of course Aristotle. Now there is one point which you mentioned in your paper, the question of envy. I mean I had defined for myself in order to make intelligible what the Greek word "eudaimon" (?) means in terms which are not misleading because happiness is of course also misleading. If someone is contented with the state of things we call him happy. And we can easily see a moron who always smiles, but he's of course not happy in the Greek sense of the word. He doesn't have a good (inaudible). So I added at least, at a minimum, an enviable condition of contentedness. No one envies a moron. No one would wish to be, unless in a state of great disturbance where he would prefer death to life he might say I wish I had no understanding of my situation. But an enviable condition. Aristotle speaks of this. Somewhere he says that chance is the cause of all good things of which a man can be enviable. Do you remember the passage? I can not now find this. Let us discuss this very briefly and then we will call it a day. We envy of course people only of things which we regard as good, that goes without saying. But do we envy them of all good things they have? What Aristotle means is that we envy them, or we may envy them, of everything except things which they owe entirely to themselves. One does not envy a man for his justice. One may envy him for the reputation he gets but that is a different consideration. So we envy people not only for the goods of fortune in the narrow sense, money or what not, but we envy them also for what they have by nature. For example, if someone is very beautiful, man or woman, which or she does not owe to any cosmetics or any other effort but to nature -- he or she is envied for that. So from this point of view everything, even the natural gifts, are goods of fortune, while only the virtues cannot be goods of fortune, the moral virtues. The intellectual virtues, in so far as they are gifts, are of course also objects of envy.

Now, there are a number of other things, but it would not be wise, the question which we have to take up sooner or later, and which is very important, is this. There are two different reasons why political rhetoric cannot be scientific. The first reason is

political rhetoric presupposes specific endoxa, well I hope I do not have to translate it each time, "things being only in opinion." And therefore political rhetoric cannot be scientific. The other reason, however, is because political rhetoric deals with particular things which are not subject to any art. Political rhetoric deals with objects of action, not with objects of the arts. That is left to the various artisans who may appear as experts, but only as experts, and do not have the vote, so to speak. Now the question is these are two radically different considerations. I mean the fact that rhetoric deals with objects of action and that it presupposes, is based on endoxa. The difficulty: Why would it not be possible to deal with objects of action of any sort, anything you wanted to decide, in a scientific or technical manner? That in fact most of us most of the time make assumptions of this endoxon character does not yet prove that it is necessary to do so. I leave this with you now as a question and we must return to it as soon as possible.

Lecture IV
Aristotle's Rhetoric, April 8, 1964

(in progress) Strauss: and I think that it is absolutely necessary if only in order to be aware that the practice of rhetoric is, of course, much older than the theory of rhetoric and this (inaudible) from the very beginning of the theory called the (inaudible). Now you began your paper with a reference to (inaudible) the Politics where the relation of the rulers and ruled is compared to that of the flute player to the flute maker. And what is the virtue which the flute player or ruler has and which the flute maker or ruled has?

Student: The virtue of the flute player is that of practical wisdom; whereas the virtue of the flute maker is that of true opinion.

Strauss: True opinion.

Student: At least that's what . . .

Strauss: Why is this opinion true, or correct? Correct opinion would be the more literal translation.

Student: It seems to be because the true opinion would enable the subject to follow the ruler.

Strauss: Now if you think first of the example, flute player and flute maker, now does the flute maker know what a good flute is?

Student: Well, in the Republic Socrates points out that the flute player would inform the flute maker . . .

Strauss: In other words, the man who knows it is the flute player. The flute maker has only opinion. But this is the opinion derived from someone who knows, thus it is correct opinion. Now but if this is so, if the relation of the ruler and ruled is that of the flute player and flute maker, or if the rhetorician is someone like a (inaudible), what happens to the distinction between *praxis* and *poesis*, between acting and producing, of which you rightly said this is basic for Aristotle? The physician and the shoemaker are both men who produce something, the shoemaker shoes and the physician health. Then, the rhetorician also produces something, that is called a persuasion. Now, then is rhetoric therefore not exactly an art, a *techne* like the other arts? And where does the distinction between producing, a matter of the arts, and acting, a matter of practical wisdom come in? What happens to it? Well we will take it up later coherently. Now first there was a question by Mr. _____. Political rhetoric cannot be scientific because it presupposes *endoxa*, authoritative opinion, and deals with objects of action. Yes, these are two different considerations. Your question . . . Why not treat these objects of action in a scientific manner, as much as possible, i.e., with as much exactness as the matter admits? Does not the Aristotelian prudent man do this? Surely, but the question is, is there not an essential difference, so that however far the scientific or theoretical treat-

ment might go it can never be, never, however much social science might progress (inaudible). But we will take up this question at a later date.

Now first let us see, the first two chapters are very difficult, very thorny, and I was very glad that Mr. _____ made such a good and on the whole successful effort to understand the sequence of the (inaudible). Chapters 6 and 7 are much more abstract than chapter 5 because chapter 5 dealt with the end, happiness and its parts, all things known to everyone of us from daily experience, whereas 6 and 7 deal with the abstract principles, what is good and good in both senses: good as choice worthy for its own sake, and as conducive to the things choice worthy for its own sake, and in the greatest generality. But indeed, as you said, Aristotle is primarily concerned with the things which are good for some end, or expedient or conducive. We can only discuss a few passages which indicate the general character of Aristotle's reasoning here. Let us turn to chapter 6, 1362 b 14-18:

Student: "Health, beauty, and the like . . .

Strauss: Meaning are good.

Student: "are good, for they are virtues of the body and produce many advantages. For instance, health is productive of pleasure and of life, wherefore it is thought ~~of~~ be best of all, because it is the cause of two things which the majority of men prize most highly."

Strauss: Namely it produces pleasure and life. So this is only another sign, You see these things are not simply true, that health is the best. It is thought to be the best, felt to be the best. And why? Because it is a cause of things, of two things, which are particularly esteemed by the many: pleasure and living, mere life. You see, this is not in any way a demonstrative argument which starts from that but it is sufficiently good because when you address the many it is safe enough to start from what the many accept. You see that? This is just a simple example. There is another passage shortly before when he speaks about the virtues at 1362 b 2:

Student: "The virtues also must be a good thing, for those who possess them are in a sound condition and they are also productive of good things and practical."

Strauss: Yes, practical means as Mr. _____ explained that they enable a man to act. Now you see here, this is also characteristic, here is nothing said at all about the intrinsic choice worthiness of virtue because of the vulgar view of virtue, virtues must be good for something. We will take this up in another context later. Now, from b 29 shortly before the quotation from Homer.

Student: "These are nearly all things generally recognized as good.

Strauss: In the Greek, of course, there is no word "generally" in this context but those things which are "agreed upon" to be good.

But this agreement means naturally agreed upon by the generality of men.

Student: "In the case of doubtful goods, the arguments in their favor are drawn from the following. That is good the opposite of which is evil, or the opposite of which is advantageous to our enemies. For instance, if it is especially advantageous to our enemies that we should be cowards it is clear that courage is especially advantageous to the citizens. And, speaking generally, the opposite of what our enemies desire or of that in which they rejoice appears to be advantageous, wherefore it was well said: 'Of a truth Priam would exalt.' "

Strauss: Meaning from a Greek point of view. If Priam will be pleased signs (inaudible).

Student: "This is not always the case, but only as a general rule, for there is nothing to prevent one and the same thing from being sometimes advantageous to two opposite parties. Hence it is said that misfortune brings men together when a common danger threatens them."

Strauss: Yes, well that could be used as a commonplace of much of present day foreign policy discussion. If the Russians like it that's a reason for not doing it, the wheat deal. But then there are things which the Russians like and we like -- no nuclear war. As Aristotle puts it, the evil things, threatening equally both parties brings the two parties together. So, for example, the situation changes a great deal. What pleases Mao and is disturbing to Khrushchev might also be disturbing to us. This is one complication (?). But you see, here is a simple case why this kind of argument can never be demonstrative, because of the intrinsic ambiguity of the situation. But of course this will never prevent men, and rightly so, from using this argument: the others like it, the enemy likes it; this is a good enough reason for rejecting it. In many cases its good of course, but not always. Now a little bit later where you left off when he quotes again Homer.

Student: "And they would leave Argive Helen for Priam and the Trojans to boast, and it is disgraceful to tarry long, and the proverb, to break the pitcher at the door. And that which many aim at and which is seen to be competed for by many, for that which all aim at was recognized as a good, and the majority may almost stand for all."

Strauss: And the many come to (inaudible) as if they were all, as if they were all. You see obviously this identification of the many with the all is very dubious, because maybe the few -- if you take all minus many equals few -- this few might be the wise. But for many considerations that is wholly irrelevant. But that is due to an ambiguity of "many" of course. "Many" might mean all normal human beings, those who are not deaf, blind, lame, moronic, and so on and so on. But "many" might of course also mean all the non-wise. This is a necessary ambiguity. If it means all normal human beings, then its sound. But if it means

all non wise then it means in a way all abnormal human beings, if to be a normal human being is to be wise. This shows the difficulty. Go on where you left off.

Student: "And that which is the object of praise . . .

Strauss: The praise worthy meaning always to act the praise worthy is good (?).

Student: "for no one praises that which is not good. And that which is praised by enemies, for if even those who are injured by it acknowledge its goodness this amounts to a universal recognition of it, for it is because of its goodness being evident that they acknowledge it, just as those whom their enemies praise are worthless. Wherefore the Corinthians imagined themselves insulted by Simonides when he wrote, 'Ilium does not blame the Corinthians.' And that which one of the practically wise or good, man or woman, has chosen before others as Athena chose Odysseus, Theseus Helen, the goddesses Alexander, and Homer Achilles."

Strauss: Yes, these examples are particularly revealing because Alexander is of course Paris, Helena's second husband. Now Athena would not agree with that, no Athena was one of (inaudible), but say Zeus would not agree with that and quite a few other people also. So if you use this kind of arguments, because some man or body of men of good judgment have approved of him or his actions, that's all right but there may be others who disapproved of him of course and on better ground. But still you see that these arguments are not entirely worthless, you see that there is no one who praised _____ (?), this low character to whom Mr. _____ referred at the beginning of the period. No one praised _____. So whatever may be wrong with Alexander or Paris, he is still superior to _____ because the goddesses praised him or thought highly of him. You see also that the enemies praise something which formerly appeared as a reason for rejecting this thing may also be a reason for accepting it. A simple present day example: General Mac Arthur was highly praised by the Japanese, because they saw he was an able general. So here the argument is this: If even the enemy praises, recognizes superiority, all the more is it praiseworthy. But you see also the way in which these arguments do have some weight but they must be elaborated in order to be truly demonstrative, if they can be made demonstrative. This is all clear?

Now let us look at a few other things in the next chapter. In 1363 b 19, begin to read here.

Student: "Since besides we call good that which is desirable for its own sake and not for anything else and that which all things aim at and which they would choose if they possessed reason and practical wisdom and that which is productive or protective of good or on which such fall and since that for the sake of which anything is done is the end and the end is that for the sake of which everything else is done and that is good for each man which relatively to him presents all these conditions, it necessarily follows that a larger number of good things is a greater good than

one or a smaller number, if the one or the smaller number is reckoned as one of them, for it exceeds them and that which is contained is exceeded."

Strauss: Why does he say, if you count the one, if you count also the one or the few? Why does he make this qualification?

Student: One steak is worth one hundred apples.

Strauss: Yes, good, but now a bit more in application to the human good (inaudible).

Student: Virtue is better than a thousand concubines.

Strauss: And steaks, and so on. In other words, if the other ingredients of happiness are all present but virtue is not present then it is really a question whether all the other ingredients have the value of the single thing, therefore Aristotle adds, and then you can take any item you want, say many friends or whatever it may be, but if virtue is in it, I mean if you have virtue plus steak its better than virtue without steak. This can easily be said even if they are otherwise in command of it (?), but it does add something.

Now another example of this ambiguity in 1364 a 10:

Student: "And if one thing is a first principle and another not, if one thing is a cause and another not, for the same reason."

Strauss: In other words here he speaks of what is preferable, a greater good. So that which is the principle is a greater good than that which is not a principle, and that which is a cause than that which is no cause, for the same reason, namely . . .

Student: "And if there are two first principles or two causes that which results from the greater is greater and conversely when there are two first principles or two causes that which is the first cause or principle of the greater is greater. It is clear then from what has been said that a thing may be greater in two ways, for if it is a first principle but another is not it will appear to be greater and if it is not a first principle but an end while another is, for the end is greater and not a first principle. Thus, Leodamas when accusing Callistratus declared that the man who had given the advice was more guilty than the one who had carried it out, for if he had not suggested it it could not have been carried out. And conversely, when accusing Chabrias he declared that the man who had carried out the advice was more guilty than the one who had given it, for it could not have been carried out had there not been someone to do so, and the reason why people devise plots was that others might carry them out."

Strauss: This is a beautiful (inaudible) of the ambiguity of, the inevitable ambiguity of the legitimacy of both ways of reasoning. Well, I remember the reasoning of Lincoln, there must be some among you who remember much better, when he contrasts the guilt of the soldier boy on the one hand the wily agitator on the other.

The wily agitator was the one who said (inaudible). But the wily agitator did not commit himself treason or whatever the crime was. The poor boy did commit the crime of treason. How to distribute here . . . Obviously some case can be made for both points. And how would it be decided now, roughly? I believe from the point of view that what is punishable is only actions proper, not speeches. And therefore the wily agitator can do what he wants and only the action is punishable. But this of course raises the question whether this line of distinction is not itself a mere endoxon, you know, a principle based on opinion which does not hold water if it is meant to be a rational principle. This is one of the few cases where Aristotle gives examples. And the difficulty of understanding these two chapters is that one does not always have the ready example for what Aristotle (inaudible). And the ideal task of the interpreter would be to give in each case an example, and preferably a telling one. Then this whole thing would be transformed from a kind of two dimensionality into three dimensionality where it becomes alive.

Student: Why didn't Aristotle do that?

Strauss: Because he thought that publicly, politically interested and able people would always find examples. But the terrific work implied here, alone in these two chapters, is absolutely amazing, to bring together all these ways of reasoning which are rhetoric. I mean, I think one can also say that if he had written only the Rhetoric he would be one of the greatest men of science there ever were, even if only the Rhetoric. But it's of course the same quality of his mind that enabled him to write his other books. Now let us treat the immediate sequel:

Student: "And that which is scarcer is a greater good than that which is abundant, as gold than iron, although it is less useful. But the possession of it is more valuable since it is more difficult of acquisition. From another point of view that which is abundant is to be preferred to that which is scarce because the use of it is greater, for often exceeds seldom, whence the saying, water is best."

Strauss: "Better" implies here better than gold and anything else. A case can be made for both views. There is no way to change that. There is one more passage which I would like us to discuss briefly. In 1364 b 12-13:

Student: "And when the sciences are nobler and more dignified the nobler and more dignified are their subjects, for as is the science so is the truth which is its object. And each science describes that which properly belongs to it. And, by analogy, the nobler and more dignified the objects of science, the nobler and more dignified is the science itself for the same reason. And that which men of practical wisdom, either all or more or the best of them, would judge or have judged to be a greater good must necessarily be such either absolutely or in so far as they have judged as men of practical wisdom."

Strauss: Now what does this distinction mean: absolutely or say

as judged according to practical wisdom? Yes?

Student: Well, the man who is known for practical reason, practical wisdom isn't infallible, in other words, he isn't always going to make the judgment (inaudible).

Strauss: He may not have made that judgment as man of practical wisdom but persuaded by some irrelevant thing or because he didn't consider the issue as important. I mean he doesn't have to be a fool. He may simply not have regarded the issue as important. Yes?

Student: Suppose a man of practical wisdom says, "the king is a good and wise man." Practical wisdom tells him to do that because the safety of the state requires it.

Strauss: Very good. In other words you turn it now around. So that what would be, what they have said absolutely would mean what corresponds, where there are no prudential considerations involved. In the other case (inaudible). A little bit further on when he speaks what is available to the better man.

Student: "And what the better man would choose, either absolutely or in so far as he is better . . .

Strauss: No, before.

Student: "also are those things which better men possess either absolutely or in so far as they are better, for instance courage is better than strength."

Strauss: Yes, why? Why does he make the qualification, either simply or as better? I believe because the better men are not necessarily lacking in strength, but qua better men we have in mind courage rather than strength. But it might also happen that all better men are also strong. I believe that is so. A bit further on:

Student: "And that which is more agreeable rather than that which is less so, for all things pursue pleasure and desire it for its own sake. And it is by these good conditions that the good and end have been defined. And that is more agreeable which is less subject to pain and is agreeable for a longer time, and that which is nobler than that which is less noble . . .

Strauss: And so on, and so on. Now here of course a question would arise what if the pleasant is something different from the noble. This question is not here discussed, as you see. Now another point which is of some interest in 1365 a 47:

Student: "And that which is chosen by all is better than that which is not, and that which the majority . . .

Strauss: No, not "chosen." I understand it, that which all possess, meaning all except we, is the greater good, for it is a disgrace not to partake in it. But that which no one or few possess, that is higher because it is the rarer. This example occurred to me:

All except we have A bombs, hence we must have A bombs too . . . (inaudible). Or only we have sputniks, an example of the second case, and therefore that is something to be desired.

Student: He makes that same point earlier when he talks about men thinking good that which they need no matter how (inaudible) it may be. In chapter 6 . . .

Strauss: Well, here he repeats it only from the point of view of more and less. Now let me see if there is anything else. A bit before the beginning of 1365 b:

Student: "And real things are preferable to those that have reference to public opinion, the latter being defined as those which a man would not choose if they were likely to remain unnoticed by others. It would seem then that it is better receive than to confer a benefit, for one would choose the former even if it should pass unnoticed whereas one would not choose to confer a benefit if it were likely to remain unknown."

Strauss: So in other words if the other receives a benefit and would never know who the benefactor was, a kind of tough morality isn't it.

Student: Ostentatious (inaudible)?

Strauss: But still that is part of popular morality. Yes, go on.

Student: "Those things are also to be preferred which men would rather possess in reality than in appearance, because they are nearer the true, wherefore it is commonly said that justice is a thing of little importance because people prefer to appear just than to be just."

Strauss: In other words they get all the benefits from the appearance of justice without possessing it, whereas if they possessed it without the appearances they would not get any benefits. Is this notion known to you?

Student: Thrasy-machus

Strauss: Not Thrasy-machus, Glaucon. Glaucon develops it at great length. He takes up the issue later on. We do not have to go into that. I would like to discuss in detail the last chapter, chapter 8 for the reason which appears from the very first sentence. Now will you begin.

Student: These are nearly all the topics from which arguments may be drawn in persuading and dissuading, but the most important and effective of all the means of persuasion and good counsel is to know all the forms of government and to distinguish the manners and customs, institutions, and interests of each, for all men are guided by considerations of expediency and that which preserves the state is expedient."

Strauss: Let us stop here. So that is in a way more important than everything else. Not that the preceding things are unimpor-

tant, but these are most obviously important for any deliberation. And the subject is primarily the politeia, or the regimes. And why is this so? Because all proposals are made with a view to the expedient. But expedient to what or to whom? You can say to the community or to the polis surely, but the community is always a specifically formed community, a democracy, an aristocracy or whatever it may be. And as Aristotle puts it, what is expedient is that which preserves the regime. There he shouldn't translate "state." That would be "polis," but he says "politeia." In other words the politically neutral considerations which exist of course, I mean something has to be done regardless of what the regime is, this is relatively rare and not a truly important thing. So the expedient par excellence is that which preserves the regime, therefore one has to know the regime. Now a second reason, introduced with a "furthermore":

Student: "Further, the declaration of the authority is authoritative and the different kinds of authority are distinguished according to the regime. In fact, there are as many authorities as there are regimes. Now there are four kinds of regimes: democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, monarchy. So that the supreme or deciding authority is always the part or the whole of these."

Strauss: So that is an additional reason. That which is authoritative, that which you must try to persuade, depends on the regime. It could be this kind of order, say a popular assembly consisting of all citizens, practically all grown up men: democracy; of a part: an oligarchy; or it may be an individual man, it may be a king. So in order to speak effectively one has to know to whom to talk and that depends on the regime. One has to know the regime. Now the conclusion of what you read is very hard and I have not found a satisfactory interpretation of that. I regard it as possible that this is an illusion to the possibility of a mixture of the regimes, but I'm not entirely happy with that. Now let us go on.

Student: I wanted to say, the question was raised last time or the time before why there are four kinds of happiness and three in the Ethics, and there are only four regimes here too and there are six in the Politics. Is it possible that these four happinesses and four regimes . . .

Strauss: No, I don't find any positive sign of it. But we have to take up this question briefly about the regimes.

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: No, you persuade the government, but the government not now in our modern sense . . . Take a town. The government may be a town meeting where every resident of the town is a member. That would be a democracy. It may be that only people on the basis of a very high property qualification are full citizens. That would be an oligarchy. The body of citizens, the body of full citizens, differs according to the regime. If it is a democracy, it would be all; an oligarchy, a few; if it is an aristocracy, a few of a certain kind; if it is a monarchy, a single man. And every

public speech, a deliberative speech, is addressed to those men constituting the regime. And therefore you have to know the regime. This will become clearer from the sequel. Go on.

Student: "Democracy is a regime in which the offices are distributed by the people among themselves by lot. In an oligarchy by those who possess a certain property qualification. In an aristocracy by those who possess an education qualification, meaning an education that is laid down by the law. In fact, in an aristocracy power and office are in the hands of those who have remained faithful to what the law prescribes and who must of necessity appear best, whence this form of government has taken its name."

Strauss: Now I suppose the difference between democracy and oligarchy is no question, with a property qualification or no property qualification. A somewhat difficult case is that of aristocracy in which those . . . (inaudible) which are in control by virtue of their education. Now when Aristotle says here "education" that is not so different from what he ordinarily says in the Politics "according to virtue," because education is that which is productive of virtue. But Aristotle uses this here in order to define what kind of education. Of course it has nothing to do with what we now call education at least in this country because now education simply means instruction and not formation of character. And for Aristotle, just as for Plato, education means first of all formation of character. But then Aristotle makes here clear what kind of education is this, namely the education laid down by the law. Perhaps there is an education which is not laid down by law and cannot be laid down. When Thucydides praises *Nicias* at the end of the Seventh Book of his work and he speaks there, how does he call it, he says that *Nicias* possessed, was praiseworthy because of his whole pursuit guided by law toward virtue. The position is ambiguous, one can also translate, the whole pursuit directed toward virtue as understood by the law. And this is of course not virtue simply. Law (inaudible) virtue is not the same as virtue simply; law (inaudible) education is not the same as education simply. Aristotle surely does not say here that the characteristic of aristocracy is virtue. That he wants to avoid. The question of virtue will be taken up in chapter 9 next time. It is a much cruder version of aristocracy than the higher. That's perfectly fitting. Now does this (inaudible) the difficulty, or is there a point which I have not considered?

Student: Well, if you just simply say its a much cruder version.

Strauss: Surely, it should be. After all, this is not the Politics. This is what you have to know. The kind of aristocracies which you meet ordinarily are these kinds of aristocracies. Remember that in the Politics Aristotle makes a distinction between an aristocracy in the strict sense and what is ordinarily called aristocracy.

Student: Yes, but he makes the distinction along the principles of virtue, numbers, and wealth. And he says well let's look (inaudible) in an aristocracy and then he points out the principles

that exist there . . .

Strauss: Yes, but this affects also the virtue which is intended. In the case of Sparta he makes it clear that the virtue intended is a very lopsided thing, military virtue.

Student: That's true, but the thing is that while virtue still exists in (inaudible) here the questions of numbers and wealth have both dropped out of . . .

Strauss: Yes, but I think not because Aristotle considers it irrelevant. But for a crude distinction that is sufficient. In an oligarchy you know the wealthy people, even if they were formerly, horrible to think, (inaudible), a case discussed by Aristotle in the Politics, thieves. If a man became rich, say he was a butcher, and became rich by having only the right kinds of steaks available then he becomes a member of the oligarchy as soon as he has the property qualification, that's oligarchy. But an aristocracy is characterized by the fact that its members claim to be the better people, not the richer people. And this better people has very much to do with decency. They would not beat (?) and mistreat and would not do similar things. You know Xenophon's _____ (?) gives a nice description of what Persian education was, that they always behaved in a dignified manner. That is what one ordinarily understands by better people, is it not? I mean they never make a mistake where to use a fork and where to use a knife. But also in a higher sense . . . (inaudible) but the most visible (inaudible). And how high it reaches, whether it reaches very high is left open. And the strict case of aristocracy would of course be where it would reach to the highest. But these are (inaudible) cases and you can disregard them for most practical purposes. Now the next point . . .

Student: "In a monarchy, as its name indicates, one man alone is supreme over all."

Strauss: In other words in a monarchy that means you don't need rhetoric strictly speaking. You must be able to persuade that monarch in the closet (?). But this does not necessarily have to be a rhetorical power (?); on the contrary, it may be wholly undesirable. Remember what we read in Hobbes' Leviathan about this question. Therefore this is very interesting. In a democracy you see it every day. A considerable oratorical power is needed to be an outstanding democratic statesman. The case of Eisenhower is the exception which proves the rule, rather than the typical case. Whereas these great monarchical statemen like (inaudible), these were not good orators.

Student: An interesting example of that would be Woodrow Wilson's classic essay on public administration where he sets forth various reforms. He then explains why Prussia had a much better administration than the United States. And the important point is that it is much easier to persuade the monarch or the smaller group of people in control to implement these reforms than it is to persuade the people of the United States.

Strauss: That was one of the favorite arguments of the monarchists and . . . (inaudible) that the President of a great republic should have adopted it. It's almost like the famous story of President Eisenhower when he said it was so difficult to refute KHRUSHCHEV. Remember that famous story. He couldn't say anything about argument in favor of communism. Because simply appealed to certain notions of military discipline which of course were natural to generals. Bismarck said of himself that he would never have succeeded if he didn't have the qualities of the courtier. You don't have to have the courtier's qualities in order to be a successful democratic politician. But on the other hand you don't have to be an orator to be a successful monarchic politician. Yes, now how does he go on.

Student: "If it is subject to certain regulations it is called a kingdom. If it is unlimited, a tyranny."

Strauss: Well, if it is according to some order.

Student: Nor should the end of each regime be neglected, for men choose the things which have reference to the ends."

Strauss: You see, hitherto he has not spoken of the ends, and the end is that thing which throws light. For example when he says offices are distributed by the lot. This is unenlightening in itself. Why by lot, or why give all the power to the people of wealth? That can be understood only when you look at the end. Is this clear?

Student: Not so clear. Why can't you define government by process, as many people do today? (inaudible)

Strauss: But still, for the very simple reason . . . Well, someone here must be able to answer that question at least as well as I can. Why is it not sufficient to define it as a process?

Student: Well its not meaningful unless we understand what the process is supposed to attain. Why do we have . . . (inaudible).

Strauss: That's the end, that's the end. What is the virtue of having so called free elections as distinguished by a single list handed down by the government? What's the virtue of that?

Student: The consent of the governed.

Strauss: Why is that good?

Student: Well, I could refer you to John Locke . . .

Strauss: That is a very good rhetorical argument that we cannot use here. I believe there would be one simple answer even from Locke, a word, and that word is?

Student: Freedom

Strauss: Freedom, which needs some elaboration, some definition,

because "freedom" is an ambiguous term but still it points in the right direction. Now what are these ends?

Student: "Now, the end of democracy is liberty, of oligarchy wealth, of aristocracy things relating to education and what the law prescribes, of tyranny self protection."

Strauss: All right. You see here how he avoids the word "virtue" when speaking of aristocracy. That's the point. He doesn't say here education and decency . . . (inaudible) because this is not the end. Education is not the end. Therefore he says that it is connected with that with education. He avoids the word "virtue" . . . (inaudible) and he avoids it because he doesn't want to open up the whole issue.

Student: I was struck by self protection as the end of tyranny. I was thinking of in Herodotus after Salamis the worry (?) is the Persians. It's not just the worry is the leader because they're aware the whole tyranny is constituted by the leaders. So everybody has to worry about his protection, because otherwise the whole state would collapse. So this self protection as the end of tyranny here is not just the end of the tyrant.

Strauss: Well self protection literally translated, the end of tyranny is guard, protection. And of course it was implied that the tyrant's end is to protect himself, and his retainers, and so on and so on. But the striking thing here is he omits the end of monarchy, of kingship proper. Now how can one understand that?

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: Yes that is good, but still closer to the connection with . . . (inaudible).

Student: Isn't it the idea that this is a book written in a democratic regime and what he would have to say about the end of monarchy . . .

Strauss: Yes, but more simply, every^(?) can figure out the end of monarchy in contradistinction to a tyranny because it will be something like aristocracy where there is . . . (inaudible) some reason or the other there is only a single ruler. It would be some notion of education or (inaudible).

Student: In the case of democracy and oligarchy he seems to give the, his standard is characterization, but in the case of aristocracy and monarchy he wants to leave certain things out because he doesn't want to get into a discussion of virtue (?). But wouldn't this also apply to his characterization of democracy?

Strauss: Why not? Because these are much simpler things, simple from the point of view of ordinary understanding. Everyone knows what freedom is, what wealth is, although one may not have a proper appreciation of it. But you know that if there is no one who can boss you around, this is a free country. Everyone understands that.

Student: (inaudible) say the same thing about virtue?

Strauss: Not quite. Because that is a very great ambiguity, because virtue may be understood in a very crude way and in a (inaudible) way and there is also this strange difficulty. If you make virtue the condition of participation in government, then how will you go about it. How will you go about it? Then everyone who is a little bit ambitious will pretend to be virtuous. And this . . . (inaudible) pretends to be virtuous is of course not virtue. What would you do? I mean, try to think of it in practical terms, how to select virtuous men. You must have virtuous men of very great discernment for the selection. On this you cannot habitually count. Because some of the crooks (?) may be very clever and appear to be, but not really be, virtuous. So what you do is to take external criteria. Wealth is of course not virtue. We know that. But then we use such a criterion as old wealth. The good old families is where you can presume that they have received a proper upbringing. This is a presumption which is good enough as far as it goes, but it is of course only a presumption because in the best families there are also black sheep. And they may be very clever black sheep so they would (inaudible) like Alcibiades who was a black sheep without any question but cleverer than anybody else. Therefore aristocracy is a much more problematic (inaudible). In a crude way what is ordinarily understood by aristocracy is of course possible. There were many of them. But the question is whether there was a single of them that was an aristocracy in the (inaudible). Now, go on where we left off.

Student: "It is clear then that we must distinguish the manners and customs, institutions and interests of each regime, since it is in reference to this that men make their choice. But as proofs are established not only by demonstrative but also by ethical argument . . .

Strauss: Yes, what does demonstrative argument mean here?

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: Yes in this case it can only mean, in other words, demonstrative is not meant here in the strict sense of the scientific argument, but the proof which you give, the substantive proof, and which in public speech would be an enthymeme. Yes, but also by ethical speech. What is an ethical speech? Aristotle doesn't mean you have to make one speech which is demonstrative, another which is ethical, but the same speech will fill both functions. The demonstrative speech will show that this is a wise course of action to take. The ethical element will show that this is a trustworthy man. Yes?

Student: "Since we have confidence in an orator who exhibits certain qualities such as goodness . . .

Strauss: Who exhibits himself as a man of a certain kind. Who exhibits this by his speech, not by protesting that he is a man of this kind. This would not be convincing. That is not for

people who are not easily taken in. But he must simply show it by deed.

Student: "such as goodness, goodwill, or both. It follows that we ought to be acquainted with the characters of each regime, for in reference to each the character most likely to persuade must be that which is characteristic of it."

Strauss: In other words in a democracy the speaker must, his character must be that of a good democrat. You know if he shows himself by his ethos as a good man in general but not of good will toward the common people, then he is out. Then he's out. Correspondingly in an oligarchy he must show himself as a good oligarch. Or in old Prussia when one of the leading men said of the other, he is a good (inaudible), meaning a good representative of the landowning class. That (inaudible) as a member of the ruling class. Just as in a democracy, a case with which we are more familiar and which is perfectly clear, if he has manners which are undemocratic, a patrician man, this is not so good. Therefore a certain kind of folksiness, Truman was I believe the greatest example of this I have observed, that is a recommendation. And as for Roosevelt who was emphatically a patrician and a member of (inaudible) which showed that he had this art, when Frances Perkins, she tells in her book, prepared for him a speech which ended with the sentence, "we want an all inclusive society," Roosevelt changed it into, "we want a society where no one is left out." This shows democratic (inaudible). Everyone can understand that, but "all inclusive," quite a few people would not know what that is. This is the ethical part of the argument, by using such phrases. Yes.

Student: It seems strange though that in Athens during the height of democracy you had the leaders who had a patrician background from Pericles down to Alcibiades, people who not only had the background, but they had the aristocratic manners, an Olympian aloofness . . .

Strauss: Well, that is true, especially of Pericles but as for Alcibiades he had a lot of troubles with this. When you read the speech in Thucydides how he had to explain away his race horses which were held against him. Pericles was a very special case, Pericles had identified him (?). He was a traitor to his class and he had shown this by deed for many decades so that (inaudible). By the way, according to Thucydides Athens was not a democracy. That is, I think, a great misunderstanding.

Student: He didn't actually say this. He said according to some . . . Oh that's right, you're right.

Strauss: It was in name a democracy. So in other words these people had also something else in mind which was represented by Pericles (?). Now the last sentence.

Student: "These characters will be understood by the same means."

Strauss: Meaning if I know the regime and its end (inaudible) articulated a bit then I will see how I must defend myself as a

public speaker to an audience which is either democratic, oligarchic, or aristocratic. I think that is very clear.

Student: "For characters reveal themselves in accordance with moral purpose and moral purpose has reference to the end."

Strauss: Well, more simply, because "moral" does not occur, according to the choice, to the preference. And the preference relates to the end. "Deliberative preference" would perhaps bring it out because preference is now used in a very loose sense. That which is the end of a deliberation is a choice.

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Strauss: . . . and especially for Mr. _____ benefit and other students of the new nations, perhaps if they are in the same region as Mr. _____ new nation is, makes this remark here, induced by the reference to monarchy or kingship which he is going to develop, kingship is that polity where the opinions and actions are as the speculative sciences would indicate, the speculative sciences. In other words, simply stated, it's the philosopher-king, that's the kingship. But the second in rank is aristocracy where the actions alone are decent, respectable. But this is called priesthood, this is called priesthood. In other words there the speculatively true opinions are not constitutive of the regime. And we are told that this priesthood was invented first by the Persians. That 's the first striking remark I found in Averroes' commentary.

I would like now to turn to the question I raised at the beginning and which was at an earlier time raised by Mr. _____, and that is this. Last time I was asked by Mr. _____, is it not possible that Aristotle treated rhetoric rhetorically. And my answer was no, but unfortunately I didn't think of the very simple reason why it must be no, namely what Aristotle transmits here explicitly is an art and arts are never transmitted rhetorically. When you think of a shoemaker and an apprentice, that is not rhetorical what he tells him. He might use rhetoric including some spanking, but that is of course used in a subordinate manner if thoughts run away to more attractive subjects when he might be compelled to do some things to bring him back to the subject at hand. Aristotle wants to lift the practice of public speech to the level of an art, a techne. Now when Aristotle speaks of arts he uses it as a rule, though not always, in contradistinction to science. Sciences, theoretical sciences, deal only with understanding a subject, whereas arts have to do with production, with producing something which would not be without the art. Whereas a theoretical science, like ornithology, birds are not the product of arts. Now there may be an art connected with birds, the training of birds for various purposes, but this is of course no ornithology. One thing we must always keep in mind. An art in the Aristotelian sense has nothing to do with what we call an applied science, because an applied science presupposes a theoretical science. We may call applied sciences technologies, if you want to, but technologies are not arts. An art has no theoretical principle proper.

So this is then clear for the time being. But now we come up to a difficulty, because while rhetoric is meant to be raised to the level of an art, the subject matter of the art of rhetoric is things which are not subject to arts. Now let us read this passage which is earlier in the book at 1356 b 37ff.

Student: "Rhetoric will not consider what seems probable in each individual case, for instance to Socrates or Hippias, but that which seems probable to this or that class of persons."

Strauss: Just as medicine as he made clear. Medicine as an art deals not with Socrates or Hippias, but with people suffering from pneumonia or whatever it may be, and the individual to be treated is simply subsumed under that class by the treating physician. The same is true of rhetoric.

Student: "It is the same with dialectic which does not draw conclusions from any random premises, for even madmen have some (inaudible), but it takes its materials from subjects which demand reasoned discussion, as rhetoric does from those which are common subjects of deliberation."

Strauss: Yes, which are already in the habit of being deliberated about.

Student: "The function of rhetoric then is to deal with things about which we deliberate but for which we have no systematic rules."

Strauss: No, "no arts." So this is the point which I had in mind: to repeat the subject matter of the techne, of the art of rhetoric, the things which are not subject to arts. Let us assume the subject is the building of a navy. We need shipbuilders, there is an art of shipbuilding. Rhetoric has nothing to do with the art of shipbuilding. The shipbuilder may have to explain his plans for building ships, but whether he has or has not the art of rhetoric is purely accidental to being a shipbuilder. In the political debate where the art of rhetoric is necessary and essential, there is reference made to what the experts say but the rhetorician as such is not an expert. He is a political man. This should be clear. So Aristotle implies here another distinction beyond that between science and art, namely the things regarding which we do not have arts but regarding which we deliberate. Now deliberation of course occurs also in the arts. We speak of a councilium (?) of physicians, a deliberation of the physicians. But this deliberation is nevertheless only the application of the art to a special complicated case. The main body of medical knowledge is not subject to deliberation. Whereas there is a whole sphere where there cannot be an art, where there can only be deliberation not guided by such canons or rules as the arts are guided by. And this is the sphere of what Aristotle calls action, action as distinguished from production, the arts are productive, and the light guiding action is neither science, nor art, but practical wisdom. This is a clumsy expression. In Greek it's a single word, "phronesis," in Latin, "prudentia." We could say "prudence" if prudence hadn't acquired this low meaning, merely prudential considerations. So either I will use "phronesis" or "practical wisdom."

Now the highest form of practical wisdom is that which is practiced by the statesman. I mean, practical wisdom strictly understood is that of the individual concerned with his well-being. But the statesman is concerned with the well-being of the city and this surely requires more understanding, broader horizons. It's higher. But fundamentally the political art, if you can call it an art, the political understanding we should rather say, political understanding is of the same character as practical wisdom. Is this clear? The subject is very complicated, but the beginning is clear. (writing on the board) So we have first science which is in Aristotle's view as such purely theoretical. Then we have art which is productive. The simplest case is the shoemaker. But rhetoric is an art, the production of speech. Speech is also the product of an art, or may be. If it is not a product of an art, but merely an improvisation by a gift of man then it may be good, may be better, than that be a purely gifted student of the arts. That goes without saying. But other things being equal, it would be inferior to speech made by a properly gifted man who had acquired the art. No theoretical premises as such. Think about the shoemaker, of course he must know something about the leather and other kinds of things. But he doesn't have to be a student of zoology, of the various animals with hides, or the uses of the various trees for the wood in case he wants to make wooden shoes.

Student: But all the arts partake of science in some way. Medicine for example partakes of . . .

Strauss: Yes, that is a question to some extent. I mean, the higher and more respected sciences, I am speaking now from (inaudible), the physician was of course more respected than a shoemaker . . . (inaudible). But still, the fundamental point is whether anatomy for example, the study of the human body, is strictly theoretical. You see (inaudible), we know that. And therefore Plato (inaudible) his own argument that the truly good physician would of course have a theoretical knowledge of the human body. But if you look at the physicians in Homer . . . But as art, as art.

Student: If the action of the state (?) is practical wisdom, then there's no such thing as political science, is there?

Strauss: To begin with, no. Let us see where it comes in. But if you are worried in any way about the (inaudible) organization, never forget that Aristotle developed political science. Well, generally speaking, practical wisdom, I don't want to call it the political art, say the political understanding . . . (writing on the board) so political understanding is the peak of that. But it is nevertheless here possible in this case, in the special case, to teach something about the broadest generalities and that becomes a theoretical science. That's political science. Now how can I explain this space (referring to the board)? Then there is the term "practical sciences," as distinguished from (inaudible).

Student: That's an applied science . . .

Strauss: No, it is not applied science. It is a science of the

polis, of the various regimes. May I postpone the question now? It is very relevant and I will take it up. But let me first continue. Now I would like to return to the subject of rhetoric. I repeat, then, rhetoric is such an art. It is a help to the political art, or the political understanding, since rhetoric is necessary for the deliberation of political multitudes. It is not the political understanding, but it is a help to it. And the deliberation of political multitudes cannot as such be scientific, first because of the character of political multitudes. We have read this passage more than once. They are not able to follow a scientific argument. But also because of the character of things which are essentially objects of deliberation or action and in no way objects of an art. In order to understand this we must make clear another distinction. (writing on the board) Arts are productive. Practical wisdom has to do with action. In Greek the word for "action" is "praxis" from which the word "practical" is derived. But I will now use the word "action." Action and production are clearly distinguished. Take the simple case of the shoemaker, what he does, both do something, the acting man and the shoemaker. But at the end of the action of the shoemaker that toward which all his processes tend is the shoe, something independent, exists outside of the action. There is a work, a product, which is not an action, which is not a human activity but a product of human activity. The action proper is something which has no end beyond itself. The action itself counts (?). Is this intelligible? There are actions for the sake of something outside of the action, a shoe a speech, whatever the case may be. This is art. And when there are actions for their own sake, which have no end beyond themselves, this is what Aristotle means. A decent action exists for its own sake. What the shoemaker does does not exist for its own sake, but for the sake that there be shoes. One can state it also differently. All arts are partial, shoes, speeches, tables, and whatever it may be. Action deals with the whole human good however limited an individual action may be. This whole or complete human good is called by Aristotle "happiness." Happiness is not the concern of any art. Arts produce things which may be conducive to happiness. But they are not directly productive of happiness. Now what does this mean? For example, shoes are of course made to be worn, for use. Now the use of things that is what we ordinarily call "life," the proper use of things most of which are produced by arts. There may be an art of money making. Whether it is genuinely an art or not a question, but let us assume it. And there are rules you can learn and if you are properly motivated, as the phrase goes, you may be quite successful. But of course a sensible man would say that acquisition must be in the service of the use of money. This use of money is life, or at least an integral part of life, that's action, what to do with it. Now the distinction is I think known to all of you from everyday life, although we do no longer use these terms exactly. Now, what to do with your money? Is there an art which tells you that? The decisions which we make, strictly speaking the artisan makes no decision, strictly speaking. I mean he will prefer this leather to that leather but that is not a decision in the sense in which decision is implied in our action. How to spend our vacation is one way (inaudible). There is no art which tells us that. Whom to marry? This is also a grave decision, as we discussed last time

when we observed Aristotle's silence about the good wife but non-silence about the good children. This is also such a decision. All these spheres, it was the common prejudice of mankind until a short while ago, there is no art or science which can guide us. In a subsidiary, yes. For example, someone might say, I will not marry under any circumstances a wife suffering from a great disease. When they will go to a physician you know that can be done. But this doesn't tell him whom to marry. It would tell him at the most whom not to marry which is not sufficient to guide his choice.

This is what we loosely call life and this is what Aristotle means by action. There we decide frequently whether and to what extent to use the arts. For example, should I invest this money in a pair of shoes or in a shirt. That means should I employ the shoemaker or should I employ the shirtmaker. The shoemaker knows how to produce a shoe; the shirtmaker knows how to produce a shirt. And they offer them, literally today, but you make your choice and there is no art of the shirtmaker or shoemaker which can help you there, because you have to then decide which of them to employ. Is this clear? Now the extent to which this is correct . . . The men of practical wisdom, the men who make wise decisions, as it were commands the artisans. I mean he does not interfere in what they do with their workshops, because they know that much better than he. But he says I want your service and not your service. Good. That is clear.

Now the question which arises on the basis of the modern views is, is it not possible to replace practical wisdom by arts. Is it possible to replace something which is essentially not teachable but into which you grow by practice, by something teachable? Would it not be wonderful if there were classes in which people were taught practical wisdom in the way in which they are taught reading, writing, and arithmetic and some other things? Now that this is a real problem even from the older point of view let alone from the view now prevailing you see from the following consideration. I come now back to your question. (writing on the board) Here we have practical wisdom, inside of a reasonable man, by the way (inaudible) you still know . . . (inaudible) the care which you must use in driving a car and such things. (inaudible) everyone understands that . . . Now this reasonable man of course this is the man who takes care of his own happiness. Then this on a higher level is that of the state. And then there is still something higher than the state from Aristotle's point of view. A thought which is easier to understand in this country than in European countries, and that is the legislator. But legislator doesn't mean what it does now. The American equivalent is not the legislators but the founding fathers. The men who laid down the whole order within which the statesmen and legislators act. So every political action takes place within a framework which is ordinarily not created by the acting statesmen. Now the Greeks looked at it somewhat differently than we did. They didn't think in terms of a constitution as a fundamental law but rather in terms of codes, of codes of law which would be changed only with great precautions. And the reason is given by Aristotle. You cannot find many wise men, and therefore . . . You remember the discussion

about rhetoric at the beginning, why as little as possible should be left to (inaudible), i.e., to the men acting now. Therefore if you have the good luck to have a first rate wise man or group of wise men who could after lifelong deliberation lay down a code, that would be preferable to improvisation on the spur of the moment when there was this calamity or that calamity and you just respond to it.

Good. Now we have the legislator at the highest and the art of the legislator may be called the architectonic art, art governing directly or indirectly all the other arts. Because naturally the legislator will . . . Which arts should be (inaudible) or not? Or differently stated, what is the difference between art and (inaudible)? For example, cosmetics -- is this an art or is this not a swindle? Now the legislator will say this, to say nothing of such arts as the production of cigarettes and liquor.

And now we make a further step. The legislator for this city, for that city, for any city, in different times, but there are some questions which come up in every legislation (?). Each individual legislator is bound by the circumstances, within narrow limits. His territory, his neighbors, his enemies -- these and other considerations come in. Poor soil, good soil, plains or mountains, or whatever it may be. So the individual legislator is limited in his choice, by what is feasible here and now. But he must make a compromise between what would be most desirable in itself and what is feasible here and now. But in order to make an intelligent compromise he must first know what is desirable in itself. Then if you are reasonable you will make the concessions, but you will know that these are concessions, they are not things which are desirable in themselves. So there must be a teacher of legislators. That's Aristotle. Not necessarily in every case, it could be somebody else. But Aristotle is the outstanding example. Now the teacher of legislators, his light is not simply practical wisdom, but it is what was traditionally called "practical science." It's in a way a theoretical science and why this is so is a long question but let me leave it at this for the time being only and presume my argument.

So we can then visualize the following thing: that there must be such an overall practical science, the science of legislation, which of course will have to deal with the various regimes because different laws are required for the different regimes, and so on. In brief, such a thing like Aristotle's Politics. Now there is a case possible, a sub-case possible, which is rejected by Aristotle but accepted by Plato (inaudible), namely that we a situation in which the teacher of legislators, and through him the legislators proper (?), will regulate everything so that there is no sphere of decisions for the individual. I took the example of the shirt and the shoe. Shall I invest my dollars in shoes or shirts? But it is possible to dispense of this effort naturally, and there is a beautiful word for that, "rationing." You can buy so many shoes a year, and just as many as you will need, so there is no question whether you will have a choice. You know, communist order, a strict communist order, where there would be no decision whatever -- there is no place for practical wisdom, where the arts

and the master art of the legislator via the subordinate arts of the administrators would make this perfectly superfluous. Is this clear? Now here if you consider that you see (inaudible) you pay a price. In other words it might be possible prior to any detailed consideration to dispense with practical wisdom and to have only arts in their hierarchy. But then you have no freedom, and one would have to consider whether freedom, freedom meaning the right to make one's own reasonable decisions. And since it is impossible to give people the right to make reasonable decisions without giving them by implication the right also to make unreasonable decisions, unfortunately found out, therefore it means the right to make their own decisions.

Now of course there are other things to consider with which you are familiar because these decisions handed down by the administrators are in fact frequently less wise than those made by the untutored individuals. In the first place because the individuals may know better what they need, really they should have for example another pair of shoes rather than a shirt or whatever their particular situation may be. And also it is undeniable that administrators have a much less interest in the individuals concerned than those individuals themselves. However important these considerations may be for practical reasons, and that is exactly what Aristotle suggests in his criticism of Plato's Republic in the Second Book of the Politics, this whole consideration doesn't go to the rule of the matter, for the following reason: The rule of the matter is can practical wisdom not be replaced by a techne, by an art? Could there not be an art of living and everyone be his own artisan of living as distinguished from a man of practical wisdom. The reasoning which I sketched before does not refute the possibility that there can be an art of living, and now not in the sense in which people speak today about an art of living. They mean what Aristotle meant by practical wisdom. When sometimes people say politics is not a science but an art, unless they mean to say which would be terrible that the statesman is something like a poet, I hope they don't mean that, but I think they mean what Aristotle meant, that practical wisdom cannot be reduced to science or art. Now in order to explain that: Life has to do with action, with action as distinct from production. One kind of action, and one very important part of it, is to act justly. We can divide up this sphere of action, for example, acting moderately, say if you don't wolf down your food or take such a tiny little bit which looks awful as if you were a bird, you know you must give a mean between a wolf and a bird when eating as you all know, but more interesting is the question of acting justly. Now acting justly means making just decisions. But what does it mean to make just decisions, are not just decisions always made on the basis of something, on the basis of what Aristotle would call the just things, meaning what is known or supposed to be just. Whether it is just in itself or made just by the law is a distinction which we can disregard. In other words, there are some rules . . . Does he not mean to act justly is to act according to certain rules or canons? But is it then the case of the man who acts justly not fundamentally the one like that of the physician. The physician also has general rules of healing and he knows quite well that these general rules must be modified. This particular case of pneumonia may be atypical

and has never been described in the literature and he must then make up his mind on the basis of what is generally known about pneumonia and kindred diseases. Now, is the case of the just man fundamentally the same and if the virtues have a certain kinship with one each other, if what is true of justice is also true in a way of moderation, courage, and so on, is not practical wisdom then also reducible to a techne comparable to medicine? Never forget that what I loosely call the art of living was metaphorically called throughout (inaudible) medicine of the mind. And a medicine of the mind must obviously have something, must . . . (inaudible). Naturally medicine of the mind was the same as philosophy, but perhaps philosophy is this art of living which is not the same as practical wisdom in the Aristotelian sense.

Now then it would be necessary to discuss, to make one thing clear, even assuming that this makes some sense. That is, is there not a difference between what I call the art of living and all other arts? Let us now consider that.

Student: Well with reference to medicine I thought that the argument took the exception in medicine and equated it to the rule in politics. The exception in medicine would be that if you had something different you wouldn't just follow out what had been done before. But that would be the rule in politics. There are always so many different things, Aristotle on justice in the Ethics considers, and they are changeable. That isn't true so much in medicine.

Strauss: Yes, but then the question would be why are the things much more changeable in politics than in medicine, or for that matter in pedagogy, in education. That would be the question. Now let me start from the most obvious thing. There are arts, most of the arts, deal with non human beings. I mean including the art of shepherding, or shoemaker, and everything dealing in (inaudible), or with human beings subject to the artisan for a limited purpose, say for instruction, children in school subject to the teacher but with a limit, or the soldiers to the general for combat. But then there are also arts dealing with human beings who are not in this way subject to the artisan. Here, in the latter case, the acting and the acted upon are simply of the same kind. Teacher and pupil are not simply of the same kind because a teacher is trained the pupil is not trained, and the shepherd obviously not, the man and the sheep, to say nothing of the shoemaker and his leather. In this art of living, as I call it, the acting and the acted upon are simply of the same kind. Within the individual: within the individual there is something which he has to control. There are resistances to rational action within him. And then, of course, also on the part of other men. This is another kind of resistance. Human resistances are involved in this kind of living, regardless whether they are in the acting individual or in other individuals. So this seems to be then the key point. If there is an art of living it will be an art of acting on beings of the same kind as the actor. Therefore, now I make a jump, the consideration of the noble and the just necessarily enters. I cannot discard obstructing material as we can do in the other arts. Take the case of the teacher in class. Of course he cannot bump

off an undesirable student. But there are ways of getting rid of him. But this kind of situation . . . (inaudible) cannot get rid of that being on whom you act, regardless of whether it's yourself (?) or some other being.

So, considerations of justice and considerations of nobility. Noble and just: this now corresponds to what we now call the morals. But since I speak about a Greek text I must use a Greek distinction which was not meaningless as we shall see on a later occasion. But if it is true that to act nobly and justly is more important than everything else it follows that action is for its own sake, whereas production and so on is for the sake of something else. Now the radical difference between practical wisdom on the one hand and science and art on the other depends on the possibility that the principles of the noble and the just are known independently of science or art. Because if they are dependent on science or art then you have this Platonic problem of the teacher of legislators and so on, and so on, where everything is ultimately subject to the super artisan, or super scientist. Now what does this mean? For example, the principle could be known by the conscience or by nature. By the conscience or by nature would . . . from Aristotle's point of view be the same. But if they are not known by nature how could they be known? Because in a way which we do not understand primarily and which we do not have to understand for any practical purposes they exist in opinion. This is the great difficulty of Aristotle's Ethics. And this question is never decided, what the cognitive status of the principle of action is. But it is clear if the principles of action, if the principles of the noble and the just, are as such existing in opinion then the sphere of action and the sphere of rhetoric will coincide, at least in all interesting respects. Because rhetoric starts from what is generally accepted, and all praxis starts from what is generally accepted. Now this precisely is the assertion of the sophists with which Aristotle deals at the end of the Ethics. In other words, I believe I see now that what Aristotle has in mind, what I didn't see before, what Aristotle says at the end of the Ethics about the sophists is much deeper than I thought. If the principles of action are endoxa, if only opinion, then practical wisdom and even politics would be fundamentally the same as rhetoric. Now Aristotle rejects this. And though Aristotle's argument is very complex, how can one state Aristotle's case against the sophist very simply, why it cannot be true that these things are merely in opinion? Well I will tell you. It is something which you do not say because it is obvious. Aristotle's answer is, the city is by nature and not merely by virtue of human agreement or opinion. Therefore, since the city is by nature, which then needs a long commentary, then the common good is of course also by nature. Because for the city there must be a common good. Now if he takes this thought of the natural character of the city and of the common good seriously, you arrive necessarily at the conception which is the peak of Aristotle's study of human things, of the best regime. Because then there must be by the nature of things, by the nature of the polis, (inaudible) point to something in which the polis can fulfill its function most perfectly. That would be the best regime.

Now this best regime is delineated by political science in the Aristotelian sense, on the basis of knowledge of the end of man. And this end of man could be known by theoretical science, science of nature. Then however the following difficulty arises, and therefore we need rhetoric in a radical way. Let us assume that the best regime is not available. But then we must be satisfied with an imperfect regime, obviously. But what does this mean? We can perhaps say this, for all practical purposes all human life according to Aristotle takes place in imperfect regimes. Now if the perfect regime is that which is based on the nature of man's perfection, on what wisdom dictates, then we have in fact everywhere rule not based on wisdom simply but on something qualifying wisdom. We may call this consent (?). In every society there are principles which are partly what wisdom, understanding the end of man, would dictate and partly what is accepted by the particular community. Now the concrete principles governing a society are this combination. Non universal endoxa, non universal because they differ, endoxa -- I hope the word "endoxa" has now sunk in; "endoxa" means that which is in opinion -- non universal endoxa of one kind or another. And therefore while the sophistic view is wrong -- the sophists were wrong in reducing politics to rhetoric -- one point is true: the principles to which we defer in the last analysis in any political debate are not simply true. They cannot be. But the political scientist in the Aristotelian sense differs from the rhetorician because he does not merely appeal to these principles but opens the whole issue of all possible regimes and their respective (inaudible), which the rhetorician would never do. The rhetorician would always argue on the basis of the established regime without raising the question of its (inaudible). Mr. _____

Student: I was wondering if we could then put the origin of the principles of the noble and just somewhere between both science and art, because it seems to be partially by nature, but not entirely just as the perfect regime doesn't exist, therefore partially by opinion.

Strauss: Altogether what we will discuss next time and thereafter will in fact deal with the question, when Aristotle speaks of virtue in general, virtue in so far as it is relevant for rhetoric, i.e., for ordinary politics, not for the founding politics, you know what I mean by the founding politics, the laying down of the (inaudible), but for ordinary politics.

Lecture V
Aristotle's Rhetoric, April 13, 1964

(in progress) Strauss: Aristotle in the Ethics and the Politics and even Plato, although you didn't mention him I don't believe, and surely Xenophon, and the mass of the Aristotelian sentences in these three chapters was not discussed. I mean, it would have been perfectly for me if you had interpreted only three sentences from the ninth chapter, that I wouldn't mind, but stick then to these three sentences you did not do. Nevertheless, since you have proper training, you made a number of remarks which are helpful. But first I must speak of the things where I do believe you were at all. You say Aristotle in chapter 9 is silent on practical wisdom. I think that is simply wrong. He is as, if not more silent, on practical wisdom than on justice, courage, or moderation which you also mention. He's silent on (inaudible) but not on practical wisdom. Now another point where I believe there is an intelligible misunderstanding. You made a distinction between praise and honor, and this is based, I suppose, on a remark in the First Book of the Nicomachean Ethics. There Aristotle distinguishes the virtues as objects of praise and happiness as an object of honor. And something to this effect occurs also at the end of chapter 9 of the First Book of the Rhetoric. Yes, but "honor" while the literal translation is misleading. Of course we honor people for their virtues, and Aristotle says (inaudible). But in this particular case when he speaks of the fundamental difference between happiness and virtue, what does he mean by that? Now people are praised for their virtues or for their actions and praise is a proper thing. This is their merit. But happiness is more than a man's merit. There is something which man does not owe to himself. The gods are honored and when Aristotle speaks of happiness in this connection he speaks of the fact that the gods are not praised. That was at least according to the Greek people. But "honor": I would translate "timion," the adjective derivative from "honor" in the First Book of the Ethics, by "venerable." There is a kind of almost worship. Virtue does not deserve worship. Happiness in a way does, because it is some eudaimonia, a good daimon, god is with it. This is of no great help for understanding this section of the Rhetoric, but I thought I should mention it to you.

Now you made one point which could seem to be farfetched, or speculative as I called it before, but which is nevertheless truly helpful. And that is your long discussion about the fact that epideictic rhetoric is not (inaudible) the military art.

Student: No, I didn't say that, I hope.

Strauss: That's the way I understood it.

Student: Not properly. It can be used for military art.

Strauss: But this of course is not what Aristotle says. I thought you were building up to another point which is quite true and which would probably not have occurred to me without your speculations,

therefore I am grateful for them. And that is this. In Xenophon's Education of Cyrus which Mr. _____ read, there are quite a few speeches by generals to the troops before battle and you find this in the works of other ancient historians. And this is surely a work of the art of rhetoric and that is what Xenophon surely means. Did Aristotle provide for this kind of rhetoric? Now let us call it with a broader term, not limited to military things, exhortation and dehortation. You know, exhortation to bravery and dehortation from cowardice and this of course would also apply in other situations. Is there a place for exhortation and dehortation in Aristotle's Rhetoric? You attracted my attention to this question, and then I drew the conclusion, no. There is no place. And this is a very interesting point, because it is as important to see what is there as to see what is not there, according to the famous American military saying, hit them where they aint (?). What aint there is as important as what is there. And especially is this justified because this concept of rhetoric, that it is a function of rhetoric to exhort and dehort, is obviously pre-Aristotelian, proof: Xenophon's Education of Cyrus. Now, Mr. _____ you have a point.

Student: You don't mean exhortation and dehortation in general, do you? Don't you mean this in a more limited sense, because wouldn't deliberative rhetoric be exhorting . . .

Strauss: Yes, but not to the noble as noble, but to the expedient, to make war or to make peace, this kind of thing. Exhortation and dehortation -- I think this was the fundamental mistake of Mr. _____, but a useful mistake because it draws to our attention this problem. Because he said praise serves the function of promoting moral virtue. Now one can rightly say, more generally speaking there must be a branch of rhetoric which serves this function of promoting moral virtue. I agree with your contention in general, but I believe that Aristotle does not have this kind of rhetoric. And to that extent you were simply wrong. Epideictic rhetoric does not have the function of promoting moral virtue, indirectly, accidentally, yes, but not essentially. Now we have here some experts on rhetoric, especially Mr. _____. What do you say on this point. How far does Cicero discuss exhortative and dehortative rhetoric?

Student: Well he uses the same three fold distinction as Aristotle does and makes no special provision for it. I am in doubt right now whether there is not some truth in Mr. _____ assertion that perhaps Aristotle would understand such exhortation as a form of deliberative rhetoric. If one of the distinguishing characteristics is speaking before groups, it may be . . .

Strauss: Policy making groups, otherwise it wouldn't be deliberative.

Student: It could conceivably be broader than that to . . .

Strauss: Well I think it would be good if you were to watch that in Cicero.

Student: (inaudible) Gorgias (inaudible) his brother and convincing

people they ought to do (inaudible). And this seems to be what Aristotle assumes about deliberative rhetoric, to persuade people they have to do this . . .

Strauss: But is this strictly speaking deliberative? Does Gorgias deliberate with his brother's patient whether he should undergo the operation or not. Is it not rather an exhortation? Here we have (inaudible) of decision, you must undergo an operation. And then we have the strong disinclination of the patient to undergo the operation. And the rhetorician bridges the gulf between the disinclination and what he should do. It is not deliberative, I would say, at least not necessarily. There may be, there may be, if he says, you know I can't take the risk, you know I have a family, or this kind of thing, then he may go in to this argument. But the main (inaudible) would simply be something like fear, and hence he has to exhort him. It is not necessary to deliberate.

Student: Aristotle refers at the beginning to manuals which existed that other people have written that spoke of the passions. Surely those manuals must have taken the general's speech to his troops as . . .

Strauss: Apparently not. What did he say about the earlier rhetoricians? What was the field of concentration?

Student: Forensic rhetoric.

Strauss: Forensic rhetoric. You know what forensic is. So not this kind of thing. We have of course to raise the question and to answer it, what precisely is epideictic rhetoric according to Aristotle. But I would say off hand, its function is not, its essential function, is not to promote moral virtue. And I believe one reason which I would say off hand is this, that Aristotle does not speak of moral virtue proper in the Rhetoric. That I believe is connected. In other words, what a father would say to his son, pull yourself together, or something of this kind, an exhortation, or, it's disgraceful to do that, and we can elaborate that and make a long speech on this remark -- this is not deliberative rhetoric, nor of course forensic, nor epideictic.

Student: I remember one point in Cicero that in so far as it could be true of Aristotle may be somewhat saving for Mr. ___ thesis. It is the following: Cicero argues that one of the reasons that epideictic rhetoric is important is that the deliberative rhetorician often wants to use it in the course of a deliberation. If he is speaking before an assembly of Roman senators it is very good, as Cicero does say, to begin by exhorting them to their duties as the senatorial class and praising their ancestors and their past actions. In this way one would put the audience in the proper frame of mind for the reception of the point of the speech.

Strauss: Yes but still that would be then a use of epideictic rhetoric at the utmost one could grant within the context of deliberative rhetoric. It would not be epideictic proper. That's not its function.

Student: When Aristotle is speaking of the use of (inaudible).

Strauss: Where is that?

Student: Book Two, chapter 21.

Strauss: Then we will wait until we come to that point but we are now concerned with thematic discussion, the explicit discussion, of epideictic rhetoric. So we must see whether Aristotle has provided for all the kinds of rhetoric of which he knew. Now let us then turn to the text. Let us remember the context. Epideictic rhetoric has to do . . . Where does it begin here? Now epideictic rhetoric is discussed in the center. He discusses first deliberative rhetoric and thereafter forensic rhetoric. The discussion of epideictic rhetoric is much shorter than the discussion of the two other kinds of rhetoric, as you can easily see. It would be good if we had statistical data, I mean if someone would count the lines of the three discussions . . . (inaudible) and then we would be quite precise about it. If you would go back to the chapter in which he discusses three kinds of rhetoric, then you would see that at the end of that chapter, which is I think chapter 3, there he gives them in the order in which he discusses them: deliberative, epideictic, and forensic, at the end of that chapter. But before the order was different. So in other words the statement at the end of chapter 3 is meant to prepare the actual discussion. I shall discuss them in this order which I give now. Before he discussed them in a different order.

Now the first point which strikes us at the beginning of the chapter on rhetoric . . . Let us read the first paragraph.

Student: "We will next speak of virtue and vice, of the noble and the disgraceful, since they constitute the end of one who praises and of one who blames; for when speaking of these we shall incidentally bring to light the means of making us appear of such and such a character which, as we have said, is a second method of proof."

Strauss: You see, that is an accident, incidental to the discussion, incidental because we are concerned above all with the proofs, the proofs proper, enthymemes and examples. But in a secondary way there is also the so-called ethical proof, the proof taken from the character of the speaker. And the speaker must present himself as an honorable man. You know that contributes toward convincing or persuading the audience. And by speaking of virtue, Aristotle says, we will incidentally also bring out what it means to be an honorable speaker. That is incidental.

Student: "For, it is by the same means that we shall be able to inspire confidence in ourselves or others in regard to virtue. But since it happens that men, seriously or not, often praise not only a man or a god but even inanimate things or any ordinary animal, we ought in the same way make ourselves familiar with the propositions (inaudible) for these subjects."

Strauss: I will mention here only one point, we have discussed that before. It was not clear whether rhetoric is truly universal, as universal as logic, as formal logic, or dialectics, or whether

it was limited to specific subject matter, political matters. Now in the case of epideictic rhetoric it becomes quite clear epideictic rhetoric surely is not limited to political matters proper. One can praise god, or even inanimate beings. There is no subject which is as such outside the sphere of epideictic rhetoric and therefore of rhetoric in general. But this applies clearly to epideictic rhetoric. Now the subject is primarily virtue and vice, the noble and the base, and this is to be considered in the immediate sequel. What is noble?

Student: "The noble then is that which being desirable in itself is at the same time worthy of praise, or which being good is pleasant because it is good."

Strauss: Now let us stop here. So the noble consists of two kinds of things: of the praiseworthy things, of certain praiseworthy things, and of certain pleasant things. This is clear. Now this is a very difficult passage. It reminds of the discussion in Plato's Gorgias, 474 d to 475 a, where Socrates defines the noble or the beautiful, that's in Greek the same word "kalon," as a) useful things, that corresponds to what Aristotle calls "good," and b) pleasant things. And the true definition of Socrates is something which is both pleasant and useful, pleasant and useful. For example a chest of drawers may be useful but not beautiful to look at, or something may be beautiful to look at but not useful. From the Platonic-Socratic point of view neither of these two things is beautiful or fine. It must be both. Is this not intelligible. In other words, the merely ornamental is not fine; the merely useful, say a hay fork or a fork used for loading manure on a wagon is eminently useful but it is not beautiful necessarily, and therefore it would not be called beautiful, or fine.

Now this definition of Socrates corresponds to Aristotle's second definition and not to the first. Now let us give an example. What does this definition mean? While being good it must be pleasant, but its pleasantness must be connected with its goodness. In other words the pleasantness must not be merely accidental. For example, exile to a quiet island may be pleasant, but as such it is not intended as a punishment, and therefore it cannot be called fine, beautiful, noble. Now if we go back to the more primary meaning of the word "noble," or "beautiful," or "fine" -- in Greek "kalon" -- is the resplendent good, the glorious good. Something may be good but lack this resplendent character, then one would not call it noble or fine. A dinner cannot be noble, or fine, or beautiful. Socrates when he got an excellent dinner in the wealthiest house in Athens said it's blameless. He would never call it beautiful, or noble, because a dinner cannot be. It lacks this glory. But love, even bodily love, can have this glory. Paying one's debts is a just act, but no one would call it a glorious deed, unless under very special circumstances it was really something unbelievably (inaudible). Undergoing an operation can be good, but it cannot be noble, it cannot be kalon. Now the interesting point is this, that in this chapter Aristotle does not give a single example of something noble which is noble because of its pleasantness. He discusses only things which are

noble in the sense of being choiceworthy for their own sake and at the same being praiseworthy. That is very strange. It is hard therefore to understand what he means. This is a very difficult passage to (inaudible) and I have not read anything about this which has helped me. The best parallel I could think of is the parallel in the Gorgias, the passage to which I referred and which reminds somehow of what is said here but it's not identical. Now how does he go on?

Student: "Is this is the noble, then virtue must of necessity be noble, for being good it is worthy of praise."

Strauss: So it fulfills the first condition. It fulfills the first definition of "kalon."

Student: "Virtue, it would seem, is the faculty of providing and preserving good things, a faculty productive of many and great benefits, in fact of all things in all cases. The components of virtue are: justice, courage, self-control, magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, gentleness, practical and speculative wisdom."

Strauss: Let us say "practical wisdom" and "wisdom." Because these are from two different words: "phronesis" and "sophia."

Student: "The greatest virtues are most necessarily those which are most useful to others, if virtue is the faculty of conferring benefits."

Strauss: Listen to that condition. The crucial qualification, the whole discussion of virtue given here is based on the premise that virtue is essentially benefiting others. This is not the definition of virtue given in the Ethics.

Student: (inaudible) he says something is pleasant because it is good. Is everything that is good pleasant?

Strauss: No. The operation is the simple example. Did you ever go to the dentist and have a tooth removed? That is surely good. But you wouldn't say that is pleasant.

Student: (inaudible) there are many goods that are pleasant that wouldn't be noble simply because they are pleasant and good at the same time?

Strauss: Perhaps it is with a view to this difficulty that Aristotle doesn't give an example of the second (inaudible). I mean one would have to go back to the gloriousness of matter which is essential for the noble. You know there are many things which are pleasant of which one cannot possibly say that they have a kind of glory. For example, if you meant to allude to the enjoyment of love I believe that is implied. . . . (inaudible) Therefore a figure like Aphrodite was popular. And this is perhaps the reason why Aristotle is here silent about it.

Student: Is this difficulty involved in another work somewhere

. . . (inaudible)

Strauss: All the praises of eros. I mean in other words compared to (inaudible) the pleasures of eating and drinking are (inaudible). There are cases in which a drink of water is the most wonderful thing in the world, but this is accidental not essential. Why does love have this degree of status in the poetry of (inaudible)? I mean, do you find dinner poetry or water drinking poetry. Pardon? No, it is possible that someone make a poem at a dinner but I think it would always be a bit of (inaudible), because there is a certain inappropriateness in that. Yes, now let us go on with the other virtues.

Student: "For this reason, justice and courage are the most esteemed, the latter being useful to others in war, the former in peace as well. Next is liberality, for the liberals spend freely and do not dispute the possession of wealth, which is the chief object of other things desired. Justice is a virtue which assigns to each man his due in conformity to the law. Injustice claims what belongs to others in opposition to the law. Courage makes men perform noble acts in the midst of danger according to the dictates of the law and in submission to it. The contrary is cowardice. Self-control is a virtue which disposes men in regard to the pleasures of the body as the law prescribes. The contrary is licentiousness. Liberality does good in many matters. The contrary is avarice. Magnanimity is a virtue productive of great benefit. The contrary is levelmindedness. Magnificence is a virtue which produces greatness in matters of (inaudible). The contraries are littlemindedness and meanness. Practical wisdom is a virtue of reason which enables men to come to a wise decision in regard to good and evil things which, as has been mentioned, is connected with happiness."

Strauss: You see, he defines briefly all the virtues mentioned with the exception of what?

Student: Wisdom

Strauss: Wisdom proper. Aristotle, I don't believe, has forgotten that, but somehow it is not worthy of consideration in this context because in rhetoric, in public speech, there is no occasion, Aristotle seems to imply, to praise theoretical wise men. There is no occasion, that he assumes. Otherwise it wouldn't make sense. One can say he mentions wisdom in order to indicate the limitation of this discourse. So the virtues, while being good, meaning salutary, they are praiseworthy at the same time. They have this splendor attached to them. Good is here the utilitarian side. They help, are salutary, but they have in addition this splendor. They are good because they procure good things and they are beneficent in many and important matters, i.e., especially to other men, and we may add, as a nasty comment, and therefore praised by them. In other words this is not the true moral virtue of which Aristotle speaks in the Ethics. Now the key point is beneficence. Now the utilitarian doctrine, we can say, I mean the best we can say about it, is that they define virtue as beneficence, namely as beneficence to others. And that's not only modern utilitarians

but utilitarians throughout the ages. But classical morality, Socratic morality, is expressed very clearly by Xenophon somewhere in his Greek history, I've forgotten now the passage. When he speaks of a certain tyrant who was very much loved by his subjects, because he had been very beneficent to them, and then Xenophon says many people identify the good man with their benefactor. The good man is not the same as the benefactor. The good man may be a benefactor, but a benefactor is not necessarily a good man. I suppose everyone of you has occasionally received benefits from someone who was not a good man.

Now in three cases, in the case of justice, courage, and moderation, as distinguished from liberality, greatmindedness, magnanimity, and prudence, in the case of these four virtues he does not mention the law. Naturally the law does make prescriptions regarding justice, courage, and moderation, especially laws of marriage. But liberality cannot be prescribed by the law, because then it ceases to be liberality and becomes simply paying your taxes. You know that is the great complaint of the conservatives against confiscatory taxes. If they were Greeks they would say the confiscatory taxes are bad because they destroy the virtue of liberality. It becomes simply justice, then, paying your taxes. And magnanimity cannot be prescribed by law obviously, nor magnificence. Nor can practical wisdom in any strict sense be prescribed by the law, accidentally yes -- drive carefully, or handle dangerous objects with the care of a reasonable man, that is true but it is only accidental. There cannot be a law regarding acts of practical as such. What's your point?

Student: He also doesn't seem to describe practical wisdom in terms of its contrary as he's been doing with the other virtues.

Strauss: Yes, that is true, that is true. Now a few more points. We cannot read the whole . . . a little bit later on.

Student: "But since the signs of the virtues and such things, as are the works and sufferings of the good man, are noble it necessarily follows that all the works and signs of courage and all courageous acts are also noble. The same may be said of just things and just actions, but not of what one suffers justly, for of this alone amongst the virtues that which is justly done is not always noble, and a just punishment is more disgraceful than an unjust punishment."

Strauss: Is this clear? Practically, I am sure you all understand, but it is a paradoxical thing that something justly done should in a certain sphere be worse than unjustly done. This applies of course only when you are at the receiving end, but still it creates a minor difficulty at first glance. Go on.

Student: "The same applies equally to the other virtues. Those things of which the reward is honor are noble, also those which are done for honor rather than money, also those desirable things which a man does not do for his own sake, things which are absolutely good, which a man has done for the sake of the country while neglecting his own interest, things which are naturally

good, and not such as are good for the individual since (inaudible), and those things are noble which it is possible for a man to possess after death rather than during his lifetime, for the latter involves more selfishness, all acts done for the sake of others for they are more disinteresting (?), (inaudible) not for oneself but for others, and for one's benefactors for that is justice, in a word all acts of kindness for they are disinterested."

Strauss: Here there is a somewhat different point of view of why the praised action is praiseworthy. This is a kind of justification of the definition of virtue given before. What is not noble? Let us start from the negative side according to what we have read here.

Student: Punishment.

Strauss: Sure, that is a special case, but generally speaking?

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: What is not noble is what is selfishly done. What is selfishly done is not noble; it lacks this splendor. The individual may enjoy getting it, but it lacks peculiar splendor of the noble. This is the point. Let us go on.

Student: ". . . and the contrary of those things of which we are ashamed."

Strauss: Is this clear? If it is something of which you are ashamed, which you would like to hide away, not to expose to the public gaze, it cannot be something beautiful, noble, fine, obviously.

Student: "for we are ashamed of what is disgraceful in words, acts, or intentions, as for instance when Alcaeus said, 'I would feign say something, but shame holds me back.' Sappho rejoined, 'Hadst thou desired what was good or noble, and had not thy tongue stirred up some evil to utter it, shame would not have filled thine eyes, but thou woudst have spoken of what was right.'"

Strauss: Now what is the imputation of this exchange between the two poets? What is the status of the sense of shame? After all Alcaeus was a decent man. He had the sense of shame. So what does Sappho's reply imply?

Student: That what he had to say was blameworthy, or else he would have said it.

Strauss: In other words, the fact that he had the sense of shame speaks against him. This is of course something which is here only alluded to, but what does Aristotle teach about the sense of shame in the Ethics?

Student: That a good man couldn't feel shame . . .

Strauss: Yes, because he would never have any, do or feel anything

of which he would be ashamed. Here this is only implied. Now the next point.

Student: "Those things also are noble for which men anxiously strive but without fear, for men are thus affected about goods which lead to good repute."

Strauss: Good repute, that is also a sign of what is noble, for which they are concerned . . . why not having fear? Why does he say that?

Student: Because fear is not virtuous.

Strauss: Yes, but here there is no direct reference to virtue. Now where are people concerned while having fear, the simplest case?

(tape unintelligible for approximately three minutes)

Student: "Victory and honor also are noble, for both are desirable even when they are fruitless and are manifestations of superior virtue, and things worthy of remembrance which are the more honorable the longer their memory lasts, those which follow us after death, those which are accompanied by honor, and those which are out of the common, those which are only possessed by a single individual because they are more worthy of remembering, and possessions which bring no profit for they are more gentlemanly."

Strauss: He has spoken of that which brings no profit, however, before. That has to do with the liberality. When you have profited then you have your reward. But things where you have no reward but fame, reputation, they alone can bring a reputation.

Student: "customs that are peculiar to individual people and all the tokens of what is esteemed among them are noble. For instance in Lacedaemon it is noble to wear one's hair long, for it is the mark of the gentleman, the performance of any servile task being difficult for one whose hair is long. And not carrying on any vulgar profession is noble, for a gentleman does not live in dependence of another."

(tape unintelligible for approximately twenty minutes)

Strauss: the beginning of chapter 10. Now this is the beginning of the discussion of forensic rhetoric.

Student: "We have next to speak of the number and quality of the propositions of which those syllogisms are constructed which have for their object accusation and defense. Three things have to be considered: first, the nature and the number of the motives which lead men to act unjustly; secondly, what is the state of mind of those who so act; thirdly, the character and dispositions of those who are exposed to injustice. We will discuss these questions in order after we have first defined acting unjustly."

Strauss: He makes a tripartition here, but before he discusses

any of the three things he discusses what it means to act unjustly. And why does he discuss acting unjustly and not acting justly?

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: Surely, no one will appear before a law court if he has acted justly, very simple. That has no deep reason, but a very obvious practical one.

Student: "Let injustice, then, be defined as voluntarily causing injury contrary to the law. Now the law is particular or general. By particular I mean the written law in accordance with which the state is administered; by general, the unwritten regulations which appear to be universally recognized."

Strauss: It is very dangerous to speak here of natural right, because this is a very cautious and provisional statement: things which being unwritten seem to be accepted by all, or are thought to be accepted by all. He will speak about natural right later, but this is not a statement which is very helpful.

Student: "Men act voluntarily when they know what they do and do not act under compulsion. What is done voluntarily is not always done with premeditation. But what is done with premeditation is always known to the agent, for no one is ignorant of what he does with a purpose. The motives which lead men to do injury and commit wrong actions are depravity and incontinence, for if men have one or more vices it is in that which makes him vicious that he shows himself unjust. For example, the illiberal in regard to money; the licentious in regard to bodily pleasures; the effeminate in regard to what makes for ease; the coward in regard to dangers, for fright makes them desert their comrades in peril; the ambitious in his desire for honor; the irascible owing to anger; one who is eager to conquer in his desire for victory; the rancorous in his desire for vengeance; the foolish man for having mistaken ideas of right and wrong; the shameless for his contempt of the opinion of others; similarly each of the rest of mankind is unjust in regard to his special weakness."

Strauss: One may say that the provisional answer to the question, what is the state of mind of the wrongdoer, but very provisional is there must be wishes incontinent in one way or the other. But this is by no means precise enough. What Aristotle wants to say is that what we have learned about the virtues is of some importance for understanding crime, because virtuous men will by definition never commit a crime and therefore there is a variety of vices which may be applied to crime. But the next discussion comes somewhat closer.

Student: "This will be perfectly clear, partly from what has already been said about the virtues, partly from what will be said about the emotions. It remains to state the motives and character of those who do wrong and of those who suffer from it. First, then, let us decide what those who set about doing wrong long for or avoid; for it is evident that the accuser must examine the number

and nature of the motives which are to be found in his opponent, the defendant which of them are not to be found in him. Now, all human actions are either the result of man's efforts or not."

Strauss: All human actions, not only crimes. Crimes are obviously human actions, and therefore we must know something about human actions if we want to know something about crimes. That's why he speaks first about the cause of human actions.

Student: "Of the latter, some are due to chance, others to necessity. Of those due to necessity, some are to be attributed to compulsion others to nature. So that the things which men do not do of themselves are all the result of chance, nature, or compulsion. As for those which they do of themselves and of which they are the cause, some are the result of habit others of longing, and of the latter some are due to rational others to irrational longings. Now wish is a rational longing for good, for no one wishes for anything unless he thinks it is good. Irrational longings are anger and desire. Thus, all the actions of men must necessarily be referred to seven causes: chance, nature, compulsion, habit, reason, anger, and desire."

Strauss: Now, in order to understand this, let us take crime. What is a crime, an illegal action committed by chance, and which of course if it is proved to have been committed by chance would be no longer punishable?

Student: Manslaughter.

Strauss: No, that I believe would be traced to anger ordinarily.

Student: Say in the case of a traffic accident.

Strauss: That could be. Say someone throws away a cigarette in a situation in which he would have no reason to expect that it would have any consequence, and by some accident a truck passes with highly inflammable material. If wholly unforeseeable, it would be chance. Now what would be nature, an action which on the face of it would be against the law but can be traced to nature, i.e., the man is not responsible?

Student: Stealing out of hunger?

Strauss: Absolutely, that would be the simple example. Compulsion is clear. Someone forces you physically to use the trigger of a gun. This is clear. You're not responsible for that. Habit, a crime committed by virtue of habit where you do not have to refer to any other motive?

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: Or addiction of one kind or another. Reasoning is clear, a calculated crime. And anger: revenge or sudden anger. And desire, because someone is attracted by something which he claims to be overpowered by. These seven causes, Aristotle makes clear in the sequel, are causes strictly speaking, not accidental. For

example, the example which he gives, there are actions which can be attributed to youth. Young people are in some respects more irrational than older ones. But Aristotle says it is not the youth which is the direct and essential cause. It's only an accident that young people are ordinarily more given to that than older ones, and other considerations of this kind. We can disregard them, although this is very interesting otherwise. In order to understand the argument, toward the end of this chapter, 1369 b 20:

Student: "In short, all things that men do of themselves either are or seem good or pleasant. And since men do voluntarily what they do of themselves, and involuntarily what they do not, it follows that all that men do voluntarily will be either that which is or seems good, or that which is or seems pleasant. For I reckon among good things the removal of that which is evil or seems evil or the exchange of a greater evil for a less because these two things are in a way desirable. In like manner I reckon among pleasant things the removal of that which is or appears painful and the exchange of a greater pain for a less. We must make ourselves acquainted with the number and quality of expedient and pleasant things. We have already spoken of the expedient when discussing deliberative rhetoric . . .

Strauss: I.e., the good in the sense of the expedient. That was the subject of deliberative.

Student: "Let us now speak of the pleasant. We must regard our definitions in each case provided they are neither obscure or too precise."

Strauss: Therefore, in other words, when he speaks of the reasons of crime he has also to speak of the expedient. Sometimes people commit crimes for the sake of some assumed benefit, not only for the pleasant (inaudible). But since he has discussed that before, and only for this reason, he will now speak of the pleasant. And thus the pleasant is his next subject. Now in this chapter he does not speak about the virtues at all. Why? Is not according to the Ethics the virtuous man the man who derives pleasure from acting virtuously?

Student: I think the definition of ignoble (?) is connected with his definition of virtue and also with (inaudible) of virtue from considerations of the pleasant. He makes this distinction.

Strauss: I think the point is the same which I mentioned before. Aristotle does not speak here of the moral virtues strictly understood, and therefore he does not claim that these actions, the virtues of which he spoke before and the actions corresponding to them, are pleasant. They are chosen for the sake of the glory, honor, fame following from them, but not because of their intrinsic pleasantness. Now, first the definition:

Student: "Let it be assumed by us that pleasure is a certain movement of the soul, a sudden and perceptible settling down into its natural state, and pain the opposite."

Strauss: So pleasure has clearly to do with nature, coming into our own. There was no mention made of nature in the definition of the good and the noble. Yes?

Student: This seems not only to do with the bodily pleasures, pleasures that come out of pain, it doesn't have to do with the pleasure of smelling a rose, does it?

Strauss: Pardon?

Student: This doesn't only have to do with pleasures that come out of pain. It doesn't have to do with pleasures from smelling a rose does it?

Strauss: Oh yes, he happens to speak of the pleasures of smelling . .

Student: I saw that, but it doesn't fit the definition because whereas thirst . . .

Strauss: Nevertheless, Aristotle would say, according to this definition, that in smelling something pleasant our smelling organ comes into its own. If we smell something unpleasant, it's against our grain. If you use this common phrase, against our grain, you will understand immediately what Aristotle means in this connection by "against nature." If you brush your hair, or a horse's hair, you can do it against the grain or with the grain. To go with the grain is much better, because then the nature helps you. Now there are things which fit our palate, just what the palate ordered, when you get something exquisitely done. I am not speaking now of when we are very hungry when almost anything might do. Then this is in accordance with the nature of the palate. And other things are against it, and therefore we are annoyed when we have to eat it.

Student: So everyday breathing, when we don't smell things pleasant . . .

Strauss: Aristotle does not link up here, does not make here the distinction between the pure pleasures which are not preceded by pain and the impure pleasures, let us say, which are preceded by pain. He does not make the distinction, naturally because he speaks of pleasure in a crude manner as he always does.

Student: This is for a normal person, isn't it?

Strauss: Oh yes, that is always understood. If there may be people who are very abnormal, they may have abnormal pleasures and pain, that is clear. There is another statement. Let us read on a few more lines.

Student: "If such is the nature of pleasure, it is evident that that which produces the disposition we have just mentioned is pleasant and that which destroys it or produces the contrary to settling down is painful. Necessarily therefore, . . .

Strauss: That is only the confirmation of the importance of nature.

There was no reference to nature, I repeat, in the discussion of the good and the noble. Now, he gives then special cases which are of some interest, for example, everything which is violent, . . . The pleasant is that which is not violent. The violent is imposed on us, against our nature. Before the quotation.

Student: "That which is not compulsive is also pleasant, for compulsion is contrary to nature. That is why what is necessary is painful."

Strauss: Necessary and compulsive . . . all right. The next example.

Student: "And it was rightly said, 'Every act of necessity is disagreeable.' Application, study, and intense effort are also painful."

Strauss: Yes, as we all know. And this word which he uses here, spoudai, the efforts, and from this is in Greek the adjective "spoudaios" derived, the serious man used synonymously with the virtuous man. So the implication here is that these things which lead to virtue are not as such pleasant, but virtue has also its pleasant side as will come out later.

Student: "For these involve necessity and compulsion, if they have not become habitual, for then habit makes them pleasant."

Strauss: Yes, they become pleasant not because of the content, but because we are accustomed to do that. Custom is a kind of second nature. Yes?

Student: "Things contrary to these are pleasant, wherefore states of ease, idleness, carelessness, amusement, recreation, and sleep are most pleasant things because none of these is in any way compulsive."

Strauss: Averroes makes here the remark, which I found amusing, to be at leisure and the omission of measuring the actions according to the law is pleasant. In other words, you do as you like and do not obey the law. This has a pleasant element in itself, therefore the pleasant is a cause for (inaudible), obviously. Yes?

Student: "Everything of which we have within us the desire is pleasant, for desire is a longing for the pleasant. Now of desires some are irrational, others rational. I call irrational all those that are not the result of any assumption. Such are all those which are called natural, for instance, those which come into existence through the body, such as the desire for food, thirst, hunger, the desire of such and such food in particular, the desires connected with taste, sexual pleasures, in a word, with touch, smell, hearing, and sight. I call those desires rational which are due to our being convinced, for there are many things which we desire to see or acquire when we have heard them spoken of and are convinced that they are pleasant."

Strauss: This is clear. You see Aristotle does not call the bodily

pleasures the natural pleasures. He says they are called natural. The others too are natural but in their case to see their naturalness some hearing of them and some having become persuaded or convinced of them is necessary. Then he speaks about the pleasures of remembering and anticipation which leads to certain complications because we enjoy remembered pain or suffering. Not simply, this is a bit complicated. But when we think of someone near and dear to us who died in one sense that is a kind of reviving of that human being, but on the other hand when we think of his act of dying that would be plainly unpleasant also in memory. But if you think of what he did when he was alive, this is pleasant. So, this he develops in the sequel, supporting it with a number of quotations. Now we cannot read everything. Let us turn to 1371 a, when he speaks of playful things. Shortly after the beginning.

Student: "And since victory is pleasant, competitive and disputatious amusements must be so too, for victories are often (inaudible). Among these we may include games with knuckle-bones, ball games, dicing, and draughts. It is the same with serious sports, for some become pleasant when one is familiar with them while others are so from the outset such as the chase and every description of outdoor sport, for rivalry implies victory. It follows from this that practice in the law courts and disputation are pleasant to those who are familiar with them and well qualified."

Strauss: (inaudible) when he speaks of these serious sports. To begin with they are followed only by effort or labor as is the gaining of science or knowledge. But it looks different when it has been acquired. When we have acquired a mastery. So I think this is not far-fetched because Plato frequently, Plato, Aristotle usually not, uses the word "play" for non-necessary things, non-necessary in the vulgar sense of the term, and counts philosophy among that, a serious play: serious, obviously; but play also because it lacks the crude necessity that we have to do it to keep alive. Where you left off.

Student: "Honor and good repute are among the most pleasant things, because everyone imagines that he possesses the qualities of a worthy man . . ."

Strauss: Let us stop here. Worthy men are spoudaios, that is the same as the virtuous man. So in a way men do desire virtues. But they are more interested in having the reputation for the same. If they could be virtuous without any too great effort, they would like to be. There is no question of it. To that extent virtue is best.

Student: "and still more when those whom he believes to be trustworthy say that it does. Such are neighbors rather than those who live at a distance, intimate friends and fellow citizens rather than those who are unknown, contemporaries rather than those who come later, the sensible rather than the senseless, the many rather than the few."

Strauss: You see there can be a cleavage. There can be all kinds of contradictions. A man may have a reputation with a few, a re-

putation for goodness with a few, but with men of judgment. You see here there can be a difficulty in speaking. Yes?

Student: "For such persons are more likely to be trustworthy than their opposites. As for those for whom men feel great content, such as children or animals, they pay no heed to their respect or esteem or if they do it is not for the sake of their esteem but for some other reason."

Strauss: Casually they might be concerned. For example the child might tell other people what he did. That is what Aristotle means. In the case of the dog or any other animal, no ready example has occurred to me, but perhaps someone can think of something.

Student: If you're a postman it is well to be well thought of by a dog.

Strauss: Yes, that is true. But there is of course the other reason that if someone makes a trip say to Soviet Russia and is not very well liked there, he ordinarily is not very much concerned with that. But when he comes back to Chicago, or wherever he lives, it's a different story. You see Aristotle spells it all out.

Student: "A friend also is among pleasant things, for it is pleasant to love."

Strauss: Understand that the Greek word for friend is "φίλος" from which there is a verb "φιλεῖν" which we ordinarily translate by "loving." That must be understood. So there are two aspects of a friend, being loved and loving. If there are two friends: a loves b and is loved by b.

Student: "For no one loves wine unless he finds pleasure in it, just as it is pleasant to be loved . . ."

Strauss: To be loved.

Student: "For in this case also a man has an impression that he is really endowed with good qualities, a thing desired by all who perceive it. And to be loved is to be cherished for one's own sake."

Strauss: So if I love someone, Aristotle says, I imply that he is somehow worth loving, i.e., good. Does this make sense? Because we read in our age about so many strange loves that we do not directly recognize it and we would have to up the case. But there is always something implied: that he's someone worth loving. And if someone says, well a mother loves her child although she knows that he is no good. But what is the answer to that? There is something good nevertheless. It's her child, her child. We will come to that later. Yes?

Student: "And to be loved . . ." Sorry. "And it is pleasant to be admired because of the mere honor. Flattery and the flatterer are pleasant . . ."

Strauss: You see, here in this context where pleasure is especially under consideration he doesn't make any difference. The difference between the friend and the flatterer is not so important, both are pleasant. Here Aristotle gives a mere enumeration, and if we want to know the truth about the difference between friend and flatterer we have to study the Ethics.

Student: "the latter being a sham admirer and friend. It is pleasant to do the same things often, for that which is familiar is, as we said, pleasant. Change also is pleasant, since change is in the order of nature; for perpetual (inaudible) would create an excess in the normal condition, whence it was said, 'Change in all things is sweet.' This is why what we only see at intervals, whether men or things, is pleasant; for there is a change of the present, and at the same time it is rare."

Strauss: Now let us stop here. Do you recognize this as true? When someone whom you haven't seen for years turns up, other things being equal, and then you see someone whom you see every day, when are you more pleased? The change, because the other is not surprising to you. Do you see that? Good. But here this emphasis on change is at variance with a remark Aristotle makes in the Ethics which we might just consider. At the end of Book Seven. Would you read that?

Student: "Nothing, however, can continue to give us pleasure always because our nature is not simple but contains a second element, which is what makes us perishable beings. And consequently, whenever one of these two elements is active, its activity runs counter to the nature of the other, while then the two are balanced. While when the two are balanced their action feels neither painful nor pleasant, since if any man had a simple nature the same activity would afford him the greatest pleasure always."

Strauss: So in other words in that case if men have a simple nature identically the same act would always please us and we would not wish any change. Go on.

Student: "Hence God enjoys a single, simple pleasure perpetually; for there is not only an activity of motion but also an activity of immobility, and there is essentially a truer pleasure in rest than in motion. So change in all things is sweet, as the poet says, owing to some badness in us."

Strauss: That is all we need. So that change is pleasant is ultimately due to our defectiveness as mortal beings, a consideration which is not even alluded to here in the Rhetoric because this is not a subject which will come up before a law court. People do not commit crimes with a view to the pleasure. Here one can easily get the impression that sameness, and the pleasure from sameness, is due only to habituation, while change alone is by nature pleasant. But this is not the last word of Aristotle on this subject. Now go on.

Student: "And learning and admiring are as a rule pleasant; for admiring implies the desire to learn. So what causes admiration

is to be desired. And learning implies a return to the normal."

Strauss: To nature.

Student: "It is pleasant to bestow and to receive . . .

Strauss: That is important. By learning we come into our own. Since we are rational creatures by learning we perfect our reason, we come into our own. Well without going into this question I think you would all admit this, that if you have understood something, if it has become clear (inaudible), this is very pleasant, very pleasant. Now Aristotle interprets this, here we are coming into our own. Next?

Student: "It is pleasant to bestow and to receive benefits. The latter is the attainment of what we desire."

Strauss: I think that needs hardly any proof, that people enjoy being at the receiving end of benefits generally speaking.

Student: "the former, the possession of more than sufficient means, both of them things that men desire. Since it is pleasant to do good, it must also be pleasant for men to set their neighbors on their feet and to supply their deficiencies. And since learning and admiring are pleasant . . .

Strauss: Now let us stop here for a moment. So well-doing, doing well is pleasant not because by being that we come into our own, he does not say that, not because of a natural sociability, but because it is a sign of one's possessing some good and of one's superiority. That sounds rather Hobbian, doesn't it? In Cope's (?) commentary to the passage I read: "Aristotle neither here nor elsewhere takes any account of the benevolent affections as elements of human nature." This goes perhaps too far, but there is some element of truth in it. I would say as follows: Philanthropy, loving human beings as such, is not a virtue in Aristotle. The Stoics speak of that, but Aristotle does not. So this we must keep in mind. But we will later on come to a passage which calls for a qualification of this statement. Yes?

Student: "all things connected with them must also be pleasant, for instance, a work of imitation such as painting, sculptor, poetry and all that is well imitated, even if the object of imitation is not pleasant, for it is not this that causes pleasure or the reverse but the inference that the imitation and the object imitated are identical, so that the result is that we learn something."

Strauss: This seems to be very narrow and low. But is there not something to it because Aristotle really thinks of all kinds of (inaudible). Have you ever been sitting with something else and looking at a collection of photographs, and looking at all kinds of people, nice or unnice people, but the experience itself is pleasant. I think Aristotle means nothing higher than that. And of course this is pleasure from imitation on the lowest level surely, but this is not completely irrelevant for understanding the pleasure from imitation on the higher levels.

Student: How about a novel about life in the slums? It can be great pleasure to read, but it's a great bore to live.

Strauss: Oh sure, but one doesn't even have to go so high. The very simple thing, especially if it takes you a minute to recognize, oh that's him, then you learn in a way something. Yes?

Student: "The same may be said of sudden changes and narrow escapes from danger, for all these things excite wonder. And since that which is in accordance with nature is pleasant and things which are akin are akin in accordance with nature, all things akin and like are for the most part pleasant to each other, as man to man, horse to horse, youth to youth. This is the origin of the proverbs: 'The old have charms for the old, the young for the young,' 'Like to like,' 'Beast knows beast,' 'Birds of a feather flock together,' and all similar sayings."

Strauss: You see here Aristotle says, man is pleasant to man. So there is something here recognized by Aristotle. There is a bond uniting all men. Why does he not put a greater stress on that than he does here? Why doesn't he take any account of the benevolent affections of human nature? Why doesn't he do that?

Student: Because men are very different. A man likes another man similar to him more than he likes (inaudible).

Strauss: In other words, the variety within the human race is so terrific that this common thing, that man likes man, is more than balanced by the other. Surely. And also, of course, there are other things. There are so many divisive things which set man against man that this is balanced, but it is there. Aristotle does not deny that.

Student: If doing kindnesses is done because of the pleasure one gets from superiority, if it's selfish, why is it noble?

Strauss: From another point of view, because if a man forgets himself, his own interests, that's noble. I spoke of this before. Someone is a benefactor, and this can be looked upon from two points of view: He neglects his own interests in favor of the others. And when you look at this you say, that is a noble character, not calculating, not petty. And if you look from the point of view that he gets some benefit out of it for, what they now call, his ego -- have you ever heard of that -- then it doesn't look so nice. It looks also in a subtle way petty. And it is in a given case impossible to decide for (inaudible) what is the case. The solution which Aristotle proposes is to deny that beneficence as beneficence is virtue. It is an ambiguous phenomenon. The character of virtue consists in something else. Now we come to another point which has very much to do with the question you raised.

Student: "And since things which are akin and like are always pleasant to one another, that every man in the highest degree feels this in regard to himself, it must needs be that all men are more or less selfish . . .

Strauss: Literally "self-loving." But the word did have in Greek that meaning, so that one may translate it by "selfish." Only Aristotle in a passage in the Ethics says that it is wrong that we condemn self-loving men altogether.

Student: "For it is in himself above all that such conditions are to be found. Since, then, all men are self-loving, it follows that all find pleasure in what is their own such as their works and words. That is why men as a rule are found of those who flatter and love them, of honor, and of children, for the last are their own work. It is also pleasant to supply what is wanting, for then it becomes our work."

Strauss: Do you see that? The other one has done the thing, but then the next one makes corrections, completes it. But through this completion it becomes really what was intended. And that not only happens (inaudible) of the whole, He also sets up his little completing thing against the thing which the other man has done and shows in this way his superiority.

Student: "And since it is most pleasant to command, it is also pleasant to be regarded as wise; for practical wisdom is commanding and wisdom consists in the knowledge of many things that excite (inaudible)."

Strauss: You see, that is the other reference to wisdom, in contradiction to practical wisdom. And what Aristotle indicates here is this. Ruling is most pleasant. Now in order to be a ruler you must have practical wisdom. But from the ordinary point of view, the only wisdom known in the marketplace is practical wisdom. And therefore the man who seems to be a man of practical wisdom is regarded as wise. And to be regarded as wise is pleasant. Wisdom itself, here distinguished by Aristotle from practical wisdom, is here popularly defined. The knowledge of many marvellous things -- things of which no one ever has heard and (inaudible), say certain manuscripts in an Italian convent or the behavior of some small animals which no one has ever seen because you might need a very special microscope which is usually not available. That's wisdom: crude knowledge. It's of course not the Aristotelian notion of wisdom, but it is important that we know that, what wisdom ordinarily means. Yes?

Student: "Further, since men are generally ambitious, it follows that it is also agreeable to find fault with our neighbors. And if a man thinks he excels in anything he likes to devote his time to it, as Euripides says: 'And allowing the best part of each day to that in which he happens to surpass himself, he presses eagerly towards it.' Similarly, since amusement . . .

Strauss: The last example shows why not all men desire to blame their neighbors and why not all men desire to rule, because there can also be a form of ambition not to do something where we necessarily become ridiculous. Stick to your own thing, the field where you are competent. We can read the end.

Student: "Similarly, since amusement, every kind of relaxation,

and laughter are pleasant, ridiculous things, men, words, or deeds, must also be pleasant. The ridiculous has been discussed separately in the Poetics."

Strauss: Unfortunately, that has not been preserved. It would be very interesting to see what Aristotle has to say about the ridiculous.

Student: "Let this suffice for things that are pleasant; those that are painful will be obvious from the contraries of these."

Strauss: So, now we know what? Now we know the reasons why people commit unjust acts: for the sake of the pleasant and the profitable, and we have been given an analysis of the profitable in chapter 6, if I remember right, and of the pleasant here in chapter 11. And now we come to the more detailed discussion.

Lecture VI
Aristotle's Rhetoric, April 15, 1964

Strauss: You tried very reasonably to look for an order in the Aristotelian enumerations, and this is very good although, as you say, you did not very well succeed. But one should do this by all means. One thing I have not understood. Why did you link up the equitable man with the magnanimous man?

Student: Well, in the discussion of equity Aristotle talks of the man who acts equitably and shows what sort of attitude he'd take towards various kinds of offenses against him. And it seems to be natural to ask whether the equitable man is the same as the just man. And it seemed to me that you would have to then go on and say that that's not adequate, so that . . .

Strauss: But the just man, as Aristotle describes him in the Ethics is one who is willing to forgo quite a few things to which he is entitled. Does this go beyond what he says here?

Student: Perhaps not. The notion that the equitable man can forget harm done . . .

Strauss: Yes, but when you read the chapter on magnanimity in the Ethics, you see that this is not quite true. There are certain things the magnanimous man does not forget. The magnanimous man is the man who is concerned with high honor (inaudible). And the point of view of equity is entirely different. The equitable man is a man who is concerned more with the intention of the legislator than with the letter of the law, a different consideration. But we may take it up later. And then there was another point which struck me: what you said about tyrannicide being a conflict between the just and the noble, and you gave also another example which I have now forgot. But does Aristotle speak about a conflict between the just and the noble? No. But why do you see a conflict there?

Student: Because it could be argued that the same act is noble, as tyrannicide may be noble, but at the same time be against the law, therefore unjust.

Strauss: But if you take the Aristotelian definition of tyranny, that it is a lawless regime, then tyrannicide would not be against the law.

Student: The other one was the man who revenges his mother and father. Common opinion might hold that this is a noble act, though this is like to be a low understanding of noble, and this would be against the law.

Strauss: Well, I believe the question of tyranny and tyrannicide is somehow present there, but let us see when we come to it. Good. And now let us then turn to chapter 12 and begin at the beginning.

Student: "Such are the motives of injustice. Let us now state the

frame of mind of those who commit it and who are the sufferers from it."

Strauss: So, let us see what the subject is. What are the things for the sake of which people commit crimes, what he has discussed before? What are these things?

Student: Pleasure and profit.

Strauss: Pleasure and profit. So we know that. And now he speaks of the state of mind of the wrongdoers and of the victims. Good. Now first the state of mind of the wrongdoers:

Student: Men do wrong when they think that it can be done and when it can be done by them, when they think that their action will either be undiscovered or if discovered will remain unpunished, or if it is punished that the punishment will be less than the profit to themselves or to those for whom they care."

Strauss: Is this intelligible. This is I believe well known to everyone from daily practice. Detective stories (inaudible): motive and opportunity. Motives were discussed before, but Aristotle is somewhat more subtle in dividing up the opportunity. It must be possible and in addition they must be reasonably certain of not being discovered. This is another consideration. The opportunity means the opportunity of doing it secretly, otherwise there is no opportunity. Everyone has the opportunity to kill anyone in this class, but this is not what we mean when we speak of that. This by the way is the principle of the order here. And the other point is also clear. I mean, we have heard of people who commit acts of robbery and embezzlement, and while they are by no means sure that they will not be discovered, they can nevertheless bury their booty and this will be at their disposal after they come out from jail again. So that the reward will be higher than the punishment. This is a very simple case. Now go on.

Student: "As for the kind of things which seem possible or impossible we will discuss them later, for these topics are common to all kinds of rhetoric."

Strauss: Meaning what what is possible or impossible in general, for human beings in general. That does not mean of course that it is possible for them, for this particular man's circumstances. About that he speaks now.

Student: "Now, men who commit wrong think they are most likely to be able to do so with impunity if they are eloquent, businesslike, experienced in judicial trials, if they have many friends, and if they are wealthy. They think there is the greatest chance of their being able to do so if they themselves belong to the above classes, if not if they have friends, servants, or accomplices who do; for thanks to these qualities they are able to commit wrong and to escape discovery and punishment."

Strauss: And to escape punishment. There are three considerations: they are capable of doing it, capable of hiding it, and capable of

avoiding punishment.

Student: "Similarly, if they are friends of those who are being wronged, or of the judges, for friends are not on their guard against being wronged and besides they prefer reconciliation to taking procedures, and judges favor those whom they are found of and either let them off altogether or inflict a small penalty."

Strauss: I trust that there is no difficulty whatever in understanding this on the basis of ordinary reading of newspapers.

Student: Mr. Strauss, this discussion is limited solely to acts of calculation, whereas in chapter 10 he discussed seven causes of action. Reason, deliberate calculation, was only one of the seven . . .

Student: To some extent you are right. He speaks of wrongdoing. Now wrongdoing strictly speaking is of course intentional wrongdoing. But someone may be accused of a crime which is not a crime, but this is not strictly speaking wrongdoing. Now he takes it literal. And now he comes to the second place. (inaudible) of those who are capable of committing a crime. But since the expectation of remaining undiscovered is important, he must speak of the things which enable a man to expect that he will remain undiscovered when he commits a crime. That comes now.

Student: "Those are likely to remain undetected whose qualities are out of keeping with the charges, for instance, if a man wanting in physical strength were accused of assault and battery, or a poor and an ugly man of adultery."

Strauss: No comment needed.

Student: Also, if the acts are done quite openly and in the sight of all, for they are not guarded against because no one would think them possible; also, if they are so great and of such a nature that no one would even be likely to attempt them, for these also are not guarded against, for all guard against ordinary ailments and wrongs but no one takes precautions against those ailments from which no one has ever yet suffered; and those who have either no enemy at all or many, the former hope to escape notice because they are not watched, the latter do escape because they would not be thought likely to attack those who are on their guard and because they can defend themselves by the plea that they would never have attempted it; and those who have ways or places of concealment for stolen property or abundant opportunities of disposing of it."

Strauss: Is there anything missing, or does he cover all the cases? I didn't find anything missing, but I have no great experience in this region.

Student: I thought the predicate of all these people was that they were likely to remain undetected?

Strauss: Yes. Later on . . .

Student: How would one find in broad daylight a means of concealment?

Strauss: Well, this is a very interesting case. There would be witnesses. I mean, if you would shoot anyone in class, or commit assault and battery you would not remain undetected. It's impractical to do it, and you would surely be condemned unless you can bring a psychiatrist he can prove that you were under an unbearable stress because of the subject we are discussing and therefore committed a crime. That can be done. Or you are able to bribe the judges of course, the third possibility. Or say someone says, I will take care of you for the rest of your days. You won't need a job. Say he will give you a trust fund of \$100,000 if you commit an act of assault and battery here against someone, maybe against your teacher. You are capable of doing it; you have the opportunity; you cannot remain undetected but the reward is greater than the punishment. So then you have the motive for doing it.

Student: Yes, that will explain motive, but I thought this paragraph was entirely concerned with the likelihood of remaining undetected?

Strauss: Up to this point.

Student: And the second item given was . . . The first sentence was reasonable, but the second one says "also." Is it true also likely to remain undetected if the acts are done quite openly and in sight of all, for they are not guarded against?

Strauss: No, I think what he means is this. This is a good argument before a court. He cannot have committed it, because only a fool would do it. I believe he means that.

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: Or simply taking it out as if it were your bicycle. Yes, that could be. But I believe it is also the other point, that this is a good argument before a court. If you say, who would do that.

Student: Did you ask whether it wasn't possible that (inaudible)?

Strauss: Yes.

Student: Yes, I think there is one thing missing, crime done in a mob.

Strauss: Now let me see whether this is not covered here. Here he says, the last point, what is the possibility of concealment either by the manner in which they act or by the places, the places. That's a good place to commit (inaudible). He speaks of places. Places do not merely mean places where you can hide your booty, but it means also the place where you commit the crime.

Student: Well, the sentence says only the places where you conceal the stolen property.

Strauss: No, no. That is another . . . Let me see. No, no. That is not that. Where concealment is possible: concealment of the act. And I believe the last point, where the disposal is easy, that refers to fences and this kind of thing.

Student: Would you read the sentence, because our translation is very clear.

Strauss: "and for all those men who have at their disposal concealment either by their manners, circumstances, or by the places." Namely, where they commit the crime. Now the next point which he makes is where there is no secrecy possible, but no punishment to speak of. Let us read only the beginning of that, where we left off.

Student: "and those who, even if they do not remain undetected can get the trial set aside or put off, or corrupt the judges.. .

Strauss: Obviously, that is clear. They get scot-free nevertheless as though they had never been found out. In every newspaper, every day, you will find examples of this.

Student: "and those who if a fine be imposed can get payment in full set aside, or put off for a long time, or those who owing to poverty have nothing to lose; and the cases where the profit is certain, or large, or immediate while the punishment is small, uncertain, or remote; and where there can be no punishment equal to the advantage, as seems to be the case in a tyranny."

Strauss: Is it clear, the last example? The greatest crime you can commit is to become the tyrant. That is the only crime which is by definition unpunishable; so therefore someone who succeeds in that can very well . . . is uncovered by the act of the crime, and at the same time escapes the possibility of punishment. So it's at the peak, you know. Yes?

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: Yes, now there is a certain difficulty, I forgot now the details, these summaries printed in his works are not all by him. This was found out somewhere, I don't have the references here, but some Englishman found that out. One is by him, but I couldn't tell you which now. You would have to go into it. If you give me a ring at home where I have my copy I can give you the reference, if you're interested in this. Good. Now we do not have to read everything. There is one case which is especially interesting. He goes on then and speaks without any clear order, at least any order which I could detect, of other people who are apt to commit crimes. Then he says, for those for which the pleasure is immediate, in line 11, or the gain immediate and the punishment afterwards; for the intemperate are such people. In other words the temptation is too great at the moment and therefore they have not the capacity to resist this. Go on, read a few more lines.

Student: "And when, on the contrary, the pain or the loss is immediate, while the pleasure and the profit are later and more lasting; for temperate and wiser man pursue subjects and . . .

Strauss: What does this mean? The temperate and wiser, or practically wiser, he does not say the practically wise, the practically wise would of course not commit crimes, but wiser than these intemperate people who cannot control themselves. Is this intelligible? For example, this is an example which I read somewhere: committing a crime in order to go to jail as an ordinary criminal in order to escape execution for a political trap. Even a practically wise man could do that. I read it somewhere in one of these magnificent stories. It might have happened. Now let us then turn to the next section, b 23, where he speaks of those kind of people who are likely to suffer in that case. Now this is, the rest of the chapter is devoted to this subject. Let us read only a few specimens in 1373 a 27.

Student: "Men are ready to commit wrongs which all or many are in the habit of committing, for they hope to be pardoned for their offenses."

Strauss: Prohibition would be an example of this.

Student: "They steal objects that are easy to conceal, such as they that are quickly consumed like eatables; things which can easily be changed in form, or color, or composition; things for which there are many convenient hiding places, such as those that are easy to carry or stow away in a corner; those of which . . .

Strauss: You see how Aristotle, how informed he was about this art of stealing. He had taken the trouble. But it is possible that some of the Sophists (inaudible).

Student: "those of which a thief already possesses a considerable number exactly similar or hard to distinguish."

Strauss: That's important, you see. If you have chickens already, say 517, if you steal fifty more it would be practically undetectable, unless the owner has branded them. So its very important activity, or I hope rather for our detecting such people if we ever have the duty to do so.

Student: "or they commit wrongs which the victims are ashamed to disclose, such as outrages upon the women of their family, upon themselves, or upon their children."

Strauss: (inaudible) in old Greek has a sexual connotation.

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: Well, it is somewhat indelicate but have you ever heard that there (inaudible) homosexuality? This would be possible. Again, we would have to assume that the victim would not be an old and ugly man. Because that would be again utterly incredible.

Student: "or they commit wrongs . . . [Sorry] And all those wrongs in regard to which appeal to the law would create the appearance of litigiousness, such are wrongs which are unimportant or venial. These are nearly all the dispositions which induce men to commit wrong: the nature and motives of the wrongs and the kinds of per-

sons who are the victims of wrongs."

Strauss: So these two subjects are now, the discussion of this is now finished. We come now in the next chapter to a subject of much greater importance. But Mr. _____ did you have any observation in your paper which we have not considered now, on this chapter?

Student: I'd just like to ask about in the first section where, at 1372 5, where the unjust act can be our (inaudible). Doesn't it seem that the unjust act can be noble, honorable?

Strauss: Chapter 12?

Student: 1372 b 6, just before mentioning Zeno.

Strauss: Read this now.

Student: "And when the unjust acts are the real gain, and the only punishment is disgrace, and when . . .

Strauss: (inaudible)

Student: "on the contrary, the unjust acts tend to our credit, for instance, if one avenges father or mother, as was the case with Zeno, while the punishment only involves loss of money, exile, or something like that."

Strauss: Are there not people who are more prompted by praise or avoidance of (inaudible) than by money? You know some people are prompted by crime because the punishment is only disgrace. And what they get for their crime is monetary benefits. In other words, people who wish to avoid both monetary loss and disgrace would not commit crime. But those who are concerned with only one of the two might commit crimes but of different kinds, of very different kinds. There would be people who are perfectly willing for the sake of what they regard as their honor to undergo all kinds of other punishments, say financial loss.

Student: So it's implied that there is something defective about this kind of honor?

Strauss: Yes sure, sure. Well, the ultimate question remains, which is here not even touched upon and alluded to in the next chapter, what about unjust laws, and transgressing unjust laws. Is this an unjust act? That would be the question. But for all ordinary purposes the question doesn't have to be raised, because the question before a law court is never whether the law is just but whether the individual has complied with the law or transgressed it. This belongs to some court of appeals which may not exist in any society. Is this clear? But Aristotle is aware of the question as he shows in the next chapter where he takes up the question of the justice of the laws.

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: What is a frame of mind? How would you describe it?

All right. What is a virtue or vice? I mean the crudest thing one has to say about it. Well let us say it is a disposition of the mind. So both virtue and vice are dispositions of the mind, only the one good and the other bad. And then there some that are in a certain twilight zone. There is no difficulty. That Aristotle does not take virtue in a very strict sense in the Rhetoric we have seen already. That is perfectly legitimate because he deals with rhetoric and not with the highest things.

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: You know, there is this point that he discusses in the Ethics that a man who does wrong, commits a crime, is not necessarily a vicious man. And the man who does not commit legal crime is not necessarily a virtuous man.

Student: At the end of chapter 12 where he talks about the wrongs which (inaudible) disposed, now doesn't that go contrary to what Machiavelli advises the Prince, namely that the Prince should never (inaudible) the women of his subjects? And if it does, then what is the meaning (inaudible).

Strauss: Let us take the classic cases: Virginia and Lucretia. In this case the man, they are not ashamed to admit that the women were ravished, why? Because they were ravished by a tyrant who misused his superabundant power. That is not a disgrace for anyone. But if it is done by another private man, that's a different situation. I mean, you must only think of the circumstances. It's a very different story. I know quite a few cases of women who met this kind of disgrace, you know, during the war, and this is something which is terrible but which is not as much a matter of disgrace as it would be if it happened by another fellow citizen under ordinary circumstances in peacetime. That's a different story.

Student: Did I understand you to say that (inaudible)?

Strauss: No. There is a distinction. A disposition is much less ingrained as such than a habit is. But for these purposes the Greek word for "disposition" is sometimes used synonymously by Aristotle with "hexis." But when he speaks strictly he distinguishes them.

Student: Does he use the word "hexis" here?

Strauss: No. Not that I know of. But DIATHESIS (?) he uses, or the verbal form of that, which we translate by disposition. And by the way, it's a quite good, almost literal, translation. Good. Now let us turn to this very important discussion at the beginning of chapter 13.

Student: "Let us now classify just and unjust actions generally, starting from what follows. Justice and injustice have been defined in reference to law and persons in two ways. Now there are two kinds of laws, particular and general. By particular laws I mean those established by each people in reference to themselves which

again are divided into written and unwritten. By general laws I mean those based upon nature."

Strauss: But let us see, a bit more literally. He speaks of law in the singular. "I call law, the one particular, the other common, particular one which each group has defined in regard to themselves and this itself divided into unwritten and written. And the common one is that according to nature." Go on.

Student: "In fact, there is a general idea of just and unjust in accordance with nature as all men in a manner divine, even if there is neither communication nor agreement between them."

Strauss: Why is this important? Even if there is no community or agreement among them?

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: Well, Aristotle . . . No, I think this is not very helpful, because it's much more straightforward and simple. If they have no connection among one another, they cannot possibly have agreed as to that particular thing. Therefore, it cannot have its origin in human agreement. It cannot be due to convention. That is what Aristotle means. So something which people have who have no community or connection whatever, and therefore it must be due to nature.

Student: "This is what Antigone (inaudible) evidently means when she declares that it is just, though forbidden, to bury Polyneices, as being naturally just, 'For neither today, nor yesterday, but from all eternity these statutes lived; and no man knowest whence they came.' And as Empedocles said in regard to not killing that which has life, for this is not right for some and wrong for others 'But a universal precept which extends without a break throughout the wide ruling sky and the boundless hearth.' Alcidamas also speaks of this precept in his Messeniacus, 'God has left all men free; Nature has made none a slave.'

Strauss: Now this is a discussion of natural right, or natural law, in the Rhetoric. It will be taken up also to some extent at the beginning of chapter 15 where Antigone is again quoted, but this will be taken up next time. Now what does this mean? There is something by nature just, i.e., something just not by human agreement, not positive law but natural. Aristotle calls it here "law," not merely "just," "the just." He gives three examples. Now let us begin from the third. What is it? What is the assertion of Alcidamas regarding natural law?

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: Or, differently stated, slavery is always against natural right. Is this Aristotle's view? What about the next example from the Antigone? That it is just to bury the brother, even against the prohibition of the positive law. We don't know what Aristotle thinks about that.

Student: We know that Aristotle says . . . (inaudible) the good man should go against the positive law.

Strauss: Sure, but the question is . . . Let us see here what the examples are. And the first is what? I'm sorry, what about Empedocles example? What does Aristotle think about the killing of animals?

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: Sure. So at least two of the examples are not good examples of natural law from Aristotle's point of view. That's very strange. And the case of Antigone we must leave open because it is nowhere discussed, and I suppose from Aristotle's point of view the duty to bury is surely ordinarily a duty but not something overriding. Think of the end of the Phaedo where Socrates talks about burying. That is of no interest to Socrates, what happens to his corpse. In other words, whether it could not be lawfully declared that a traitor may not be buried, there is no statement of Aristotle denying that. Two of the three examples certainly run counter to Aristotle's view of what is right. That's very strange. One cannot establish from this more than that Aristotle somehow admitted natural right, but he doesn't give us any inkling of any provisions of the natural law. One could of course say this, that while the last two examples contradict Aristotle's view, by the very fact that they contradict it, they confirm the assertion that there is natural right, namely that there is a natural right to enslave people who are by nature slaves, that there is a natural right to eat animals. This right is not a positive right, a right established by human legislation. Man is so much superior to the beast that he, that there is no question of his justly eating animals fit for human consumption. So, in other words, this cuts both ways. Averroes (inaudible) by a misunderstanding in this case, unless the Latin translation mistranslates him, says that the prohibition against eating animals is a positive law. He didn't mean in Islam, or in Greece, but among vegetarian nations. So under no circumstances would it be a natural prohibition.

Student: (inaudible) He says that there is natural right, although men do not always agree on exactly what it is.

Strauss: Where does he say that? He only says all men divine that there is such a thing, something just, by nature common to all men, even if there is no community among them so that agreement might, divining it might derive from their culture, as someone said. It comes from human nature. Now in order to clarify this point, one would have to turn to Aristotle's discussion of this subject, which is of course not here. It is in the Fifth Book of the Ethics, in 1134 b 18 to 1135 a 5. I brought my translation with me, because that is really a very important subject. I have studied it n(?) times; I have read it again. In the Fifth Book, 1134 b 18ff;

Student: "Political justice is of two kinds, one natural the other conventional."

Strauss: Now "political justice" means here the right which obtains

among fellow citizens, as distinguished from members of the family, or people who are not fellow citizens. But this doesn't mean that there is no natural right among people who are not fellow citizens. It means only that there are, there is natural right in the fullest sense only among fellow citizens. There is much more of rights and duties among fellow citizens than among fellow citizens. Good.

Student: "A rule of justice is natural that has the same validity everywhere."

Strauss: Well, Aristotle doesn't speak of "rule." He says natural is that right which has everywhere the same power.

Student: "and does not depend on our accepting it or not. Conventional is that right that in the first instance may be settled in one way or the other indifferently, though having once been settled it is not indifferent."

Strauss: The simplest example is of course right or left driving. It does not make itself any difference, but once it is settled you have to drive right or left whatever the law says. Aristotle gives a somewhat different example.

Student: "For example, that the ransom for a prisoner shall be a mina, that the sacrifice shall consist of a goat and not of two sheep, and any regulations enacted for particular cases, for instance the sacrifice in honor of Brasidas, and ordinances in the nature of special decrees."

Strauss: So the latter things are all merely positive. That is clear.

Student: "Some people think that all rules of justice . . .

Strauss: "All just things"

Student: "all just things are merely conventional, because whereas a law of nature is immutable . . .

Strauss: There is no "law of nature." "Whereas that by nature," meaning the right by nature.

Student: "is immutable and has the same validity everywhere as fire burns both here and in Persia, rules of justice are seen to vary. That rules of justice vary is not absolutely true, but only with qualifications. Among the gods, indeed, it is perhaps not true at all . . .

Strauss: In other words, "perhaps" meaning if there is anything which could be called right among the gods, which Aristotle denies elsewhere, then there it would be unchangeable.

Student: "Although there is such a thing as natural right, all just things are variable, but nevertheless there is such a thing as natural right as well as justice not ordained by nature and it is easy to see which rules of justice, though not absolute, are natural

and which are not natural but legal and conventional, both sorts alike being variable."

Strauss: Is it easy to see? Give a single example. Aristotle gave some example. For example, let us take the case, to sacrifice a goat but not two sheep, that's positive. But what is a natural example?

Student: To sacrifice.

Strauss: To sacrifice. And to ransom for one mina -- positive. What is natural?

Student: To ransom.

Strauss: Perhaps, even more generally, to help fellow citizens who have suffered hardships by public service.

Student: I think, for those examples that the one other reason you could make an argument that Aristotle really does not give a natural right teaching in the rhetoric . . . The examples in the Ethics suggest that natural right is political, i.e., that it is something that the polis, the community, does by nature, whereas the examples in the Rhetoric seem to be objections, good rhetorical arguments . . .

Strauss: If this was the case, then they would be of no relevance regarding Aristotle's own teaching. They would be only things that are popularly assumed, to which the forensic orator will therefore appeal, but the Ethics is surely not a rhetorical book. Let us first see what we get out of the Ethics.

Student: I have a question which has been bothering me a little bit, and its sort of general but its specific in this case. That is this: If these are not true examples of Aristotle (inaudible) natural right, then he seems to be going against something which I've read elsewhere, I don't remember where, which is that a teacher shouldn't teach anything that is false.

Strauss: Yes, but here he teaches rhetoric. In this particular case he teaches what is the way of arguing before a law court, and then considerations come in which Aristotle would not necessarily regard as valid theoretically. After all, then you can say Aristotle shouldn't have made this remark about how to steal cleverly by having already 350 chickens before so if you steal fifty more they cannot be discovered, which is also something which he shouldn't say.

Student: Well, that's what I mean. It's very general. It brings up the whole question, how can he teach rhetoric, because he's necessarily teaching something which is not . . .

Strauss: Aristotle was I believe fully ^{aware} of that and therefore he wrote this long justification in chapter 1, which we have read, why a decent teacher can teach rhetoric in spite of (inaudible). He must do it in order to counteract the criminals. You see, this is

an eternal verity, which is made clear by Plato in the Republic, First Book, that the art of the thief and the art of the detective are identical. What the criminal has to know and what the detective has to know are the same, only the detective has a different moral intention from the criminal. The knowledge is the same. Take any other example. If a general discusses the defense of the country and he may write a book about it. Think of de Gaulle. He teaches, of course, the enemy how to conquer his own country. De Gaulle (inaudible), by his famous teaching about what the German's called then the blitz war he taught the German's who were more given to innovation at that time than the French military authorities were how to conquer France. That cannot be helped. There are things which are by their nature ambiguous. Then one must not become a soldier in the first place, and of course one could say still less write books about it. But this cannot be helped. I mean de Gaulle surely was a very patriotic Frenchman in writing that book. No one has ever questioned that, but (inaudible).

Student: Did he just read a sentence that said that it is easy to tell which laws are conventional and which are natural?

Strauss: Well, "laws" it doesn't say -- "which just things." Yes, and he believes that anybody can figure it out on the basis of these few remarks. It is possible (inaudible) some conclusions. You know, for example, sacrificing, or more generally, worshiping the gods is natural, is practiced everywhere. But how to worship them, and to worship which gods, that's positive.

Student: How about something like the act of a legislator setting up a democracy. Is he acting out of a natural . . .

Strauss: That is not a matter, because not everywhere is there democracy. (inaudible). May I be permitted to continue my brief summary of this statement in the Ethics? So there is, then, a distinction between natural and positive right. But even the natural right is changeable. Both are equally changeable. Now this is a very paradoxical assertion, and it is made without any qualification. And therefore Thomas Aquinas' statement that only the principles are unchangeable and not the conclusions which are changeable is not what Aristotle says. Now one possible (inaudible) on the basis of what follows, let us read where you left off.

Student: "The same distinction will hold good in all other matters. For instance, the right hand is naturally stronger than the left, yet it is possible for any man to make himself ambidextrous."

Strauss: Now this is a useful example. We are by nature, or most of us, are by nature right handed, but we can become by training ambidextrous. Now it is hard to say, what is a man who has made himself by his own efforts ambidextrous? Is this better than to be only right handed? Let us assume for one moment it is better to be ambidextrous. Then it would mean in this context that positive right would be an improvement on natural right, not every positive right but some are an improvement. And as a consequence of this we find sometimes the view that positive law is an improvement by being a modification of natural law. A simple example is

this: In the later Roman statements we find for some that natural right is what nature taught all animals. Now nature taught all animals to raise their offspring. That's one of the examples given. What does Aristotle teach about raising off-spring? Not universal. Exposure of infants is regarded by Aristotle as just. Here you have a modification by human reason of what all animals including man are by nature prompted to do, and therefore a change in that. Nevertheless, Aristotle implies without any question that there is a natural standard for positive law. But where do we find that? Now let's go on.

Student: "The rules of justice based in convention and expediency are like standard measures. Corn and wine measures are not equal in all places, but are larger in wholesale and smaller in retail buying."

Strauss: In other words positive law considers the individual circumstances and is, therefore, necessarily variable.

Student: "Similarly, the rules of justice ordained not by nature but by man are not the same in all places, since forms of governments are not the same."

Strauss: Since not even the forms of government are the same.

Student: "Though in all places there is only one form of government that is natural, namely the best one."

Strauss: All right. There is a single regime alone which is everywhere the best by nature. Now what does he mean by that? Someone gave democracy as an example. Laws in a democracy differ from laws in an oligarchy and so on, because they are meant to support the democracy, and other laws are meant to support oligarchy and so on. So laws depend on the regime. This is a key premise of Aristotle's teaching. And regimes vary from place to place and also from time to time. So is this a complete relativism? No, Aristotle says. There is one regime alone the best everywhere by nature. So I believe that Aristotle's doctrine of natural right can roughly be stated as follows but it needs a long argument to support it: There is a kind of flooring, minimum requirements of society, for example, the worship of gods, the example here, or that citizens have to take responsibility for their fellow citizens who have fallen in misfortune by serving the city, this kind of thing. There are some minimum conditions, the flooring, but this flooring is variable in many ways, because of the variety of circumstances. On the hand there is a ceiling. And that's the best regime, by nature the best. But you cannot always have it. That it's every the best doesn't mean that it's everywhere possible, not at all. Not even literally, from Aristotle's point of view the best regime would not be possible in intemperate climates, where it's too hot or too cold. In itself it deserves to be established everywhere, but it's not feasible. So there is in fact a very great variety and you cannot indicate any particular thing which is simply valid and yet there are clear indications by the minimum and the maximum conditions.

Student: Is it reasonable to ask that since its changeable how can we know what it is?

(first side of tape runs out)

Student: If natural right is changeable, is it a fair question how is to be known since it differs from one time to another . . .

Strauss: Sure, but you must not forget that is one implication of the Aristotelian teaching regarding practical wisdom, that the question of what is just here and now must be decided by the man on the spot here and now. That's clear. But he must have standards, as you say. Aristotle leaves no doubt about them, but the question is this: The standards are there. There is a hierarchy of ends from Aristotle's point of view which is by nature, not in any way due to human arbitrary decision. But this is not sufficient for deciding what is to be done here and now. And the principle can be stated as follows. In all actions there are two considerations. One is the rank and the other is the urgency. In a given case the less high may have to be preferred to the higher because of the urgency. A simple example: to undergo an operation is not something high, but it may be the most urgent thing in a given situation. To study Aristotle's Rhetoric is something much higher than to undergo an operation. But in a given situation you have to sacrifice the study of Aristotle's Rhetoric to this unpleasant necessity. You can say that the highest principles guiding deliberation are potentially in a certain tension and therefore no universal rules to be given. Now how far this would go into detail, into any particular rule, what we call the ten commandments for example, that Aristotle has never discussed. Aristotle makes the general statement that stealing, and committing adultery, and murder, and so forth are always bad. And there is no question about that for all practical purposes, but then there come the subtle cases. I mean, take an example from modern times: espionage. I think very few people will have the heart to say that this is a sinful act. But whoever says espionage is necessary and that it is just admits at least the necessity of deception, the moral legitimacy of deception. There may well be cases which are presented to us in the famous literature about it in which this cannot be achieved without killing people. Well if you say that killing in war is not murder, but this is not killing in war. It is killing in peacetime. And the line is very hard to draw there in a given case. Adultery seems to be something very different. Why should this ever be defensible? Well I thought of a case which is not practical in our age but which could well be practical in former ages. If the only alternative to civil war in a given situation owing to the fact that the reigning king has no issue because of inability to generate and if this disaster can be avoided by his wife being induced, because he would never do that, being induced by a wise counselor who thinks of the misery, wars of York and Lancaster, ruining a country for a century, . . . I would not have the heart to condemn that wise counselor and I believe, I have no evidence in Aristotle, but I think that's the only interpretation compatible with this unqualified statement that natural right is changeable. What you can do is this. You can begin to define, to draw a line between killing and murder, but then the definition has to become ever more complicated

to meet all cases. And then you must still say, there may be a case of which I didn't think in which I would have to change it. That is the point.

Student: Then you would say that it is a rule which has to be altered to meet the circumstances.

Strauss: Yes. For Aristotle, what he means by the best regime, the rule, those men ought to rule who are by nature best for rule by their justice and their intelligence. And he would make this as a standard in a given case. You have a regime which is not formally based on this principle, say oligarchy or democracy, but it is clear that democracy will be better the more it provides within its limits for this possibility. The same would be true of an oligarchy. So you have standards from Aristotle's point of view, but you do not have inflexible standards. That is Aristotle's view. This is the best which has occurred to me hitherto.

Student: In a way Aristotle would admit that you cannot make rules for practical application when circumstances vary. If other just men were there they could see that the solution arrived at was just. But you can't tell anybody how to (inaudible) that position or provide rules to give someone a guide.

Strauss: Exactly, and if one would go beyond what Aristotle here says, one would say that this is highest function of the historian especially, because in many cases the wisdom of such a risky decision is not in a wholly novel situation. But the duty of the historian would be to make this distinction between a deviation from what is ordinarily right that is just and a deviation which is not just.

Student: Do I understand that your interpretation means something like this. Supposing that Aristotle had been alive at the time of Henry VIII . . . (inaudible).

Strauss: I see, that would be a possibility, yes. It would be less grave than adultery. No, no, yes well according to the Biblical notions adultery is both ways, but not from the Greek point of view. It depends on the woman rather than the man.

Student: . . . (inaudible) thought it was possible to have a society without religion. That would mean no sacrifice.

Strauss: This is surely not the Aristotelian point of view.

Student: Now this is accepted by (inaudible).

Strauss: Well, then he deviated from Aristotle. Aristotle is perfectly clear. When he enumerates the ingredients of a polis, divine worship is always one. Well, if you take very crude things, for example, there is no society possible in which there is no protection of the lives of the members of the society and of their property, even in communist societies there is some property. When you have gone to that store and bought a pair of shoes, that's your property. It can be stolen from you. And of course the honor of the family,

of wives, what Machiavelli calls these crude things which people everywhere demand: security for life, property, and the honor of their women.. These are this flooring (?).

Student: Would these then replace worship?

Strauss: Not from Aristotle's point of view. We have the expert on (inaudible) here. Would you agree with what Mr. _____ says about him?

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: I'm not speaking now about what he says in the (inaudible) Book of the Metaphysics, but divine worship practiced by the polis. Does (inaudible) believe that society is possible without worship?

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: Yes, but this doesn't settle the issue, because there may be some other worship not so (inaudible). So at any rate I believe we can safely say that the case of Aristotle is different.. Now we have to go on in chapter 13. He makes here first a distinction. This is simple to understand. A crime may be a crime against a fellow citizen and may be a crime against the city. Theft is a crime against the individual, and high treason, or desertion, is a crime against the city. This is clear. Now the considerations, then, which enter accusation-defense are two: first, injustices from damage done to someone else, and in order to know what a damage is we have to know what evils are, which has been stated in an earlier chapter; and the second point is that crime is an act committed voluntarily and knowingly, knowing not only the law, that goes without saying, but knowing also the circumstances of the case. It is obvious that if you cannot possibly know the circumstances of the case, you cannot commit a crime. If someone enters his bedroom in the night and finds a woman there and having no light, taking it for granted that it is his wife, and he has intercourse with her, he does not commit adultery. Aristotle in his Ethics makes this subtle distinction, but it's very subtle. He must repent it when having found the facts of the case. But this is obviously not something which will be brought up before a law court. But still, this would be a case where ignorance, not of the law, but of the facts. And above all it must be knowingly done but intentionally done. Let us turn to 1373 b 38, immediately before 1374 a:

Student: "But since a man while admitting the facts often denies the description in the charge or the point on which it turns, for instance, admits that he took something but did not steal it, that he was the first to strike but committed no outrage, that he had relations but did not commit adultery with the woman, or that he stole something but was not guilty of sacrilege since the object in question was not consecrated, or that he trespassed but not on public land, or that he held congress with the enemy but was not guilty of treason, for this reason it will be necessary that a definition should be given of theft, outrage, or adultery in order that if we deny or prove that an offense has or has not been committed we may be able to put the case in a truer light."

Strauss: So who gives the definition? Who gives the definition of these things?

Student: The prosecutor?

Strauss: You mean the legislator? Does he necessarily do that, especially in older law? No. But then the orator would have to supply a definition sufficient for the case at hand. And on the highest level of course he would have to have a perfectly sufficient definition of that.

Student: In the case of treason it would have to be quite specific because he could be thinking of someone like Themistocles for instance who would always make provisions with the enemy and with his own city. If Athens lost a war he could always go to Persia because he gave the king certain information . . .

Strauss: Yes, but you must also see what the situation is. Say Themistocles is before a law court and then there are witnesses who have seen him talking to the Persians. He cannot possibly deny it. And therefore he will say, yes I talked with them but I did not commit treason and then let us see whether they have any evidence of treason.

Student: But it's even more subtle than that because he told them to come in and he gave them information and this information . . .

Strauss: In other words he deceived them.

Student: But this information could also have made for victory. It was just a matter of fortune.

Strauss: These are then very difficult borderline actions and which will look to a law court under one set of conditions perfectly good, and under another set of conditions very bad. These are very risky things without any question. But the principle is I believe very clear and we do not have to dwell on that. Now let us go on where we left off.

Student: "In all such instances the question at issue is to know whether the supposed offender is a wrongdoer and a worthless person or not; for vice and wrongdoing consist in the moral purpose and such terms as outrage and theft further indicate purpose, for if a man is struck it does not in all cases follow that he has committed an outrage, but only if he has struck with a certain object, for instance, to bring disrepute upon the other or to please himself. Again if a man has taken something by stealth it is by no means certain that he has committed theft, but only if he has taken it to injure another or to get something for himself. It is the same in all other cases."

Strauss: So the decisive point is intention or purpose. Now purpose is also the key point in Aristotle's definition of virtue in the Ethics. But there is of course a great difference because the intention of the moral man, the virtuous man, is not quite the same as the purposes spoken of here. If it is true that a man may

be virtuous and yet commit a crime and a man may be vicious and never commit a crime, then purpose as considered by the legislator is not the same as purpose considered from a moral point of view. Of course they can easily switch into each other, but it is a much cruder notion which is presupposed in a legal context. The examples I believe are clear. Is there any difficulty. Someone may have taken something stealthily, for example, what belonged to him, that's not theft. Or he may have taken something stealthily at the request of the owner who didn't wish other people to see that it could happen easily.

Student: Is it true that the purpose (inaudible) the statement in chapter 1 that we can only talk about what is or is not (inaudible)

Strauss: I don't remember that statement.

Student: It's in the sixth paragraph of chapter 1, at the end of 1354 a: "Further it is evident that the only business of the litigant is to prove that the fact in question is or is not so, that it has happened or not."

Strauss: Yes but these are circumstances of the facts, that he took away stealthily what belonged to somebody else and he took it away for his own benefit. This belongs to the facts.

Student: But how would one prove from the circumstances of the facts about intention, that he talks with the enemy with the intention of betraying the city?

Strauss: Well, that is a great question, how to prove this. But still . . . How to find out may be complicated. But the question is whether it is a factual intention or not. The distinction between easily knowable facts and facts which can be known only with difficulty is still a distinction within the realm of facts. The other thing is the law. Ordinarily, with a qualification which Aristotle mentions later, ordinarily one cannot question the law of course. One cannot question the definition of say theft which the legislator makes explicitly or implicitly. But he can only show that the defendant did not commit theft as defined by the legislator. Then he is free. There is no difficulty in that. But there are great ambiguities about facts. In every law suit this difficulty becomes (inaudible).

Student: You still maintain that it's a question of fact, whether he did that or not?

Strauss: Sure. But you must not identify the distinction between fact and law with the distinction between fact and value. If intention belongs to fact and if certain kinds of intentions prove viciousness then viciousness is a fact. This is a vicious criminal. It is then a factual judgment. I read elsewhere a statement which illustrates this issue again. Somewhere someone said about there are no funny facts. There are no funny facts. I deny that. I know many funny facts. But it is of course a consequence of the fact-value distinction because "funny" is a kind of value judgment, a negative value judgment. Now let us go on where we left off, 1374 a 18:

Student: "We have said that there are two kinds of just and unjust actions, for some are written and others are unwritten . . .

Strauss: Not "actions." "Things" I would translate. Leave it quite loose.

Student: "and have spoken of those concerning which the laws are explicit. Of those that are unwritten there are two kinds."

Strauss: You see it cannot refer to unjust or just actions. There cannot be unwritten or written just actions. It must refer to things in general. Sometimes it is translated "rules of justice" or "principles of justice," but this is too hard and fast to speak of rules or principles.

Student: "One kind arises from an excess of virtue or vice which is followed by praise or blame, honor or dishonor, and rewards; for instance, to be grateful to a benefactor, to render good for good, to help one's friend, and the like."

Strauss: Yes, well where does this belong. It belongs to the unwritten law. But the unwritten law, does it also belong to the natural law, to the common law as Aristotle calls it?

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: Yes, but still whether they obey it is an entirely different question. But whether they wouldn't admit that this is the right thing to do, to praise people who do these things and blame those who do the opposite, I believe Aristotle would have no doubt about that. That would then be an example of what belongs to the common law. Not everything unwritten is common but what is common is necessarily unwritten and only by accident also written. Is this clear? The positive as such is written law. But the positive law may embody natural law. But the natural as natural law isn't written.

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: I would say, not necessarily. If this international law is based on treaties or agreements, then it's positive. And if there are some rules for (inaudible) which are universally recognized by all cities or (inaudible), it could be natural. What would be such a thing? It's very hard to say, given the difference between Greeks and barbarians, between civilized and uncivilized peoples. You could say that the right to enslave natural slaves, and this means of course that you have to make some slavery expeditions, this belongs to the sphere of international law and would be naturally right from Aristotle's point of view. I think that if we can speak at all about international law there it would be law based on treaties, agreements, and therefore surely not natural.

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: Yes, but natural and unwritten are not identical. There may be unwritten customs of course which are not natural. I do

not believe that the question of international law, law between the cities, plays any role in Aristotle, nor for that matter in Plato.

Student: . . . (inaudible) the laws within the city as having to do with certain rules and that common law (inaudible).

Strauss: I do not believe that is what Aristotle means. "*idios nomos*," literally translated of course "private law." But it means private to this particular city, so it is better to translate by "particular."

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: I remember that. I only mentioned the single point that he did not regard this Empedoclean natural right as truly natural right as truly natural. So there is first an unwritten law which is, which concerns actions so noble, an excess of virtue and of vice, where no punishment proper or reward proper is given but only praise on the one hand and disgrace on the other. For example, let us take the simple case. Ingratitude is generally regarded as something very nasty, but it is obviously impossible to make it a criminal offense. Because at this very moment you can no longer be grateful, but you simply pay your debts and . . . (inaudible). And gratitude from this point of view is an excess of virtue, something which cannot be legally demanded, and therefore ingratitude an excess of vice. And (inaudible) doesn't mean that it is a particularly murderous action but something which is impossible to be reached by law proper. This is the unwritten law. This is one kind of the unwritten law, and the other . . .

Student: "The other kind contains what is omitted in the special written law."

Strauss: In the particular law, which implies already that the preceding thing refers to the common law, the universal law, the natural law. And this refers to the particular law. The particular written law has an essential defect, and the correction of this essential defect of written law is equity. So equity is for Aristotle nothing but that. Put more cautiously, that is the primary meaning of equity for Aristotle. Now why is necessary necessary?

Student: "for that which is equitable seems to be just and equity is justice that goes beyond the written law. These omissions are sometimes involuntary, sometimes voluntary on the part of the legislators, involuntary when it may have escaped their notice, voluntary when being unable to define for all cases they are obliged to make a universal statement which is not applicable to all but only to most cases, and whenever it is difficult to give a definition owing to the infinite number of cases as, for instance, the size and kind of an iron instrument used in wounding, for life would not be long enough to reckon all the possibilities. If then no exact definition is possible but legislation is necessary, one must have recourse to general terms. So that if a man wearing a ring lifts up his hand to strike or actually strikes, according to the

written law he is guilty of wrong doing, but in reality he is not, and this is a case for equity."

Strauss: This is clear, because he has hit a man with iron, but the iron was minimal and couldn't have any serious effect. I mean what could the legislator do? The legislator could say perhaps, iron of a certain weight. But then the weight must be defined again by the judges now because . . . It becomes in this way a matter of equity. Now the details which follow are quite interesting.

Student: "If then our definition of equity is correct it is easy to see what things and persons are equitable or not. Actions which should be leniently treated are cases for equity. Errors, wrong acts, and misfortunes must not be thought deserving of the same penalty. Misfortunes are all such things that are unexpected and not vicious. Errors are not unexpected, but are not vicious. Wrong acts are such as might be expected and vicious, for acts committed through desire arise from vice."

Strauss: Through desire, that must be emphasized. What is the alternative to actions not coming from desire?

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: No, no. This is not due to anger. Anger does not prove viciousness or meanness. Desire would. That is the point. Anger can be an extenuating circumstance in many cases. Desire cannot. There is a clear and simple case. If someone kills a man, and he says, yes I killed him but I did it from anger -- an extenuating circumstance. But if he raped a woman and he say, yes I did it but I did it from desire -- not an extenuating circumstance. And this is the clearest example because the greatest crime stemming from desire is rape, and the greatest crime stemming from anger is to kill someone. Now is there any other point on equity we should discuss? Then we will turn to the beginning of chapter 14. The next chapter deals with weighing what is a greater or lesser crime, a consideration of more or less. Hitherto he spoke only of what is a crime and what is not a crime.

Student: "Wrong acts are greater in proportion to the injustice from which they spring. For this reason the most trifling are sometimes the greatest, as in the charge brought by Callistratus against Melanopus, that he had fraudulently kept back three consecrated half obols from the temple builders. Whereas in the case of just actions, it is quite the contrary. The reason is that the greater potentially inheres in the less; for he who has stolen three consecrated half obols will commit any wrong whatever."

Strauss: What was your difficulty?

Student: If I understand that correctly it means that even a small violation of the law may . . . (inaudible)?

Strauss: If a man is dishonest regarding trifling sums, where the temptation is so small, how dishonest will he be if the reward is Bobby Baker like? That's one point. On the other hand, it is not

true the other way around. If a man can be proved to be honest regarding trifling sums, that does not prove that he will be honest if (inaudible).

Student: It's not only trifling, it's that . . . It's like stealing from a blind man, or something like that.

Strauss: Yes, yes. Averroes refers to that in his commentary. Despoiling a poor man is a greater crime than despoiling a rich one. And if he cannot abstain even in that case, what will he do in other cases? The other point we would have to consider is that the rich man is likely to be more on his guard than the poor man, but morally it makes it of course worse.

Student: Better protected too by the law.

Strauss: At least as some people say. Good. Now we come a bit later. Go on.

Student: "Wrong acts are judged greater sometimes in this way, sometimes by the extent of the injury done."

Strauss: You see that is obviously a very different consideration from that where the injustice, the meanness, is greater. Now, also the damage is greater, which has nothing to do with the meanness.

Student: "A wrong act is greater when there is no adequate punishment for it, but all are insufficient; when there is no remedy because it is difficult, if not impossible, to repair it; and when the person injured cannot obtain legal satisfaction since it is irremediable; for justice and punishment are kinds of remedy. And if the sufferer, having been wronged, has inflicted some terrible injury upon himself, the guilty person deserves greater punishment. Wherefore Sophocles, when pleading in behalf of Euctemon who had committed suicide after the outrage he had suffered, declared that he would not assess the punishment at less than the victim had assessed it for himself."

Strauss: So here the damage . . . These are cases where the damage is greater and therefore the crime is greater. Then he gives some other cases.

Student: "A wrong act is also greater when it is unprecedented, or the first of its kind, or when committed with the aid of few accomplices."

Strauss: Now why is the man who committed the crime first worse than (inaudible)?

Student: He sets a trend.

Strauss: Yes, yes. In other words, his inventiveness shows a particular, of unheard of things. It is greater because it is unheard of. You made a remark on this case.

Student: I just asserted that this and the ones following parallel

almost exactly the marks of noble action given . . .

Strauss: In other words, an unheard of noble action is also greater than a heard of one, other things being equal. Averroes gives here the example of Cain, the first murderer, because all other murderers imitate him. That is what you have in mind.

Student: This is probably a good practical example, after the great train robbery in England I was told by a postal worker on railroad mail service in this country that they were armed and were also given courses of instruction in how to use their arms. So there's a case where innovation set everyone to think about this.

Strauss: Now this of course does not necessarily mean that the punishment will be more severe, because a certain equality of punishments is generally assumed in civilized countries. But it is a very strong point in the speech of the accuser of course. To say, no one had ever thought of this particular refinement. Now let us read a few more points. Go on where we left off.

Student: "and when it has been frequently committed, or when because of it new prohibitions and penalties have been sought and found. Thus at Argos the citizen owing to whom a new law has been passed is punished, as well as those on whose account a new prison had to be built."

Strauss: That might go a bit far but it points in the right direction. The crime is greater the more brutal it is, or when it has been for a long time premeditated, when the recital of it inspires terror rather than pity."

Strauss: Hitherto he has discussed only how to find out whether a crime is greater or less. This is finished at this point. And now he goes over to another subject, namely what an orator can do in order to enhance or minimize a given crime. "Trick" is of course an addition of the translator. Literally it translates, "the rhetorical things". You can add any substantive you want.

Student: "Rhetorical things of the following kind may be used: the statement that the accused person has swept away or violated several principles of justice, for instance, oaths, pledges of friendship, plighted words, the sanctity of marriage, for this amounts to heaping crime upon crime."

Strauss: In other words, the accumulation of these crimes will be very impressive on the jury.

Student: Wrong acts are greater when committed in the very place where wrong doers themselves are sentenced, as is done by false witnesses; for where would a man not commit wrong if he does so in a court of justice?

Strauss: Do you get the point? There is a rhetorical element in it.

Student: "They are also greater when accompanied by the greatest

disgrace, when committed against one who has been the guilty person's benefactor; for in that case the wrongdoer is guilty of wrong twice over, in that he not only does wrong but does not return good for good. So too again when a man offends against the unwritten laws of right; for there is greater merit in doing right without being compelled. Now the written laws involve compulsion, the unwritten do not. Looked at in another way, wrongdoing is greater if it violates the written laws; for a man who commits wrongs that alarm him and involve a punishment will be ready to commit wrongs for which he will not be punished."

Strauss: So here you see clearly the tricky element. It depends on which side you stand, whether you defend or accuse. You can argue both ways. And that is (inaudible). Someone raised an objection to this whole slightly immoral element of it. But if you think what is now regarded as the duty of the defender of the criminal. It goes very far. He must try his best to get him free or at least a minimum of punishment. And he can very well be defended, the public prosecutor will state the case as strongly as possible against the defendant, and that must be balanced by an opposite statement of the defender, and then the jury has all the facts including the rhetorical embellishments on both sides. This would of course presuppose that the legal and rhetorical qualities of the two speakers is roughly equal, otherwise there might be some (inaudible) on this point alone.

Student: You convinced me before, but there is a certain problem in what you just said and that is that you would expect it from men who had the reputation of public prosecutors, but you wouldn't expect it from a (inaudible) teacher. That was my problem.

Strauss: But still must you not raise the question, how is it possible given the well known infirmities of human beings to have the maximum guarantee that justice is done. I mean the case against the defendant must be stated as strongly as possible in the interests of the law. But it must also be stated as strongly as possible for the defendant lest the law might be misapplied in this case. I think from this point of view it is perfectly defensible.

Student: I agree that it's defensible. It's just that the concession to the injustice bothered me.

Strauss: I would say, to the infirmity of men rather than their injustice. And that is the same of injustice only if you think justice requires not to have some indulgence in making some concessions to human infirmities. That's a very tough view which you argue for.

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: That is from his poems. I do not know now from which of his poems. He wrote two poems, one on the nature of things and the other on "purifications," a moral and religious poem. I do not know which, but from one of the two. I suppose it is from the second.

Student: . . . (inaudible) not being used originally rhetorically.

Strauss: Yes, yes. Not in a forensic context, that's true.

Student: Could you explain how Aristotle gets from equity as first defined as defects or omissions in the law to the broader notion of equity as (inaudible).

Strauss: Where does he say this? What is the clearest passage on this point?

Student: 1374 b ...

Strauss: For example (inaudible) you would prefer arbitration to go before a law court. But he gives the reason in the last case. For the arbitrator looks for what is equitable, whereas the judge looks at the law. I mean, anything -- let us see whether he cannot pursue that -- a concern with justice which is not fettered by the letter of the law, corrects the letter of the law, and perhaps even disregards it. What about that? There would then be this difficulty, that the equitable would become identical in the highest sense with what is by nature right, because it would disregard law altogether. Equity is clearly defined as a correction of the positive law of this particular society. Well the word equitable and especially the plural was used very commonly for the decent man, the gentleman, who were also called "kalokagathia," the noble and good man, and "spoudaios," the serious man. There was a (inaudible) in any case, the equitable man. Now the definition of that, one could say, there was always a reference to law in the consideration of equitable, which was not necessarily present in these two other considerations. An equitable man is a man who completes the law, i.e., who goes beyond the law, and this going beyond the law may very well be disregarding the law -- in a case where the law prescribes something preposterous. What was your interpretation of that? You didn't use magnanimity in this context?

Student: Well I did, but I think now that that was an error. I thought that overlooking a minor clause was a reflection of magnanimity.

Strauss: No, I do not believe that this was the point because if you look at the end of justice, the disregard of the petty with a view to the ends of justice is not quite the same as disregard of the petty because one thinks highly of oneself as a magnanimous man would. But however this may be, we must now stop.

Lecture VII
Aristotle's Rhetoric, April 20, 1964

(in progress) Student: I would think for two reasons: One that it is appealing to the higher faculty of men; the other that since it comes second if we start from the bottom most people do not achieve it, and therefore it is the highest part of the state.

Strauss: Well, differently stated, Aristotle is a philosopher. Let us never forget that. And as a philosopher he is very much concerned with what is the right kind and sufficient kind of establishing something. And we are constantly exposed to insufficient argument, and one kind of these insufficient arguments are the rhetorical arguments. And indeed this has to do, you stated it more radically, because reason as such is higher than the passions. It is a kind of reasoning. Now to come to some more specific points: You were struck by the value free or amoral treatment of torture, of evidence based on torture.

Student: Torture is only one of the five that (inaudible) immoral.

Strauss: Yes, but on the other hand can you tell me what a conscientious man can do in a judicial system where torture is employed? I mean, if he would then say torture is something preposterous, absurd, as Aristotle surely thinks, it is absolutely impossible under such circumstances?

Student: The best that one can do is to use it for one's own use, whichever way it goes.

Strauss: And that's what Aristotle does. So, in other words, look at the situation of the pleader. He has no choice. He cannot possibly attack the institution of torture when pleading before a court which is based on the principle of torture. Why did he not discuss such evidence as murder weapons, tangible things. I think he discussed it by implication. How does a murder weapon come up in a proceeding? Does it march in and say, I am the murder weapon?

Student: It comes in by way of a witness.

Strauss: So, the witness. Therefore, he discussed it. The murder weapon is not independent, I take it. Now these are only a few points which one should correct, but in the main it was a very good statement.

Student: When you asked why the enthymeme would be the most important consideration for Aristotle, were you lumping together with the enthymeme the example?

Strauss: Sure, sure. When we come to the details we will come to that. Now I think we have to discuss one broad subject which was implied in the whole first book, and that is the following thing. We have discussed the three kinds of rhetoric. This was obviously the main theme of Book One: deliberative, epideictic, and forensic. But in discussing each of these three kinds Aristotle has a special

discussion of one kind of thing -- in the first case, the good things; in the second case, the noble things; and in the third case, the pleasant things. Now how do we call these things. I said "things," but we can perhaps do better than that.

Student: Values?

Strauss: Values they would be called. But I think one would have to be a bit more precise than that and say "kinds of values." Yes, one might perhaps say, the highest kinds of objects of choice. You find a discussion of these three things in Thomas Aquinas' Summa, Part I, Question 5, Article 6. Thomas refers to the authority of Ambrose, not of Aristotle. This is of course not an Aristotelian statement, that there are the good things, and the noble things, and the pleasant things (inaudible). It emerges from the way in which he casts his statements in the first book of the Rhetoric. Now, this triad is not so familiar to us. We rather know of the triad: the true, the good, and the beautiful. That is more familiar to us than this one. Now one thing must be clear. The good here seems to be the useful, subordinate, but this is by no means certain. It is, however, the way Thomas understands it: the useful; the noble, decent, moral; and the pleasant. I remind you of the passage in Hobbes' Leviathan where he discusses the same subject in a very different way, Chapter 6. I will read it to you. "The Latin tongue has two words, whose significations approach to those of good and evil; but they are not precisely the same; and those are "pulchrum" and "turpe." Whereof the former signifies that, which by some apparent signs promiseth good; and the latter which promiseth evil. But in our tongue we have not so general names to express them by. But for "pulchrum" we say in some things "fair"; in others "beautiful," or "handsome," or "gallant," or "honorable," or "comely," or "amiable"; and for "turpe," "foul," "deformed," "ugly," "base," "nauseous," and the like, as the subject shall require; all which words, in their proper places, signify nothing else but the "meine," or countenance, that promiseth good and evil." This is in Greek "kalon," the noble. "So that of good there be three kinds: good in the promise, that is "pulchrum"; good in effect, as the end desired, which is called "jucundum," "pleasant," "delightful"; and good as the means, which is called "utile," "profitable"; and as many of evil" So this is a restatement from a hedonistic point of view of the Aristotelian, Thomistic view. Here you have of course a "beautiful," not merely noble, but the beautiful as beautiful, which is not necessarily in the Aristotelian, Thomistic construction. This can easily be proven. (writing on the board): We have "utile," "honestum," and "jucundum." Now, we translate it is "the useful, or profitable," always instrumental, always a means; "the Noble," as we say "the moral"; and "the pleasant." The "pulchrum," the "beautiful," is not in here, because the "pulchrum" has not this relation to desire. "Pulchrum" is that which pleases merely as apprehended, the beautiful rose. The Hobbian scheme is this, that he omits this. It never occurred to me, but it's as simple as that. The honestum as honestum is out. So you have the utile, the pulchrum, and this is the end, the pleasant. And the noble, or the moral, comes in only as required for this purpose via his doctrine of natural right and natural wrong, as some of you may remember. Now but to go back to Aristotle with whom we

its rhetorical use. Now in spite of the merely rhetorical use one point is clear when one reads that. To that extent his rhetorical use of natural law has an evident premise. Human laws are not necessarily just. That is the solid starting point for the pleader who is dissatisfied with the ruling of the law in the case at hand. The rhetorical use is based on something that is not rhetorical. This we must not forget. Let us read then the case for the written law, arguments which have been repeated especially in the nineteenth century in the polemics against natural law. Will you read that, 1375 b 13ff:

Student: "But if the written law favors our case, we mustn't say that the oath of the dicast to decide to the best of his judgment does not justify him in deciding contrary to the law, but is only intended to relieve him from the charge of perjury if he is ignorant of the meaning of the law. That no one should (inaudible) is that which is good absolutely, but that which is good for himself."

Strauss: There must be a correspondence between the good simply, the natural, and the good for oneself, meaning for this particular community.

Student: "That there is no difference between not using the laws and their not being enacted; that in the other arts there is no advantage in trying to be wiser than the physician, for an error on his part does not do so much harm as the habit of disobeying the authority; that to seek to be wiser than the laws is just what is forbidden in the most approved laws."

Strauss: That means Sparta, in the First Book of Thucydides when the Spartan King praises the Spartans because they are opposed to those who try to be wiser than the laws. Averroes states it as follows. The natural law is not specific, lacks limitation, but the written law is complete. This is this kind of argument. Now in the sequel he comes to the question of the use of the witness. This we might also read.

Student: "Witnesses are of two kinds: ancient and recent. Of the latter some share the risk of the trial, others are outside it. By ancient I mean the poets and men of repute whose judgments are known to all. For instance, the Athenians in the matter of Salamis appealed to Homer as a witness . . .

Strauss: Homer having said somehow that Salamis belongs to Athens.,

Student: "and recently the inhabitants of Tenedos to Periander of Corinth against the people of Sigeum. Cleophon also made use of the verse of Solon against Critias to prove that his family had long been notorious for licentiousness, otherwise Solon would never have written: 'Bid me the fair haired Critias listen to his father.' One should appeal to such witnesses for the past, but also to interpreters of oracles for the future; thus, for instance, Themisticles interpreted the wooden wall to mean that they must fight at sea. Further, as stated, are evidence. For instance, if one man advises another not to make a friend of an old man, he can appeal to the proverb 'Never do good to an old man.'

Strauss: Because he cannot possibly requite you.

Student: "And if he advises another to kill the children after having killed the fathers, he can say 'Foolish is he who having killed the father suffers the children to live.'

Strauss: Aristotle can be as Machiavellian as Machiavelli, only Machiavelli cannot be Aristotelian. Honestly. What kinds of things are these which we read here, witnesses? The word is misleading today. To a considerable extent he is speaking, of course, of what we would call authorities, the use of authorities. And in this context naturally proverbs do, the wisdom of the ages embodied in them. But proverbs as such cannot settle it as Herbert Simon has noted. Aristotle has seen this a bit earlier. And it is possible that this reflection is of what Alfarabi and Maimonides say about the rhetorical being based on traditions, meaning on specific authorities. Why Aristotle chooses these particularly obnoxious proverbs I do not know, but perhaps in order to draw our attention to how little truly authoritative they can be, and yet how powerful they are especially if expressed in perfect verse. Therefore in the Middle Ages they spoke of the poetic syllogism. The poetic syllogism is a syllogism, is a kind of reasoning which convinces by the metrical perfection of the statement. There is something to that. I know one beautiful case. In the Iliad somewhere, I think Hector says it, 'Let war be the business of the men.' (reads it in Greek). When you read it, since it is metrically perfect it can't be otherwise. Until Aristophanes came and played with the conceit of a city in which the women were in control in the Assembly of Women. And there the verse occurs (reads in Greek) which is metrically as good as the first. This shows us that sometimes the mere metrical thing has a power of convincing. A more recent example, in one of President Roosevelt's campaign speeches he used the three names of his three opponents. Do you know who they were?

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: That has in itself a kind of (inaudible) which one can call poetry, or at least rhetorical.

Student: These two proverbs, they seem to be quite different in his choice. One is logical and one seems to be illogical, no sense to it. 'Never do good to an old man,' it has no reason to it, whereas the other one of course is quite pragmatic.

Strauss: But the other doesn't state the reason either. You have to (inaudible) the reason. He is a fool who after having killed the father leaves the sons.

Student: But that's pragmatic. . .

Strauss: But you still have to spell it out to make it quite clear, because the sons are likely to avenge the father. Similarly, 'never do good to an old man', the reason is not given. You must make it clear, because he is not likely to be in a position to pay back the benefit you bestowed on him. He will be dead before. But they are both life's (?) maxims without any question.

Student: Wouldn't ancient witnesses be used before deliberative rhetoric as well as forensic rhetoric?

Strauss: Yes, but this I believe is not excluded, is it, although Aristotle should have said so? But still, witnesses are necessary in forensic rhetoric, and then since he brings up witnesses in the narrow sense he enlarges the issue and speaks of witnesses in general, also of the ancient witnesses. And then of course we see that they will be used in epideictic rhetoric, and naturally they will also be used . . . the example of Themistocles is obviously taken from deliberative rhetoric, the context of deliberative rhetoric.

Student: Why does Aristotle just quote poets and statesmen, and no philosophers?

Strauss: Well, where does he mention it? A good question, but you should be in a position to answer it.

Student: Well actually the philosophers and the statesmen were one and the same for Aristotle, like Solon who was a wise man and also a statesman. Wasn't he?

Strauss: No, that is very un-Aristotelian. Solon was not a philosopher from Aristotle's point of view under no circumstances, unless he uses the word "philosopher" in the loose, popular sense.

Student: Philosophers have no authority.

Strauss: Sure. There is somewhere the passage, we haven't discussed it, where he says one must always praise properly (?), for example, when one speaks to Spartans. What was the other example?

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: The savages or barbarians from the north. And then the third he says, not the Athenians but philosophers to indicate a problem. The Athenians are, of course, not philosophers, but there are philosophers in Athens. No, what Mr. ____ said is, I think, the only possible explanation. Now the next point which he discusses then are the ordinary witnesses. We will not read that. In this passage, 1367 a 33, at the end of the section, this reminds me of an extreme statement (inaudible) occurred in a comedy, that a man who can win is a true rhetorician. He can win even if he has not a single witness on his side as well as if he had a thousand witnesses -- that is a true rhetorician. Good. Then we come to contracts where Aristotle says that the situation is fundamentally the same as that in the case of laws. And this confirms only what we said about the use of the natural law or the written law. I mean taking the contract as a kind of written law, as Aristotle says, we insist on the sacredness of the contract when it is useful for us, and we treat it from a natural law point of view when it is not good for us. This is a purely pragmatic use of natural law with rhetoric. The contract is a kind of law. The law itself is a contract, as is here asserted 1376 b 7-10. The same passage occurs in the Politics somewhere in the Third Book. But there it says, the (inaudible) says law is a contract, which amounts to a rejection by Aristotle

of this view. But in the Rhetoric it's all right. It's good enough as a popular argument. Which contract to choose in case of conflict depends entirely on what is useful for . . . Yes, but where does the morality of that pleader come in, if he is so unscrupulous. He defends a man of whom he is certain he is innocent. If this is so, think of that famous representative of integrity, Perry Mason. He defends people who seem to be absolutely guilty and he knows they are innocent. Therefore, if he commits all kinds of irregularities like breaking and entering, and so forth, he has this . . . This is what, I think, Aristotle has in mind. He cannot help if his means will also be used by unscrupulous rhetoricians. That is possible in every art. That's the famous thing with boxing, remember from the Gorgias. The boxing teacher teaches an art which can of course be misused. But this doesn't mean that the art of boxing isn't a legitimate art. The same is true of rhetoric. But it can be used even in its immoralities, or quasi-immoralities, by just men. The same appears also in the use of oaths, which has also its exhilarating side. Let us read that, at the end of the Book, 1377 b 3.

Student: "As to oaths four divisions may be made; for either we tender an oath and accept it, or we do neither, or one without the other, and in the last case we either tender and do not accept, or accept and do not tender. Besides this, one may consider whether the oath has already been taken by us or by the other party. If you do not tender the oath to the adversary, it is because men readily perjure themselves, and because after he has taken the oath he will refuse to repay the money. While if he does not take the oath you think that the dicast will condemn him and also because the risk incurred leaving the decision to the dicast is preferable, for you have confidence in them but not in your adversary. If you refuse to take the oath yourself you may argue that the oath is only taken with a view to money, that if you had been a scoundrel you would have taken it at once, for it is better to be a scoundrel for something than for nothing."

Strauss: You get here a notion of it, but let us turn to . . .

Student: Now, since we have shown how we must deal with each case individually it is clear how we must deal with them when taken taken two and two, for instance, if we wish to take the oath but not to tender it, to tender it but not to take it, to accept and take it, or to do neither the one or the other. For such cases and similarly the arguments must be a combination of those already mentioned. And if we have already taken an oath which contradicts the present one we may argue that it is not perjury; for whereas wrongdoing is voluntary and perjury is wrongdoing, what is done in error or under compulsion is involuntary. Here we must draw the conclusion that perjury consists in the intention, not in what is said."

Strauss: In other words, he said the wrong thing, but he did not commit perjury, just as in the other cases he took away secretly but he did not steal. You remember that.

Student: "But if the opponent has taken such an oath, we may say that one who does not abide by what he has sworn subverts everything;

for this is the reason why the dicasts take an oath before applying the laws."

Strauss: Well, it's only another illustration of this great free-wheeling character of the pleader, but which is then justified . . . Take the simple case, torture is a good example of that because no one can deny that if torture is an accepted practice then the most conscientious pleader must favor that, and must argue on the basis of that, and similarly in the case of the other things. This is one of the complexities of human life which we cannot help being amused by, but if you are caught in these things they are not so laughable. Now we turn now to Book Two where Aristotle makes the general point, the speaker must make himself and the audience human beings of a certain kind. Now the disposition of the speaker is most important in deliberative speech and of the audience in forensic speech. Why? Why is the disposition of the audience, of the speaker most important in deliberative speech?

Student: Well because deliberative pertains to the future and that element of trust in the speaker's character is much more important than in forensic rhetoric.

Strauss: So the authority of the adviser is greater than that of the pleader. In forensic speech the speaker is much less important, but everything depends surely on the mood of the jury, and therefore the emphasis is on them. Now the points to be considered are . . . The ethos of the speaker consists of three elements: practical wisdom, virtue, and benevolence. It is clear if he doesn't show himself to be a man of practical wisdom, that speaks against his advice. If he shows himself an untrustworthy character, think of Alcibiades, it speaks against him. But if both shows himself clearly to be very intelligent and very virtuous but not benevolent, say coming from an enemy city or being not a democrat and speaking for the demos, this has to do with benevolence. There is a parallel to that in Plato's Gorgias, 487 a, where Socrates claims to be impressed by what Callicles tells him because Callicles has the three qualities required. Do you remember what they were?

Student: Good will, frankness, and a good education, therefore intelligence.

Strauss: Very good. Yes, intelligence corresponds to practical wisdom, benevolence, and frankness. Frankness is not mentioned here. Why not? And Socrates doesn't mention virtue. Otherwise it's the same thing. I think it is because virtue takes the place of frankness. The virtue of which Aristotle speaks takes the place of the frankness of which Socrates speaks. There is some evidence for that in 1378 a 11-12:

Student: "for either through want of sense they form incorrect opinions, or if their opinions are correct through viciousness they do not say what they think."

Strauss: Yes, they do not say what they think. That is a dishonesty, a lack of virtue. Not to say what one thinks, this is part of injustice, as Aristotle suggests in the Topics somewhere. This

explains incidentally a difficulty in the First Book of Plato's Republic which I have never understood before. When Socrates says to Thrasymachus, you must say what you think, and a few pages later Socrates says it doesn't make any difference whether you think it or not. Thrasymachus says does it make any difference whether I think it or not (inaudible) discusses this by itself, and so accepts it then. Now this has to do with the question of justice. To say what one thinks is just and to say something that one does not think is in a way unjust. This only in passing. But the key point is since we know already, or are supposed to know, what virtue is, the excellence by which a man establishes authority, we have to consider the other thing, passion or emotion, especially with a view to the jury.

(first side of tape runs out)

Strauss: 1378 a 19ff:

Student: "The emotions are all those affections which cause men to change their opinion in regard to their judgments and are accompanied by pleasure and pain."

Strauss: (inaudible) opinions are those by which men changing differ from what they were before in regard to their judgments, and then there are those affections which are followed by pain and pleasure. And then he gives a few examples to make this clear. So there must be a change. They are productive of changes. And it must be followed by pleasure and pain. Now the orator must produce these changes in the audience. We know that. And the first subject Aristotle takes up is anger, quite naturally because this is the most visible thing going on in assemblies and the most dangerous for (inaudible) ways to fight against it. The word *orge*, anger, is used for example by Thucydides frequently in the sense of passionate altogether without having anger in particular in mind. But because of the kinship, when you speak of an excited multitude it is most likely to be anger. Think of demonstrations and such. The key point in the definition of anger is what?

Student: Slighting.

Strauss: Slighting. Not merely hurt, this is implied of course, that leads to a difficulty, doesn't it?

Student: The difficulty would be what's the difference between slight and hurt.

Strauss: Well hurt, for example, is when someone cheats you of money. You are hurt, or if he does something else. He doesn't slight you. If he spits in your face, that is slighting you. Or if he doesn't say hello when you say hello to him. There can be greater cases, but you can be hurt by a man without being slighted by him. I mean that is already (inaudible), that you say, he cheated me, he regarded me as a sucker, a fool. But then you make a little psychology: He didn't think of you as a sucker, a fool, he merely wanted your money. Are not such cases possible? I mean one must be very self-conscious if one says, he regards me as a sucker. One can be hurt in many ways without being slighted. To say nothing of the fact that when

you are hurt by some inanimate thing, you cannot possibly speak of slight. In many cases someone hits you by accident. He hurts you, might even blind you or kill you, and yet cannot possibly call it slight. So there is a difference between hurt and slight. What they now call the ego is not necessarily affected by hurt, but it is necessarily affected by slight. Is that clear? Good, but there is a difficulty connected with that. Now there are a few difficult passages. Let us see, after the quotation from Homer at the beginning of chapter 2:

Student: "Slighting is an actualization of opinion in regard to something which appears valueless."

Strauss: Actualization of opinion, literally an actuality, *energeia*, of opinion. What does this mean? You have an opinion about the valueless of a thing or a man but it does not become actual . . . You can regard someone or something as utterly irrelevant and indifferent to it, but it doesn't become a theme. Doesn't that happen all the time when we pass by people, don't pay any attention. The *doxa*, the opinion, is not actual, is potential. But if the potentiality is actualized we say, yes I regard him as irrelevant, immaterial, worthless, then it becomes a slight. So without this actualization no slight takes place. No one is hurt, unless he is crazy, if all the people whom he meets say on State Street downtown do not pay any attention to him. I'm sure there are people who are hurt by that but we can dismiss them as nuts. Good. Then he discusses in the immediate sequel the three kinds of slight: contempt, spite, and outrage. Is the distinction clear? Let us read it.

Student: "There are three kinds of slight: disdain, spitefulness, and insult; for he who disdains slights since men disdain those which they consider valueless and slight what is of no account. And a spiteful man appears to show disdain; for spitefulness consists in placing obstacles in the way of another's wishes not in order that any advantage may accrue to him who spites but to prevent any accruing to the other. Since then he does not act in this manner from self-interest, it is a slight; for it is evidence that he has no idea that the other is likely to hurt him, for in that case he would be afraid of him instead of slighting him, nor that he would be of any use to him worth speaking of, for in that case his thought would be how to become his friend. Similarly, he who insults another also slights him."

Strauss: Yes, the Greek word for insult is *hubris*, which has more implication than insult has. Insolent pride would come somewhat nearer.

Student: "for insult consists in causing injury or annoyance whereby the sufferer is disgraced, not to obtain any other advantage for oneself besides the performance of the act but for one's own pleasure; for retaliation is not insult but punishment. The cause of the pleasure felt by those who insult is the idea that in ill-treating others they are more fully showing superiority. That is why the young and the wealthy are given to insults; for they think that in committing them they are showing their superiority."

Strauss: Let us stop here. So this is in ascending order, isn't it, contempt, spite, insult. But one can, of course, raise this question. Is this in every respect an ascending order, generally speaking, of course, but is not contempt more insulting from another point of view than spite and insult? The trouble which the spiteful man and the insulter takes is a kind of concern and a kind of refutation of this contempt, is it not? If he were truly (inaudible) he wouldn't go to the trouble of the spiteful or insulting action. From this point of view, contempt is much worse than the two others. But this of course is not recognized by any legal code quite rationally, because contempt cannot be a punishable crime, can never be.

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: There are ways in which people feel that, and these are the real insults.

Student: Isn't that some sort of an insult?

Strauss: Well not quite, it surely is nothing which could ever be brought home before a court of law, never. And therefore from this point of view it is of course the lowest, the weakest, because it cannot be proven. A man can look at another man when he makes a certain statement which can much more expressive of contempt than if he spits into his face. But this look, which doesn't have to be a so-called dirty look, can never be brought home. Now the difficulty of this discussion appears from the sequel, 1379 a 10. Let us read that.

Student: "It is now evident from these considerations what is the disposition of those who are angry, with whom they are angry, and for what reason. Men are angry when they are pained, because one who is pained aims at something. If then anyone directly opposes him in anything as, for instance, prevents him from drinking when thirsty or not directly but seems to be doing the same, and if anyone goes against him, or refuses to assist him, or troubles him in any other way, when he is in this frame of mind he is angry with all such persons. Wherefore the sick, the necessitous, those at war, the love sick, the thirsty -- in a word, all who desire something and cannot obtain it -- are prone to anger, and are easily excited, especially against those who make light of their present condition. For instance, the sick man is easily provoked in regard to his illness, the necessitous in regard to his property, the warrior in regard to warlike affairs, the lover in regard to love affairs, and so with all the rest; for the passion present in his mind in each case paves the way for his anger."

Strauss: What is a passion present in each way? Give one example.

Student: Desire?

Strauss: Yes, desire. So this is a very important discussion here. Anger is necessarily founded on desire. It is always secondary. Now this is the basis of the famous discussion of spiritedness, which is the Platonic term for anger in the Republic, but Plato

(inaudible) that spiritedness is higher than desire because it is founded on desire. That's of course a spurious argument, as this whole argument is. Aristotle surely does not mean that anger is higher. The Platonic argument by the way is this, that anger is compatible with authority, whereas desire is not. But we cannot go into this question. So we are angry whenever we are thwarted in the fulfillment of our desires. This underlies the traditional distinction between the concupiscible part of the soul, the concupiscible, and the irascible. The concupiscible is desire. That comes always first. But if the fulfillment of the desire encounters resistance then anger and its kin arise. It's always derivative. That is developed, for example, in the Summa.

Student: What happens when slight isn't involved? You gave the example . . .

Strauss: That is a point I was going to make. That's a difficulty. So if this is so, then slight is not necessary. And do we not have many cases where people because they are hurt but not slighted get angry? For example, someone doesn't get something but his competitor gets it. He doesn't have any thought of being slighted. For example, it could be a roulette of sorts so there would be no slighting. But he didn't get it. He gets angry. The reduction of anger to slight is too narrow. And Aristotle knows this as we shall see.

Student: Might not one be slighted by providence?

Strauss: That is a very good point. That is a possibility. We will come to that. But not by providence, by chance. That could very well be the case. Sure.

Student: Doesn't he attempt to take care of this partially by saying that it's not necessarily a slight but a comprehended slight?

Strauss: No, I believe that Aristotle admits this point, that anger is aroused by simple hurts. And I will give you some proof. Is anger limited to the human being? Aristotle himself refers to angry dogs. Now slight is something of which only human beings are capable, a sense of slight. I also like dogs, that is not the point, but we must not make them entirely human. You know, you see jealousy, repentance, and all these things you can easily believe you can find in dogs, but this is not the reason at all. I mean as though dog-lovers were (inaudible). I mean they do not strictly repent if they make this beautiful gesture, or they are not truly jealous although we believe they are. They do not smile as some people say, although when you see a puppy play you can't help believing that he is smiling. But he doesn't smile. Because he is not a rational animal. Dogs are angry, but they do not feel slight. And so anger is really a broader phenomenon. Aristotle admits it. We have only to read in the immediate sequel and then we will find it.

Student: "Again men are angry when the event is contrary . . .

Strauss: I'm sorry, no. Men are angry when they desire and do not get what they desire, especially against those who slight the present predicament, the present concern. A bit before, when he gives

the examples of the sick man, the poor, the lovers, the thirsty, and altogether who are in a state of desire . . .

Student: "Wherefore men are angry when they are pained because one who is pained aims at something. Wherefore the sick, the necessitous, those at war, the love sick, the thirsty, in a word all who desire something and cannot obtain it are prone to anger and easily excited especially against . . .

Strauss: "the highest degree," more literally translated, i.e., slight is more anger provoking than hurt, but hurt is also anger provoking. That is what Aristotle means. And then in the immediate sequel we come to the point which our Canadian friend made, I still a problem with your name although Aristotle says it is a sign of slight not to remember names, but you know it is not a sign of slight but because of the difficulty. Now, read the sequel.

Student: "Again men are angry when the event is contrary to their expectations."

Strauss: Yes, but here (inaudible) is involved. When the opposite takes place, happens, there can be anger against (inaudible), and therefore even against God. Curse God and thy, say Job's wife. Yes, a little bit later before 1379 b, when he speaks of the serious people. What is that?

Student: But these acts must be of such kind that they are neither retaliatory nor advantageous to those who commit them, for if they are they will then appear due to gratuitous insult. And men are angry with those who (inaudible) or despise things which they themselves of the greatest importance. For instance, if a man speaks contemptuously of philosophy or of personal beauty in the presence of those who pride themselves upon them, and so in all other cases. But they are far more angry if they suspect that they do not possess these qualities either not at all or not to any great extent, or when others do not think they possess them; for when they feel strongly that they do possess those qualities which are the subject of mockery they pay no heed to it."

Strauss: Is not that very wise, what he said? Now b 7, a bit later:

Student: "And with those who do not return their kindness not requite them in full, and with those who oppose them if they are inferiors; for all such appear to treat them with contempt, the latter as if they regarded them as inferiors, the former as if they had received kindnesses from inferiors."

Strauss: So in other words in the case of inferiors people get more angry than equals or superiors. That is also part of the picture. The only thing which is a bit difficult for me here in this enumeration is when he says, in 1379 b 20, people are angry at the bringers of bad news because they think these bringers do not worry about their hurting us, their paining us. I do not know whether Aristotle is right on this particular point. I believe it is a kind of simple association. I mean we are really angry at the bad news and the bringer has to suffer for it. It is not necessary that it

have this implication.

Student: Maybe it's something like blaming the weather forecaster for the weather.

Strauss: Yes, something like this.

Student: It seems to me he implies something more, not just that someone brings the bad news but that it would be all right if someone brought the bad news and then offered sufficient respect, or condolences . . .

Strauss: But it won't help. There are so many scenes in tragedies or in histories where very humble servants bring this bad news and suffer for it.

Student: Later on he makes use of an episode in Antigone when one of the soldiers brings news to Creon that Antigone has buried her brother against the King's wishes, and before the messenger even gives the information he first of all starts telling Creon that he's not a bad fellow, that he's doing this against his will, that he didn't want to bring the news, he wanted to run away. He diverts him about ten minutes before he finally tells him.

Strauss: Yes, this was an awareness of this fact. He was a shrewd fellow. Now the difficulty here in this discussion is this. When he speaks about the disposition men are in when they become angry, there is no emphasis on slight. But when he speaks of the man at whom they are angry the emphasis is altogether on slight. Did I make the difficulty clear? In the first enumeration, 1379 a 11-29, no emphasis on slight or contempt; in 1379 a 30 - b 37, emphasis on slight. Why? I believe he had an answer in 1380 a 2-5, if you'll read that.

Student: "It is evident, then, that it will be necessary for the speaker by his eloquence to put the hearers into the frame of mind of those who are inclined to anger and to show that his opponents are responsible for things which rouse men to anger and are people of the kind with whom men are angry."

Strauss: Yes, now I think that is the answer. If you wish to make your audience truly angry you must show that the defendant or the opposed party, domestic or foreign, not only thwarted you but slighted you. Therefore the emphasis is on slight. A good example is, I think, Cleon's speech in Thucydides, Book Three, chapter 39, sections 4 and 5. When Thucydides argues against the MITYLENIANS who had deserted Athens, the Athenians wanted to kill the whole male adult population, Cleon was in favor of that measure. He brings in the subject of the hubris of the MITYLENIANS, not merely that they damaged the Athenians but that they insulted them. I believe that is what (inaudible) generally do, because the other (inaudible) if they only took care of their interests and this hurts your interest, that's too bad. That does not make you angry. But if you are told, they wanted to hurt us, then you get angry. That explains why from a theoretical point of view anger is not limited to slights, but the rhetorically interesting kind of anger is that

which is aroused by slight.

Student: Is the reference to which you just referred in Thucydides have anything to do with Aristotle's example of the individuals who are being angered and directed on page 173. He says the angered man must always be angry with a particular individual.

Strauss: Some individual. But individual does not necessarily mean Cleon or whoever it might be. It may also mean an individual city. For Aristotle, obviously, you can be angry at a nation in war. Aristotle means individual as something named, with a proper name, whether an individual or a group of men. You are not angry at a kind of thing. This will become clear when he discusses hatred. There, he contends, we may hate kinds. For example, a woman hater, a man is not angry at woman, he may be angry at this or that woman, but he may hate woman. And the case of the dogs who are said to be angry at mailmen, not at this or that mailman, would of course show us a lower level of doggish anger. So let us keep this in mind. Aristotle uses frequently (inaudible), expresses himself very laconically. This is by the way a question, since I mentioned Thucydides, I believe he is never mentioned by Aristotle. (checking the index) No, he is never mentioned. Aristotle must have had quite a few examples from orators and from historians and from poets for all of these points, but he gives an example in only a very few cases. This is a question which would deserve some study, but we cannot go into that. One would have to know much more than we do.

Student: You posed a paradox at the end of the last meeting. You said that (inaudible) would permit something which is a crime based on desire even though the ultimate end of a crime committed on desire is only (inaudible), and that if one committed a crime out of anger even though the ultimate end of that crime is murder . . .

Strauss: If the end was murder then the anger was only played. I have no doubt that clever people can pretend to be angry without being angry. No, you misunderstood me. I said this. What is the greatest crime coming from anger ordinarily speaking of course, not taking farfetched cases?

Student: Manslaughter.

Strauss: Yes, the killing of a man. What is the greatest crime coming from desire? Rape. Now if you look at it practically, how it happens in real life, if a man pleads before a court that he killed a man in anger, extenuating circumstances; if he is accused of rape and he says, yes I committed the crime but I did it out of lust, he will get a contempt of court in addition. So this shows that desire is not an extenuating circumstance. And one can infer from this that anger is nobler than lust. And one can give additional evidence. An authority, whether it's a father or teacher or whatever, does not lose his authority by the mere fact of anger. He may lose it if it's foolish anger. But think of Moses angrily destroying the tablets. Does this take away anything of his impressiveness? No. But if a man in authority shows himself in a state of lust, he will lose something of his authority. These are the empirical bases for Plato's sweeping assertion that spiritedness is

higher than desire, which, however, if you go into it and analyze it properly you will see it's not true universally stated but there is some element of truth as is shown by these examples.

Student: The reason I asked this is because when we see today that anger is based or founded on desire, I wonder if that doesn't . . .

Strauss: Yes, this creates a certain difficulty, but this is exactly what Plato does not bring out in the Republic. Plato's argument runs roughly this way, that is of course implied also here, slight. In one of the passages which we have not read Aristotle says that we are not angry if we know that we deserve that evil inflicted on us. He gives the example of the slave. The slave is to be whipped. But the wise master will tell him first that he deserves to be whipped, and explain it to him. And if the slave is satisfied he will not get angry at the master, at least hopefully. Good. So we are angry only if we believe to be in the right, if we believe to have been hurt wrongly. It's not universally true, but there is an element of truth. If you . . .

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: Oh no, a low man surely not, but tolerably decent men get angry when they have the feeling that some harm has been done to them. I mean not mere hurt, but some wrong. Therefore, anger implies a sense of right. Desire does not imply a sense of right. Therefore anger is higher (inaudible). So there is something to that. Anger is a more respectable passion than mere desire, especially the bodily desires. And therefore Plato can build up his beautiful conception in the Republic, but it is nevertheless a questionable thing. And the simple sign of this is that in the highest case it makes sense, and it is even necessary, to speak of a desire for knowledge -- both Aristotelian and Platonic. But anger does not enter here. To the extent to which a man gets angry in a theoretical discussion he disqualifies himself, which doesn't mean that it can always be helped. There may be a high degree of stupidity, which is of course the least (inaudible), or there may be a very perverse assertion, but strictly speaking we must not get angry. Good. Now a few words about the last chapter of today's assignment, chapter 3, where Aristotle deals with the mitigation of anger, producing gentleness, mildness. Now in the Ethics mildness is treated as a virtue. Here it is treated in the context of passions. Whether it is truly a passion according to what Aristotle says here is hard to say, but the main point is unimportant to the rhetorician. This is too subtle for him. It is enough that he is constantly confronted with the necessity of appeasing an angry audience in a deliberative or judicial assembly. Now what has to be done in this respect is in a way simple to say because if you know what makes men angry you know also what takes away that anger. A few passages we might read, about the dogs we must read. Aristotle says so little about man's best friend that we must read it, 1380 a 22.

Student: "Even the behavior of dogs proves that anger ceases towards those who humble themselves, for they do not bite those who sit down."

Strauss: They cease to be angry if a man shows fear of them. That is Aristotle's (inaudible). I can easily see how he comes to that but I wonder whether it is right, whether (inaudible) the man now admits the dog's superiority. That such cases occur is quite obvious. I remember a very tough old dog. When we as children went to school we had to go around, but when we came to this house we walked very (inaudible). I think this shows how little has changed in this respect, but it does not necessarily prove that Aristotle is right. A little bit before Aristotle speaks of those who are angry, what we do when we are angry at a slave.

Student: "Evidence of this may be seen in the punishment of slaves; for we punish more severely those who contradict us and deny their offense, but cease to be angry with those who admit that they are justly punished. The reason is that to deny what is evident is disrespect and disrespect is slight and contempt. Anyhow we show no respect for those for whom we entertain a profound contempt."

Strauss: Yes, but this is of course here a difficulty, is it not, that those angry at a slave do not despise the slave. That cannot go together. Those angry at the slave do not despise the slave. They take him seriously. Yes, but if you think of Aristotle's great-souled man, the magnanimous man, the truly superior man, could he be truly angry because he despises almost everything? That's another point. On yes, the passage which I had in mind occurs here in 1380 b 16-18.

Student: "And if they think that they themselves are wrong and deserve what they suffer; for anger is not aroused against what is just; they no longer think that they are being treated otherwise than they should be which, as we have said, is the essence of anger."

Strauss: Yes, you see that's it. Therefore, that there is a sense of right is implied, or may be implied, that's a correction for your sake, in anger, and more necessarily than in the case of desire. That is a kind of superiority. There are also some nice cases of the irrationality of how men get rid of their anger in b 14-15, shortly before what you just read. When the man at whom they are angry has suffered even greater than they wanted to inflict upon him. They wanted only to beat him, but then he became blind. Then the anger ceases, at least ordinarily. There is another example also later. For example, men are not angry at people who are dead, because they have suffered the extreme, and in addition they can never get at them any more and the satisfaction of anger being impossible the anger atrophies or ceases.

Student: That last definition of anger, (inaudible) to be treated otherwise than one expects. That's very general isn't it. Because that would suggest that anger would be a reaction to any unjust treatment . . . (inaudible). You are treated otherwise than you expect when you are robbed. Why? Someone wanted your money, nothing more.

Strauss: That depends. You see, Aristotle says anger is necessarily preceded by desire. Now which desire precedes our being slighted

and our feeling of being slighted and therefore getting angry? Our desire to be recognized as something very important, I suppose. And then of course the more a man has this desire, the more inflated he is, the more does he have a chance of getting angry. At least if he has no means of enforcing it, of enforcing his own estimate of himself on others by having power, for then he can counteract it.

Student: Yes. I just thought that this definition was broader than slight, that slight need not be included in that definition, that it merely meant that you were treated otherwise than you were expected to be. We expect to be treated justly. We can be treated unjustly without being slighted.

Strauss: Yes, but the broadest definition which Aristotle gives is that anger arises when we are thwarted, and this thwarting may take the form of slighting where our estimate of ourself is thwarted or it may be when our desire for an apple is thwarted. Another fellow gets it first.

Student, (inaudible)

Strauss: Sure, but this creates a certain difficulty, doesn't it?

Student: You mean you shouldn't get angry at someone . . .

Strauss: Yes, sure. In other words by being angry at him you pay an attention to him which is not easily compatible with your alleged superiority. Sure we get angry, but take the other case. We get angry when we hurt our (inaudible). Have you never had this experience? Good. This is by the way another sign why anger is higher than desire. When we make this experience, we hurt our leg here (apparently indicating the table's leg), we treat that leg as an animate being which wants to hurt us. We personify it. And this is, I believe, another point why anger can be said to be higher than desire. This poetic element is absent from desire. You can desire an apple without making any personification of that. That's all for this time.

Lecture VIII
Aristotle's Rhetoric, April 22, 1964

Strauss: Now I turn to the subject of today. What you said about the Ethics and the Rhetoric in the treatment of the moral phenomena is of course quite correct, but it has an important implication. In the Ethics Aristotle is concerned with the virtues and vices, and above all with the virtues. The seamy side of man does not come out clearly in the Ethics, and since the seamy side is politically very important the student of politics has to learn quite a few things, not only (inaudible). This is a side we must never forget. Now to come to a special point. "CHARIS", how to translate that. Well I think some light is thrown on this if one considers that it is the opposite of compulsion. What you do under compulsion is not a gracious act. At the beginning of Thucydides when he speaks of the Trojan war he says the Greek princes did not go against Troy out of graciousness, but from compulsion, because Agamemnon was so strong. In Xenophon's Hiero I observed that in the first part in which the author discusses tyranny at its worst I think the proportion of compulsion and grace is roughly sixteen to four, and when tyranny is brought up to its best it's equal. there is as much grace as there is compulsion. This may also be (inaudible). When you say that in the discussion of shame and disgrace he mentions first throwing away one's (inaudible), and you reminded us of Hobbes. But Hobbes is in entire agreement with that. You know that.

Student: He says it's disgraceful, not unjust but disgraceful.

Strauss: I see, and I agree, only Aristotle would⁽²⁾ this simple distinction between the honorable and the just. Good. You mentioned also the discussion of fear, that the disfavor of the gods is not mentioned and that is a very good point. We will have to take this up. You said Aristotle is silent on death being the most fearful thing. And that is true. He mentions it of course, but it is not so emphatic. Because he says we fear destructive evils, and surely death is destructive. But why no such emphasis on fear of death in the Rhetoric. It's very practical, because death as such is never an object of deliberation, perhaps of forensic rhetoric -- in order to say, he must be killed because that is the extreme punishment and the only one we can find -- but not in deliberative as such. But for example we fear thermo-nuclear destruction. This would be a way in which fear of death would come up. But fear of death as such is not a political thing, although it is implied in many political things. You stressed properly the political importance of philia, friendship, love, however we translate it, but it must be understood of course that the friendship, as you indicated, which is of importance in rhetoric is not friendship of the highest kind, what Socrates calls the good friend. Political societies are never good friends to that extent, however friendly to each other they may be. One point from the Ethics may be of some help: the difference between friendship and benevolence. Do you remember that?

Student: Benevolence, or good will, is a part of friendship. Benevolence, or good will, is shown between friends.

Strauss: But benevolence is not friendship. I mean you can be benevolent to someone without being friendly to him.

Student: There must be this recognition.

Strauss: Yes, for example you can wish that boxer a will win the next fight, and to that extent you are benevolent to him. But that is of course not friendship. Now the most fundamental point which you raised concerns the general character of the discussion in the Rhetoric. You said it is not a theoretical discussion and you referred to the discussion of the passions in the Ethics. Does he discuss passions in the Ethics?

Student: He discusses virtues and within those virtues there will be discussed . . . for instance he discusses the virtue of courage and then discusses the emotion of fear.

Strauss: But the discussion of fear is extremely brief compared with that in the Rhetoric. So we cannot say that we find a discussion of the passions in the Ethics. Their knowledge is somehow presupposed, but they are not discussed. Only one minor last point. You referred to Aristotle's modesty when he says . . . (inaudible). Yes this is true. I would not (inaudible) a kind of urbanity, not to be very heavy, professorial. . . . (inaudible). This is a part of that Attic urbanity which Aristotle, while not coming from Athens, nevertheless acquired. This creates sometimes difficulties, because sometimes the perhaps may be a real perhaps and you must make up your own mind. But I would like first to say something about this subject of Aristotle's discussion of the passions. Aristotle was attacked for that by one of his most famous enemies, Francis Bacon. In his Advancement of Learning, in the Everyman's Library edition on page 171-72, we find the following remark regarding the inquiry touching the affections: "As the ancient politics in popular states were wont to compare the people to the sea and the orators to the winds, because as the sea would of itself be calm and quiet if the winds did not move and trouble it so the people would be peaceable and tractable if the seditious orators did not set them in working and agitation. So it may be fitly said that the mind and the nature thereof would be temperate and staid if the affections as winds did not put it into turmoil and perturbation. And here again I find it strange as before that Aristotle should have written diverse volumes of ethics and never handled the affections which is the principal subject thereof, and yet in his rhetorics where they are considered but collaterally and in the second degree, as they may be moved by speech, he finds place for them and handles them well for the quantity, but where their true place is in the ethics he pretermits them; for it is not his disputations about pleasure and pain that can satisfy this inquiry no more than he that should generally handle the nature of light can be said to handle the nature of colors; for pleasure and pain are to the particular affections as light is to particular colors. Better travails I suppose had the Stoics taken in this argument, as far as I can gather by that which we have at second hand; but yet it is like it was after their manner, rather in subtilty of definitions than in active and ample descriptions and observations. . . . But the poets and writers of histories are the best doctors of this knowledge;

where we may find painted forth with great life, how affections are kindled and incited; how pacified and refrained; and how again contained from act and further degree; how they disclose themselves, how they work, how they vary, how they gather and fortify, how they are inwrapped one within another, and how they do fight and encounter one with another, and other the like particularities; amongst the which this last is of special use in moral and civil matters; how, I say, to set affection against affection, and to master one by another; even as we used to hunt beast with beast and fly bird with bird, which otherwise percase we could not easily recover; upon which foundation is erected that excellent use of praemium and poena [reward and punishment], whereby civil states consist; employing the predominant affections of fear and hope, for the suppressing and bridling the rest. For as in the government of states it is sometimes necessary to bridle one faction with another, so it is in the government within."

Now with this remark Bacon has written the program for the political philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, without any question. And you see that he states it here in clear opposition to Aristotle. Now what do we have to say to that? Why did Aristotle not treat the passions in the context of his moral and political philosophy? Why did he not do that. We would have first to raise the question, what is his political philosophy about?

Student: The best state.

Strauss: Well let us say the variety of regimes and of course with a view to the question, what is the best regime. But the passions exist of course under all regimes. In all regimes you find fear, and hatred, and envy, and friendship, and so on. The only difference is this, that in the best kinds of regimes the leading men, the rulers, would be men who controlled their passions properly, who have virtue. Therefore virtue is an immediate subject of political philosophy, whereas the passions are not. Passions are politically neutral. They occur in every regime. Therefore they are not a fit subject of political philosophy. For the purpose of the control of the passions, especially in one's own life but also politically, ordinary knowledge of passions is sufficient. In other words, in order to be moderate regarding food and drink you do not have to have a profound analysis of the desire for food and drink. You know, that's not necessary. You do not have to enter into the spirit of these desires, or anger, or whatever it may be. You know quite well that you must control it. That's good enough. Too sympathetic understanding of these things might even be harmful to control, and every attempt at understanding requires some sympathy with the subject matter. It might be a good idea not to know too much about it and simply say to these savage dogs, to hit them over the head so to speak. Good. But nevertheless there is no question that a theoretical man, as Aristotle was, must be interested in the passions beyond the practical use by the rhetorician. Where would he treat them then, not in the Ethics? Psychology. And there are at least general references to the passions, quite a few, in De Anima. But the discussion of the soul, De Anima is a very short book relatively speaking. But if Aristotle had thought of elaborating the points about the passions that would have been the place for it.

This is surely true. Good. Now let us then turn to our text and begin with chapter 4. And we might as well read the beginning. The first sentence:

Student: "Let us now state who are the persons that men love or hate and why, after we have defined love and loving."

Strauss: Now let us stop there for a moment. He says, who are the men loving and why do they love, but in the cases of all the other passions he adds a third point. For that turn to the beginning of chapter 2, for example. There is always a third consideration.

Student: "Let us then define anger . . .

Strauss: No, no. I mean where he makes this general statement. I will look it up. Try chapter 6.

Student: "What are the things of which men are ashamed or the contrary and before whom, and in what frame of mind will be clear from the following considerations."

Strauss: Yes, in what frame of mind is here missing, and only in the section on friendship. That is very strange. Why does he do it? Let us go on first and read a few more lines.

Student: "Let loving then be defined as wishing for anyone the things which we believe to be good for his sake but not for our own, and procuring them for him as far as lies in our power. A friend is one who loves and is loved in return. And those who think their relationship is of this character consider themselves friends."

Strauss: Let us stop here. Those who believe to be disposed in this manner toward each other believe to be friends. This believing occurs here three times in the beginning statement. It occurs in the case of no other passion. That may be a solution to this question why the state of mind is not mentioned here as it is in the case of all the other passions. Look, a man believes to be a friend of someone else and yet he is not a friend. Does this make sense? There is a beautiful discussion of that in Xenophon's

ECONOMICS I believe in chapter 21, no it must be earlier.

When he says -- a sentence which they usually do not dare to translate because it is a bit complicated, but not too complicated for any man or woman of eighteen or say normal intelligence, some older men have strange notions of what they can expect -- that we believe to be friends to those by whom we believe to have been benefited: a double believe. In other words a man may believe to be a friend of someone else without being one. He may believe to have been benefited without having been benefited. Take a drug addict. He believes to have been benefited by someone who gave him this stuff, and then he may say, he's my friend. But he believes to be his friend, he is not truly his friend, he only regards him as a useful man; and he is not truly useful. Now this element of delusions is perhaps not as powerful in the other passions. I mean, we are angry all right. We can play the angry man without being angry, but then we know it of course. But this delusion -- there is no delusion about being angry, whereas we can be deluded about our being

friends, and both can be deluded about it.

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: But still our anger . . . That he may Aristotle says so. It may only be apparent, that's all right. But the anger is the (inaudible). But here the friendship is not genuine. That is, I think, the difficulty. Now one can perhaps also state it as follows: There is no special hexis, no special disposition required for loving, whereas a special disposition is needed for the other passions. This would be the case if we are always disposed to love and to hate, if there is no special occasion needed. If, in other words, it were true that to be a human being simply means to have friends and enemies, no special required. In b 34, shortly before 1382 a:

Student: "Kinds of friendship are comradeship, intimacy, kinship."

Strauss: Well everyone has kindred, doesn't he, because he is born from human beings. He may be a foundling, I know that. But generally speaking he will belong to families, and hence they have the friends and enmities belonging to the families, whether they are personal, or on the basis social class, or race, that's unimportant. And therefore when they say in these famous recitations of the deepest human problems, he didn't have a single enemy, you know in a matter of murder, that is not so simple. We all have friends and enemies. I mean in a crude sense it may be true, but not in a deeper sense. Surely this science (?) is strange and needs interpretation. Now let us go on. Well, why don't you continue where we left off.

Student: "This being granted, it necessarily follows that he is a friend who shares our joy and good fortune and our sorrow and affliction for our own sake and not for any other reason; for all men rejoice when what they desire comes to pass and are pained when the contrary happens, so that pain and pleasure are an indication of what they wish. And those are friends who have the same ideas of good and bad and . . .

Strauss: Well "ideas" of course is not there: "for whom the same things are good and bad." One can translate it if one wants to, "who regard the same things as good and bad," but "ideas" shouldn't be in. That is a Lockean notion of ideas, wholly alien to Aristotle.

Student: "and love and hate the same persons, since they necessarily wish the same things. Wherefore one who wishes for another what he wishes for himself seems to be the other's friend."

Strauss: The "seems" is not unimportant.

Student: "We also like those who have done good, either to us or to those whom we hold dear, if the services are important or are cordially rendered or under certain circumstances and for our sake only; and all those whom we think desirous of doing us good; and those who are friends of our friends and who like those whom we like . .

Strauss: Wait a moment. Is this so simply true, that the friends

of our friends are our friends? Well I remember the case of a student who loved, I think he genuinely loved me, I have no reason to doubt, we have remained friends for twenty years, but he also loved someone else, another teacher, and this other teacher and I did not love each other at all. And he was very unhappy about that, which was a very charming thing, but this is a cruel experience. I believe that you must have had that experience, that you can have two different friends to each other. This is possible. It may be impossible on the highest level of friendship, but this highest level is, of course, not the subject here. It is only a rhetorical topic of some plausibility. It is true in foreign relations. The allies of our allies are to some extent our allies, and this may also be true in domestic politics, but simply it cannot be said to be true. And then he also says the same thing about the beloved.

Student: "Those who are liked by those are liked by others."

Strauss: "Loved" one should say. "Like" is too little. This is a different case here, not the same as (inaudible). For example, our friend's father is loved by him but he is not his friend in the ordinary sense of the word, in a wider sense yes, but these are not identical.

Student: "and those whose enemies are ours, those who hate those whom we ourselves hate, and those who are hated by those who are hated by us; for all such persons call the same thing as we what is good, so that they wish what is good for us, which as we said is the characteristic of a friend. Further, we love those who are ready to help others in the matter of money or personal safety. Wherefore, men honor those who are liberal, courageous, and just."

Strauss: You see the change from love to honor. We love those who are beneficent regarding (inaudible), therefore men honor the liberal, the courageous, and the just.

Student: "and such we consider those who do not live upon others, the sort of men who live by their own exertions, and among them agriculturists and beyond all others those who work with their own hands."

Strauss: Good. Is this not interesting, because for political oratory this is an important consideration. Aristotle does not make such a remark in the Ethics. First of all we note that the moral qualities here mentioned are treated by Aristotle of course as factual, and as factual as whether men are tall, lame, or whatever observable qualities people may have. These are facts which everyone knows. People love the farmers. "Agriculturalist" is a strangely complicated translation. The tillers of the soil -- I think "farmers" would be better. You know, then you derive, as it were, something which is a very elementary phenomenon from a complicated technique, not to say technology. Do you see what I mean? Good. So people love the farmers and those working with their own hands. What do you say to the assertion? I think it is a very profound remark. There is no such animosity against these kinds of people on which you can . . . (inaudible) as there can be against traitors, bankers, politicians, highbrows, the rich, the King. You know,

there is no such presupposed animosity toward them. That's of some importance. Aristotle doesn't pay too great attention to that in his political or moral teaching, but in his Rhetoric it's of some importance. A whole branch of poetry, bucolic poetry, draws on that somehow. It's a very wholesome thing.

Student: Does the switch from love to honor in the sentence we just read indicate . . . (inaudible)?

Strauss: Not quite. I believe it is impossible to combine love with contempt. There are people who are, how do they call it, a kind of perversion, how do they call it, someone who is completely, there is a word which these fellows use, when someone despises a woman and is completely her slave, they have a word for that . . .

Student: Neurotic, masochist, misogynist.

Strauss: No, no. This kind of servility, of inner dependence, there is a word for that but I do not know it. This, of course, exists, but it is a morbid phenomenon. Normal human beings cannot love someone without respecting him to some extent. But still be- some respect and honor there is a great difference. For example, a mother loves her child, but one cannot really say she loves her child. That could be misleading. We surely respect respectable people. We honor the liberal, the courageous, and the just. We do not necessarily love them. Even if we can only love a virtuous man, which one can doubt, one cannot possibly say that one loves everyone, every virtuous man whom one knows. That's impossible, because that would make friendship very watery if you can have so many friends, as Aristotle also observes in the Ethics usually two men or very few can be friends. Now what is your point?

Student: That the ocean of friendship is beginning to be watered down, because at the very start of this sentence . . . (inaudible), "the further we like those who are ready to help others in the matter of money or personal safety . . .

Strauss: Well I think if we start from the fact that we like those who are beneficent in this respect, if we start from this we will also understand why men honor those who have these qualities to a higher degree: the liberal man, the courageous man, and the just. Yes, I think if we start with that fact. Now we cannot go on through the examples. That must now suffice. Let us turn to 1381 b 14-16:

Student: "And we like those who resemble us and have the same tastes provided their interests do not clash with ours and that they do not gain their living in the same way; for then it becomes the case of potter being jealous of potter."

Strauss: I think that is very neatly put, that he adds this qualification, that if people have the same interests as us, if they have much in common with us, that's a bond. But then of course competition for livelihood enters, or something of this kind, that may bring about just the opposite. Now go on.

Student: "and those who desire the same things provided it is

possible for us to share them, other wise the same thing would happen again; and those with whom we are on such terms that we do not blush before them for faults merely condemned by public opinion, provided that this is not due to contempt; and those before whom for faults which are really bad."

Strauss: Let us first get the terms straight. To be ashamed in regard to those things referring to opinion, as distinguished from those things referring to the truth. What does he mean by that? Give an example.

Student: Among close friends what other people think won't make too much difference, it'll just be what our friends think and they'll only be concerned about the true things. (inaudible) I'll blush in front of a friend, but what other people are going to talk about, public opinion, (inaudible), and things like that won't make any difference between my friends.

Strauss: Now what is an example?

Strauss: Say the early eighteenth century in England when there is an excessive punctilio with regard to the code (inaudible), and with your friends you can despise the sort of honor that makes two people go out and get killed over a matter of who goes into a theater first.

Strauss: Sure, but it is not so immediately accessible to us because we have to travel back two centuries, but otherwise it's all right.

Student: The only thing I could think of was that if you spilled something on your tie or something and didn't know about it, people generally speaking would say that's wrong but your friends wouldn't.

Strauss: That is of course a clear sign that you are all young people, but some of you will know the tremendous importance of the cosmetics industry now. If someone colors his hair or beard, this disgraceful thing that he conceals his age is not disgraceful to a good friend. And where he would of course be ashamed to admit that he had defrauded someone, which is a true disgrace . . . One can also take this. Take two Russians who are not ashamed to talk to each other about Khrushchev's crimes, which if it were done in public would be very unpleasant. This is only something which is disgraceful according to opinion. It is not disgraceful in itself, and this kind of thing. So the distinction makes some sense. Now what has this to do with the remark made by (inaudible) in the Ethics?

Student: I was just going to say that this should show that Aristotle's discussion of friendship here, though not the highest friendship is still not the lowest friendship. The lowest friendship would be one when someone would do something for you.

Strauss: No, that is not friendship in his sense, in any sense.

Student: Isn't that one of the listings in the Ethics. There are three types of friends . . .

Strauss: Oh, you mean the business friendship. No, this he doesn't take seriously as friendship.

Student: You mean here it's not friendship.

Strauss: No, I mean even in the Ethics it's not treated as genuine friendship. It's discussed only to exclude it. I mean business people are connected only by the fact that it is advantageous to both to have this business relationship. They are not friends. Friendship can develop from this, but as such it is a spurious friendship, because it lacks the true motive. Each thinks entirely of himself, and he uses the other as a means. And since this is done mutually, it is mutually satisfactory; but this still doesn't make this friendship. In a moment one would regard the other as an end. It would change. That can happen, but it's not necessary. But what about the passage in the Rhetoric, rather in the Ethics that a man, a truly virtuous man would never do anything which is base even conventionally. You remember this statement. He would never do anything which is base in itself, intrinsically base, but also never do anything which is base conventionally, base or low or dishonorable.

Student: Consequently, he says the truly virtuous man would never experience shame. And he says that is why old men who should be more virtuous than young men should never experience shame.

Strauss: Very great old men, older men. But still this is a very interesting question. I think that in reading the Fourth Book, at the end of the Fourth Book of the Ethics where this passage occurs, we came already up against difficulties there when we turn to Book Five. Now a virtuous man is also, of course, a just man. Now Aristotle makes it quite clear a man can be just and yet commit, very rarely naturally, an unjust act. Just as a man can be unjust and commit quite a few just actions. So if this is so, if the just man doesn't cease to be just if he commits under very special circumstances an unjust action -- of which as such he must be ashamed naturally -- then it cannot be so simple. I believe it is a very extreme statement about this virtuous man who will never do anything improper to the slightest degree ever. Surely in a way for, as a public figure that can be done. It has been shown frequently. But for someone who knows this man very well, it is hard to say. So we have perhaps to limit it to (inaudible) knowledge.

Student: This passage here though, he's thinking of the case where it's sort of on a regular basis and not just the result of negligence or (inaudible) if a friend does something that is conventionally wrong. He's not thinking of the virtuous man who slips up in a particular case. I mean isn't he talking about . . .

Strauss: A habitual thing you mean. That may be. That is possible.

Student: At least not a rare thing.

Strauss: Well, for example, if someone would be embarrassed to show a bodily defect of his, which having a good tailor is invisible to the public, but he changes his jacket in the presence of a friend,

because it is only conventionally disgraceful. No sensible man will look down on another because he has a physical defect, although for the one who has the defect it may be somewhat embarrassing to show it. That's possible.

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: Well this is a subject of great delicacy. Aristotle doesn't mention it here. He mentions the gods in a later passage. I suppose that Plato and Aristotle would not hesitate to say that the gods worshipped by the city of Athens, as they are meant by the city of Athens, do not exist. Surely this is so. How would this refer to the remark at the end of the Fourth Book. This would again prove the fictitious character, the extreme character, of the statement there, because it is unthinkable that people who are really good friends would not express to each other frankly their opinions on this subject, only opinion condemned by the public.

Student: Would Aristotle say that that which has to do with the gods is conventional.

Strauss: Well he says so. Read Book Twelve of the Metaphysics, the passage quoted in the Middle Ages, 1074 b. I have quoted it here once in class. Now let us go on.

Student: "and those whose rivals we are or by whom we wish to be emulated but not envied, these we either like or wish to be friends with them; And those whom we are ready to assist in obtaining what is good, provided greater evil does not result for ourselves; and those who show equal fondness for friends whether absent or present, wherefore all men like those who show such feeling for the dead."

Strauss: Is this not interesting, that it is a sign of good character that men do not forget their dead, also an implication only but still not altogether negligible. This is one other thing which has not changed, which is not so peculiar to one particular culture. Now let us turn to what he has to say about hatred, which is rather difficult in some points, 1382 a 1.

Student: "As for enmity and hatred, it is evident that they must be examined in the light of their contraries. The causes which produce enmity are anger, spitefulness, slander."

Strauss: "Slander" one can also translate "calumny," but it is perhaps the same.

Student: "Anger arises from acts committed against us, enmity even from those which are not; for if we imagine a man to be of such and such a character we hate him. Anger has always an individual as its object."

Strauss: Individual properly understood, also individual groups designated by name, Spartans, Thebans, and so on.

Student: "For instance, Callias or Socrates, whereas hatred applies to classes."

Strauss: Also to classes, we may hate individuals also. How many cases do we find where an individual hates another individual.

Student: "for instance, everyone hates a thief or informer."

Strauss: Is this not strange? Do not social scientists say that is not true? We know people, the thieves themselves, do they not love the thieves? What is the answer? Of course not. Why?

Student: The same reason that people who hijack trucks or cars get the trucks stolen by other thieves.

Strauss: The same is true. The informer hates of course people who inform on him. So you see how wise Aristotle was.

Student: The potter is jealous of the potter.

Strauss: Yes, but in this particular case that's important. So Aristotle says that everyone hates them, sure.

Student: "Anger is curable by time, hatred not. The aim of anger is pain, of hatred evil; for the angry man wishes to see what happens, to one who hates it does not matter. Now the things which cause pain are all perceptible, while things which are especially bad, such as injustice or folly, are least perceptible; for the presence of vice causes no pain. Anger is accompanied by pain, but hatred not; for he who is angry suffers pain, but he who hates does not. One who is angry might feel compassion in many cases, but one who hates never; for the former wishes that the object of his anger should suffer in his turn, the latter . . .

Strauss: Suffers as much, as much, and therefore he can have pity if he suffers more. That's the idea. And he who hates wishes the extinction. Now this creates some difficulties. I would like first to state them. Aristotle seems to say that hatred and anger are mutually exclusive. While he admits that hatred may arise from anger, yet if you are actually hating you are no longer angry and vice versa. But on the other hand if you look at such masters of hatred as the Nazis, did they not both desire the destruction of the Jews and to make them feel pain, and both equally strong? This I mention only as an indication of the difficulty. Hatred, Aristotle says, is without pain, a settled, quiet determination. One wishes the hated being not to be, but its being does not cause pain. Is this possible? Is it possible to regard something as a great evil, otherwise one wouldn't hate it, without being pained by it? Aristotle's answer in lines 10-12 is to this effect: One may possess a great evil without being pained by it. For example, one may be foolish, which is a great evil, without being pained by it. Everyone knows such people. A man may be unjust without being pained by injustice. Everyone knows such people. It is possible. But in that case one doesn't know that this is an evil. If Aristotle misinterprets hatred, as he would seem to do, what is the reason for his error? Perhaps as follows: I think this would be along the lines of Aristotle's thinking, which in this respect is similar to Plato's. He starts from the highest form of hatred. Now what is that. That of the wise man, of course, who hates vice and folly, i.e., he wishes

vice and folly not to be, without however being pained by its being. Whether that is possible if the hatred is intense, that it would go without pain is truly difficult to understand for me. Surely, I don't see how hate on any lower level, i.e., on the only level which we practically meet, can be without pain, and on this ground, on this general ground which I believe is very strong; for there is no pathos, no passion, without pleasure or pain. That belongs to its definition as we have seen. And hatred is surely not accompanied by pleasure, therefore it must be accompanied by pain. In the meantime I thought a little bit more about it and this occurred to me. If we hate a man -- we should never do that, but unfortunately we are not perfect -- then it is perfectly true we wish his non-existence, or at least, which is practically the same thing, we wish him to be (inaudible), another place. If there is someone in a factory -- I deliberately don't use the example of a faculty -- who hates a fellow worker, he wishes him to be in another factory. Perhaps only in an extreme case he wishes his extinction. But is he pained when he is not around? The pain arises when you see that man, when you are near him. Perhaps Aristotle thinks of the (inaudible) case of actually being confronted by the hated individual. Now this is all I have to say.

Student: I was wondering about earlier in the discussion of friendship the disposition being absent and also on reading the definition I expected there would be some reference to pleasure in accordance with the definitions of the other emotions. Pleasure is not included in the definition. . And I wondered if this had any relation to the absence of pain in . . .

Strauss: Yes but in the case of friendship there is doubtless pleasure.

Student: But he doesn't mention . . .

Strauss: But he makes it very clear. I mean if you do not like the presence of someone else, to be with him, then you are not his friend. You may respect him very highly. But if the mere being together is not pleasant to you and vice versa, then it's not friendship. So, on the contrary, this would precisely show . . . Perhaps his silence about pleasure -- that is the point which you make which is very sound -- is connected with his silence about pain, but this would only confirm the difficulty. Passions without pleasure and pain cannot be, and hatred must be painful.

Student: In connection with this, you said earlier that passions were not discussed in the Ethics, but how is friendship discussed in the Ethics?

Strauss: A virtuous passion, shall I say. Friendship is both virtue and passion. One can say this: the relation of friendship to justice as the highest virtue is comparable to that between love and obedience to the law in the Christian tradition. This affective element, which does not necessarily belong to justice, is essential to friendship. Friendship is both noble and pleasurable, whereas the pleasurable of the virtues, this is not so simple. Of course Aristotle says the virtuous man derives pleasure from virtuous actions,

but it is not as powerfully present as it is in the case of friendship. That is the reason why Aristotle discusses friendship after the conclusion of the virtues. You know the virtues are finished in Book Six. Then there comes a discussion of pleasure. Then there comes the subject of friendship, Books Eight and Nine. And then a new discussion of pleasure. Aristotle (inaudible) around the discussion of friendship are discussions of pleasure, which underlines what I said before. Yes, but still I must say does anyone have, can anyone save Aristotle's assertion about hatred?

Student: Well, I think it's somewhat related to what you said about the highest form of hatred. From his examples it seems that Aristotle is thinking about hatred in terms of things or follies, and anger in terms of individuals. For instance, the fight for integration in this country, people who are very intense about this personify the evils and make the government figures, take Governor Wallace, they make them the evil things, the people. But people who just say think about the theoretical foundations of the arguments and maybe then conclude, yes this is a bad thing, we hate segregation. They would like to see this removed but they don't have the identification of evil with people, people trying to do bad things . . .

Strauss: But are they not pained by this lack of (inaudible)?

Student: It would certainly be a less intense pain (inaudible) pain if there are some unfortunate things around, but we don't feel that there is some kind of conspiracy of evil people. That I think would be the more personal one related to anger . . .

Strauss: I see you have in mind that Aristotle says everyone hates a thief. He does not think of this individual or that but he hates really thievery

Student: Right

Strauss: and not the thief.

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: Yes, I thought of that too, but still . . .

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Strauss: . . . hate doesn't have to be this particularly exciting. People hate something, perhaps some dead man, a composer or philosopher, but is this truly hate?

Student: It seems to me possible that Aristotle combines pain and pleasure each with love and hate. At the beginning of chapter 4 he says that we feel pleasure when our friends feel pleasure and pain when our friends feel pain, and perhaps then reversing this, we feel pleasure when our enemies feel pain and pain when our enemies feel pleasure.

Strauss: In other words Aristotle does mention pleasure and pain this discussion. I had forgotten that. You are quite right.

Student: (inaudible) includes malevolence among the dozen or so primitive passions.

Strauss: As pleasurable?

Student: As pleasurable, yes. I think I can imagine very well hating (?) Governor Wallace, for example, desiring not his extinction but his humiliation.

Strauss: But his extinction as the Governor.

Another Student: May I try to pick up the argument? From what was said and perhaps borne out by our bungling translator's omission of the "also," which this edition didn't omit.

Strauss: Who is the translator of the Rhetoric for the Loeb?

Student: Freese in the Loeb

Strauss: Because the translator of Aristotle's Ethics and Politics, Rackham, is quite good in the Loeb translation.

Student: But in omitting the "also" in the matter of (inaudible), it struck me that hatred as he translates it applies to the class, hence to the potential. The hatred of thieves and informers is in potentia, and as long as (inaudible) I hate all kinds of injustice, as I state this it causes me no pain. And when we see a particular act of injustice, someone goes and raps to the police, then anger is considered to have joined in with the hatred.

Strauss: I see what you mean. In other words, that has something to do with what I said about the highest case. Now if the highest case is truly the hatred of vice or folly, i.e., of something which is not a characteristic (inaudible) of this or that person, if in this sense the object of hatred is the class and not individuals then in this case the pain may not become actual. But it would become actual in a given case. This might be, I do not know.

Student: Christians are taught to hate the sin but not the sinner as an antidote to the pain.

Strauss: Yes, but would the Christian not feel pain about the act of sin? I think he would. Well we have here an authority. Would he not suffer from the fact that there is sin?

Student: Did you say that the pain associated with hatred followed upon the sight of the hated one?

Strauss: Well, I speak only on this point which I believe you must have observed. I observed it, that there are some people whom I dislike, but if I don't see them my dislike is entirely dormant and in no way unpleasant. But I do not know how far we can go. It's a pity we do not have commentary by Thomas on this passage. We would have this (inaudible).

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: But I must say it struck me as a greater difficulty than the other remarks Aristotle makes about the various passions. That's all I can say.

Student: I was thinking with regard to this point that pain is . . . (inaudible), and therefore there is no pain associated with it. Can't there be pain about anticipated injustice?

Strauss: Well that is a difficulty which (inaudible) would have. And I can only say of the highest case where we have sinning but not the sinners, but of course not in the Christian sense, therefore I said vice and folly, one can hate it without being pained by it, namely by simply saying that the world is a kind of zoo and there must be all kinds of animals in it. You know this is a kind of quote philosophic unquote posture towards these things.

Student: It may sound funny to ask this at the present time, but can we actually say at our level of thinking that Aristotle was wrong? Isn't that presumptuous of us?

Strauss: But you must admit it is extremely rare that I dare to say here Aristotle was not simply sound.

Student: Yes, I admit that.

Strauss: But it is possible that Aristotle was such a -- there could be one thing which is not a very good excuse, for a philosopher not an excuse at all, but which at least may repair the damage which I have done -- perhaps Aristotle was such a wonderful man that he never in his life felt hatred.

Student: There seems to be a problem similar to this in his discussion of virtue. It seemed that virtue, the highest point of virtue is some sort of beneficence, of doing good towards others, concern for others. Then in his discussion of pleasure, he says the most pleasurable things are those closest to ourselves, those that help us. He says at that point all men are selfish, and I think this would imply . . .

Strauss: But in what sense. The Greek word for selfish doesn't have such a bad connotation as the English word. "*φιλαΐα*", self-love.

Student: This would seem to imply that beneficence would somehow be more pleasurable but somehow painful . . .

Strauss: Beneficence as such? Why should this be painful?

Student: Because it is defined as unselfish, and the most pleasurable things are those which . . .

Strauss: Oh but it can very well go together with self love. I do not see any difficulty here.

Student: Aristotle doesn't seem to mention the connection at all between hatred and power here, and the possibility of hatred deriving

from the power of the object hated to inflict a point of view or a punishment contrary to the desire of the person hating. You mentioned the individual who can hate a composer because perhaps this composer had the power to change the course of music (inaudible).

Strauss: In other words, if I understand you correctly, we cannot hate somebody who does not have power of one kind or another. Is that what you mean? And Aristotle does not mention that.

Student: But I think for him it depends more on just the pain.

Strauss: Well, now let us see. But does he speak of power as power when he is speaking of friendship. It's the opposite. Perhaps this is not so important. As in the case of fear, whether the fear is (inaudible) is obviously very relevant. Good.

Student: I think Aristotle would respond to our objection that in all these examples we give of hatred where we think there is pain that this is anger also, and that wherever there is pain and what we call hatred anger is also present, hence the example of the presence of a man you hate would be said to revive anger at him.

Strauss: No, no. I think that would be simply wrong if Aristotle would say that. If I think of certain cases from that factory, there is never any anger. It's just a deep dislike, which we can very well call hatred and which Aristotle would call hatred. There is no question. That will not do. But we must go on because I have to discuss (inaudible). Now let us turn to another passage in the next chapter, 1382 b 8-9, that was the passage which was quoted, men as a rule do wrong when they can, and similar remarks in the neighborhood. So men generally are bad. There's no question this was Aristotle's view. Aristotle was not a babe in the woods, what they now call an optimist. Is this not the same, I do not know. The whole discussion of people whom we fear, one point I believe is implied, that the good men are not fear inspiring to good men. It's not stated, but if you look at it this is tacitly excluded. And this is of some importance because in foreign policy the situation is of course never present because of the complications. No polis, however good, is simply good, or its adversary doesn't have to be simply bad. But in the case of the individuals I think that is true. We do not fear a good man, do we? Provided that we are tolerably good ourselves, otherwise we might have to fear him.

Student: Most good men are (inaudible).

Strauss: Extreme case, extreme case, and that is one of the most pernicious habits to watch always the extreme cases and then believe we can get excuses for ordinary cases.

Student: I am very sorry.

Strauss: I am glad to hear that. Good. Now a bit later on in b 29, the fear inspiring things and what people fear:

Student: "Let us now state the frame of mind that leads men to fear. If, then, fear is accompanied by the expectation that we are going

to suffer some fatal misfortune, it is . . .

Strauss: Yes, from destructive afflictions, destructive either of our lives or of something very important to us, our health, our fortune, and so on.

Student: "It is evident that none of those who think that they will suffer nothing at all is afraid either of those things which he does not think will happen to him or of those from whom he does not expect them or at a time he does not think them likely to happen."

Strauss: Now watch Aristotle's precision here. This covers, I think, the whole (inaudible).

Student: "It therefore needs be that those who think they are likely to suffer anything should be afraid either of the persons at whose hands they expect it or of certain things and at certain times. Those who either are or seem to be highly prosperous do not think they are likely to suffer anything, wherefore they are insolent, contemptuous, and rash, and what makes them such is wealth, strength, a number of friends, power. It is the same with those who think that they have already suffered all possible ills and are coldly indifferent to the future, like those who are being beaten to death; for it is a necessary incentive to fear that there should remain some hope of being saved from the cause . . .

Strauss: This is (inaudible), those who believe to be beyond evil and those who have lost all hope, neither of which will fear.

Student: "A sign of this is that fear makes men deliberate . . .

Strauss: Does this remind you of something, fear makes men . . .

Student: Hobbes.

Strauss: Sure. That is in a way the starting point of Hobbes.

Student: Also the Biblical injunction, fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom.

Strauss: Sure, but this is not (inaudible) to the fear of the Lord, but in a looser, wider sense one can say that. This is a key point in Hobbes' definition of fear. Fear is eminently rational.

Student: I think Johnson had a quote that said, hanging concentrates a man's mind marvellously.

Strauss: That is in one way true, but of course he can no longer fear.

Student: "Whereas no one deliberates about things that are hopeless, so that whenever it is preferable that the audience should feel afraid it is necessary to make them think they are likely to suffer by reminding them that others greater than they have suffered and showing that their equals are suffering or have suffered and that at the hands of those from whom they did not expect it in such a

manner and at times when they did not think it likely." Remember Pearl Harbor?

Strauss: Yes, and the whole situation before the Second World War altogether gives beautiful illustrations. The argument at that time, what happened to Austria may happen to Czechoslovakia; and what happened to Czechoslovakia may happen to Poland; and what happens to Poland may happen to France, and yet no one believed it. Yes?

Student: In regard to this passage where he gives the reason wealthy people are all these nasty things, that struck a bell, though I couldn't find the reference, but it was earlier in the Rhetoric. He gave us reasons for people acting unjustly and he explicitly said just the opposite of this. He said, for example, young people tend to act intemperately, but it's not because they're young, it's because they're intemperate. And here he says wealthy people act insolently, contemptuously, and rashly because they are wealthy.

Strauss: Yes, but still would this not make the intemperance, the moral defect, the proximate cause?

Student: No, it's not that they're intemperate here . . .

Strauss: But that is of course implied. The proximate cause of their actions is a vicious habit, but the vicious habit is fostered by stations in life, by age, and so on and so on. This is a secondary consideration. To trace it to a vicious habit is always sound. To trace it to these other things is never sufficient because this is not universally true. Not all young men are of this kind, not all rich men are this way, and so on. We will come to the question of the various age groups and social groups later in the Second Book. Now let us turn to this passage about the gods, in 1383 b 3ff, at the end of chapter 5.

Student: "If we have never done wrong to anyone, or only to a few, or not to such as are to be feared, and generally if it is well with us in regard to the gods, especially as to intimations from signs and oracles and everything else of the kind; for anger inspires confidence and it is the wrong which we suffer and not that which we inflict upon others that causes anger, and the gods are supposed to assist those who are wronged."

Strauss: Let us stop here. The gods had not been mentioned among the things which inspire fear of confidence except here. So this case is very interesting, because this is a case of a cooperation of anger and vulgar piety. When people are angry, and they are angry if they believe they are in the right, that they have been wronged, and this cooperation with piety is here discussed. Now as it was observed he is silent on the effect of fear of the gods in the case of one's having acted unjustly. Why is he silent on that? I mean, the other case, people believe the gods are on their side and yet they acted unjustly.

Student: I don't have an answer but in the list of good things besides the absence of a good life one would have thought (inaudible) he might have very well have put in the favor of the gods.

Strauss: Yes, but Aristotle mentions them only here. The wronged party believes he has the gods on his side.

Student: It would be impious to suggest that the gods favor . . .

Strauss: Sure, absolutely. The unjust men are of course also impious. That's the simple connection. Yes, that is quite true. Let us read the following sentence.

Student: "The fact is that anger makes us confident, that anger is excited by our knowledge that we are not the wrongers but the wronged and that the divine power is always supposed to be on the side of the wronged. Also when at the outset of an enterprise we believe that we cannot and shall not fail or that we shall succeed completely."

Strauss: Here he does not refer to the rightness or wrongness, to the justness or injustice. You see, he makes this quite clear. I mean, if people attempt something in the belief that they will win, the question of the gods does not arise in that connection. I believe that is the connection between the two statements.

Student: How is it possible after what he has said in the preceding chapter about the association of pain (inaudible) with anger to make the gods now angry over vice, that is, injustice. This was not a subject for anger in chapter 4. Doesn't the anger of the gods depend on the perceptibility of vice?

Strauss: But you must see the context. Aristotle suggests by his silences elsewhere that the gods will be used by the deliberative orator, perhaps also by the forensic orator, but especially by the deliberative orator if he wants to inspire confidence. He doesn't need the gods in order to inspire fear. This at least is Aristotle's implicit suggestion, nor in the other cases. But here it is obviously a common topic. I think if one would read Thucydides' History, which is after all a terrific document of rhetoric among other things, this would be confirmed. The Spartans, who believed to have been wronged, are the ones who call on the gods all the time as the avengers of Athenian injustice. The Athenians do not do so. So (inaudible) as we would call it today, to build morale. That is, I think, what Aristotle means. It is surely strange that it is mentioned only here. Now we must say a few words about the following two chapters. Now first, chapter 6, the sense of shame. The objects of sense of shame are evils which bring disgrace not other evils like death, illness, and so on. The destructive evils are the object of fear. Here you have a good example for the difference between the good and the noble, by starting from the opposite. The destructive evils correspond to the good; and the disgraceful evils correspond to the noble. Is this clear? The examples which he gives are quite interesting, and some very amusing. For example, to profit from little things is disgraceful. Think of a penny pincher in business, and of course flattery, a softness, a lowness, and boasting. These are the main examples. Let us see in 1384 a towards the end, at the transition to b, after he has quoted this beautiful proverb, as he calls it.

Student: "That is why they feel more ashamed before those who are likely to be always with them or who keep watch upon them, because in both cases they are under the eyes of others."

Strauss: This has something to do with the (inaudible) to which you referred. Do you see the connection?

Student: We'll be on better behavior when there are friends around who would be ashamed in front of us.

Strauss: They only have to be acquainted with us.

Student: But in a city where we can lose ourselves . . .

Strauss: That's an important consideration. I mean it may be very unpleasant to be always watched by old maid aunts and this kind of thing but it has also great virtues from a social (?) point of view. Let us read a few more passages. Oh yes, 1384 b 22, the other cases of a sense of shame. Men are ashamed also of those who will tell what they have seen, like servants. In other words, men would not be ashamed of their servants, but the servants might tell the tale. So in this indirect way they would be ashamed of the servants.

Student: "Similarly, men are ashamed not only before those who have been mentioned, but also before those who will reveal their faults to them, such as their servants or friends. In a word, they are not ashamed . . .

Strauss: I just wonder whether friends does not mean friends of them, meaning of the servants. Otherwise, friends doesn't make sense.

Student: It would mean also, friends of your friends I would be ashamed in front of because they would tell you, rather whether they are my friends or not.

Another student: Friends in the loose sense, like friends for utility.

Strauss: I will tell you why this wouldn't work. This (inaudible) must have some thing on which it depends, and the only other word on which it can depend in this sentence . . .

Student: Couldn't it say "friends of these?"

Strauss: Friends of these, yes, but of whom, of whom? Who are the "these?"

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: Servants, that is how I understand it.

Student: "In a word, they are not ashamed either before those whose opinion in regard to the truth they greatly despise, for instance, no one feels shame before children or animals, or of the same things before those who are known to them and those who are not. Before the former they are ashamed of things that appear really disgraceful,

before strangers of those which are only condemned by convention."

Strauss: Yes, this was mentioned before, this distinction. But it is quite interesting. Now he is using the word "nomos," which more literally translated is law. In the first case he called it doxa, which is ordinarily translated by opinion, but we must always keep in mind that in this kind of discussion opinion, doxa, and nomos are the same. They are not simply the same, very far from it, but in this opposition they are the same. This incidentally is a refutation of the common view that the opposition of truth and nomos, or of nature and nomos, is a peculiarity of the so-called sophists. That's not true. (inaudible) a peculiarity of the sophists would have to be defined much more precisely. And now a few words about the last chapter about grace, which would perhaps be the best translation, graciousness, something of this kind. And then of course it includes also gratitude, which we still recognize in the English, graciousness and gratitude. This chapter seems to be the center of the discussion of the passions. It is unusually brief. Perhaps it is needed not for oratorical purposes but chiefly for the sake of magnification or, as he translates it, amplification. Because these are not things which are as such important in forensic rhetoric. It's not a crime not to be gracious, nor is it a crime to be ungracious. But in order to show up what kind of fellow that is you might mention this (inaudible), and also to present yourself as a respectable man you may reveal, not of course by mentioning your gracious acts but in a more subtle way, that you are yourself gracious. There is one point which is a bit difficult it seems, after 1385 b. Perhaps you need the whole context. Well let us say there is a discussion between Athens and one of her allies and then one has said, they have acted so graciously towards you and therefore you must not take such a dim view of this unpleasant thing they have done now. Where does he begin with that?

Student: "Since then it is evident on what occasion, for what reasons, and in what frame of mind a feeling of benevolence arises it is clear that we must derive our arguments from this: to show that the one side either has been or still is in such pain or need and that the other has rendered or is rendering such a service in such a time of need. It is evident also by what means it is possible to make out that there is no favor at all or that those who render it are not actuated by grace; for it can . . .

Strauss: To show them up as non gracious. Yes.

Student: "for it can either be said that they do or have done so for their own sake in which case there is no favor, or that it was mere chance, or that they acted under compulsion, or that they were making a return not a gift whether they knew it or not."

Strauss: Now what it mean? That seems to be a difficulty, whether they knew it or not. In other words the other party claims or has been presented as being gracious to this city, and then you say they were not gracious at all, they owed it to us. So now they owed it to us, that's clear. But regardless of whether they knew it or not, how would you argue? Well if they knew it, of course it cannot be grace. If they knew that they owed it, it was not an act of grace

on their part. But if they did not know it, how would you argue in that case?

Student: They should have known it.

Strauss: Sure, it is still worse. They owed it to us and they have forgotten it. Now these are the kinds of things which Aristotle, I believe, supposes us to figure out for ourselves, because he felt that they were quite obvious. I thought when reading this of the case of Russian gratitude or ingratitude toward the West. That would be a good example. But how to state the case that they owed us gratitude and the opposite case, that they did not owe us, here you have all the materials together. They were surely in great need at that time, this much is sure. But on the other hand, the question whether the West acted for the sake of the Russians, that would be complicated and one would have to have great rhetorical gifts, as Churchill undoubtedly did, to make that case. But it can be done. I think it can be done by simply showing that one knew that the Russians were these terrible fellows they proved to be since, and it was only, perfectly with their eyes open, as Churchill made clear in his first speech in 1941. So it was seen as an act of grace. He could well have said, let Hitler and Stalin slit each other's throat. Now is there any other point you want to bring up?

Student: Is there any significance to the fact that at the end of the chapter on shame he simply directs us to draw the contrary of the arguments for shame in order to find out what shamelessness is? Is this once again his unwillingness to discuss subjects . . .

Strauss: I doubt that, no, surely not. On the contrary, what Aristotle means is very harmless. In order to show that certain people were shameless, of course if it suits you that the criminal was shameless or that this foreign city which formed certain alliances was shameless, he's simply saying, I don't have to repeat all this. When he speaks so fully about the opposite in the case of hatred, that is easily explained. Why?

Student: Because it's not simply the opposite.

Strauss: Oh yes, hatred is the opposite of friendship. But why does he speak much more about hatred than about shamelessness? Because he wants to make clear the difference between hatred and anger. But the question which you raise is of course an (inaudible) one. But he says quite a bit about confidence. Now there is only one point in the confidence section which has no parallel in the fear section and that is that about the gods. Whether that is sufficient as an explanation, I doubt that.

Student: Couldn't you argue then that all he has to do is to put in that which is different?

Strauss: There could be a simple reason. Because he has gone out of his way in the case of the opposite of fear, namely confidence, he is no longer under such a compulsion when he comes to the next passion, namely a sense of shame. You see that? Well this is of course subject to the question that this explains the rest. I mean

in the following cases. Whoever reads that paper should keep this in mind as a question.

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: No, shamelessness has surely nothing to do with anger, does it?

Student: I can't think of anything. So maybe that would be the sense that it is nothing to do with anger and that would . . .

Strauss: No, I believe the simplest explanation is since he has spoken of how to switch from one passion to the opposite and how to use the material regarding one passion for the treatment of the opposite, since he has done it so well in the case of confidence he does not have to do it in the case of shamelessness. Yes?

Student: Would you care to comment on why moral virtue (inaudible).

Strauss: Yes, but the question is raised (inaudible). Is it a disposition, a habit, in the way in which the virtues are a habit. Is it a habit? This would be the first question. Now if it is not a habit, it could not be. And then the question would be, is not graciousness as meant here not based on a habit, but some way of acting which arises without (inaudible), so to speak, no habit is formed. If the habit were formed, then it would become something different. I do not know what. Then it would be friendship perhaps or something.

Student: Is it clear that Aristotle regarded grace as unqualifiedly something good? I was wondering if this might be a reason?

Strauss: But what would it be. The translator tends to speak of benevolence, which is part of the story. Now if we limit ourselves to benevolence, benevolence is surely not a virtue for Aristotle. Something like benevolence may go with certain virtues, but it is not simply virtue. Now let me see, how can I make this clear. Where do we find a discussion of this? To some extent in the First Book of Plato's Republic, I think. Polemarchus had said justice consists in helping friends and hurting enemies. And Socrates tries to show that the just man will not hurt anyone, but he doesn't even attempt to show that the just man will help everyone. Now such a thing like benevolence or grace, if we take it as a virtue, would be universal beneficence, (inaudible) did not regard as a virtue. The Stoics later on did that. In the sense of a general mild kindness and absence of viciousness, surely, but this would not be a virtue. It would be too nondescript. There is no equivalent in this stage to something like universal love as we know it, especially from the Biblical tradition. But it exists also, the Stoics have that, and have it as a virtue, but not for Aristotle. The reasons are complicated. The usual explanation I regard as simply nonsensical, that Alexander the Great conquered the Persian empire and the polis lost its importance and therefore universal feelings. But of course every man with sense knew that Alexander didn't conquer the whole globe, or the whole earth. He went into India, but there was something beyond that, and how long did this empire last? How long did

Alexander reign? Thirteen years. When was (inaudible)? Isn't it grand that this empire lasted for ten years. But flatterers of kings said of course that he ruled the whole earth. But no serious man can be taken in by that. In other words, the particularism of the polis, like Athens or Sparta, is simply replaced by the particularism of the Seleucid empire, or the Ptolemaic empire, if we call it that way, and that's all. This does not explain it. The reasons are deeper. Plato indicates in the Fourth Book of the Republic in his famous noble lie that the primary intention, the fraternity which is in a way expected of us would be universal. But in fact it will only be the fraternity of fellow citizens. He does this in a simple way. He uses a word for earth which may mean the earth as a whole and then he replaces it by territory which can also mean the specific territory, this and not this. That is a simple way to indicate the problem. Plato knew, and so did Aristotle, that there is a kind bond among all human beings, but this bond, being so universal, is very nondescript, so to say. People have to live together in one way or another to have a full obligation, to say nothing of the fact that there are of course conflicts between the various cities or whatever it may be, which are very important and prevent (?) any factual universal beneficence. This, I think, was the true reason for that. Benevolence is of course not beneficence. If you wish well that this boxer should win the next match, you don't do anything for him. And this is not something praiseworthy. I mean if someone wishes well only to worthy people and worthy causes, this is surely a sign of practical wisdom and virtue without question, but still if he doesn't do anything for them, and in most cases he cannot do anything for them, this is not something admirable. I wonder whether Aristotle's remark about hatred is connected with that, that he speaks about hatred somewhat more favorably than we would do. This just occurred to me. I mean we are struck (inaudible) that hatred is something petty (?). If it is serious it is a kind of being enslaved by him or those whom we hate, a kind of inner dependence. Aristotle must have known that. But politically speaking, on a lower level, hatred is of course a very common phenomenon both within the city and among cities. Say the demos and the better people, there was a considerable degree of hatred between them in Greek cities as we know. Aristotle refers to it himself. Now whether it was really so that they loathed each other, wished the extinction of the other party without being pained by that, perhaps. I mean, if someone hates the Soviet Union is he pained by that, and I think you would have to say no. It's not strictly speaking pain. You would have to think of a special situation and then it would become anger. Perhaps this is the way to solving this difficulty, that we start from this kind of phenomenon. Perhaps this is altogether a good way to consider what they thought about human (inaudible) beneficence or benevolence, in order to come to that point. But I'm not satisfied with that. Now was there anyone else? If not we will meet again next Monday.

Lecture IX
Aristotle's Rhetoric, May 11, 1964

Strauss: Aristotle doesn't discuss, you say, shamelessness. He only refers to it as the opposite of shame.

Student: He says it can be described in terms of shame.

Strauss: Yes, but is there not a simple reason for that. The orator is compelled to make the people sometimes (inaudible) shameful, filled with shame. Is he ever under the compulsion, provided he is tolerably decent, to make them shameless?

Student: Well as I said in my paper it didn't seem to me that there would be much occasion for the rhetorician to rouse shamelessness in his audience as there would be say in the case of mildness, the opposite of anger.

Strauss: There are, of course, shameless orators. The classic example is (inaudible), but this is not something that Aristotle would recommend, although he was quite successful for quite some time as you know. But on the other hand, how to instill people with shame this he must know. And is this not perhaps the equivalent in Aristotle, it occurs to me just now, of the exhortatory rhetoric for which I was looking in vain. To fill the public, the deliberative body, or the jury with shame is of course way of appealing to their (inaudible).

Student: The things which you feel ashamed about are those which, you are ashamed when you don't have a share in the honorable things, so this is . . .

Strauss: But if they are shameless, they are, so to speak, unaware of their defects, and if they become shameful they become aware of their defects and therefore better men. So this one would have to consider in the context of this broad question regarding exhortatory rhetoric which was taken up before. Now a few points. You emphasize the fact and I believe I know the reasons that for Aristotle pity is not the passion, just one among many. And you said this with an obvious polemical intent, because there must be a man or body of men who made pity the passion.

Student: Well even today in our society pity is regarded as more, more stress is placed on pity . . .

Strauss: This is what I thought you meant. But you are perfectly correct when you say for Aristotle pity is in itself just one passion among others and it has its good side and its bad and we must go into it before we make a wholesale accommodation of pity. I will take this up later. The appeal to pity by sight this was of course very common in Athenian forensic rhetoric. Socrates in the Apology refers to that. The defendant brought his kids in, so the poor kids would influence the jury. I have seen in this country, not in reality but on the screen, say a bar girl appearing as a witness and looking as the most modest housewife you could imagine. This

is also sight, sure. This has not changed. You had the greatest difficulty with indignation and you found that our view of indignation is broader or deeper than Aristotle's view. Can you repeat your definition of indignation as you understand it.

Student: Well it seemed to me that we feel indignation, or what we believe to be righteous indignation, also at occasions on which there is an injustice or injury done, as for example, an insult.

Strauss: In other words, to someone else?

Student: Not merely indignation felt at someone else's good fortune, but also at another's wrong doing.

Strauss: But this, I believe as you partly said, is anger.

Student: Well, it does seem that they are different, though. Aristotle says that anger involves desire for revenge, whereas it doesn't seem necessary to the other.

Strauss: Well revenge in the wider sense as redress (?), surely he implies that, doesn't he. I mean indignation.

Student: To make things right again.

Strauss: One point: Aristotle doesn't know indignation as a general indignation. I mean indignation which is not indignation at individuals or even groups. You know, it is not an indignation at injustice as such, or at society.

Student: Well, the example I had was abuse of public office. We feel indignant.

Strauss: Yes, we call this indignation, but perhaps (inaudible) is not quite the same thing as what we call indignation. The question is how Aristotle would describe that. I think he would probably say, you are rightly angry. I believe he limits indignation to that particular case where we find a disproportion between desert and fate, so that if someone is a high official he doesn't discuss that.

Student: He looks at it, you know, in a positive way. He's indignant at someone who has undeserved good fortune, but not at somebody who just does wrong. Or another example, we are indignant at somebody who commits a shameful crime.

Strauss: Then one would have to open the whole issue and make fully clear what we mean today by indignation and then confront it with Aristotle and see in the first place what the root of the difference is, and only then could one settle the question who is right or wrong. Now the last point regarding old and young, now this is important of course especially for the deliberative orator. In certain situations there may be a clear cleavage between the old (inaudible). We have one . . . (inaudible). In Athens before the Sicilian expedition the young generation was enthusiastic for that war, and the older generation was opposed to it. The younger didn't know what

war means. They had not been in a war. And the older ones knew what a war means. Therefore if you have such a split audience you have to speak in such a way as to speak the language of the young and the old at the same time, speak as it were out of the two corners of your mouth. That is quite an art. Now needless to say the same applies to other subjects, because the split into the old and the young is not the only one. There is also the rich and the poor, of whom we will speak later, and some other divisions. Now a few words about Mr. _____ statement. That would be a quite natural transition since we have had this long interruption. Mr. _____ asked how is it possible for the orator to persuade men against their hatreds, given the fact that hatred never ceases. I think one must always look at specific phenomena. Take Churchill in 1941. He hated Hitler as well as Stalin. In other words people may hate different people and this variety alone gives the possibility of playing the one hatred against the other. This is one thing which can be done. The main point however is in 1382 a 17.

Student: "It is evident then from what we have just said that it is possible to prove that men are enemies or friends . . .

Strauss: To show up men as being enemies or friends.

Student: "or to make them such if they are not . . .

Strauss: In other words you can arouse love or hatred, obviously.

Student: "to refute those who pretend that they are . . .

Strauss: Who say that they are. This is a part of an answer to Mr. _____ question. Some people say they hate, but they don't hate at least not sufficiently. This, I think, is an indication of this difficulty. But here's a more basic question. What does Aristotle think is the cause of hatred; for he says so little about it. He says so little about it, that is true, but on the other hand by saying that hatred is the opposite of love, of friendship, he says quite a bit. If you turn to the end of 1381 b, where he speaks of the kinds of friendship:

Student: "Companionship, intimacy, kinship, and similar relations are species of friendship."

Strauss: Yes, we only need that and then we know that those who are not comrades and relatives and (inaudible) are potential enemies. This is the transition to your next question. Would race prejudice be an example of what Aristotle considers hatred? I would say, not necessarily. Not necessarily, especially if both parties accept the situation. Think of what they now call the Uncle Tom negro and nice plantation owners. There is clearly race prejudice, but there is no hatred. That can happen. I mean, race prejudice has in itself nothing to do with hatred. It may lead to hatred and hatred may also come out without previous prejudice from conflicts of interest. Now the antagonism of the Greeks and the Turks on Cyprus, that would be very clear. Because there is such a long history, of centuries, of terrible things done first by the Turks and later on (inaudible). This cannot be eradicated by conjurers. This goes

without saying. One can perhaps say that a general cause of hatred is that people hate others who deprive them of a great good or who do them great harm, especially if there is no hope of speedy recovery of the good in question. If one has taken away a girl from a man the frequent reaction is hatred and other things remaining equal this hatred may remain until the end of his life. This is I think so obvious and is so much implied in what Aristotle says that (inaudible). But now the chief point in your statement was to draw my attention to how a certain kind of modern psychology deals with this kind of question in contradistinction to Aristotle. Well since you have taken such psychology courses at least in college you know these things much better than I do. I make only a few points. In (inaudible) we read: "The fundamental aim in life is to live and to live pleasurable." (inaudible) That's science. How do these two ladies know. I thought of two entirely different people. One is the Cosa Nostra people who surely have this fundamental aim, and the other would be this most pleasant character, I hope you know him, Bernie Wooster, in Wodehouse's novels this beautiful character, a drone who goes out of his way (inaudible), a charming man. Good. Now let us see, she says a lot about aggression: "Aggression and sexuality being integral parts of human nature are bound to function for either good or ill while life lasts." I suppose so. If an attempt is made to deny their rights, meaning the rights of aggression and sexuality, and excludes them from participation in life for good they must flow into channels of hate and destructiveness. Yes, but what are these rights. That would be exactly the interesting question of aggressiveness and sexuality. And of course I do not even raise the question whether concern with honor and glory can be reduced to aggression and sexuality. That would lead beyond much more (inaudible).

Hate expresses hostility and something deeper than anger. That is also what Aristotle says, only he doesn't use the word hostility because that expresses hostility, then the hostility precedes therefore hate. But what is hostility. Let us forget that. (reading?): Hate expresses hostility and something deeper than anger. Hate, like hostility, implies hurt to others, expresses enmity, and seeks directly no socially constructive ends. That leads to certain questions, for example, the Turks and the Greeks. Is national hatred incompatible with constructive social ends. That's at least an open question. All these wars of liberation waged in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries which are animated by a hatred without any doubt. . . . This is an open question whether they . . . Surely a value free social science cannot pronounce on this subject with any dogmatism. (reading?): Hostility is an essential evil in people. Even an amoeba can have hostility. Now since amoebas are beings without any responsibility, as I know without biology, therefore this essential evil is not an evil for which people are responsible, I take it. If its the same thing. (reading): It is because of the high proportion of individuals filled with feelings of inferiority and with reactions to it of pride, power seeking, and hostility that we have so many of the world's problems. But the question arises simply, are not these feelings of inferiority justified in many cases. That I call democratism, which of course has nothing to do with an intelligent adherence to democracy, namely a stupid egalitarianism which has no basis either in fact or in reason.

Basically it is the internal factors which are the sources of hostility. Well I have observed once James Baldwin, the well known Negro author, in action, and he had a lot of hostility. I would not assume for one moment, because I think it would be absolutely indecent, to find out whether he has internal factors (inaudible), but it was quite clear that the Negro situation as it is, which is an external factor, is productive of hostility. Now of course the more intelligent social scientists therefore don't leave it at Freudian psychology as you know, but also add Marx, the external factor and the internal factor, both. Now Aristotle did not know of Freud and Marx, but he does it in advance. He provides for both things, the external and the internal factors, and perhaps for something else.

Now here a more general point. Well, of course, this question doesn't come up here. Did they say anything about the fact value distinction?

Student: No.

Strauss: That, I believe, is generally so. You see, in some respects psychology is less advanced and less sophisticated methodologically owing to the connection with medicine and the obvious necessity of making a distinction between health and sickness. Psychopathology also shares this common sense prejudice, and this switches then over into social psychology. So therefore they are simply not up to date. Now a behaviorist psychology, in the sense of a value free psychology is really impossible, but unfortunately if this is done with such a naivete, that people do not even think about it in our age, then of course it is no good. Some assumption as to the fundamental aim in life, as they call it, i.e., the end of man, is absolutely necessary. Needless to say, this fact is not a solution, the end, as it were, but only the beginning. The complexity of life and its goals makes it necessary to go much deeper, much beyond this simple assertion that there are ends and aims in life. And of course one has also to consider here the variety of levels, and that is exactly the point which we have to do in reading the Rhetoric. If you compare the Rhetoric and the Ethics you see the variety of levels. The demands are much higher in the Ethics than in the Rhetoric.

Something that was mentioned earlier reminded me of (inaudible) distinction between true virtue and presumptive virtue. Now rhetoric has chiefly to do with presumptive virtue. But while this must be emphasized that the Ethics has a higher level and that one sees this particularly when comparing the treatment of happiness in both works, one must not be blind to the possibility that many things in the Ethics will be elucidated through the Rhetoric because the passions which are the subject matter of ethics at least as the matter on which we act may throw some light on the virtues themselves. Surely, as we have seen from the example of indignation today, what is accepted by opinion today is not in all points identical with what was accepted by opinion in Aristotle's times. This is true. One must realize this, and take this very seriously. But why is there such a difference? Which means, what are the reasons given for this understanding of indignation and the reasons given for that under-

standing of indignation. And then of course we will be able to know which reasons are the best. We must first know the reasons. This is absolutely necessary. The dogmatism which consists in disregarding all reasons as mere rationalizations cannot be tolerated. From no point of view, even if I happened to be a Freudian or a Marxist I would regard this as an outrageous dogmatism. One must begin with the manifest, as both these schools say, but you must take the manifest very seriously. It is . . . (inaudible), this understanding of indignation, that understanding of indignation, and then only can you explain it Marxistically, or psychoanalytically, or whatever. But without this qualified, or provisional, acceptance of the opinions, there is no possible beginning of meaningful study. And these opinions are, of course, prejudices. There is no question. Prejudice means every judgment (inaudible) sufficient examination. The wholesale rejection of prejudices, or Descartes' notion, the universal doubt once in one's life and then you get rid of the whole stuff forever, this is a fantastic thing. It's absolutely impossible. The trouble is that we do not know our opinions. How can we get rid of them by simply condemning them? The best thing is to start from the critique of specific questions, say the race prejudice. But if the race prejudice is attacked it is attacked on the basis of another prejudice. Either race is irrelevant regarding intellectual and moral virtue, or it is our duty to regard race as irrelevant. These two prejudices are distinguishable but are not always distinguished. Now even if there were genuine knowledge regarding this matter, it would not be genuine knowledge in the case of the citizens acting upon it. He would not know. He hasn't made a study of races. He is told that Professor so and so at Princeton has said this, and a Professor at Columbia has said that. That's only opinion. That's not knowledge. And democracy means that the scientific experts advise but do not rule. Even if democracy were the rule of debate, which is not quite true because debate must end sometime because we need decision, but even if democracy were the rule of debate the debate would not be scientific but rhetorical. Here we are back at Aristotle.

Now I would like to make two additions to what we discussed last time. And first regarding chapter 7 on grace, or how was it translated here?

Student: Benevolence.

Strauss: Yes, benevolence is not quite good. This is the central chapter of the discussion of passion. Now Aristotle said earlier, at the beginning, 1378 a 8, the speaker must be thought to be prudent, good, and benevolent. Now this benevolence is akin to friendship. You remember what he means by that. If the speaker is regarded as very shrewd, and very fair and so forth, he is not necessarily benevolent to the addressees. Think of a Spartan gentleman addressing an Athenian deliberative assembly. He may be very wise; he may be very virtuous; but he is of course not an Athenian. So he must be presumed to be benevolent. Benevolence is akin to friendship but not identical to friendship. As we have seen, you can be benevolent without doing anything for the one to whom you are benevolent. You are benevolent to that jockey, i.e., you wish that he wins, but you can't do anything about it. And of course there is

no necessary reciprocity in the case of benevolence. Whereas in the case of friendship reciprocity is essential. Now here we understand better the peculiar character of *CHARIS*, grace as it is here called. It is like benevolence possible without reciprocity yet implies doing something for the other. And this is, I believe, what the orator needs. He must show that he has not only a cold, languid benevolence, but that he has done something for the city, especially of course if he is a foreign ambassador, as is particularly clear. The unpopular speaker must try to gain the benevolence of his audience by referring to what he has done for them, and not merely to what he feels for them, because words are cheap. And on the other hand, no reciprocity is required. Think of the speaker who is respected because (inaudible) virtue but distrusted because of his origin or whatever it may be, or his family, or connections. So there is no reciprocity. There cannot be friendship. Therefore, this, I believe, is the reason why grace is the central thing. It is the thing required in addition to practical wisdom and virtue of the orator.

Now another point which we discussed at some length last time, and that was Aristotle's analysis of hatred in contradistinction to anger. Aristotle says hatred is without pain, whereas anger is with pain. And this didn't seem to us, at least not to me, to agree with our own experiences. I believe one can understand this perhaps as follows. Anger does not go without pain. Now let us consider the context: rhetoric, and more particularly, forensic rhetoric, a judicial context. Anger attenuates -- he killed a man but he did it in anger -- but why? Because it is painful. He acted under this pain. Whereas desire does not attenuate, because it is not painful as such. We discussed earlier homicide and rape, the two characteristic things. You remember also that according to Aristotle in the Ethics unjust actions which are committed in error, if they are committed from error about facts, they are not unjust actions. But what is the criterion that it was done by error? The commission has been followed by repentance, i.e. pain. He's sorry for having done it. Now, let us come to the practical issue, the most interesting question connected with hatred, murder. Murder from hatred is inexcusable because hatred is not painful. It follows from this kind of legal logic. Because pain is a sign of dissatisfaction. The killing from hatred must be understood as sheer satisfaction. Since this is so, since he did not suffer at all, since he had sheer satisfaction, this is particularly revolting. And this element of revoltingness belongs to the element which we can call punitiveness, which is such a large part of human life. I wonder whether that is of some help in understanding what Aristotle says, in other words not to take it as a general psychological analysis but as an analysis within the context of judicial logic, the principles on which the people sitting in judgment act. These things have partly changed, not completely, and this has something to do with compassion (?). This subject we will come back to. I know I am very nasty if I don't allow discussion now, but we have to go on. Let us turn to chapter 8, and read the beginning.

Student: "Let this suffice for grace and the opposite. We will now state what things and persons excite pity and the state of mind of those who feel it. Let pity then be a kind of pain excited by

the sight of evil, deadly or painful, which befalls one who does not deserve it, and evil which one might expect to come upon himself or one of his friends, and when it seems near."

Strauss: Let us stop here. Now the obvious kinship with fear is noticeable, because fear has also to do with the destructive or painful evil. This by the way is important, this kinship between pity and fear. Does anyone here think of it at this moment. Sure, tragedy. The combination of pity and fear is the (inaudible) of tragic passion. But of course the kinship with anger is also noticeable because of the unworthy, of the man who does not deserve it. You remember in the case of anger there was said to be a sense of slight. We are not angry if we feel we deserve the (inaudible). Yet of course there is anger also on the basis of any obstruction. We know that. Hence, there is also compassion with people who deserve what they got. That is I think a necessary inference from the situation (inaudible) anger, and in addition an obvious fact. Hobbes says something about people who have compassion, no it's not in the Leviathan, when a young murderer is sent to the gallows, which at that time was a public festival, and then the women, especially the older ones, see this handsome fellow and have very great compassion. From their point of view he doesn't deserve it because he's good looking. Sure, this is the wrong kind of compassion from Aristotle's point of view. Aristotle's analysis of the passions has clearly normative implications. Indiscriminate compassion, that he rejects as not worth considering. Now compassionate men are among others the educated men as we see in line 27 of the same section, and those who believe in the existence of decent men, that is the transition of 1386 a 1. In other words, you must believe in the existence of decent men, because if you think all men are indecent you can't have pity with them. They would all deserve their fate. That's what Aristotle means. Now the question of compassion is of course crucial, especially since the days of Rousseau. Compassion has been said to be the virtue, or the rule (?) of all good men. Aristotle, of course, does not agree with that at all. The discussion of "misericordia" in the Summa, Second Part, question 30, especially on the basis of Augustine and Cicero, but without any reference to Aristotle because Aristotle would not be useful for this purpose, is only in fact against Aristotle. And here compassion is treated as a virtue. For Aristotle there is not even a virtue regarding the passion of compassion. There is a virtue but (inaudible) regarding the passion of anger. But there is no virtue regarding the passion of compassion. What is more characteristic for Aristotle is admiration for virtue in suffering, rather than compassion with suffering. Compassion with suffering is there, but that's not the decisive point. Say Priam, who is taken as an example in the Ethics, he is not so much an object of compassion. At least equally important is the fact that his virtue shines through his sufferings. You mentioned Hobbes in the Leviathan, De Cive chapter 3 paragraph 10 is a bit stronger, because compassion is there presented as commanded by the natural law, and hence as a virtue.

Student: In the chapter I quoted he put it the opposite way, that the opposite feeling was not natural. To take pleasure in another's pain is unnatural unless (inaudible).

Strauss: (inaudible) . . . I mean you may say that this obviously requires a reason.

Student: But the implication is that compassion is more natural.

Strauss: That is perfectly . . . (inaudible), but in De Cive he goes beyond that. He says in effect that it is a virtue. Now this of course in Hobbes is very simple because since the root of all virtue is a passion, and the whole problem of the difference between pathos, passion, and ethos, character, does not exist in Hobbes. Consequently . . . (inaudible). Now let us read the beginning of the next chapter.

Student: Now what is called indignation is the antithesis to pity; for being pained at undeserved good fortune is in a manner contrary to being pained at undeserved bad fortune, and arises from the same character. And both emotions show good character . . .

Strauss: They both are the passions of a decent character, or good character. In other words bad men do not have that. They can have a kind of spurious compassion, a kind of silly soft-heartedness. And similarly in indignation, like that fellow who brought his horn into the courtroom, I've forgotten his name, that could be construed as indignation but Aristotle would not allow it.

Student: "Or if we sympathize with and pity those who suffer undeservedly, we ought to be indignant with those who prosper undeservedly; for that which happens beyond a man's deserts is unjust. Wherefore we attribute this feeling even to gods."

Strauss: Namely *Nemesis*, what he calls indignation. All right, let us leave it at that. So the gods have *Nemesis*. Well you know it plays a great role in the ordinary Greek notions. is even made a kind of goddess. But they bring down the high and mighty, which is also said to be (inaudible). But the more noble view, which Aristotle suggests, is that they bring down only those high and mighty who do not deserve to be high and mighty and therefore it is clearly not envy but indignation. The implication is that the gods do not possess compassion. Does this make sense from Aristotle's point of view. For example, Nicias, a famous man, speaks of the gods as having pity, somewhere in Thucydides, (inaudible), but not from Aristotle's point of view. And why not? I think this is indicated, and this is one of the passages which you had in mind I believe, in chapter 5 towards the end. Well very simply, who has compassion is he who knows that he is not invulnerable to evil. And the gods being deathless are invulnerable. They are blessed and deathless by nature. Read the next paragraph.

Student: "It would seem that envy also is similarly opposed to pity, as being akin to or identical with indignation, although it is really different. Envy also is indeed a disturbing pain directed against good fortune but not at one who does not deserve it, but of one who is our equal and like. Now all who feel envy and indignation must have this in common, that they are distressed not because they think that any harm will happen to themselves but on account of their neighbor; for it will cease to be indignation and then be-

come fear if the pain and disturbance arise from the idea that harm may come to themselves from another's good fortune."

Strauss: "*Nemesis*" too is a disturbance, a disturbance of the mind. That is true of all passions. All passions are forms of disturbance, of intoxication. It may not be a pleasant drink. It may be a very painful drink, but all are forms of (inaudible). That is understood. Though Aristotle thinks they are nevertheless necessary to the functioning of human life. Shortly before 1387 2:

Student: "And all these feelings arise in the same character and their contraries from the contrary; for he who is malicious is also envious, since if the envious man is pained at another's possession or acquisition of good fortune he is bound to rejoice at the destruction or non-acquisition of the same. Wherefore, all these emotions are a hindrance to pity although they differ for the reasons stated, so that they are all equally useful for preventing any from feeling pity."

Strauss: Surely the last is the consequence for the use of these things by the orator. He must show, for example, that the defendant deserves his misery. He says, I am a poor man, so the orator shows that he is poor by his own fault. That take away that. Or, that he is not in misery. He claims to be in a condition of starvation, but then he shows that he has quite a big bank account and only pretends to live in poverty, and so on. But the more important point, I think, is this. Why does the decent man feel pleasure at the misery of the wicked and pain at the felicity of the wicked, and pleasure at the felicity of the good and pain at the misery of the good. Shortly before this passage which you read Aristotle says, he necessarily expects that what happens to other good men may happen to him too, i.e., he knows that there is no necessary connection between desert and fate. I believe we come now to that passage where you had some difficulty about the wise man. Do you remember the passage? Let us proceed step by step. In 1387 a 13-15, which we do not have to read, men are not indignant at the possessors of virtue - no one is indignant that someone possesses virtue - but at the possessors of wealth and such like things of which the good men are worthy, and the men of good birth, and the noble. So, in other words, true virtue shifts into presumptive virtue. If we try to state Aristotle's views: The favorites of nature and chance deserve good things. This is the position on which are divided acts in Thucydides, in the speeches. I come from an old, wealthy family; it's owed to me. Now let us (inaudible) from here. Why is this so?

Student: "And since that which is owed seems closely to resemble that which is natural, it follows that if two parties have the same good men are more indignant with the one who has recently acquired it and owes his prosperity to it; for the newly rich cause more annoyance than those who have long possessed or inherited wealth."

Strauss: Through inheritance, that's the key point. In other words we make a transition which may be impossible in logic and inevitable in practice from the good to the well born, from nature to the ancients -- well born means of course ancient families. That happens in all societies, even in democratic societies of course. I mean,

think of the Daughters of the American Revolution. What is implied in this, and disregarding any particular group, is the respect for the founders. And old injustice, like Spartan oppression of the (inaudible), was not regarded as oppressive in the way in which new oppression . . . (inaudible). Here you see the difference modern times, especially the twentieth century, and earlier times, because there is now no longer any recognition officially of any prescription, no prejudice of antiquity is recognized anymore. That here is a fundamental difference. But Aristotle still takes this older one as the natural one. By the way, if the favorites of nature deserve good things, this would of course still more be true of the gods than of Alcibiades. Can one be indignant at Zeus outside the theater. Is it possible? Think of a public speaker. In other words, I believe one must consider these points, the gods coming in in the background of the rhetorical discussion. The old is distinguished from that which is by nature; the good is something different from the old. This is a thesis which Aristotle states so simply in his discussion of Hippodamus in the Second Book of the Politics, a terrific sentence: we do not seek the ancient but the good. This is, one can say, the most revolutionary principle which exists. And to that extent Aristotle was not a conservative, only Aristotle said that there is a presumption in favor of the old contrasted with the untried new, a presumption not a necessity. Now let us go on where we left off.

Student: "The same applies to offices of state, power, numerous friends, virtuous children, and any other advantages of this kind. And if these advantages bring them some other advantage men are equally indignant; for in this case also the newly rich who attain to office owing to their wealth cause more annoyance than those than those who have long been wealthy, and similarly in all other cases of the same kind."

Strauss: In other words Aristotle refers here to a phenomenon, dislike of the newly rich, which has not changed. A certain prejudice in favor of possession, prescription, still survives. And if our Communist enemies or friends say that this has radically changed one only has to remind oneself of what a Polish somewhat theoretical Communist seems to have called "mels," which means Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, the initials. They become a simple unit. In other words the reverence for mels, or let us even drop Stalin for the time being . . . (inaudible) defer to them, just as Marx had to defer to (inaudible). In one way or the other this is inevitable. Now go on.

Student: "The reason is that the latter seem to possess what belongs to them, the former not; for that which all along shows itself in the same light suggests a reality, so that the former seem to possess what is not theirs."

Strauss: So what is the reason then? These fellows of the old families were born wealthy, and therefore it seems to belong to them. Well, what is natural in this? (inaudible) Was he not also born with his property? That the situation is somewhat different does not escape Aristotle, but still it has a certain plausibility on which people act. We turn now to chapter 10. Let us read 1387 b,

the beginning of that chapter.

(first side of tape runs out)

Student: "It is equally clear for what reason, and of whom, and in what frame of mind are envious if envy is a kind of pain at the sight of good fortune in regard to the goods mentioned in the case of those like themselves and not for the sake of a man getting anything but because of others possessing it."

Strauss: So here then the consideration is similar people, not good people, good or bad people. To that extent envy as such is morally neutral. I mean the envious man is not concerned with the goodness or badness of him whom he envies; he is only concerned with its belonging to the same group. For example, no Brazilian farmer is envious of a Chinese farmer. But in that village the farmer who does badly is likely to be envious of the other man. Envy presupposes this comparison. There are differences, and I believe the difference between the two sexes is not uninteresting because, I believe, that envy and jealousy are somewhat more common among the female sex than among the male, especially the extent. Because femininity is here the term of comparison, whereas in (inaudible) not all men are particularly concerned with masculinity. Well there are many exceptions in relating (inaudible) do not share this weakness, but I only wanted to bring it in as one sign of what Aristotle means, that man is not simply envious of man. That is the point he wants to make. It must be a group. The group can be very large, but it is a subdivision of the human race. If there should be universal envy, then this might be a consequence of the democratic principle. I deserve the same as the best, if this is a possible thought. But this is not that natural envy which Aristotle has in mind. Now let us read only a few points. In 87 b, where you left off.

Student: "for those men will be envious who have or seem to have others like them. I mean like in birth, relationship, age, moral habit, reputation, and possessions. And those will be envious who possess all but one of these advantages. That is why those who attempt great things and succeed are envious, because they think that everyone is trying to deprive them of their own; and those who are honored for some special reason, especially for wisdom or happiness."

Strauss: I think this would lead . . . this is a starting point to the view that the gods are (inaudible), because the gods have everything. But then there are certain honors, special honors say given to Pericles (?), and then they should have this honor. And especially people who are honored for wisdom and bliss. The mere being honored say for wealth . . . (inaudible) because every sane being knows that wealth is not the greatest good.

Student: Doesn't this imply that those who are honored for wisdom and happiness are base?

Strauss: Well, they are envious, that's how I understand this.

Student: But envy, isn't that characteristic of base men?

Strauss: Now let me see. Or maybe you are right, because it gives an enumeration of those who are envious. Yes, that is true. That would mean . . . Yes, I think you are right. Those who are honored on wisdom, on the ground of wisdom, are envious. But still, the question is are those who are honored on the grounds of wisdom in fact wise (inaudible).

Student: But they apparently aren't wise or happy.

Strauss: But remember when he speaks here of happiness you have to read the chapter on happiness and see what happiness means, and then you will find a long piece in which wisdom is practically absent. You remember that wisdom was mentioned at the beginning . . .

Student: He defines happiness in terms of all these things we discussed.

Strauss: Without wisdom.

Student: Yes, without wisdom.

Strauss: So they are envious, but those who are honored are envious, not the wise as wise. And then he says, who are anxious to be regarded as wise, because they are ambitious in regard to wisdom. Or was there something in the sequel you had in mind?

Student: This was the passage.

Strauss: Now we have to read a few more passages at the beginning of the next chapter about emulation. Now what Aristotle has in mind is fundamentally this simple distinction. When someone is confronted with a more or less equal man, socially equal, age, this kind of thing, who is superior to him, there are two possibilities: either envy or emulation. Envy is base; emulation is noble. In other words, envy would only like to prevent the other from doing his work, whereas emulation would induce the fellow to surpass him. In other words that is compatible with the free recognition of the merits, whereas the other leads to denigration. The distinction in itself is clear enough. Whether they are so radically distinguished that there are not, that one can say that there is not a possibility of envy in the man who is emulous, that's a long question. For crude practical purposes the distinction is clear. That's the difference between engaging in an open fight and shooting a man in the back. One wants to win honestly, and the other does not want to. He only wants to, he can't see the superiority of the other and wants to extinguish him. Now read this, the beginning.

Student: "The frame of mind feel emulation, what things and persons give rise to it, will be clear from the following considerations. Let us assume that emulation is a feeling of pain at the evident presence of highly valued goods, which are possible for us to obtain, in the possession of those who naturally resemble us."

Strauss: Who are similar to us by nature.

Student: "pain, not due to the fact that another possesses them,

but to the fact that we ourselves do not. Emulation, therefore, is virtuous and characteristic of virtuous men, whereas envy is base and characteristic of base men; for the one owing to emulation fits himself to obtain such goods, while the object of the other owing to envy is to prevent his neighbor from possessing them. Necessarily, then, those are emulous . . .

Strauss: We cannot read that, but the main distinction, again Aristotle develops it. But it is also made clear, we must not forget one point, when Aristotle speaks of these nice passions like emulation and compassion and indignation, these are all forms of perturbation, a respectable one but nevertheless something eating a man -- you can put it this way. And this eating takes away from your intellectual energy. However, here one point comes in which I think is of great importance. If the passions are ingredients of moral virtue, for example, that the moral man controls fear, controls emulation, or pity, or whatever it may be, but he is not free from them, then moral virtue as moral virtue cannot be strictly speaking serenity. To the extent to which I can trust the rather good index to the Ethics by Bywater, the word "perturbation," which Aristotle uses here, never occurs in the Ethics, but it would require a very thorough check. I would not trust any index completely. Now the last three chapters deal with the three forms of age: youth, old age, and the middle age. And the middle age is of course the best from Aristotle's point of view, because the mean is the best, it's the peak. The young are lovers of honor and victory, rather than lovers of money. A greedy and stingy young man is more conspicuous than a greedy and stingy old man. They are good natured, full of hope, and trusting people, especially regarding . . . (inaudible), 1389 a 20:

Student: "full of hope; for they are naturally as hot blooded as those who are drunken with wine and besides they have not yet experienced many failures. For the most part they live in hope; for hope is concerned with the future as memory is with the past."

Strauss: Youth have their whole life before them.

Student: "For the young the future is long the past short; for in the morning of life it is not possible for them to remember anything but they have everything to hope, which makes them easy to deceive, for they readily hope. And they are more courageous; for they are full of passion and hope. And the former of these prevents them fearing, while the latter inspires them with confidence; for no one fears when angry and hope of some advantage inspires confidence. And they are bashful; for as yet they fail to conceive of other things that are noble but have been educated solely by convention."

Strauss: Let us stop here for one moment. Now first the hopeful character: It can also be stated, youth is the age of illusion, of noble illusions. Now young people know only the things which are noble by convention. Now is this not an exaggeration? Aristotle, I think, would argue this way. Even the things noble by nature they still know only through authority, through having listened to their elders. And to that extent, even the things by nature noble are for them noble by convention, and therefore because of this fact they are given to feeling shame. I believe what Aristotle means because

it is only by nomos, the noble, no true convictions, many lapses, shame. Or, the judge regarding things that are in the element of opinion is opinion, public opinion, outside of oneself, and therefore the sense of shame. Aristotle could have said of course that young people are given to sense of shame because they cannot possibly have acquired that firmness in virtuous actions which requires long experience, as he says in the Ethics. But he doesn't say that here, and one would have to balance these two different statements and see which one comes closer. Now go on a bit.

Student: "They are highminded, for they have not yet been humbled by life nor have they experienced the force of necessity. Further, there is highmindedness in thinking oneself worthy of great things, a feeling which belongs to one who is full of hope. In their actions they prefer the noble to the useful. Their life is guided by their character rather than by calculations; for the latter aims at the useful, virtue at the noble. At this age more than any other they are fond of the friends and companions, because they take pleasure in living in company and as yet judge nothing by expediency, not even their friends."

Strauss: Now let us stop here. Yet, the difficulty is this. Youths do have character, don't they, or virtue, and when he says here, they live more by ethos than by calculation . . . The youths have character, or virtue, but no practical wisdom. The virtue which they have is a kind of, what Aristotle calls in the Sixth Book of the Ethics, natural virtue, not virtue strictly speaking. It's something which goes naturally with youth. Aristotle is of course thinking of youth at its best. I don't have to tell you that. What Aristotle describes here is now, or at least when I was young, was called the well known idealism of youth. They do not have a sufficient awareness of how many things are impossible, practically impossible. Of course the word idealism doesn't exist in Aristotle, nor in Plato for that matter, because there are no ideas from their point of view. But something similar, what Aristotle means, the love of the noble and the disdain of all prudential considerations, and this is of course also (inaudible). He speaks in the sequel also of the cocksureness of young people. They believe to know everything and they swear it is so. Nor do they know how soon they will see something else which will render questionable what they now firmly assert. Let us read this absolute beauty, which we must read together, line 10-12 of this same 1389 b.

Student: "They are fond of laughter and therefore witty, for wit is cultured insolence."

Strauss: Is this not a beautiful statement. I prefer this sentence to ten pounds of modern psychology. Now the old men, in the next chapter. I don't believe you will find anywhere a more perfect (inaudible), also aesthetically (inaudible). Because the element of insilence of course belongs to that. In the case of teasing it's obvious. Culture is of course (inaudible), educated is better. Wit is educated insolence. Now the old men, we don't have to labor the point, are nasty and grunpy, low minded and stingy, loquacious and (inaudible). These are things which are in a general way true. Why does Aristotle put this? Aristotle is compelled to counteract the

common opinion regarding the venerability of what are now called the senior citizens. After Aristotle had gone so far as to say the good is not identical with the old and since the premise, the good is the old, necessarily leads to the fact that the senior citizens are regarded as at the peak of wisdom, because they are the transmitters of the old, they are closer to antiquity than any of the latter ones, and therefore Aristotle is under compulsion I think to counteract that. Now the middle age is of course the best time for virtues. It's the prime, the peak. Where to put it is hard to say. Aristotle says up to 49. Now what would be necessary, which we cannot do here, would be a close comparison, especially of chapters 12 and 13, namely which items in the discussion of youth are paralleled in the discussion of (inaudible), and vice versa, and then see some more subtle things. I have not done it.

(tape ends abruptly and possibly prematurely)

Lecture X
Aristotle's Rhetoric, May 13, 1964

(in progress) Strauss: You showed again by deed how necessary it is, what you even did not pretend to do but what should be done some day by someone, to give a truly philosophic interpretation of the Rhetoric, meaning this, to make first clear without relying on the fact that rhetoric is a well known part of our great tradition, without relying on that, in other words going behind the establishment of rhetoric in the Aristotelian sense, just look freshly at it and see in the first place, and this means by having read the book n times, what is the point of view from which Aristotle looks at the human things in writing the Rhetoric. There are of course many phrases, catchwords, available for that, but I'll avoid these catchwords. And the only flaw which I discerned, and which is absolutely trivial, is this, that you omitted the second subdivision of imagined examples, the fables. But this is really a trivial thing, and the only and the only tiny external flaw which I could discern. Now to begin with the last point, why does Aristotle discuss only possibility and, to some extent, impossibility and not necessity? I mean I do not wish to quibble and say that impossibility is of course necessity in reverse. Why is he concerned with the possible and not with the necessary?

Student: Well in public speaking I don't think we can very often reach the necessary.

Strauss: More simply.

Student: We don't care about something which is done (inaudible).

Strauss: But look at any debate. If the one answer were evidently necessary, there wouldn't be a debate. There must be at least a show of reason on the other side. A man is accused. If it were settled before the trial that he is guilty, there would be no argument.

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: Yes but they are not the burden (?) that could only come in in a subsidiary fashion. For example, that all men are mortal is tacitly presupposed in every discussion. But this is not the theme. People don't argue about it. Now a few more points about what you said. Now the question about wealth and piety we must discuss. You discerned the importance of that point. We must discuss this coherently when we come to that question. You saw quite rightly that the most striking feature of Aristotle's discussion of noble birth is a critique of noble birth. So if you read in some historian of ideas, that in the 17th and 18th centuries people began to doubt of the virtues of the feudal order based on noble birth and that this is a terrific event, they haven't read this chapter of the Rhetoric. This was only simply restored as something very trivial. And of course there are many other passages. Plato says it very simply in the Theaetetus that everyone, I mean this man says he has sixty-four ancestors on both sides and all this kind of thing, a beautiful pedigree, and Plato simply says everyone of us has this.

So, I mean, there is a silly prejudice in favor of, that Aristotle is not a Jacobin goes without saying, but it is not a peculiarity of Jacobinism to doubt the respectability of nobility as such. At the beginning of your paper you raised a very grave question, regarding the goods of fortune with which Aristotle is concerned in these chapters, 15-17. What precisely is a good of fortune? Aristotle mentions here only noble birth, wealth, and power, political power, and not for example health and beauty. And you saw that the definition of goods of fortune in other places differs from the one used here. Now but if we look at the context I believe we can understand the reason. Now let us first take the rich and the poor as one example. When he discussed the old and the young Aristotle came up with a conclusion as to which is the best age. Do you remember that?

Student: Middle age.

Strauss: What would be the analogy regarding the issue of rich and poor?

Student: A man with enough to live but not too much.

Strauss: The middle class, we can say. And is there any external evidence that Aristotle held this view?

Student: Well yes, I think his own life.

Strauss: No, this is not enough. I mean, writings.

Student: The Politics?

Strauss: Politics: a long discussion that the middle class is the best. Good. But interesting enough, Aristotle does not make this remark here regarding the rich and the poor. Now if we look at these things we will see the case of the rich and the poor, the noble one and the base one is perfectly clear. What is the difference between such things as the noble and the base, the rich and the poor on the hand and the beautiful and the ugly or the healthy and the sick on the other?

Student: Responsibility.

Strauss: Why responsibility? Are people responsible for their noble birth? Of course not.

Student: Oh, I meant noble character. (inaudible)

Strauss: Do you mean whether a man is say six feet tall or four feet tall is not properly called a good of fortune? He is born to that. Still, don't we speak of the accident of birth still, which seems to indicate that from one point of view nobility and so on can be called goods of fortune. No, but some thing very obvious . . . The noble and the base are distinct parts of society. The rich and the poor are distinct parts of society. Whereas the ugly and the beautiful are not distinct parts of society except by accident. It might be that a very fine looking conqueror race becomes the ruling society by conquest, and then there would be by accident, the noble

ones would be the beautiful ones and the ugly ones would be the lower class. But that is accidental, not essential. But is this not obvious that whatever you may think about beauty it is not as such politically relevant. I have mentioned more than once the case of Mc Nutt (?), of now forgotten greatness who was notorious for his being handsome and it didn't prove to be an asset in political life. People now say even that one of the advantages of the present President compared with his predecessor is that he is not so attractive, or he is not so photogenic. I believe photogenic is one subdivision of beauty. I have never given it any thought. So, I believe, Aristotle picks those differences which are as such politically relevant. And those between the men in power and those who have no power is obviously politically relevant. These are the goods of fortune which (inaudible). The others he disregards here. Whether that is sufficient. To clarify this matter is another question. The ordinary distinction is the distinction between internal goods, or goods of the soul; bodily goods, to which of course health and beauty would belong, and strength; and external goods, the most simple case being wealth. But also, for example, the reputation is external to you in so far as it is not a part of your immediate being as a living being. Good. I will leave it at these remarks and turn right away to chapter 15.

Now these chapters 15-17 deal with the goods from fortune, which as such have an effect on character. That is Aristotle's principle of selection. Now whether beauty and ugliness has as such an effect on character is at least a question, whereas in a broad consideration wealth and poverty do have such an effect because there are certain group characteristics. We cannot well speak of group characteristics of the beautiful on the one hand and the ugly on the other. Good. Now chapter 15, noble birth. And this deals indirectly with the question of the relation of the good and the ancient, obviously, because noble birth is ancient lineage. You know, this question of the good and the ancient has been taken up last time in 1387 a 16 and 24-25. We cannot read that now. Let us turn now to chapter 15, 1390 b, near the beginning of the paragraph. He says that men of noble birth are in the habit of despising, of looking down on those men, those contemporaries of theirs, who are similar to their own ancestors. Do you have that?

Student: "Such men are prone to look down even upon those who are as important as their ancestors, because the same things are more honorable and inspire greater vanity when remote than when they are recent."

Strauss: Again, this is the prejudice of antiquity. What he translates by "vanity" is more literally "a good subject of boasting," one could say. The ancient has a certain glamor and this glamor of the ancients is because this famous ancestor who founded that ducal house say under Henry VIII by spoiling monasteries some people would say. He may be far inferior to, say to the present Lord Russell for all I know, maybe, but yet this old, the founder, has a reputation which the present Lord, in spite of his liberal principles, can never acquire, because of 4000 years. Now read on.

Student: "The idea of noble birth refers to excellence of race,

that of noble character to not degenerating from the family type."

Strauss: I.e., that's to say there are, the implication is that true noblemen would have both virtuous ancestors and himself virtuous. But there is no necessity, of course, for that.

Student: "a quality not as a rule found in those of noble birth, most of whom are good for nothing."

Strauss: Or are cheap, more literally translated. Very few noblemen are themselves noble. Go on.

Student: "for in the generations of men there is a kind of crop as in the fruits of the field. Sometimes if the race is good for a certain period men out of the common are born in it and then it deteriorates."

Strauss: The famous families like that of Bach, some families of mathematicians, some ruling houses. After all look at the Hohenzollern house. You had the Great Elector and Frederick the Great, a relatively succession. And there are other ruling houses which produced very outstanding men. But this is only for a time.

Student: "Highly gifted families often degenerate into maniacs, as for example the descendants of Alcibiades and the elder Dionysius, those which are stable into fools and dullards like the descendants of Cimon, Pericles and Socrates."

Strauss: Isn't that interesting. In other words, the reason for this whole thing is nature. Now people would say the laws of heredity. Surely a bit more is known about these matters than was known before, but the fundamental (inaudible) remains. Precisely on the basis of the Mendelian laws, you cannot be sure which abominable great grand uncle will assert himself into your first born son. The gamble remains therefore fundamentally the same. It is interesting here that Alcibiades is more gifted than Pericles from this remark, which incidentally is, I think, also the suggestion of Thucydides in his history. But more strange is that he is even more gifted than Socrates, because (inaudible) these steady fellows, steady and not gifted, and what Aristotle thought is not clear. Perhaps he lacked that brilliance which Alcibiades had. That is possible. It is (inaudible) to understand this passage. But what he thinks is what Plato meant by the distinction between the manly and the sedate, sober, moderate, a favorite distinction of Plato. Only Aristotle reinterpreted it for a reason which is not pertinent here. Now this much about noble birth. But you were perfectly right. The criticism of the very notion of nobility, of noble descent, is surely important, and in Aristotle's case it is perfectly free from envy and this kind of thing which have played such a great role in modern criticism of hereditary nobility.

Regarding wealth, discussed in the next chapter, we may limit ourselves to a statement towards the end. What is ethos of rich, of wealth, lines 13-14.

Student: "The character of the rich man is that of a fool favored

by fortune."

Strauss: Yes, (inaudible) which doesn't mean that there are not rich men who are sensible and decent and virtuous, but qua rich. . . I mean if Aristotle was anti-democratic, which in a sense he doubtless was, this had nothing to do with vulgar prejudice. This can be shown by such passages. He regarded a certain amount of wealth as highly desirable for office holders. This is a defensible position. How would they have the leisure if they do not have independent means. And if these independent means are supplied by a party, then he is at the mercy of the party (inaudible). He is no longer an independent man. One simply should forget about these idiotic explanations of Aristotle's non-democratic view in terms of mere class prejudice. This goes without saying. Now let us come to the last chapter about power, surely meaning political power. Let us read this brief chapter.

Student: "In regard to power, nearly all the characters to which it gives rise are equally clear; for power compared with wealth exhibits partly identical and partly superior characteristics."

Strauss: So in other words power qua power is better than wealth qua wealth, contrary to the view which one hears sometimes ascribed to Lord Acton, that power corrupts. Power corrupts less than wealth according to Aristotle. It may corrupt, surely, but it doesn't necessarily.

Student: "Thus, the powerful are more ambitious and more manly in character than the rich, since they aim at the performance of deeds which their power gives them the opportunity of carrying out."

Strauss: In other words, and the rich as rich do not have this incentive. They want to enjoy their wealth.

Student: "And they are more energetic; for being all obliged to look after their power they are always on the watch. And they are dignified rather than heavily pompous; for their rank renders them more conspicuous so that they avoid excess. And this dignity is a mild and decent pomposity. And their wrong doings are never petty but great."

Strauss: Yes, which is in a way something good. In other words, they would not forge checks and this kind of thing. The case of Bobby Baker would probably prove that he doesn't even belong to the powerful, but to the rich or the would be rich. Good. Now this remark about dignity is especially interesting. The word is in Greek "*Seimnoma*" . One could also translate it by "stateliness," a soft and decent looking heaviness, importunity, pomposity, in other words, a mitigated pomposity, a decent form of pomposity is dignity. You see Aristotle can be very nastily epigrammatic (?) if he wants to be. Think back to the definition of wit which we discussed last time as educated insolence. I believe it is more true to present day English, if I can be trusted in this matter, to translate it as civilized insolence. I think the word "civilized" has taken over much of the meaning of the word "educated." Now we must not mistake the description of the rich and the powerful for describing the business man and the politician. That is absolutely

clear, because it wouldn't be true of the businessman. The businessman is not as such a man concerned with just enjoying his wealth. That's clear. And the politician is also not necessarily concerned with these kinds of deeds, conspicuous deeds, which Aristotle has in mind. A wheeler and dealer is also a politician. (inaudible). What is now here translated as dignity is not mentioned or discussed in the Ethics. The magnanimous man, who is the perfectly virtuous man, does not have this quality of dignity. But it is treated as a virtue in the Eudemian Ethics, the smaller ethics, 1233 b 35ff, and is there presented as a mean between self-willedness and obsequiousness. In other words, the self-willed who is completely unconcerned with the others and the obsequious who is too much concerned with the others. But characteristically in the more perfect ethics it is not mentioned. What is the definition of dignity given by La Rochefoucauld, a man notorious for his malicious tongue? I forgot what it is, but it was also a nasty remark about the pomposity implied in it. That's a truth then that was obviously known to Aristotle, as you see here. Now we must now come to the passage a bit later, at the transition from 1391 a to b, what he says about this kind of people, where he comes to the question about the gods. These people are too arrogant and too unreasonable because of their good luck.

Student: "Now although men are more arrogant and thoughtless owing to good fortune, it is accompanied by a most precious quality. Fortunate men stand in a certain relation to the divinity and love the gods, having confidence in them owing to the benefits they have received from fortune."

Strauss: Now there is only one thing which must be changed: "One most excellent character, ethos, follows good luck," and that namely what we can loosely call piety, at least a piety of sorts. This love of the gods is not treated as a virtue, i.e., as a good ethos, a good character, in the Ethics. Now this is of course very strange as was observed and we cannot help thinking of the diametrically opposed tradition in which we were brought up, just to mention the very common views of the term "the poor ones," in the sense of the pious ones, in the (inaudible). Now in his comment on the passage, Cope says lovers of the gods got fearing, we say (?). But he doesn't reflect sufficiently about the very crucial difference between god loving and god fearing. Now Aristotle must have known the fact to which you referred, that people frequently in misery or distress turn to the gods. I mean there is sufficient evidence from other Greek writers that this was very common and known to them. But why does Aristotle speak only of this side of the matter? What position could say a Greek take towards his wealth with a view to thinking about the gods?

Student: Well he could think that the gods had given him this wealth.

Strauss: Well that's what they do, that's fine. But they could also take another view, especially if they are very wealthy and everything goes fine. If they are not thoughtless people what apprehension . . .

Student: The gods might be jealous of them.

Strauss: Envy. And this is what Aristotle thinks is a lower kind of piety than to be grateful to the gods and to love the gods because they have been good to us. This does not completely dispose of the other, but the fearing of the gods I think Aristotle would have disliked as fearing. There is a Greek word for fearing gods, a very common word, "DEISIDAIMONIA," fearing of divinities, not of demons, because demons is then understood in the Christian sense, but fearing of divine beings. And that is the equivalent to what is now called superstition. And that I think indicates the Aristotelian reason. The fear of the gods he doesn't want. But the best thing is possible, without going to the question whether the popular gods exist at all, once one accepts them the best position possible is that one loves them. And this is easier for the lucky ones. This is a very sober statement of Aristotle. I do not know whether this satisfies you as a statement of the truth.

Student: It doesn't seem quite . . .

Strauss: But is it not reasonable as a position of Aristotle?

Student: Yes.

Strauss: And you are, in other words, what is the provision for the poor?

Student: Right.

Strauss: Then we are absolutely left to our own devices to figure out Aristotle's answer to that, absolutely left to our own devices. Would he wish to take away the comfort, perhaps the only comfort which the poor and the distressed have? Why not?

Student: It's obvious.

Strauss: Well I would like to spell out this obvious . . .

Student: Politically it would help . . .

Strauss: No, no, simpler. One thing which I think we simply must assume and which will be confirmed, Aristotle was a decent man. I mean this kind of trust I think he generates and this must also not be abandoned for light and transient causes. So if we are confronted with such a question, we should say how would a decent man, a man (inaudible) who says compassion belongs to a decent character -- you remember, it's not a virtue but it belongs to a decent character -- but he would say this, and this I believe is crucial, since this kind of thing belongs to the poor it is also stricken with the essential defects of the poor. I give you another example where I make this clear to myself, because these things are not easy to find. Some of the most important presuppositions are of course not stated, because they never became an issue for anyone. For example, when the Greek democracy, and Aristotle only formulates that, defines itself rule of all, in fact Aristotle says it's the rule of the poor. Now that it defined itself as the rule of all is clearly demonstrable, because they did not exclude the rich and the gentlemen from citizenship.

That they are in a way excluded, because they are in a minority, you know this famous objection to formal democracy, this is true. But why did they not argue, we are those who are underprivileged, poor, and the only way in which we can redress the balance is by political power. The others have what now would be called economic power. Why did they not do this? I think a very simple reason which we can all understand although it is no longer of any use in present day political discussion. You cannot base a right on a defect. Poverty is a defect. It may have some accidental advantages. That's another matter. But in itself it's a defect. But freedom, being a free born . . . (inaudible). You know this kind of approach is underlying that. So that what belongs essentially to the poor, what is at home in poverty, is by this very fact discredited. This doesn't mean that it (inaudible) abolished, and that one should be callous regarding it. Poverty goes together according to Aristotle with lack of education, especially formation of character. And this is not an abstract statement. This is based on a very simple consideration. The woman folk of the poor have to work in other people's houses. They cannot be guarded and watched by the father and brothers as the women folk of the well to do can. Therefore their reputation cannot be that of the well to do. This is the kind of thing which Aristotle has in mind. I hope this has been of some help to make clear these few points. To claim a right on the basis of defects -- I am underprivileged, I come from a broken home, I have been given a raw deal, and therefore -- it's absolutely impossible. You may claim something more for yourself or others on the basis of merit, of course. I mean if Pericles did what he did for Athens for so many years he can raise a claim to higher honor and higher considerations than (inaudible) can, of course. I would not even call it hard-hearted, but hard-headed. And I think that is also at the bottom of this (inaudible). Aristotle likes better a piety coming from gratitude than a piety coming from need. You can put it this way.

Student: Now what is the difference between piety coming from gratitude and piety that extends from fear of envy on the part of the gods?

Strauss: This Aristotle would dismiss as superstition. He says so. The poets say that the gods are envious, Aristotle says in the Metaphysics, First Book, but the poets say many lies. It's absurd that the gods can be envious. We are supposed to respect them. Do you respect an envious human being? No. Hence how can you respect an envious god? It's as easy as that for Aristotle. Good.

Student: Couldn't you also consider that he doesn't mention the piety of the poor because to mention it would be (inaudible) to take away their last solace which might lead to political instability?

Strauss: Sure, but you must not forget another point. You must not forget that there was one event which had a very great impact on everyone concerned. And that was the death of Socrates. Now Socrates was condemned and executed by the democracy, by the demos, not by the oligarchs. They also didn't like Socrates but (inaudible). This was a general view, I have written occasionally about it, it is generally not sufficiently considered that the lower classes could

be particularly dear to the intellectuals. I deliberately use this abominable word now. But you know that when meeting an issue you have also to use the terms. This view is sheer nonsense. This happened in the nineteenth century. Then this famous alliance, of which the greatest representative was Marx, of the intellectual with the lowest proletariat. The general view in the past was that the middle class, especially the urban middle class, are more open to philosophy to any other part of society. Kings are too undependable. You know, one may be open, another not. This kind of study has never been made because the problem of philosophy and society is not seen, because the simple word "culture," or whatever they say, conceals the difficulty. That's a very long question. And if someone wants to be a sociologist he has here a practically an untouched pasture and can make terrific, how do they say, historical contributions. I mean historical in the sense in which they say the Test Ban Treaty was historical. Good. Now we turn to chapters 18ff and we have quite a few things to say. I have already neglected my iron rule not to permit questions.

So we have now finished the sections on passions and characters. The last six chapters dealt with characters. Now these are two of the three concerns of the rhetoricians: passions and character as we have seen, 1356 a 1-4, for example. But the most important subject is the convictions, the beliefs, and the core of these convictions is the enthymemes, as we were told at the beginning, 1354 a 12-15, etc., the rhetorical syllogism. And now we gradually approach this core of the problem in the next few chapters. We do not know what an enthymeme is except that it's a rhetorical syllogism. But one little thing we know already: The addressee of rhetoric is presumed to be simple minded, whereas the addressee of other syllogisms is not to be presumed to be simple minded. The passage is 1357 a 11-12. But the difficulty is this. This simple minded fellow, which doesn't mean that he doesn't have a lot of horse (?) sense, I would say that he's not sophisticated. That would be a good American rendition. But this simple minded fellow is not merely the addressee, as in a sermon, but the judge. I mean a sermon, whether he says afterwards that this was a good or bad sermon, that is not strictly speaking to be a judge. This judgment of his is absolutely irrelevant. Whereas the judgment of the member of the jury, guilty or innocent, or of the member of the deliberative assembly, to make war or not make war, for example, is of course a judgment with teeth in it. In this sense he is the judge. Now this is stated by Aristotle in a very dark way at the beginning of chapter 18 and it is perfectly possible that there is something wrong with the text. I will give a very brief summary.

Aristotle distinguishes here in fact between a strict meaning of rhetoric and a large meaning. In the strict sense only politically effective speeches on political matters, forensic or deliberative, belong to rhetoric. In the large sense even the persuasion of an individual belongs to rhetoric. You know that we have discussed in connection with the relation between the Rhetoric and the Gorgias, he refers to that. Now he goes on to say that the opinions peculiar to each of the three kinds of rhetoric, forensic, deliberative, and epideictic, from which the proofs are derived have been given in Book One. Now we turn to what is common to all three kinds of

rhetoric. This is a general description of the subject of chapters 19ff. Now there is a certain ambiguity here which we will take up when we come to chapter 20. What are these things which come up everywhere? These are things like possible and impossible, did it happen or will it happen, and large or small, in other words the arguments a fortiori and so on. We should dwell for a moment on some of these examples, because hitherto we haven't had a single example of an enthymeme. That was (inaudible). Here we get the first taste of this kind of thing. Now let us turn to chapter 19, the beginning.

Student: "Let us first speak of the possible and the impossible. If of two contrary things it is possible for one to exist or come into existence, then it would seem that the other is equally possible. For instance, if a man can be cured he can also be ill; for the potentiality of contraries qua contraries is the same."

Strauss: Now let us stop here for one moment. Now Aristotle demands from us a relatively great effort because these examples are not necessarily examples pertaining to forensic and deliberative rhetoric. We have to take other examples more pertinent to the subject matter. Now what is the situation in a forensic situation, a defendant. Some people enter the courtroom with a certainty he is innocent, or let us take the more interesting case, with a certainty he is guilty. Now then the first thing which the orator has to do is to show that he may not be guilty, that it is only possible that he is guilty. And if it is possible that he is guilty, it is possible that he is innocent. Do you see the point? Or take the other case. He is innocent. He has an unblemished record. He comes from a fine family and all this kind of thing. But for everything there is a first kind, is the obvious answer. What I try rather poorly now I think we would have to do in all cases in order to make alive what is here reduced to the most severe abstract formula. But Aristotle thought of course of these kinds of things, what I called in another connection somewhat differently, to transform the two dimensional into the three dimensional. This we must do. We have not⁽²⁾ a very great from Aristotle here. That would be the task of the commentator. Otherwise we do not understand him properly. Consider deliberative; we may win the war. I.e., it is not necessary to win the war. (inaudible) . . . The first outcome (inaudible) it is made clear, it is not necessary that we win this. I.e., it is possible that we win the war. And that moment the other fellow has already admitted it is possible that we lose the war. I mean if the question is so that there is absolute certainty, then no debate arises. This is trans-rhetorical, so to speak.

Now let us take a few more examples a little bit further on. Perhaps you should go on just where you left off.

Student: "Similarly, if of two like cases the one is possible, so also is the other. And if the harder of two things is possible, so also is the easier. And if it is possible for a thing to be made excellent or beautiful, it is possible for it to be made in general; for it is harder for a beautiful house to be made than for a mere house."

Strauss: That's obvious. You see, some of these things are not merely rhetorical. That is exactly the point. The rhetorician uses some arguments which are not limited to rhetoric; but the point is that the difference between these various kinds of *topoi* (?) is of no interest to the rhetorician as rhetorician. At least I do not see any general difficulty on this point. By the way, regarding possible and impossible we must never forget that the Greek word translated by "possible" is in many circumstances translated better by "feasible." Something may be possible on the north pole, and therefore it would be absurd to say it is not possible. But of course who is deliberating on the north pole. And so possible means in practice feasible for us here and now, and not logical possibility, not even general possibility for human beings. Good. Now go on.

Student: "Again, if the beginning is possible, so also is the end; for no impossible thing comes or begins to come into existence. For instance, that the diameter of a square be commensurable with the side of a square is neither possible nor could be possible."

Strauss: Here is of course a minor difficulty. The example is all right, but it is not very political. You may be able to start a war when you wish. But it does not follow that you can end it when you wish. This is a dubious premise, but sufficient nevertheless in rhetoric. A little bit later. These things are possible for which either *eros*, or desire, is by nature.

Student: "And things which we love or desire naturally are possible; for as a rule no one loves the impossible or desires it."

Strauss: The opposite end of Goethe's Faust (?): Him I love who desires the impossible. For Aristotle that is a fool who desires the impossible. Aristotle is in no way a modern man. Yes but is this so. For example, here he makes a crucial qualification, that no one desires or loves the impossible generally speaking. There are cases where people love the impossible. I mean the fact that all desire it does not in any way prove that it is possible and still less that it is possible for you. I mean for example say to build up a big empire is perfectly for China but not for Albania, to take a very trivial example. And the last point which I want to mention here is at the end of 1391 a and the beginning of b.

Student: "And if the whole genus is among things possible to be made, so is the species, and if the species, so the genus. For example, if a vessel can be built so can a war-vessel, if a war-vessel so can a vessel."

Strauss: Of course, the difficulties here are patent. Albania may -- I like to use Albania as an example because that is so wholly outside the pale that nothing can happen to anyone -- now if Albania were able to build a bomb, or bombs, and although hydrogen is a species of bombs they fortunately cannot produce this species. Is this clear? Good. Now let us take the examples regarding practice (?), we can say. Now in the next paragraph, what is here: whether something has happened. This is of course most important in forensic rhetoric. Did he kill, did he commit murder, or did he not, lines 19-20: "And all, when they have made a decision and have the power, do it; for

nothing is in their way." Let us consider for a moment the character of this reasoning. He said, I killed that man. And he really hated him. In addition he had the opportunity, apart from the motive, the gun, and all the other things. Does it prove that he committed the murder, the favorite theme of Perry Mason. And I think that this is not just the invention of this great novelist, Erle Stanley Gardner, but it is a serious question. Of course he does not (inaudible). He may have changed his mind at the last moment. You see, it is very plausible. It can be even beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt, as we say. But this means, in other words, beyond the shadow of plausible doubt. It's not impossible. Now let us take a famous case, the case of Hitler. Hitler had written Mein Kampf and showed what he planned. He had overrun Austria, and Czechoslovakia. Would it truly follow, as Churchill above all others said, this famous formula, one by one. He will attack next Poland, or whatever it is, and then France, overcome the West. Strictly speaking it was only a probability in spite of that. I mean not only could he die . . . There was no certainty. People change their minds. I mean even if he wrote the Mein Kampf, that was the other argument against Churchill, the only thing one could say from a strict point of view in favor of Churchill whom I admire very much was that it was a safe assumption, a safe assumption. It was no certainty. Similarly today it is possible, I think no one can deny that, that Soviet Russia will become more liberal. But of course it is possible. One cannot bank on it. One cannot base one's decisions in such matters on certainties, but only on possibilities and then it is indeed a good, safe, and wise maxim, bank on the worst possibility. Bank on the worst possibility in such a way as not to preclude if you can have it the emergence of a better possibility. But the priority I think in this case is perfectly clear.

Now these kinds of things have always to do, as we say, with possibilities, and if the possibility is high we call it probability. And since probabilities can be made the subject of a mathematical discipline, a calculus of probabilities, one could say, well let us give over the matter to mathematicians. Aristotle does not mean that at all. And the fact that there was no probability calculus in his time was the least important reason. The key point is simply this. The most probable is in a sense the least probable to be chosen by the enemy. Because both sides know somehow what the most probable is and protect themselves against it. And therefore what is the least probable or the intermediate probability is, is impossible to figure out and could not be figured out but only found out by timely defections. If someone in the inner council of the enemy would defect, this would make superfluous reams of figurings out done by (inaudible). Would you admit that in spite of the fact that you are a mathematician? Good.

Now the last item discussed here, the greater and smaller, was already discussed in chapter 7 of the First Book, so we don't have to speak about that. I have now to proceed rather fast. Now the next chapter, chapter 20: The subject matter of chapter 19 was the common, what is common to all kinds of rhetoric. But this was still in a way non-common, or peculiar. We might say that Aristotle means now by the common the formal. This is not Aristotle's language but

just for convenience sake. Because the consideration of possible and impossible, did it happen or did it not happen, will it happen or not, are still substantive considerations. Now he deals only with the forms of proof. Good. And he speaks first of examples because in a way examples precede the enthymemes. Every enthymeme is based on premises, as every syllogism is based on premises, but the premises are reached primarily, ultimately by induction. And therefore induction comes first, but induction in rhetoric is the example, as Aristotle puts it. Now he distinguishes between two kinds of examples: actual examples and invented examples. Actual examples is what we now call historical examples, say particular cases with proper names, for example, the Persian King and Greece. And the other, the invented ones, are either comparisons, more literally translated juxtapositions, and speeches, meaning here fables, like those of Aesop, for example -- you establish something by telling a fable. We will discuss perhaps the example of Socrates, which is quite interesting, 1393 b 4-8, as an example of parable, of one form of invented examples.

Student: "Comparison is illustrated by the sayings of Socrates. For instance, if one were to say that magistrates should not be chosen by lot; for this would be the same as choosing as representative athletes not those competent to contend but those on whom the lot falls, or as choosing any of the sailors as the man who should take the helm, as if it were right that the choice should be decided by lot and not by a man's knowledge."

Strauss: Why is this not true induction, but only rhetorical induction? That would be the question. That is implied by Aristotle of course.

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: For example, (inaudible) takes the pilot. You don't choose a pilot by lot, and the pilot is also responsible for your life in a way. Well, but you are of course on the right track. What Aristotle has in mind is the specific difference between the political ruler and the so called ruler of the ship is not considered in (inaudible). And therefore it is rhetorical. In other words there may be some element of truth in what Aristotle says, but it is not established by that. It is superficial. May I give you another example which struck me even more than this. That is Socrates' argument to his son *LAMPROCLUS* when *LAMPROCLUS* complained about Xantippe, his mother, that she was unbearable. And then Socrates asked him -- you know Socrates is one of these poker faced men -- did she bite you? No. Well it can't be too bad if she didn't bite you. But she said terrible things to me which no one can hear^{get} getting indignant . . .

(first side of tape runs out)

Have you heard what terrible things the actors throw at each other in the theater? Yes. But they don't mean it. Does your mother mean it? You see, and the boy was of course helpless. But the ambiguity of meaning, The actors do not mean it in one sense and the mother does not mean it in another. This logical swindle is the

effectiveness of this argument, of course.

Now let us come now to the next point which is the "*gnome*" in Greek, chapter 21, which is translated here by "maxims." The traditional translation into Latin was "sententia." Is it still used? You still speak of a sententious (inaudible), don't you? Yes. This is a part of the enthymeme. Now a maxim is a general statement regarding objects of action, but not a syllogism regarding them. The syllogism would be an enthymeme. But either the premises or the conclusion of an enthymeme without the syllogism itself is a maxim. And so we come here closer to the subject of enthymeme than ever before. Now if we turn to 1394 a 29, if you would read that.

Student: "But when the why and the wherefore are (inaudible), the (inaudible) makes an enthymeme. For instance, 'For not to speak of the charge of idleness brought against them, they earn jealous hostility from the citizens.' Another example, 'There is no man who is happy in everything.' or, 'There is no man who is really free.' The latter is a maxim but taken with the next verse is an enthymeme; for he is the slave of either wealth or fortune. Now if a maxim is what we have stated it follows that maxims . . .

Strauss: Now let us stop here. Now here we have the first explicit examples of enthymemes in the Rhetoric, if I'm not mistaken, and therefore we should particularly observe them. Now do you see why these enthymemes are not strict syllogisms and yet have the form of syllogisms. For example, educated men are envied; but envy is something bad; hence, you should not become educated. That's a perfect syllogism. What's wrong with that?

Student: There is more to being educated than just having envy . . .

Strauss: Exactly. But something of this kind, some one defect or another of this kind, this we would always find. This incidentally is said by Medea in Euripides' tragedy. Now the other thing too. No man is free; hence, no man is happy. What would Aristotle say, or Plato for that matter?

Student: He would say that the premise, no man is free, is a mistake, because there are men who are substantially not (inaudible).

Strauss: Sure, something like this. Because we know that Plato regarded Socrates as a happy man. And therefore he must have assumed that men can be happy. In other words, these are all crude statements which have a great popular plausibility, but they don't hold water. This is the point. Now let us see the next point, when he comes to the next quotation very shortly after.

Student: "Now all those that state anything that is contrary to the general opinion or is a matter of dispute need demonstrative proof, but those who do not need no (inaudible), either because they are already known as for instance, health is a most excellent thing for a man at least in our opinion, for this is generally agreed . . .

Strauss: No, no. To the many, to the many. So this is perfectly good enough. If the many agree with it you can make it as a (inaudible)

of a syllogism. It doesn't have to be true. Yes.

Student: "or because no sooner are they uttered than they are clear to those who consider them, for instance, 'He is no lover who does not love always.'"

Strauss: Yes, this was said by *HECUBA*, the wife of Priam, to *MENELAUS* in the Trojan Women of Euripides in a very special situation. She does not believe that *MENELAUS* has ceased to love Helen despite his saying so. You know, once a lover of Helen, always a lover of Helen; more generally, once a lover of a woman, always a lover of that woman. This is clearly not true, but the mere perfect metricality of the statement acts itself as an additional proof. This is the poetic syllogism which convinces merely by its perfect expression. Here in 1395 a 8-18, in the context where the verses from Homer are quoted.

Student: "To express in general terms what is not general is especially suitable in complaint or exaggeration."

Strauss: You see what he calls here exaggeration, "*OCINOSIS*" in Greek from (inaudible). That corresponds to the Latin word "indignatio," indignation. Mr _____ for your special information, "*OCINOSIS*", that can be seen from Cicero's and Quintilian's views. They call that, to create this kind of indignation. "*MEMOSIS*" used by Aristotle is (inaudible) indignation. That's the whole difficulty which we could not solve last time. It is badly translated by "indignation." We have to find a better word for it.

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: I do not know, vindictive justice, or something of this kind. I do not claim that I can answer this question. It takes a very long time to find a proper equivalent. But this only in passing. "*OCINOSIS*" is used by both Cicero and Quintilian, is translated by "indignatio." Good. He says here, because these maxims are common, since all agree to them, they are thought to be correct. That doesn't mean that they are correct. But we don't want more in rhetoric. Let us read b. By the way I didn't get any questions in writing from any of you. Either you will give me such questions or I will return to my bad habits. Now read this.

Student: "Further, maxims are of great assistance to speakers, first because of the vulgarity of the hearers . . ."

Strauss: Now listen with what ease Aristotle makes such an atrocious statement, with which everyone is of course but too familiar. But this is crucial. It goes for the whole book.

Student: "who are pleased if an orator speaking generally hits upon the opinions which they especially hold."

Strauss: This "especially" must be emphasized. He expresses universally what they sense particularly, in the case at hand. They could not express it universally and they get it then from him.

Student: "What I mean will be clear from the following and also how (inaudible) from the four maxims. The maxim, as we have said, is a statement of the general. Accordingly, the hearers are pleased to hear stated in general terms the opinion which they have already formed in particular. For instance, a man who happened to have bad neighbors or children would welcome anyone's statement that nothing is more troublesome than neighbors or more stupid than to beget children. Wherefore, the speaker should endeavor to guess how his hearers form their preconceived opinions and what they are and then express himself in general terms in regard to them. This is one of the advantages of the use of maxims. But another is greater; for it makes speeches ethical."

Strauss: "Ethical" meaning expressive of character and giving a notion of the character of the speaker.

Student: "Speeches have this character in which the moral purpose is clear."

Strauss: The choice, the choice is clear, proairesis.

Student: "And this is the effect of all maxims, because he who employs them in a general matter declares his moral purposes. If then the maxims are good, they show the speaker also to be a man of good character."

Strauss: This is sufficient. The crudity of the hearers is crucial. They cannot express generally what they think or feel in the particular case. And therefore this is where the orator comes in. He can say what they only sense. The orator gives them a good conscience for the generalization. This makes them very happy, because man is a rational animal within his irrationalities and he wants to have a good conscience based on maxims. This is also of some importance for judging the influence of writers, because the distinction between speakers and writers is ultimately not tenable. Most are the authors of public utterances, addressed to the public. The famous question of Nietzsche's influence on Germany and how far this prepared the terrible things which happened afterward has very much to do with that. There is always, not only in Germany, a lot of actual and more of potential bestiality among human beings, but to give it a good conscience the bestiality as such is wholly unable to do. When Nietzsche wrote his terrific pages in a German which could not be improved about cruelty versus compassion, cruelty became so to speak respectable, which it never was before. It is impossible to find out by statistical or any other studies how great his effect was. But it must have been terrific, that something which is hitherto regarded as absolutely impossible (inaudible). I'm sure one could make similar studies about changes in American sexual behavior of which I heard a report last night on the t.v. These things are of course not due to these high school boys and girls but to some writers, to speakers, who made it possible. And there are a number of them, surely Freud but also (inaudible). Men are always acting on authority. Those who act against authority are a tiny part of the population, the criminals. Surely they exist and they are unconcerned, but the non criminals are always deferential people. The trouble is that they are sometimes deferential to the wrong kind of people.

And the question is whether one can do anything about that. And this is, I think, somewhat, is an illustration, a tangential illustration, of what Aristotle has in mind. The fundamental thing is the same, the need for universalization or generalization by which the speaker satisfies the people. Now of course Aristotle in his wisdom and his decency says these maxims establish the character, the moral character of the speaker. And if the maxims are moral, then they establish him as a moral man. But who is the judge of the morality of the maxim and of the morality of the speaker: the same crude people whom he addresses. That's a difficulty. There is no easy solution to this difficulty. The judges of the decency of the orator are of course these crude people of which he spoke here. So I think I have now acted within the limits of what I am supposed to do, meaning not to stay too long here. I had a rather lengthy statement which I suppressed on the question of the absolute necessity of rhetoric as a parallel to the question of the absolute necessity of practical wisdom. Rhetoric is of course not practical wisdom, and vice versa. But they belong to the same sphere, the sphere of action. And what we have today, scientific social science, is opposed on the same ground to both, to rhetoric and to practical wisdom, because science and expertise are to replace the need for practical wisdom and for rhetoric. This question we must always keep in mind. The statement which was quoted, the concern with the authoritative character of the particular -- that is the decisive point. Even if there should be a science or art higher in rank than practical wisdom it could never make superfluous practical wisdom. If the science which gives us our true maxims of action is higher in rank than the application of the maxims, theoretically, but it would never make superfluous this application. In all action the question arises sooner or later whether it is as a member of a jury or any other connection, whom to trust and whom not to trust. A witness (inaudible), there is no possibility of settling that in any other way except by practical wisdom, i.e., theoretically and the element of probability, a probability which cannot be handled by probability calculus.

Rhetorical reasoning is necessary not only of the character of the addressees, or the judges who also are crude, but of the subject matter as well. All reasoning on this kind of thing, deliberation or forensic, cannot transcend the probable, and therefore rhetoric can never be superseded by science. In this sphere the scientists can never be the judges. I do not speak even now of the problem of democracy, in other words, to replace the jury by a (inaudible) of psychoanalysts, which from a certain point of view is an imaginable suggestion. But I disregard this here. How to trace that and how to understand that fully, that is of course a very long question. That has surely to do with the simple question, what is man, whether man can be manipulated as brutes, plants, and other things can. And even if we could, would it be desirable. And without raising this question and clarifying it one cannot even begin to discuss this matter. I think I will leave it at this.

Lecture XI
Aristotle's Rhetoric, May 18, 1964

Strauss: I don't have to tell the class anything about the quality of your paper, but the delivery hard to follow. I must make sure whether I understood you correctly. Now if I understood you correctly you mean to say that not all of the topics discussed in these chapters are merely rhetorical. Aristotle transcends the boundaries of rhetoric.

Student: Transcends them or strains them.

Strauss: Well first let us leave it at that. Would this be altogether suprising. Let us look at it from a practical point of view. Is it not possible that for an orator in a given situation a rather strict argument might be the rhetorically best. I mean, if he can do with a better syllogism and can get it across and convince with it, why shouldn't he use it?

Student: Still, that seems to me to be a revision, a change in emphasis from what he led us to believe in the first two chapters (inaudible). There is a considerable difference between rhetoric and dialectic even though they are counterparts to each other.

Strauss: Yes, but the fundamental difference would still remain, why, between rhetoric and dialectics, even if a certain kind of reasoning would occur identically in a dialectical argument and a rhetorical argument.

Student: Well there are two reasons. One is that the rhetorician is speaking to the many and the dialectician . . . (inaudible).

Strauss: Although this difference may not affect the doings the doings of the two men at every point, this would still remain. I am very grateful for your attempt to show in various places why these particular forms of reasoning discussed in chapter 23 are not strict arguments, but only enthymemes. I was reminded not only by your paper but also by some other things that the question raises quite some time ago, does Aristotle's Rhetoric not deal rhetorically with the subject, cannot be dismissed. When I was so rude to you that time, I had a very good reason. We should try to be subtle only if compelled to do so. Because otherwise you get a (inaudible) which is very dangerous. Once I had a simple formula for this common sensical rule of conduct. Let me see whether I can remember it. There is one rule: Don't try to be clever. I think that is rather obvious. But the more subtle rule, the more important rule, is this: try not to be clever. Only then will you be truly clever, where it is necessary to be clever, if I may use this somewhat derogatory word "clever" now. But what Mr. ___ pointed out about the (inaudible) of this particular section is surely something which I had not observed. It surely is something which one has to consider. And there may be other things; for example we have seen quite a few references to the gods especially this quite extraordinary statement about the people who are in good luck, meaning the noble, the rich, and the powerful, that they at least, whatever defects they may have, have

a decent posture towards the gods. And the other remark (inaudible) -- whether one should not have to take them all together and compare the message of the Rhetoric regarding the gods with say the Ethics, to say nothing of the Metaphysics. And then that gets into a deeper stratum. This I cannot now discuss.

Well I have here a question. "Aristotle has consistently argued that the enthymemes are the most convincing proofs in rhetoric . . ." Strictly speaking they are the proofs in rhetoric, not only the most convincing.

Student: What about examples?

Strauss: Yes, but the question is are they proofs. "His commentator Averroes argues that examples are more persuasive in rhetoric than are enthymemes." And you refer to the passage in the commentary. I don't remember it, but I assume your facts. "How do you account for this difference?" Well if Averroes says so, I wouldn't see any difficulty in this, because examples are no proof strictly speaking. The relation is this. Examples are related to enthymemes as induction is to demonstration. And now the leading up to a general proposition through examples is of course in this way simpler to follow, provided the examples are reasonably chosen -- not from Alaska but from the things people know generally. Because the particular cases falling within a man's experience are the most obvious things. There would be no difficulty on this point, I believe. Unless you use the word "proof" in a looser sense so that you call both the induction and the demonstration proofs. But there is no reason to assume that.

Student: The reason you say there is no need to do this is because Aristotle is more restricted with his (inaudible).

Strauss: And one would have also to look up the passage and preferably, since it's in Arabic, (inaudible) would ever include examples or induction, and would not always refer to demonstration.

Student: I couldn't understand you Mr. Strauss.

Strauss: Whether the term used by Averroes in the Arabic original is ever used for induction in contradistinction to demonstration, which I cannot know. So you would have to go into that.

Student: I don't understand why you would put that (inaudible).

Strauss: Because if he means it in the way which I suggested it, then there is no reason why examples should not be more persuasive. Because the examples lead up to premises from which you deduce the enthymemes. Good. Now first I have to return the papers from last time. Here I have Mr. _____ paper where there are a few points. This paper is quite speculative but it is also very subtle. So, in other words, it is nothing to be ashamed of. Now here you say, the passions of the audience are changed by the speaker, whereas the character of the speaker is determined by the audience. (inaudible) is doubtful, whether the character of the speaker is determined by the audience. (reading?) Our examination suggests that the speaker's

character is like a mask which he wears in order to appear as much as possible like his audience. I think that Machiavellianizes Aristotle a bit. As to the specific evidence which you used here, you say in a note, the fact friendship and hatred are essential to the discussion of character is indicated at the beginning of Book Two. Well strictly speaking Aristotle says that they are essential to the discussion of being trusted. Now being trusted is not exactly the same as virtue of character. This distinction would have to be considered. And then you make another point in this connection. Friendship and good will are the only passions whose definitions contain no reference to pain or pleasure. I am grateful to you because you drew my attention to this point and so I looked it up. And I saw to my surprise that in seven cases of these eleven passions there is reference to pain, only to pain not to pleasure. Seven of these eleven are surely painful passions. And there is in no case a reference to pleasure alone. No passion is discussed which is regarded as simply pleasurable. When he discusses mildness, the opposite of anger in chapter 3, there he also says nothing about pain and pleasure. Now this of course can be understood because it is not strictly speaking a passion but a virtue, although it is not stated here. As regards friendship you would have to consider the following fact, that it is explicitly said to be being enjoyed and feeling pain with the friend. So friendship is not simply of course beyond pleasure and pain. I mean a friend who does not feel sorrow for his friend's sorrow and pleasure for his friend's pleasure is of course not a friend. The question is a sound question. There are some other points which I made, a very few, which you will easily find. Now let us then turn to our assignment.

This section which we are discussing today is, as we have seen from the very beginning, the core of Aristotle's Rhetoric, whether we like it or not. Someone might find the discussion of the passions much more interesting and rewarding, but from Aristotle's point of view there can be no doubt about that. That is what Aristotle said at the beginning. And the enthymeme is of course akin to the dialectical syllogism, not to the scientific syllogism. But the difference: the dialectician talks to one or a few. And another point which is crucial: in a dialectical discussion, a Socratic conversation (inaudible), there are no deadlines. There is only one Platonic dialogue with a deadline, with a clear deadline. Which is that?

Student: The Phaedo.

Strauss: Why?

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: So it's really a deadline, literally. But otherwise there is no reason why this conversation shouldn't go on. In the Protagoras Socrates says that he has some business, so they must stop it. But immediately after they left, where did he go? To his banker? No. He stands on the street corner, or something like that, and tells for four or five hours these people the conversation he had had for four or five hours within. So why Socrates pretended that he had no time, this we must figure out for ourselves. So in dialectical discussions there is no deadline, and there is of course essentially

a deadline in rhetoric. I mean if someone says, well there are filibusters, well there were no filibusters in the Athenian assembly. And in addition, even filibusters can be stopped as we have been taught. And also of course in the dialectical discussions talks back, naturally. There is an exchange. The dialectician may be defeated. Not everyone is as good a dialectician as Socrates. He's surely not the superior of the addressee or authoritative for him. He may be by nature superior to him, but he has no legal superiority, obviously. Whereas the rhetorician addresses a crowd; there is a deadline; the addressees do not talk back -- they may heckle him -- but they are the judges, the authority. They will decide whether the defendant will be declared guilty or innocent, or whether we will wage war or not. The rhetorician doesn't decide this. So the difference is, of course, fundamental. Now perhaps we will begin in 1395 b 24, at the beginning of the chapter.

Student: "Let us now speak of enthymemes in general, and the manner of looking for them, and next their topics; for each of these things is different in kind. We have already said that the enthymeme is a kind of syllogism, what makes it so, and in what it differs from the dialectic syllogism; for the conclusion must neither be drawn from too far back, nor should it include all the steps of the argument. In the first case, length causes obscurity. In the second, it is simply a waste of words because it states much that is obvious. It is this that makes the ignorant more persuasive than the educated in the presence of crowds, as the poets say, the ignorant are more skilled at speaking before a mob; for the educated use commonplaces and generalities, whereas the ignorant speak of what they know and of what more nearly concerns the audience. Wherefore, one must not argue from all possible opinions but only from such as are definite and admitted, for instance, either by the judges themselves or by those whose judgment they approve. Further, it should be clear that this is the opinion of all or most of the hearers. And again, conclusions should not be drawn from necessary premises alone but also from those which are only true as a rule."

Strauss: Because otherwise you could never have a practical argument. So in other words the rhetorician moves in a kind of middle region. He mustn't go too high regarding the premises. And he must not go too low, as it were, in establishing the facts of the case. To take a simple case, the assumption underlying all murder trials is that when there is someone killed in a certain manner then he must have been killed by somebody else. He cannot have died, nor can it be suicide. This presupposes ultimately a principle of causality, of course. If he would go into a discussion to prove discussion, that would be absurd. And also regarding some crude facts, meaning that human beings are either men or women, which can be subject to some qualification in the light of this famous case some years ago, I've forgotten now the name, this is wholly irrelevant, immaterial. Good. The theoretical man is also concerned also with the remote and the obvious. Perhaps the remote and the obvious are ultimately the same, in so far as the problems inherent in the obvious may be the most concealed thing and thus the most remote thing. This I believe is clear and doesn't cause any difficulty I trust. Now let us see what he says in the sequel.

Student: "First of all then it must be understood that in regard to the subject of our speech or reasoning, whether it be political or any other kind it is necessary also to be acquainted with the elements of the question either entirely or in part; for if you know none of these things you will have nothing on which to draw a conclusion. I should like to know, for instance, how we are to give advice to the Athenians as to making war or not if we do not know in what their strength consists, whether it is naval, military, or both, how great it is, their sources of revenue, their friends and enemies, and further what wars they have already waged, with what success, and all similar things."

Strauss: Well I believe Aristotle also proceeds here like a theoretician. He tells us the obvious. But still, that is the point. A theoretician must state it, as we know. (inaudible) a passage where he gives a kind of commentary on that. A little bit later in 23-25, he alludes again to that quasi-universality of rhetoric by speaking that gods are as much a theme of rhetoric as human beings. So the question of course is then, if this belongs to the definition of rhetoric -- this I believe is what you meant, if I could follow your very quick development -- if rhetoric is defined by this universality so that it deals with gods as well as with men, then of course the cognitive status of rhetoric would be affected by the fact that the rhetorician talks about gods, because then the cognitive status of the knowledge regarding gods would of course affect the status of rhetoric as a whole. This is what I believe you meant.

Student: I didn't think that in connection with the gods, but later on . . . (inaudible).

Strauss: I see. But the main point you stated.

Student: Yes.

Strauss: Good. And here he gives in the sequel another problem of this kind, a little bit afterward when he speaks regarding justice, whether it is good or not good. It may be necessary for a rhetorician to face a conflict between the just and the good, the good meaning here the expedient. Of course it may. For example, in the discussion in Thucydides, should the Athenians kill the *MITYLENIANS* or not. And the question is, it may be just for Athens to do it, but it is not expedient. In some cases it is possible that the argument about the injustice would not bother the assembly, and nevertheless the question would have to be (inaudible). Now let us turn to 1396 b 19, the transition. Now one way of selection, the first way . . .

Student: "And this the first is the topic (?). Let us now speak of the elements about enthymemes. By elements and topics of enthymemes I mean the same thing."

Strauss: Now what does "topic" here mean. Now when he speaks first of topic what does he mean by that. The first principle of selection must be, the point of view of selection must be that it is topical.

Student: I think this has reference to the (inaudible) he has made of rhetoric up to this point in Book Two, i.e., all that proceeds . . . (inaudible).

Strauss: Yes but here he speaks of selection. You have this long enumeration of the goods things, the pleasant things, the noble things, and so forth, but the rhetorician of course can't use all these topics in a single speech. He must select, from each point of view must he select in the first place. What's the most urgent consideration?

Student: The matter at hand.

Strauss: Exactly. Now in England or in this country, I do not know, no in England, in this country one says "timely" I was told instead of "topical," meaning belonging to the matter at hand. This is the first consideration. It must be relevant to the fact that this is a trial for life on the following circumstances, etc. That's the first consideration. And then there is another way in which we must select, and these are the elements of enthymemes or the topos, the (inaudible) of enthymemes. What does he mean by that now? The commonplaces. Well, the commonplaces are considerations which are of course not limited to the particular case at hand. They are universal. Now these have, however, been discussed before as he says in the sequel and as we know, in all the chapters on the good, pleasant, and noble things, and on the possible and other things. What does he have in mind now? 1397 a 1:

Student: "Let us now endeavor to find topics about enthymemes in general in another way . . .

Strauss: In another way. What is that other way? I mean not in the way in which we look for example at the possible and how to establish a past fact or to create a presumption in favor of a future fact. Here we have to deal with something radically different. Yes.

Student: (inaudible) from the point of view of the principles of logic.

Strauss: Yes this is surely correct. But can we not perhaps . . . This is a good word, but such good and ready available words are also dangerous. What do we know about and what do we mean by logic? Now look at the situation of an orator. Say he has to defend a man accused of murder. Of course he has to know the law. He has to know the broad considerations which are adduced for getting a man free, the famous things like he didn't have a motive, and this kind of thing. That we know. These topics have been discussed. But he needs something else. And also for example that it was not possible that he murdered that man because he was in Chicago at the time and the murder was committed in Los Angeles, an everyday topic as you know. But what are the topics which Aristotle means now?

Student: He has to know what form his argument will take . . . (inaudible).

Strauss: Yes but how does it look in practice? Think of yourself

confronted with (inaudible). Take a political subject, should we invade Cuba. We have to know the facts of the case. You have to know the broad considerations about expediency and justice, which have been supplied. Now this would not get (inaudible) if you know these two things, the most particular and the most general, if you had not yet a speech. And Aristotle is now speaking of this which transforms the commonplaces as well as the facts at hand into a speech, into an argument, into an argument which can convince a popular audience. Here we are not concerned with the particular arguments of the case, nor are we concerned with the substantive commonplaces discussed before in Book One and Two, but how to build up an argument which carries conviction. Yes.

Student: How would we make an argument that we should invade Cuba? Well we could take the first topic. That would be . . . (inaudible) and say well, looking at opposites, what would be the result if we didn't do it.

Strauss: Or you take similarities. Appeasement is wrong. Not to get rid of Castro is appeasement. Hence, . . . Of course that needs some elaboration. The deeper difficulty will be discussed at the end. Now we will only try to understand what it is in general about. So that we see it is truly necessary and a reasonable statement of Aristotle to say, this is the core of rhetoric. What is the use of the common places? That you know the considerations regarding just, expedience, noble, pleasant, and what have you, and what is possible and so on, and on the other hand of the particulars of the case, if you cannot bring the two together. That is what makes a rhetorician a rhetorician more than anything else. Aristotle would deny that he should have also the right kind of style. He speaks about that later. That's not the core. The core of the rhetorician is that he brings together these things. He brings to bear the universal on the particular by mediating between them, and this mediation is the enthymeme. Now let us turn to the first example at the beginning of chapter 23.

Student: "One topic of demonstrative enthymemes is derived from opposites; for it is necessary to consider whether one opposite is predicable of the other as a means of destroying if it is not, as a means of constructing one if it is. For instance, self-control is good; for lack of self-control is harmful."

Strauss: Now let us stop here. Why is this not demonstrative? Why is it enthymematic? Is it not a very sound argument?

Student: The general principle is that self-control is good and that's sufficient for rhetoric, however there are cases where self-control is . . . (inaudible).

Strauss: But in what context would it make sense? There is a beautiful example of this . . .

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: But this is not the connotation of the Greek words here. They refer to intemperance in a cruder sense. Now we have fortunately

an example of that, namely the defense of Alcibiades in the Sixth Book of Thucydides' history when the argument is made that Alcibiades, a notorious profligate, cannot be used as a general. How can you entrust the fate of Athens to a notorious profligate. Everyone admits that profligacy is wrong and temperance and moderation is good. The question is does it (inaudible). Does Alcibiades deny his profligacy? He does not deny it. It was too obvious a fact. He does not deny it. But he tries to show that it doesn't settle the issue, therefore that is a defectiveness if you apply it.

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: Exactly, because no one was more moderate and temperate than Nicias and there are other generals who were very moderate throughout the ages and they were very unsatisfactory generals. Alcibiades says something along these lines. Sowing one's wild oats belongs to spirited youth, and this is also generally accepted. And therefore he kills one endoxon with another. Therefore these are not demonstrative arguments. Now we cannot possibly discuss all of them. Let us take a later case after the quotations of the verses, when he comes to the next point.

Student: "Another topic is derived from similar inflections; for in like manner the derivatives must either be predicable of the subject or not. For instance, that the just is not entirely good; for in that case good would be predicable of anything that happens justly."

Strauss: Only for the explanation of the term. "Inflections," he says. It means this. What is true of the word itself in the nominative singular is true also of all inflections, of all cases. What is true of the just is also true of the genitive, the dative, the accusative, and so on, and also of course of the adverb, justly. This is the meaning of the passage. Now the next point.

Student: "Another topic is derived from relative terms; for it to have done rightly or justly may be predicated of one, then to have suffered similarly may be predicated of the other. There is the same relation between having ordered and having carried out. As Diomedon, the tax-gatherer, said about the taxes, 'If selling is not disgraceful to you, neither is buying disgraceful for us.'"

Strauss: Is this a strict argument, an absolutely irrefutable argument? Why not?

Student: Some sellers are put into jail or punished for selling while the buyers of the things they sell are not punished at all.

Strauss: But still, let us take an example closer to the example here. It may not be base to license houses of prostitution. There is plenty of evidence from (inaudible) states for that. Nevertheless it would always be base to take out such a license. The argument can be easily defeated. But it has a certain show, therefore it must be met. Now the next point.

Student: "And if rightly or justly can be predicated of the sufferer it can easily be predicated of the one who inflicts suffering, if of the latter then also of the former. However, in this there

is room for a fallacy; for if a man has suffered justly, he has suffered justly but perhaps not at your hands. Wherefore one must consider separately whether the sufferer deserves (inaudible) and whether he who inflicts suffering is the right person to do so, and then make use of the argument either way."

Strauss: Why does Aristotle here state that this is an invalid argument? In a sense all rhetorical arguments in the strictest sense are invalid. Why does he stress here that this is an invalid argument?

Student: Well, in this case there is another difficulty that comes in in this particular example, which he also (inaudible) later. It's not that all rhetorical arguments are not necessary. They're all equal (?). The others were probable in the sense that he wasn't forced to them. But here there is another problem . . . (inaudible).

Strauss: Or a private citizen may not do it. Think of the Ruby-Oswald case. I mean for all we know Oswald might have deserved capital punishment, but really not at the hands of a private citizen. It is not the logical defect from a strict point of view which Aristotle has in mind, but given the judicial situation this argument comes of course up. You know, on the level of the purely forensic argument, had he a right to do that. This is, I think, the point. Now another example, after the next paragraph after he has spoken of the gods. If even the gods do not know everything, how could men. And the general argument is the argument from the more or less.

Student: "Another topic is derived from the more and less. For instance, if not even the gods know everything, hardly can men; for this amounts to saying that if a predicate which is more probably affirmable of one thing does not belong to it, it is clear that it does not belong to another of which it is less probably affirmable. And to say that a man who beats his father also beats his neighbors is an instance of the rule that if the less exists the more also exists. Either of these arguments may be used according as it is necessary to prove either that a predicate is affirmable or that it is not."

Strauss: Now if we look at this argument strictly, there are of course very strict and stringent arguments from the more or less. Say, if a car can carry two very obese people it can surely carry two small children. There is no quarrel with that. But why is it not in its rhetorical use simply true, as given in this example, that he who beats his father will surely beat his neighbor. What is the reason behind this inference?

Student: Father-beating is more heinous.

Strauss: Sure. He who commits the greater crime will not hesitate to commit the lesser crime, which is not universally true of course. I mean there are quite a few people who commit murder and would not commit a petty theft, for example, because that would be below them. They might be perfectly willing to commit armed robbery, but not petty theft. But more specifically, the opportunities of annoying

a man are much greater for the nasty father than for the nasty neighbor. This is clear. Now a bit later, after he has spoken of Patroclus and Achilles. And if not even the other artisans are despicable, then also not the philosophers. How does he go on?

Student: "If generals are not despised because they are frequently defeated, neither are the sophists."

Strauss: This is some difficulty regarding the text here. Let me see what it was. Some manuscripts read, "And if the generals are not to be despised because they are frequently put to death . . .," which makes more sense I think. You know, in some countries the generals are put to death as traitors or whatever. Think of the French revolution, when this kind of thing can happen also in modern times. Now why does this not follow? In other words, if art as art is respectable, but philosophy is the art of arts; hence philosophy is the most respectable art. Aristotle uses this kind of argument, Plato too. Now what is the defect of this argument in rhetoric? Look at the other artisans and look at the philosophers. No other art in the strict sense of the word investigates the things in heaven and beneath the earth, unless you would say (inaudible) that a man who digs potatoes, or onions, he uses this example, investigates the things beneath the earth. Good. But, in other words, the specific objection against philosophy from the polis, that it is dangerous to the traditional beliefs, is not met by the argument. This is, I think, the defect here. Now a few lines later.

Student: "Another topic is derived from the consideration of time. Thus Iphicrates, in his speech against Harmodius, said, 'If before accomplishing anything I had demanded the statue from you in the event of my success, you would have granted it. Will you then refuse now that I have succeeded? Do not therefore make a promise when you expect something and break it when you have received it.' Again, to persuade the Thebans to allow Philip to pass through their territory into Attica, they were told that if he had made this request before helping them against the Phocians they would have promised. It would be absurd therefore if they refuse to let them through now because he has thrown away his opportunity and trusted them."

Strauss: Well, what would you say? The second argument, it is simple I think to see the difficulty, the changed situation. But it is nevertheless an impressive argument.

Student: I thought this (inaudible) showed the insufficiency of rhetoric . . . (inaudible)

Strauss: Can you state that more clearly.

Student: Well rhetoric doesn't work because/as you say you don't need it any more. You promise something, but you don't have to make the deal anymore because you have already obtained what you want. Here words isn't going to . . .

Strauss: Yes but the question is this. It is very hard for people,

unless they are tyrants or quasi-tyrants, to confess openly principles of indecency or injustice. You must not forget that. And this is of course an inducement for unjust people to be good rhetoricians or hire good rhetoricians, call them speech writers. Because the open confession of injustice is unbearable. Think that even Hitler developed a kind of science, and what is more respectable in our age but a science, in order to justify his proceedings. So that is necessary. Now the next point, where we left off.

Student: "Another topic consists in turning upon the opponent what has been said against ourselves. And this is an excellent method, for instance, in the Teucer. And Iphicrates employed it against Aristophon when he asked him whether he would have betrayed the fleet for a bribe. When Aristophon said no, 'Then,' retorted Iphicrates, 'if you, Aristophon, would not have betrayed it, would I, Iphicrates, have done so?'"

Strauss: Meaning of course, you, a louse like you. Go on.

Student: "But the opponent must be a man who seems the more likely to have committed the crime. Otherwise it would appear ridiculous ...

Strauss: This doesn't have to be labored I take it. For example, if Sol Estes, who appeared again in the newspaper, would use this argument against a man, say against Dwight Eisenhower, then it would be ridiculous. Go on.

Student: "If anyone were to make use of such an argument in reference to such an opponent for instance as Aristides. It should be used to discredit the accuser; for in general the accuser aspires to be better than the defendant. Accordingly, it must always be shown that this is not the case. And generally it is ridiculous for a man to reproach others for what he does or would do himself, or to encourage others to do what he does not or would not do himself."

Strauss: Now again this throws very much light on the situation (inaudible). You see also the defect of rhetoric. Because the fact that the accuser is an unsavory fellow is perfectly compatible with the accusation being just. In a way he is irrelevant and yet very, very powerful. The unsavory accuser is ridiculous, surely. I mean if he talks of decency when everyone knows what kind of fellow he is, this doesn't do away with the fact that he might in this particular case state the truth. This is clear. This is naturally an exclusively rhetorical argument, this kind of turning the tables.

Student: Iphicrates was a mercenary was he not and who sided against Athens one time?

Strauss: Yes. But I know not more than you know about that, at the time when Philip was already in power.

Student: But he was acquitted and a juster man than he was condemned.

Strauss: This I do not know. Of course, this kind of thing one

would have to consider, by the way in all the other cases when he quotes from dramas, if the dramas have been preserved one should see the context and one would find quite a few things which do not appear by just reading the Aristotelian text. This is another specimen of what Mr. _____ meant by his earlier remark, the rhetoric employed by Aristotle. Good. Now let us go on.

Student: "Another topic is derived from definitions. For instance, that the *Θαῖμνος* is nothing else than a god or the work of a god. But he who thinks it to be the work of a god necessarily thinks that gods exist."

Strauss: Now here this is a good example where we happen to know, (inaudible) Plato's Apology, and therefore we can reconstruct the argument. We have the complete argument. If we did not have that, we wouldn't understand it. This is the argument, the central argument, of Socrates in the refutation of the charge. Now go on.

Student: "When Iphicrates desired to prove that the best man is the noblest, he declared that there was nothing noble attaching to Harmodius and Aristogeiton before they did something noble. And, 'I myself am more akin to them than you, at any rate my deeds are more akin to theirs than yours.' And as it is said in the Alexander (?), that it would be generally admitted that men of disorderly passions are not satisfied with the enjoyment of one woman's person alone. Also, the reason why Socrates refused to visit Archelaus declaring that it was disgraceful not to be . . .

Strauss: Literally translated, "it would be hubris." "Insolence," we can say.

Student: "insolence not to be in a position to return a favor as well as an injury. In all these cases it is by definition and the knowledge of what the thing is in itself that conclusions are drawn upon the subject in question."

Strauss: It must of course be understood, Aristotle does not even mention it, that these definitions don't have to be scientific definitions. That goes without saying. Here we have a complete example of Paris -- Aristotle calls him Alexander all the time -- who was a terrible fellow, who took away the wife of Menelaus, Helen, and had a very bad reputation. And here someone defends Paris' decency in such matters by saying, a decent man is a man who is satisfied with the enjoyment of a single woman. Paris was never in love with any other woman but Helen. Hence, he is the model of decency. There are some other considerations suppressed, but still it makes some impression. But you see also how a definition of moderation, or decency, is here used. That is what Aristotle has in mind. Now here we have also in Socrates' case, which naturally interest us most, you saw that this section begins and ends with a Socratic statement although in the first case Socrates is not mentioned, but everyone knew that. Now what is according to Aristotle the chief contribution of Socrates, the philosopher? The definitions. I had not thought of it but on the basis of what you said I wonder whether there is not something going on more than meets the eye immediately. In this section on the definitions there are four examples,

two Socratic. Now to come to the last point. Here Socrates has an unusual definition of hubris. Now in order to understand it one must consider the fact that hubris is sometimes used in opposition to moderation, sophrosyne in Greek. And Socrates says therefore, he does not go to Archelaus -- do you remember Archelaus from Plato's Gorgias? This super criminal according to (inaudible). There is no evidence outside of Plato's Gorgias that he was a super criminal, but (inaudible) is a rhetorician. He has the right to exaggerate. Now Socrates doesn't go to Archelaus from sophrosyne, or rather justice, because sophrosyne and justice can be used synonymously and are frequently used synonymously. Now what is justice? What does he imply for the definition of justice? Justice is a will to requite good with good and bad with bad. This is the definition which Aristotle gives in the Ethics, Fifth Book, when he speaks of reciprocal. But the will is not sufficient. If you wish to require good for good and bad for bad, you are not yet just. You must be able to do it. Here you have Socrates' implicit definition. Justice consists in being able to do good to those who have done good to you and to do bad to those who have done bad to you. I mention this in passing for those who like to understand Plato's Republic. The second definition of justice given in the First Book of the Republic is what?

Student: Helping friends and hurting enemies.

Strauss: Justice consists in helping friends and hurting enemies. In the Clitopho, the short dialogue preceding the Republic in the traditional order of the dialogues, a dialogue now declared to be spurious, Clitophon says that the only definition of justice which Socrates makes is that. Now that is a very long story why (inaudible) should do that, but we have to consider it. This would be in my opinion a confirmation of that. But this only in passing, it has nothing directly to do with the issue with which we are concerned. Now let us skip the next two points. In the next place he talks about the many meanings of words, which has been discussed in the Topics. Certain parts of the Rhetoric are identical, so to speak, with the Topics. That we know already, and for a very simple reason. Why should one not use a really stringent argument, more than a rhetorical argument, if you have it, obviously. But it is not of the essence of rhetoric to do that. Good. Now the next point, when he speaks about induction.

Student: "Another from induction. For instance, from the case of the Woman of Peparethus it is argued that in matters of parentage women always discern the truth. Similarly at Athens when Mantias, the orator, was litigating with his son, the mother declared the truth; and again at Thebes when Ismenias and Stilbon were disputing about a child, Dodonis declared that Ismenias was its father, Thettaliscus being accordingly recognized as the son of Ismenias."

Strauss: And therefore they accepted him. They regarded him as the son of Ismenias. Now you see hear, the proposition to be established is women always recognize the truth regarding their offspring. Well, how do you know? Can there not be mistakes and this kind of thing. And here examples. This is established by examples. And this is taken to be inconclusive, of course. Why?

Student: (inaudible) the argument on the other side.

Strauss: No, no, more specifically.

Student: The biological (inaudible).

Strauss: No, then that would be trans-rhetorical. We would have to get in experts and so forth. The most obvious, the most obvious.

Student: Well she can lie about it.

Strauss: Exactly, exactly. Sure she can lie, perhaps because she wants to have the offspring legitimate. Since we argue legally and where such principles obtain, the marriage, the marriage contract, reveals the identity of the father. For the purposes of the law it is sufficient that the woman gave birth to a child while being married. And therefore we do not have to go into biology. Averroes gives here this example, which is of course a bad use of rhetoric, one can prove that obedience to the divine law is not necessary; for these and these men transgressed the law and lived very well after. You can also prove the opposite. You can prove that those transgressors (inaudible). In other words, that's a subject that cannot be treated except rhetorically.

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Then in the sequel he takes the argument from authority, in 21ff. And this interesting example, which is here in this context, to which Mr. ___ referred, the trouble into which Delphic oracle came, because Apollo cannot gainsay his father Zeus. Now if the oracle of Zeus said this then Apollo cannot (inaudible) it. Needless to say, there is no way of having a scientific argument here. We do not have to read that. Now let us rather turn to 1399 a 11.

Student: "Another topic is that from enumerating the parts as in the Topics. What kind of movement is the soul; for it must be this, or that. There is an instance of this in Socrates of Theodectes: 'What holy place has he profaned? Which of the gods recognized by the city has he neglected to honor?'"

Strauss: And which of course would not settle the issue made in the charge, that Socrates did not recognize the existence of the gods of the city. But it would be good enough for getting an acquittal, because only (inaudible) can be brought home. Now the sequel.

Student: "Again, since in most human affairs the same thing is accompanied by some bad or good result, another topic consists in employing the consequence to exhort or dissuade, accuse or defend, praise or blame. For instance, education is attended by the evils of being envied and of the good of being wise, therefore we should not be educated, for we should avoid being envied; nay rather that we should be educated, for we should be wise. This topic is identical with the Art of Callippus, when you have also included the topic of the possible and the others which have been mentioned.

Strauss: Now if we take here this example, I think one can say that

this issue cannot be settled in a popular discussion, because the two opinions invoked are equally evident for the simple mind. I mean both, it is terrible to be envied -- don't do anything which will make you envied; and the other, this is of course good. But he cannot settle that. Socrates uses this argument in Xenophon's Memorabilia, Book Four, chapter 2, where he proves to the interlocutor called Euthydemus -- that means straight to the demos, on his way straight to the demos -- that wisdom is not the highest good because people have come into very great trouble because they were wise. You might read this when you think of it. Now that there are such issues that cannot possibly be settled by this kind of argument is a kind of justification of the fact-value distinction. If issues of this kind cannot be settled in popular discourse, let us leave them entirely open. What would Aristotle say to this reasoning?

Student: He might say something like . . . (inaudible).

Strauss: I noted by the way that you quoted someone close to me. But good. But Aristotle would simply say this, are factual questions any more easy to be settled in popular discussions. What is good of these factual questions is at least as good regarding factual questions. I mean any question of astronomy, biology, and so forth is as little to be settled in popular discourse as (inaudible). Now of course there is another implication which we must not forget, which we must not leave unmentioned. This argument seems to be particularly foolish for the following reason. No one can escape envy by lacking every possible distinction. If a man is ugly, weak, poor, unconnected, no friends and family, lacks all moral and intellectual virtues, and of course sick, because he might (inaudible), then that's the only way in which one can avoid envy. Therefore the real strength derives from the fact that wisdom is invidious to a particular degree. People are not afraid of being envied for being wealthy and powerful, and not only because wealth and power gives them a kind of protection, not only because of that. This would all belong to the kinds of things to which we were referred . . . (inaudible). A little bit later, the topic after the next.

Student: "Again, since men do not praise the same things in public and in secret, but in public chiefly praise what is just and beautiful . . .

Strauss: The noble, the just and noble.

Student: "just and noble, and in secret rather wish for what is expedient, another topic consists in endeavoring to infer its opposite from one or other of these statements. This topic is the most weighty of those that deal with paradox."

Strauss: Did we come across this theme in an earlier reading? Of course we did. The question is a purely rhetorical one. But where?

Student: The Gorgias (?).

Strauss: Can you state how the issue came up there, the true issue, I mean, which is not the same as that explicitly stated?

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: In other words, all men say (inaudible) and all men choose from a different point of view. Exactly. So you see how good it is to have read the Gorgias. Aristotle had read it naturally. Now let us go to another passage here, in 1399 b 5.

Student: "Another topic consists in concluding the identity of antecedents from the identity of results. Thus Xenophanes said . . .

Strauss: Xenophanes was, of course, a famous philosopher.

Student: "there is as much impiety in asserting that the gods are born as in saying that they die; for either way the result is that at some time or other they did not exist. And generally speaking one may always regard as identical the results produced by one or other of any two things. 'You are about to decide not about Isocrates alone but about education generally, whether it is right to study philosophy.' And 'to give earth and water is slavery.' And . . .

Strauss: Which was a demand made by the Persian King on the Athenians. To give in to this demand means to be enslaved.

Student: "And 'to be included in the common peace implies obeying orders.' Of two alternatives you should take that which is useful."

Strauss: Yes, the same conclusion follows from different premises. You choose the more useful premise.. For example, meaning this in this particular case here, you praise Socrates the individual rather than philosophy, if for the audience the respectability of Socrates is more acceptable than philosophy. If however the situation is such that there is a prejudice against Socrates but you can hope to convince your audience of the decency of philosophy, then you try to take the philosophy angle and that simply subsumes Socrates. This is what he means. Now 1400 a 5.

Student: "Another topic is derived from things which are thought to happen but are incredible, because it would never have been thought so if they had not happened or almost happened. And further these things are even more likely to come true; for we only believe in that which is or that which is probable. If then a thing is incredible and not probable it will be true; for it is not because it is probable and credible that we think it true. Thus, Androcles of Pitthus, speaking against the law, being shouted at when he said, 'Laws need a law to correct them,' and went on, 'And fishes need salt, although it is neither probable nor credible that they should, being brought up in brine; similarly, pressed olives need oil, although it is incredible that what produces oil should itself need oil.'"

Strauss: Now here the very improbability is used as proof. And this is a very good example of an enthymeme. After all what is improbable is admittedly possible. And therefore under certain conditions you can precisely use the very improbability if your examples are equally good for your audience as these examples were upon an Athenian audience, you can bring it home. Now let us read only one

more point, and then I would like to make a general remark at this time, in 1400 b toward the end, the last example in chapter 23, 1400 b 26.

Student: "Enthymemes that serve to refute are more popular than those that serve to demonstrate, because the former is a conclusion of opposites in a small compass, and things in juxtaposition are always clearer to the audience. But if all syllogisms, whether refutative or demonstrative, those are especially applauded the result of which the hearers foresee as soon as they are begun, and not because they are superficial; for as they listen they congratulate themselves on anticipating the conclusion; and also those which the hearers are only so little behind that they understand what they mean as soon as they are delivered."

Strauss: Now that's a good illustration of the simplicity of a good rhetorical argument. Now I would like to bring up a question in the very short time which we still have. What one should do of course for a full (inaudible), he would have to have a very good knowledge of the Greek orator, not all of whom have been preserved, but quite a few have. And the commentary by Cope (?) which I use while I go is based on a constant consideration of these orators including Demosthenes himself. But I am not very familiar with them and so I turned to consider only the few speeches which I know and which are of course on the highest possible level of art, the speeches in Thucydides. I reread for the occasion Pericles' first speech in Thucydides, Book One, chapter 140 ff. Now the issue was this. Should we give in to the Spartan demands to rescind the Megarian decree. The Megarian decree was a decree (inaudible) but between their neighbors, the Megarians, to come to markets in the Athenian empire. And the argument was this. After all, the Megarian thing is a small thing. As they said before the Second World War, "la Yugo chose," Yugoslavia, the French, "chose" is "thing." So the Megarian is a trivial thing, and war with Sparta is a big thing; hence, we do not go to war over the Megarian decree. This was the state of the discussion, and Pericles replies as follows: "The Megarian decree is not a small thing, if you (inaudible), because it is a test of your firmness. And then the demand itself is an infringement of your sovereignty." So it's not a small thing, but a big thing. Not to give in to Sparta, to the Spartan request, probably means war. Pericles admits that. He would be a very lousy fellow, and not a statesman, if he would say it is riskless. (inaudible) there would be war, which is a question to which he returns. Can we win the war? And then he has a magnificent survey of the power of Athens on the one hand and the enemy's on the other in order to show the Athenians, we can win. Of course, we can win means we may lose, naturally. But the implication is we would not be worse off by losing the war than by giving in now, because one demand accepted would lead to other demands, and so on.

Now it is a masterly statement. What is rhetorical in it, i.e., not strictly reasoned? Only subordinate things, for example when proves Athens' power to resist by saying, we are like an island. Of course like an island, possessing a navy, and we can guarantee imports of foodstuffs and this kind of thing. And of course it is not quite the same to be like an island and to be an island. But this is really

trivial. The main point is, it is a very strict and powerful argument. Fundamentally, the reasoning of Pericles is of the same character as that of a first rate state paper, only here presented to a popular audience, which is a great compliment by the way to the Athenian audience. I have never read George Kennan's famous articles, but you know that was also an attempt to reason out a political problem and arrive at a rational conclusion. There was a very famous statement of an editor of the London Times, I forgot his name, maybe 1907, which led to a radical change in British foreign policy, Britain turning against Germany and toward France. Does anyone remember the name? It was printed later in a history of the London Times. I remember Bismarck's argument which changed the Prussian policy very radically against Austria, no longer in subordination to Austria but taking the side of the German national unity movement under the leadership of Prussia. The argument against the opponents, the real Prussian conservatives, was a masterpiece of reasoning. So these things exist. Why cannot there be rhetoric of this caliber. That it is rarely possible, this is clear. But it leads to a deeper question.

Now the fundamental issue would seem to be this. Either all political reasoning is ultimately rhetoric, rhetorical reasoning, because ultimately it appeals to opinions, which can never be simply true; or, the core of political reasoning, as practical reasoning, is indeed not scientific, theoretical reasoning, but it belongs to the sphere of practical reason -- it lacks theoretical certainty, but it has moral certainty, moral certainty in the old sense of the term that you can be sure that you act rightly, justly in taking this course. I remember a discussion of this issue by Yves Simon in his work on democratic government, I believe in the first chapter, which states the Thomistic view very clearly.

Student: Which book?

Strauss: Principles of Democratic Government. It was brought out by the University of Chicago Press. This is the only work of Simon with "democratic government" in the title.

Now here I come up with an observation which I find of some importance. When Aristotle discusses rhetorical reasoning in the Rhetoric he compares it with dialectical reasoning and scientific reasoning. He does not discuss the relation between rhetorical reasoning and the reasoning belonging to practical wisdom, prudence, phronesis. And that is of course what makes it so difficult. And I do not believe that this is an accidental failure, but it is connected with one of the greatest difficulties of the Ethics. The fundamental obscurity there is that the cognitive status of the principles of action is not made clear. It is only said that the principles of decency become evident only to the decent man. But how they are related to what man knows by nature, what every man knows by nature, this is not made clear. Now if I may say a word about the view now prevailing in the social sciences, the view as you all know is of course this. Political reasoning, say even in a first rate state paper, is hypothetical, theoretical reasoning. If we want this and this, then we must do that and that. But the "if," the condition, is supplied not by reason but by a decision (?), values perhaps.

So, in other words, the whole reasoning is ultimately dependent on something which cannot be rationally established. Aristotle does speak of the practical syllogism in the Ethics once, in the Sixth Book. The practical syllogism is one in which given the end, this and this are the right means, right not merely from the point of view of efficiency, but also of decency. But he makes it clear at the time that the end comes to sight only to decent people. Now in a state paper as such I believe the limitation of the reasoning to decent people would not be very helpful. You may have read what may happen to Charles Percy for his decent action regarding the West Side block. Some people think he may lose the election because of this virtue. But surely, especially in foreign policy, where things are so tough . . .

Now I believe that this is an important point which I submit to your consideration. It is not sufficient to understand the relation between rhetorical reasoning and dialectical reasoning. It is also important to understand the relation between rhetorical reasoning and the reasoning, prudential reasoning, prudential used in the Aristotelian sense of the term. Now the strict Aristotelians of the Middle Ages, men like Farabi, they held that the principles of all action, at least of all social action, do have the character of endoxa. They used the Arabic translation of endoxa, things which are only in opinion, nor strictly speaking rational. Now in ordinary political discussion, for example if you take say such a great example as Bismarck's state paper, what is the ultimate premise? The preservation of monarchy, more particularly of the Prussian monarchy, which is of course not an evident truth, because there were quite a few people even at that time in Germany who were not so sure that the Prussian monarchy is indispensable for the well-being of Germany. If the politically effective principles have this character, which is now called ideological or mythical or what have you, then of course this would be of crucial importance. And even the strictest and most rational belief or policy would still rest ultimately on such considerations which are not simply rational. But to clear up not the truth, not even to aim so high, but only to clear up what Aristotle says about it, we would have to have a much better understanding especially of the Ethics and of the cognitive status of the principles of action than we can presume to have. Aristotle can be very specific. He can be even unnecessarily specific, as we have seen. In quite a few cases he has said things we knew before we opened the book, for example that you have to know the facts of the case before you can argue about them. We do not need a man of Aristotle's mind to learn that. But Aristotle can also be of a most annoying and intriguing laconism. The Spartans were known for their brevity . . . (inaudible). And I believe that is one of the cases on which Aristotle is very laconic.

Student: The thing that I have a question about is does Aristotle ever discuss practical reasoning as such?

Strauss: Sure, the Sixth Book of the Ethics, some passages in De Anima. Sure.

Student: You mean when he tries to discuss what prudence is . . .

Strauss: And also when he speaks of practical knowledge, practical wisdom, in the Third Book of the Ethics, he also says something about this, but it is very brief. I mean these developments which you find very conveniently in Yves Simon, and this goes of course back to the Thomistic tradition, there you find a rather full discussion. Now Simon, using present day (inaudible), which is always a risky thing, calls this practical knowledge affective knowledge. That is not entirely without basis in Aristotle. You know, where you are not detached; you are concerned, affected. Therefore it is implied only he who is engaged or committed will see it. It is not theoretical certainty. But still, this has something to do with what Aristotle means, but it is not identical. Well one important link in this argument is this. There is not in Aristotle a habitus of practical principles, which Thomas calls synderesis and which can be loosely called the conscience. That does not exist in Aristotle but is a crucial part of the Thomistic tradition. That doesn't mean that it is incompatible with Aristotle, but it is not simply Aristotelian, unqualifiedly Aristotelian. And I believe that is of very great . . . I did not see that before, that this question is very pertinent in order to understand the Rhetoric as a whole. To repeat: because Aristotle is very specific about the difference between rhetorical reasoning and the other kinds of theoretical reasoning, dialectical and scientific. But the relation of rhetorical reasoning to prudential reasoning is not discussed as far as I can see. And that is one point where one should try to (inaudible). So next time we will have the rest of Book Two.

Lecture XII
Aristotle's Rhetoric, May 20, 1964

(in progress) Strauss: or rather the mere fact that he adapts it to the mood, the capacities, and the prejudices of the audience shows that the speech itself will not simply be a state paper. What is the objection which one could make to Mr. ____ concluding remarks? I did not want to go into the question which as far as I know has not been properly handled hitherto. In the speeches of Thucydides the use of rhetorical means learned by Thucydides from Gorgias and other rhetoricians, you know (inaudible) and similar devices which will be discussed in chapter Book 2 3 of the Rhetoric, this of course was very well known, but in the analyses of the speeches where is the line between the truly prudential and the adaptation -- this must also be done. Now you referred to the speech to which I referred last time. To what extent is that speech rhetorical? The only thing which strikes me immediately, and which I mentioned last time is the comparison of Athens to an island, which is of course a dubious thing. Because the islanders in this situation -- it is understood an island has a strong navy, say Great Britain until (inaudible), or until the Corn Laws one should rather say perhaps better. So they can prevent foreign invasion and they can produce their food. But the Athenians closed off from upstate or downstate, however you call it, by a Spartan invasion depended absolutely of course on import and in addition the fact that the rural population was compelled to live in Athens and had to look (inaudible) at the ravaging of their country places and their lands . . . (inaudible). So this is the only clear case in this speech as far as I can see of a purely rhetorical argument.

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: Yes, that he says at the beginning, which is rhetorically quite impressive, but it is more than merely rhetorical when he says, I do not change my mind, I come back always to the same point: no concessions to the Spartans. And then he contrasts himself with the proceedings of human beings, by which of course he implies that he is in a way super human, that he is not a (inaudible), and simply follows the broad line of the policy without any deviation caused by momentary complications, momentary impressions. I would hesitate to call this unqualifiedly rhetorical.

Student: Well, I thought it was rhetorical in the sense that he could not have made such an absolute statement until he had decided that in this particular case the right policy was to go to war.

Strauss: Yes but this was a prudential judgment.

Student: That was, but then the statement itself as the whole speech is an organization of the material in order to make his case shine up the best, which is not what he did originally when he was thinking it out himself.

Strauss: That would refer not to the quality of the arguments, the logical character of the arguments. It would refer to choice of the

proper words, and having this beginning and this end, and not bringing in the most powerful things in the middle where the attention is lagging, but at the end. This is of course rhetorical, but this has nothing to do with the logical character of the argument. Now what is the shortcoming of Mr. _____ otherwise clear and very good statement. I mentioned it last time. Well whatever that may be worth, and for the time being I am still impressed by that, that Aristotle does not describe the character of rhetorical reasoning by distinguishing it from scientific and dialectical reasoning, and not from prudential reasoning. And I believe, and no one knew better than Aristotle, that in rhetoric, which is a very political thing, the comparison with prudential arguments would have at least been as relevant as that with dialectic and scientific arguments. This leads to further questions. Now the fallacy of (inaudible), the same example occurred to me which occurred to you, namely the argument against the democratic (inaudible), because that is the most obvious case in this country. But I tried to think of other examples also because sometimes the examples of Aristotle look to us farfetched. They were surely not farfetched to his immediate audience. And one last point. Aristotle deals here with fallacious enthymemes. Now I will state the difficulty as simply as I can. Are not all enthymemes fallacious? How would Aristotle reply to that?

Student: I think the real enthymemes will be ones in which the givens may be open to question, but once you assume the givens, the reasoning is strict, the conclusion will follow. There is no trickery in it. There's not a false connection. An absolute statement may not be true, but taking it to be true the conclusion will follow.

Strauss: Well Aristotle gives of course this simple argument. Since the enthymeme is a syllogism, and since wherever there is a syllogism there is also the possibility of syllogizing closer, there must also be the possibility of false enthymemes. But how does it look in practice? Let us remind ourselves of an earlier passage in this book, in the Second Book, 1398 a 3-14, that's in chapter 23.

Student: "Another topic consists in turning upon the opponent what has been said against ourselves and this is an excellent method. For instance, in the Teucer, and Iphicrates employed it against Aristophon when he asked him whether he would betray the fleet with a bribe. When Aristophon replied, no, 'then,' retorted Iphicrates, 'if you, Aristophon, would not have betrayed it, would I Iphicrates have done so?' But the opponent must be a man whom seems the more likely to have committed a crime.

Strauss: To make it a bit more emphatic, who has the reputation.

Student: "Otherwise it would appear ridiculous if anyone were to make use of such an argument in reference to such an opponent as Aristides."

Strauss: Who was famous for his justice.

Student: "It should be used to discredit the accuser; for in general the accuser aspires to be better than the defendant. Accordingly,

it must always be shown that this is not the case. And generally, it is ridiculous for a man to reproach others for what he does or would do himself or to encourage others to do what he does not or would not do himself."

Strauss: Now here we have two words, "ridiculous" and "inept." However questionable rhetorical arguments may always be from a strict point of view, not all rhetorical arguments are ridiculous and inept. And this is a sign, we can say, that there are bad and hence false enthymemes. Now what Aristotle discusses in chapter 24 are of course not defects of enthymemes from the point of view of the content as in this case here but from the point of view of the form. By the way this discussion now going on about (inaudible), what is his name, reminds of this issue. When they accused this man who has been tortured by gangsters that he is a crook. Now of course he may be a crook but it comes with bad grace from people, lawyers, habitually engaged in defending crooks. This is what Aristotle would call inept or ridiculous, but it seems that it doesn't do any harm to these people. Mr. _____ raises this question. If the cognitive status of rhetoric is obscure, does this mean that the principles of rhetoric are not demonstrable? What counterparts to the (inaudible) scheme in the Ethics are there in the Rhetoric? Finally, is the cognitive status of political science similarly obscure? These are admittedly three questions, although it is stated only in the third case "finally." But it is a fair inference that there are three questions. Now I deny the "if." The cognitive status of rhetoric is not obscure. It's made perfectly clear. These are arguments based on endoxa, on things which are not known, and not strictly speaking knowable. In other words the transformation of opinion into knowledge is not possible without leaving the whole sphere. That doesn't mean that the things might not be knowable, but then we would not longer speak about rhetoric. So the cognitive status of rhetoric is clear and the principles of rhetoric are demonstrable. They are demonstrable because they make quite clear the peculiar status of these principles. Let us take a simple example: the enumeration of the parts or ingredients of happiness in the First Book. You remember that long list, many children, good children, wealth, and so on and so on. Aristotle would simply say, is something missing, tell me and tell me whether this thing you regard as missing is generally admitted to be an ingredient of happiness as the other things which I have mentioned. So from this point of view it is demonstrable. But the authority, or the tribunal to which he refers is opinion. But on this basis it is not obscure at all. What counterparts to the (inaudible) in the Ethics are there in the Rhetoric? Well we know that, when he speaks about the just things, the good things, the noble things. And compare -- we have discussed this on a few occasions -- what he says about the virtues in the Ethics and what he says about them in the Rhetoric differs. The emphasis on benefiting, which is so strong in the Rhetoric is absent from the Ethics, and also which virtues are not mentioned at all which are mentioned in the Ethics. The Ethics is concerned with bringing up gentlemen or confirming gentlemen in their gentlemanliness. This is not the function of rhetoric. The function of rhetoric is primarily to persuade political multitudes of what is expedient in deliberative assemblies and what is just in forensic matters. Finally, is the cognitive status of political science

similarly obscure? Well, since I have shown that the cognitive status of rhetoric is not obscure, they can only be similarly clear. The question properly phrased would be, how is the cognitive status of political science related to the cognitive status of the principles appealed to by the orator. Well you only have to compare the very brief discussion, if we can call it a discussion, of the regimes in the Rhetoric with that in the Politics to see that the politics is much more quote scientific unquote. You know the detailed discussion of which institution fits which regime. For example, that in itself election by lot is characteristic of democracy follows strictly from the democratic principle, equal freedom of all citizens and no property qualification, that was understood. Now if this is so . . . Since all are equally free, they must have equally the chance of becoming elected. Now this chance is practically destroyed if men are elected by vote, because when voting for people one considers the qualities of the candidates, wisely or unwisely is another matter. One doesn't vote for a man merely because he is an American citizen. That is obvious. But if the election goes by lot, then everyman by the mere fact that he is an American citizen has the same chance as every other, and therefore there is a necessary connection. But the whole discussion . . . after all the Politics begins with the assertion that the polis is by nature, and therefore this is not a matter of opinion. Secondly, a moment's reflection shows, and Aristotle extends that reflection so that it is unintelligible how it could ever have been forgotten, that the polis is necessarily a specific polis, meaning specified by the regime. It is democratic, oligarchic, or monarchic, or whatever it may be. And this regime is really the decisive thing which gives a polis its character. And there difficulties arise, because there it is no longer so simple as that men have to live in a society of a sufficient size in order to develop their potentialities. But in what kind of a polis -- that becomes a big question. But even here you simply have one opinion against the other. Wealth is the most important for the oligarchs, therefore they limit citizenship to the wealthy. Free birth is decisive as the democrats say, therefore they give citizenship to every freeborn man. That meant always of course no easy naturalization. The ordinary thing is that the citizen is the son of a citizen, and so forth. Both principles are from the point of view of reason as Aristotle understands it wrong. Now therefore these two regimes, which are politically most interesting, are based on false opinion, but to be more general, on opinion. And all arguments within these regimes ultimately defer to an authoritative opinion and do not question that. There are people of course who are patriots who would say I don't care for oligarchy or democracy, but whichever makes the city greater. And therefore they are perfectly willing to make revolutions, as they are now called, or rebellions, as they were called in former times, changes of regimes. But the question is, is this general patriotic notion, let our city be as powerful, wealthy, and respectable as possible regardless of what the regime is. Max Weber argued that way, by the way, against the Bismarckian regime. This regime is worse for Germany's power than the Western democracies. Proof: the First World War. That is a political argument. What would Aristotle say to this argument. Weber wrote some state papers on this point. What would Aristotle say about that, about this patriotic not partisan proposal: I don't care for the regime, I'm only concerned with the

greatness . . . By the way DeGaulle of course holds the same view. DeGaulle has no particular preference for democracy or for monarchy. But the (inaudible) is what makes France great and respected.

Student: Well, he would probably be against this notion.

Strauss: On what grounds.

Student: On the grounds first of all that he is more interested in the internal harmony of the state . . .

Strauss: But still, we speak now in the very greatest generality. Therefore, let us not enter into this particular point. What would Aristotle simply say, and what he in fact says in the Third Book very clearly? What is wrong with this notion that the regime is irrelevant, that the greatness of the polis is the only thing that counts?

Student: He would say you couldn't separate the two.

Strauss: Which?

Student: The kind of regime from the greatness, its wealth. It would have to follow . . .

Strauss: It is not true. Under certain conditions that has been shown in a number of cases, say that either oligarchy did not work anymore -- the city did not expand -- or, in another case, democracy.

Student: Does it have something to do with the distinction between the good man and the good citizen?

Strauss: Yes, it has to do with this, but it be to complicate it even more. Surely it has to do with that, because the good citizen is simply a man relative to the regime. So the good democrat is the bad oligarch, and vice versa. The good communist is the bad liberal democrat, and vice versa.

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: No, no. Let us disregard . . . We are trying now to find a scientific politics by disregarding the regimes, and simply say, the patriotic point of view which means independence of foreign domination, no oppression within, wealth, and respected, perhaps even feared, by the neighbors -- crude goals which are as important today as they were in Aristotle's time. Now what would Aristotle say to that? Something very simple.

Student: Such a regime would need rulers, and the question would be ...

Strauss: All (inaudible), Machiavelli gives the very answer, efficient, shrewd fellows, people like Henry IV of England.

Student: Could there be a disagreement about the ends or goals?

Strauss: Yes, but why are you so complicated.

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: Well, the distinction is not denied. But it is simply said, the regime is only a means for an end; the end is independence and power, freedom and empire, as someone has said. That's the end. And which regime is conducive to that, that (inaudible). And if at a certain stage, say the oligarchy as in England was no longer conducive to freedom plus empire then they change it to democracy. Now what is the simple . . . Aristotle says this enumeration, my dear fellow, of the ends of politics is incomplete. It is not true that this enumeration is complete; for you omit, Machiavelli would say, the most important point. And what is the most important point according to Aristotle?

Student: A good life?

Strauss: Let us say virtue, because the word is now in such disrepute that even sticklers for proper expression may use it again. If you exclude virtue, what you would leave is an arbitrary selection. That is simply absolutizing an opinion, however plausible that opinion to the multitude might be. That doesn't make it any better. So we reach then the conclusion. We cannot disregard the question of the regime, as you all meant of course. We have to raise the question of the good regime, the best regime. And this best regime is again according to nature. This is no longer merely a matter of opinion. This is a very rough draft of Aristotle, but I think you should remember it. Therefore political science, or political philosophy, is not mere opinion because it begins with the natural character of the polis and terminates in the naturally best regime. But in between, these other regimes . . . if I use the language now of Farabi and others, they would say this, that the best regime alone aims at true felicity. The others aim at imaginary felicity of which there are various cases. But imaginary felicity is by definition of course something only in opinion, which doesn't mean that it cannot be very powerful in what we call reality but it is nevertheless an opinionated thing and not true. So this would be a rough analysis, I would say. But the difficulty comes in, well I have sketched for you this well known Aristotelian argument . . . This is not the end of the story because let us assume the best regime is not possible, or at least very rarely possible, then you arrive at the conclusion that in all regimes which you are likely to find in this imperfect world you will have ultimately a dedication to principles which cannot claim higher cognitive dignity than opinions. One might have to live with that. And yet I think the difference would be this. Because the political scientist, the political philosopher, would see that, whereas the political man as political man would not necessarily see it, because he would simply absolutize the accidental. But by seeing this, surveying the whole thing, he is not himself thinking in the element of opinion, and to that extent his reasoning will not be rhetorical. For example when Aristotle describes in Book Six the institutions most conducive to democracy and oligarchy, these are all political proposals, proposals based on prudential reasoning, but the question of how to sell these institutions to the democrat, to the oligarch, that would be the part for the rhetorician, to recommend them in a politically effective manner. That is not his concern. So the

distinction between political science and rhetoric is absolutely intact, from Aristotle's point of view. But we will have to take this up somewhat later again.

Well Aristotle sneaks first at the beginning of chapter 24, to which we turn now, of cases in which we have the mere appearance of a rhetorical syllogism, or enthymeme, which is caused by the way of speaking. In other words there is not even an appearance of an attempt to prove something. That's the first case, 1401 a 3. Let us read only the end of this paragraph.

Student: "This fallacy appears to be the result of the form of expression. For the purpose of using the diction to create an impression of syllogistic reasoning, it is useful to state the heads of several syllogisms. 'He saved some; avenged others; freed the Greeks.' Each of these propositions has been proved by others, but their union appears to furnish a fresh conclusion."

Strauss: Now what does this mean here. This example is not entirely convincing, is it? Aristotle makes a presupposition which we must add. Aristotle says nothing new follows. These three things have been proved before. He saved those; he avenged some others; and he liberated the Greeks. The putting together of them doesn't change anything. But could it not be that the man wants to prove that he is a good man, a benefactor, and this may follow from the putting together of the three things. What Aristotle implies is that in the speech in question -- I believe he refers to a speech by Isocrates -- this was not made. I have not even taken the trouble to look it up. Now let us turn to the next one.

Student: "The second kind of fallacy of diction is homonyms. For instance, if one were to say that the mouse is an important animal since from it is derived the most honored of all religious festivals, namely the Mysteries, or if in praising the dog one were one were to include the dog in heaven, or Pan because Pindar said, 'O blessed one, whom the Olympians call dog of the great mother taking every form,' or were to say that the dog is an honorable animal since to be without a dog is most dishonorable, and to say that Hermes is the most sociable of the gods because he alone is called common . . ."

Strauss: Well that goes back to a Greek proverbial phrase which is explained in the footnote.

Student: "and that words are most excellent since good men are considered worthy not of riches but of consideration; for 'logou axion' has a double meaning.

Strauss: Now what does it mean, the good men are worthy of logos, worthy of consideration, literally translated, worthy of speech? Now if this is so, if we say the highest thing we say in praise of the good men, they are worthy of speech, hence speech must be the most respectable thing. But why are the good men regarded as worthy of speech in the ordinary understanding?

Student: Because of their riches.

Strauss: No, no, take a better one, which is still very common. Because of their deeds. And what would follow from what is generally admitted is precisely that deeds are the most important and not the speech. This is a clear fallacy. Now let us go on.

Student: "Another fallacy consists in combining what is divided or dividing what is combined; for since a thing which is not the same as another oftens appears to be the same one may adopt the more convenient alternative. Such was the argument of Euthydemus to prove for example that a man knows that there is a trireme in the Peiraeus because he knows the existence of two things, the Peiraeus and the trireme. Or that when one knows the letters one also knows the word of them; for words and letters are the same thing. Further, since twice so much is unwholesome, one may argue that neither is the original amount wholesome; for it would be absurd that two halves separately would be good but bad combined. In this way the argument may be used for refutation, in another way for demonstration, if one were to say one good thing cannot make two bad things. But the whole topic is fallacious.

Strauss: In other words, it is not merely fallacious from the point of view of severe philosophic or scientific reasoning, it is even ridiculous, inept. This is what Aristotle means. Now the first example is, I think, perfectly clear. All words consist of letters. Now a man who knows all letters will therefore know all words. It's obviously not right. Or two chemicals which are separately productive of health, but combined are fatal. It's impossible. And the other way around, if you take two fatal chemicals they cannot possibly be conducive to health. This is absurd. Now the next example, we know that already from an earlier discussion but it is now taken as an example of a fallacy.

Student: Again, one may quote what Polycrates said of Thrasybulus, 'that he deposed thirty tyrants,' for here he combines them.

Strauss: That still belongs to that. In other words, he claims honors for thirty tyrannicides, but it was one action. Good.

Student: "Or the example of the fallacy of division in the Orestes of Theodectes, 'It is just that a woman who has killed her husband should be put to death' and 'that the son should avenge the father.' 'And this in fact is what has been done.' But if they are combined perhaps the act then ceases to be just. The same might also be classed as an example of the fallacy of omission; for the name of the one who should put the woman to death is not mentioned.

Strauss: I think this is also perfectly clear. Now the next one.

Student: "Another topic is that of constructing or destroying by exaggeration, which takes place when the speaker without having proved that any crime has actually been committed exaggerates the supposed fact; for it makes it appear either that the accused is not guilty when he himself exaggerates it or that he is guilty when it is the accuser who is in a rage. Therefore there is no enthymeme; for the hearer falsely concludes that the accused is guilty or not although neither has been proved.

Strauss: In other words, not even the attempt to prove has here been made. He argues the crime is enormous, hence "a" committed it -- which really doesn't work. Or, the crime is enormous, hence "a" did not commit it. This is clear. The next is also inconclusive. Yes.

Student: "Another fallacy is that of the sign; for this argument also is illogical. For instance, if one were to say that those who love one another are useful to states since the love of Harmodius and Aristogeiton overthrew the tyrant Hipparchus, or that Dionysius is a thief because he is a rascal; for here again the argument is inconclusive; not every rascal is a thief, though every thief is a rascal."

Strauss: Sure, and these principles appealed to, that not every rascal is a thief, are also generally known, therefore they belong perfectly within the context of rhetoric. Now then there comes the example of the mice, which was discussed by Mr. _____. Clearly that is absurd, because the mice might as well have ruined the Egyptians' equipment. There is no reason for praising the mice. It was merely by accident. Let us then take the next one.

Student: "Another fallacy is that of the consequence. For instance, in the Alexander it is said that Paris was highminded because he despised the companionship of the common people and dwelt at Ida by himself; for because the highminded are of this character, Paris also might be thought highminded. Or, since a man pays attention to dress and roams about at night, he is a libertine . . .

Strauss: I have the greatest respect for decency, but I would still translate "adulterer," otherwise it doesn't become a legal case.

Student: "because adulterers are of this character. Similarly, the poor sing and dance in the temples, exiles can live where they please, and since these things belong to those who are apparently happy . . .

Strauss: "who are thought to be happy." This is a technical term, reputed to be happy.

Student: "reputed happy, those to whom they belong may also be reputed happy. But there is a difference in conditions. Therefore this topic also falls under the head of omission."

Strauss: To make this clear what it means, "thought to be" or "reputed to be," if someone argues: "x" is rich, hence he is happy; this is not rhetorically bad because wealth is reputed to be an ingredient of happiness. Of course it is not sufficient. But it is not as absurd as this is and as ridiculous because here exiles can live wherever they like except where they like to live, at home. So it is particularly stupid. Good. Then we come to the "propter hoc." Go on.

Student: "Another fallacy consists of taking what is not the cause for the cause, as when a thing has happened at the same time as or after another; for it is believed that what happens after is produced

by the other, especially by politicians. Thus Demades declared that the policy of Demosthenes was the cause of all the evils to Athens, since it was followed by the war."

Strauss: Now let us skip a bit, skip the next point -- no, we can read that too.

Student: "Another fallacy is the omission of when and how. For instance, Alexander had a right to carry off Helen, for the choice of a husband had been given her by her father. But this was a fallacy; for it was not as might be thought for all time but only for the first time . . .

Strauss: In other words, when she was unmarried.

Student: "for the father's authority only lasts till then. Or if one should say that it is a wanton outrage to beat a free man; for this is not always the case, but only when the assailant gives the first blow."

Strauss: Now to come back to the example of Alexander and Helen, we had a case before, do you remember that, in 1398 a 22, when it was proven that Alexander was a man of signal temperance because he was satisfied with a single woman, which is a sign of temperance. But this was not criticized by Aristotle. Why is this argument better than the one here? If we can make distinctions between poor arguments -- but, I think, we must, because that is one way of an intelligence test.

Student: The first argument is good as far as it goes. Being faithful is sticking to one woman all the time. But it just happens that in his case there are other things . . .

Strauss: Yes but what is the point of view? What was it that the first speaker wanted to prove?

Student: A definition.

Strauss: But still, a definition of what? Let us say temperance. In other words, the case that Paris was temperant is not as bad as to say that he was a just man, which is the issue here. By taking away another man's wife he was unjust, but he may still have been (inaudible) temperant. So these are nice distinctions.

Student: He uses this later too in comparing Alexander and Aristides in I think the Third Book, chapter 12, and he doesn't explain. I suppose he has already accepted the argument he is making here. He didn't believe this, did he?

Strauss: No, I do not think Aristotle regarded this as sufficient (?) What is the objection to the first argument, which is a bit better than the one here?

Student: For a man who professes virtue . . .

Strauss: Granting that Paris was perfectly satisfied with Helen,

does this prove his temperance, his decency? That's roughly the same word because it comes from the Greek word "cosmos" which means (inaudible), appearance, decency. Now what could it also prove? Granted that Alexander was entirely faithful, absolutely faithful to Helen, does this prove his temperance. Well it might prove that Helen was a singularly attractive woman for him. It could have nothing to do with his character. But still taking this somewhat loose definition of decency, which is here used, it is not on the face of it as shocking as this one, about his justice. Good. Now we come to a more subtle and fundamental difficulty in the next paragraph.

Student: "Further, as in sophistical disputations an apparent^(?) arises as the result of considering a thing first absolutely and then not absolutely, but only in a particular case. For instance, in Dialectic it is argued that that which is not is; for that which is not is that which is not. Also that the unknown can be known; for it can be known that the unknown that it is unknown. Similarly in rhetoric . . .

Strauss: But first, do you understand this seemingly unintelligible passage, that non-being is. I think that is a demonstrable proposition that non-being is. I mean you couldn't possibly say that non-being, or nothing, is not being if it were not in a sense. And if you say the unknowable is knowable, if you say this is unknowable, you could not possibly say that if you didn't know it in a sense. Is that true? For example, take Kant's famous attempt to prove the impossibility of speculative metaphysics, because the objects are unknowable. But how could he make this argument if they were not knowable? In a sense, in a sense. And the disregard of this "in a sense" is the defect there.

Student: Which would you prefer if you had the choice, happiness or a ham sandwich? I can prove that a ham sandwich is better because nothing is better than happiness, and a ham sandwich is better than nothing.

Strauss: Nothing is better than . . .

Student: Nothing is better than happiness, and a ham sandwich is better than nothing. ^{STK 1005} Well, I have quite a few objections, because I am not so much impressed by the virtues of a ham sandwich. Now what is the rhetorical equivalent of these famous difficulties?

Student: "Similarly in rhetoric an apparent enthymeme may arise from that which is not absolutely probable but only in particular cases, but this is not to be understood absolutely. As Agathon says, 'One might perhaps say that this very thing is probable. That many things happen to men that are not probable.' For that which is contrary to probability nevertheless does happen, so that which is contrary to probability is probable. If this is so, that which is improbable will be probable, but not absolutely. But as in the case of sophistical disputations the argument becomes fallacious when the circumstances, reference, and manner are not added. So here it will become so owing to the probability being not probable absolutely but only in particular cases."

Strauss: "in certain respects."

Student: "The Art of Corax is composed of this topic. If a man is not likely to be guilty of what he is accused of, for instance if being weak he is accused of assault and battery, his defense will be that the crime is not probable. But if he is likely to be guilty, for instance if he is strong, it may be argued again that the crime is not probable for the very reason that it was bound to appear so. It is the same in all other cases; for a man must either be likely to have committed a crime or not. Here both the alternatives appear equally probable; but the one is really so, the other not probable absolutely but only in the conditions mentioned. And this is what making the worse appear the better argument means. Wherefore men were justly disgusted with the promise of Protagoras; for it is a lie, not a real but an apparent probability, not found in any art except rhetoric and sophistical."

Strauss: Now let us see that. In other words, the application to rhetoric of this well known sophism, that non-being is, is the improbable is probable, based here on the verse of Agathon. In a way it makes, of course, sense to say that, because clever people will do the improbable thing as strategy, not what everyone expects, but the improbable. And therefore one can say pointedly the improbable is probable. But Aristotle says that nevertheless this is a misuse because this probability, so to speak, is a probability of the second order we could say, and does not belong to the primary level of probabilities with which we are always concerned. From this point of view, this would destroy all ordinary probability reasoning. This man was found alone in that house, blood on his jacket, a sworn enemy of the murdered man and deriving money from his death. And then the man says, precisely because there is a ninety-nine percent probability, what a fool I would have been to kill him. It would be the end of all probability reasoning of all human life, one could say. There is a fundamental fallacy involved. Now here Aristotle refers explicitly to a well known work of Protagoras, a famous sophist. He claimed that he was able to make the weaker logos, the weaker assertions, stronger, and Aristotle says what he means is that he wanted to make the improbable probable. But this does necessarily mean that this trick here, I mean the misuse of probability as such, was Protagoras' point. What precisely did this famous principle mean? Needless to say this is something of great practical importance, especially in forensic rhetoric. A criminal who doesn't have a ghost of a chance according to all ordinary considerations because the case is so clear, how can he be acquitted? If he has a lawyer or orator who can make the weaker (inaudible) stronger, stronger than that of the accuser. Now what is . . . The example which Aristophanes gives is this. Father beating is generally regarded as bad. So that's a strong logos. Now what does a weaker say? It says, but Zeus fettered his father. And now Zeus has obviously much more authority than any other being, and therefore father beating is (inaudible). You know, that means to make the weaker logos the stronger logos. And then one would have to argue that out. This would of course not occur in ordinary forensic rhetoric, but not entirely unrelated to that. By the way, the being of non-being is the theme of Plato's dialogue Sophist, but there it is made perfectly clear that non-being does not mean

unqualified non-being, but being other. Being other means of course being not like that. In other words, it is impossible to speak about being without introducing negativity of sorts. In an entirely different way that was done later by Hegel. This only in passing. Now let us turn to the next chapter.

Student: "Next to what has been said we must speak of refutation. An argument may be refuted either by a counter syllogism or by bringing in objections. It is clear that the same topic may furnish counter syllogisms; for syllogisms are derived from probable materials, and many probabilities are contrary to one another. An objection is brought, as shown in the Topics, in four ways: it may be derived either from itself; or from what is similar; or from what is contrary; or from what has been decided. In the first case, if for instance the enthymeme was intended to prove that love is good, two objections might be made: either the general statement that all want is bad, or in particular that "Caunian love" would not have become proverbial unless some forms of love had been bad.

Strauss: That means incest. Go on.

Student: An objection from what is contrary is brought if, for instance, the enthymeme is that the good man does good to all his friends, it may be objected that the bad man does not do harm to all his friends."

Strauss: Now let us take the case more simply. The good man is the opposite of the bad man. But the bad man also may benefit his friends. Therefore, it is not the property of the good man to benefit his friends. This is his argument. Aristotle regards this as (inaudible) from a rhetorical point of view. It would lead of course to the conclusion that benefiting one's friends is not of the essence of the good man. Or you have to make distinctions between what is a friend. I mean is the relation of (inaudible) to his helpers friendship? This leads then beyond what you can use in forensic rhetoric.

Student: "An objection from what is similar is brought if the enthymeme is that those who have been injured always hate, by arguing that those who been benefited do not always love."

Strauss: Yes, this is good enough, isn't it. In other words, you want to prove that this man who is suspected of having killed "b" hated "b". And you prove it by the fact that he had been hurt badly by the murdered man. And then the reply to that is, by no means. Just as people who suffer ill do not necessarily hate, or rather just as men who have suffered benefits are not necessarily grateful, there is no necessity why a man should have been hurt should be full of hate.

Student: The problem I see here is that this seems more likely to be an argument of the opposite.

Strauss: Yes, that is true. Averroes in his commentary, I looked it up, says it is a combination of the opposite and proportion, and proportion is what he means by similitude: doing well, loving; doing

ill, hating, that combination of the two things.

Student: Could give any example that would be more similar?

Strauss: No. I tried in all cases to find a simple example, well of course I couldn't invest an infinite time. Very rarely did I succeed. Now go on.

Student: "For instance . . .

Strauss: One sees simply the high degree to which these things were articulated in Aristotle's time that he could leave it at these very laconic remarks, assuming that it would be understood. Now these works to which he refers when he says for example to the Art of Rhetoric at the end of chapter 27, we don't have that. And our training in these matters is particularly bad. The teaching in rhetoric and also in formal logic has practically disappeared from general instruction. I know that roughly ten years before I tended the highest classes in high school formal logic was still a part of the obligatory instruction. I'm sure in this country too that has disappeared for quite some time. But on the other hand, in the philosophy courses, courses in formal logic were very rarely given. No where at the university where I studied was there such instruction given formally. Logic meant at that time transcendental logic in the Kantian sense, and not formal logic.

Student: "The fourth kind of objection is derived through the former decisions of well known men. For instance, if the enthymeme is that one should make allowance for those who are drunk, for their offense is the result of ignorance, it may be objected that Pittacus then is unworthy of commendation. Otherwise he would not have laid down so severe a punishment for a man who commits an offense while drunk."

Strauss: This is a reference to authority.

(first side of tape runs out)

refers here to the conflict between universal laws and laws peculiar to particular nations like Pittacus who made the penalty twice as strong if it was committed by a drunken man. Here you have the universal law, what he called the universal law in the chapter on that, is of course not an appeal to authority, but the appeal to a particular legislator, either your own or another highly renowned. Contradicting that universal law would be an example of that.

Student: "Now the material of enthymemes is derived from four sources: probabilities, examples, necessary signs, and signs. Conclusions are drawn from probabilities when based upon things which . . .

Strauss: Now we do not have to read that. The main point I think is this. Aristotle says here it can be shown in all cases of rhetorical argument that the proof is not strict, scientific. But this is not a legitimate refutation of a probable argument because that is taken for granted. Beyond a reasonable doubt -- Aristotle uses the Greek equivalent of that phrase. Beyond a reasonable

doubt means very probable. It does not mean that it is of apodictic certainty. Now of course taking this into consideration, we see how much depends on the ability of the speaker. Say, does a guilty defendant deserve pity or not? Whether he will convince the jury or not will depend entirely on his power of persuasion, i.e., on among other things his proper selection of the particular topos for this purpose. Now let us turn to 1403 a where he speaks about these various signs.

Student: "Signs and enthymemes based upon signs even if true may be refuted in the manner previously stated; for it is clear from the Analytics that no sign can furnish a logical conclusion. As for enthymemes derived from examples, they may be refuted in the same manner as probabilities; for if we have a single fact that contradicts the opponents example the argument is refuted as not being necessary, even though examples more in number and of more common occurrence are otherwise. But if a majority of the examples is on the side of the opponent, we must contend either that the present example is not similar to those cited by him, or that the thing did not take place in the same way, or that there is some difference. But necessary signs and the enthymemes derived from them cannot be refuted on the ground of not furnishing a logical conclusion, as is clear from the Analytics. The only thing that remains is to prove that the thing alleged is nonexistent. But if it is evident that it is true and that it is a necessary sign, the argument at once becomes irrefutable; for by means of demonstration everything at once becomes clear."

Strauss: Now what is this? He says necessary signs. Now what is a necessary sign? We had some examples before.

Student: In Book One, chapter 2 he gave two examples: one, it is a sign that a man is ill because he has a fever; and the other, a woman has had a child because she has milk.

Strauss: The simplest I believe would be, where there is smoke there is fire. Whereas the one which you mentioned before; Socrates was wise, is just; hence the wise men are just, is absolutely inconclusive because it might so happen that one wise man, Socrates, was also just. Now if we take this case here for example. In this case what can you do? An unmarried girl is pregnant. This is a fact. With this you have to start. And the argument is this. The only man who could have responsible for the pregnancy was "x". If this is absolutely settled, the only thing to do which (inaudible) is to prove that she is not pregnant. This is the kind of case he has in mind. For nonnecessary signs, as they are called here, "x" has dated that girl, and hence he is responsible for the pregnancy. Clearly this would not make any impression on anyone. Good. Now we leave it at this and I would like to return for a few minutes to this broad question which I mentioned at the end of the last meeting and which was brought up today.

Now the difference between political, practical reasoning, prudential reasoning, and rhetorical reasoning. Now political reasoning belongs to prudence and prudence is, according to the Sixth Book of the Ethics, I'll read it in Thomas Aquinas (inaudible): "Prudence

is located not only in reason but has also something in the appetite. Prudence in the Aristotelian sense is constituted by some fusion between an intellectual quality and the moral qualities, virtues." If we start from this point, is this applicable to the question of rhetoric? You would say, the rhetorician must also have some moral qualities.

Student: No, that's the difference. The rhetorician does not need any moral . . .

Strauss: In other words the rhetorician must possess virtue and good will as we have seen, but is this truly necessary. The reputation of virtue and good will is perfectly sufficient. If this were the whole evidence, one could say rhetorical reasoning is not necessarily and essentially influenced by the virtues and good character of the speaker -- truly good as distinguished by reputation, which is a very different thing. Now I looked up a statement by Roger Bacon in his Moral Philosophy. Roger Bacon you will not mistake for Francis Bacon. Roger Bacon is thirteenth century, I believe late thirteenth century. I do not remember the dates. And he was one of the first Latin authors to be influenced by the Arabs. He was engaged in missionary activity, and therefore learned Arabic, and so forth. Now he has quite a discussion of this problem of rhetoric in the Fifth Part of his Moral Philosophy. I have here a new critical edition of that by Massa. Now I will give you the main points: "Political science is strictly speaking practical and not speculative. Speculative sciences are such as do not teach us to be or to become good. Civil science in the looser sense consists however of a theoretical and practical part." In other words, in the practical science of morals and politics there is a more general part which can be called theoretical although it is not strictly speaking theoretical. It's only relatively theoretical. For example, Aristotle's various discussions about the various kinds of regimes goes much beyond the purpose of immediate practical use. And now he comes to the key point. "The theoretical part of the practical sciences does not have the effect of making us good." Let us say this. Reading the Nicomachean Ethics, the analysis of choice and of the virtue being a mean, does not have the effect of making us good, nor, I suppose, the description of the individual virtues. Now what follows from this. Moral philosophy is not for the sake of contemplation or speculation, but for the sake of our becoming good, as Aristotle said. And he says also there that knowledge or science has little or no effect toward virtue. Hence, scientific arguments are not sufficient for morality. Here is a place where rhetoric comes in. Rhetoric has this effect of bending our will, and this is his point. So the question we discussed earlier, the question of an exhortative rhetoric which would be conducive to making men good, at least aspire to being good, for which there is no place in Aristotle as we have seen, at least not in the Rhetoric, is here the central theme and we shall see soon why. Now in order to show how important this bending our will toward the good is, he says the practical intellect is more noble than the speculative intellect. Here he shows of course a non-Aristotelian premise, because Aristotle always denied that. Now let us see a few more passages. "We need greater and more powerful inducements so that we are bent to this kind of thing. But this is exactly supplied by rhetorical

arguments and not by any others. Now this argument [meaning the rhetorical arguments] is not known to the general run of artists [artists in the medieval sense of the college students and teachers], since the books of Aristotle and his commentators have only recently been translated and are not yet in use among the students. But Cicero's Rhetoric which was known always in the Western world does not teach this argument, the rhetorical argument which makes us good, except only in connection with forensic purposes, so that the orator could persuade the judge, etc. We need the complete doctrine of Aristotle and his commentators to get this most desirable exhortative rhetoric." That's what Bacon said. Now I am not now concerned with whether that is historically correct regarding Aristotle. I am only concerned with the fact that here we have a clear demand for this kind of rhetoric which to our common sense seems so evidently necessary. So here we have it. You will find . . . Aristotelian rhetoric is the one which exhorts to virtue. And now he refers to a praise of rhetoric by Cicero in his (inaudible). But above all, and this shows, Augustine On Christian Doctrine, Book Four. Augustine is the authority for the possibility and necessity of rhetoric. Now if we use the other word, sermon, the sermon which is to have this moral appeal, that is the point (inaudible) primarily in mind. Now let me see whether I can find it. "Cicero had said, he is eloquent who can say small things in a small way, things of a medium weight or dignity in a medium way, and say the grand things in a grand way. And this he interprets to mean, to teach what should be done, this is the small; to delight the hearers touching their (inaudible) is medium; but bending is the greatest. And is what is to be expected of rhetoric. What are needed are affective sermons, speeches, which in a magnificent manner change the affect towards the deep, and here is the place for the grand style. . . . Demonstration doesn't move the practical intellect unless by accident, but rhetoric moves the practical intellect per se, essentially and absolutely and he can bend the mind, which demonstration never can." And then he says this Fifth Part of his own work must set forth arguments of extreme beauty so that the mind will suddenly be enraptured toward agreement and before it can see the contrary, meaning possible objections, as Farabi teaches in his book on the sciences. And he shows then in the sequel that this applies especially to religious beliefs, to beliefs peculiar to a sect, sect in the sense of a religion as it was used in this kind of literature based on the Arabic sources. Now the whole argument regarding these things . . . The basis of all arguments here are the Church, Holy Scripture, the testimony of the Saints, the miracles, and so on, and the consent of all Catholic Doctors, and the arguments are fundamentally of a rhetorical or poetic character. This does not make any fundamental difference. And he refers here, "One can learn much from Averroes' commentary and the book of Aristotle, which is available in Latin although it is not in use by the multitudes. At the beginning of this commentary the translator said he was unable to translate the text of Aristotle because of the difficulty. But Horace's Poetics can be very helpful and also what Alfarabi, (inaudible) say in their work.

So I think this is quite interesting to consider. I had completely forgotten that. Here we have surely a statement about the edifying rhetoric, exhorting rhetoric, which is not merely of biblical origin

by the way, but in the Greek schools there developed such a thing after Socrates' time and there is at least one example in Xenophon, in Memorabilia I 4, of such a speech exhorting to virtue. So this existed but Aristotle has no systematic provision for this kind of rhetoric. That was the question. Does this help us in any way as regards our great question of the relation of prudential and rhetorical reasoning. In a sense there is no reason whatever for assuming that there is any conflict here because you simply say, prudential reasoning is practical reasoning. And in the Logic Aristotle discusses only the various forms of theoretical reasoning, where even rhetorical reasoning would be regarded as theoretical. The absence, however, of any reference to this problem from the Rhetoric and certain difficulties in the (inaudible) itself creates the problem of which we have spoken before. I may say something more about it next time.

Lecture XIII
Aristotle's Rhetoric, May 25, 1964

(in progress) Strauss: What has this discussion of style and diction to do with political science? But you answered that question. You can't make an analysis of Lincoln without paying very great attention to his rhetoric. The same would of course be true of Winston Churchill. But if one would raise the objection that these are unusual men and that the general run of politician is not considered from this point of view, I would refer you to Senator Dirksen of Illinois who is obviously a rhetorician if not of the highest caliber, perhaps a bit too high flown. When you say I found it a bit harsh if you say that the Americans love money more than other nations, this has been questioned and can very well be questioned. But it would have to be properly stated. Max Weber says somewhere in a discussion of capitalist morality that tax farmers (?) in former ages and so on and other kinds of people, no one could rival them in avarice. So this I think is somewhat unfair. But surely the absence of older social traditions from this country, the older non-capitalist traditions, gives this country a peculiar character. That is perfectly true. Even in England, this old country with this long past, I remember how I was shocked when I heard for the first time the question, how much is he worth. It is untranslatable into any other language, I believe. But this is not America, this is England.

Student: (inaudible) rate men according to how many sheep they had. This was their kind of money.

Strauss: Well it may be pure sentimentality but one can say sheep are simply nicer to look at, especially lambs. Now gold is more durable than sheep, I know that. But, you know, there is a certain difference when the property consists in the immediate objects of use than in that indirect thing, money, which of course has infinite advantages, as Aristotle has explained to us prior to Adam Smith, but still it has also its peculiar dangers.

Now I think that was a very good paper, especially since it answered one question which one can raise about Aristotle's Rhetoric as a whole, from the point of view of present day political science. Needless to say the remarks of Aristotle have very much to do with the fact that rhetoric is not equally required in all regimes, as you saw very well. Say the government of the country is in the hands of twenty families and their most respected members and they meet in council. There is no need for rhetoric in this elaborate form. There is a need for it in popular government, obviously. I think that today a statesman cannot be quite successful if he is not an orator as well. This helps very much, whereas in other regimes there was no necessity for that. Of course he must be able to state clearly what he wants, but that is not yet rhetoric. One has of course famous exceptions. There have been Presidents of the United States who have been notorious for not being good speakers, President Eisenhower for example and I think also the present President who doesn't strike one as a great orator. So this needs some qualification, especially the point that both rhetoric as such and

the level and character of rhetoric has something to do with the level and character of the polity. This is also clear. In that wonderful biography of Lincoln by that Englishman, LORD CHARNWOOD there is a beautiful reflection on the Gettysburg Address, that it did not make at that time any impression. The impressive orator was a then famous man, Everett, who was the official speaker and he spoke for two hours and this was a masterpiece of rhetoric by ordinary standards, standards which are still noticeable behind Senator Dirksen, a certain high flown language. And of course this speech has been forgotten. Now let us turn to the text. Let us read the beginning of the Third Book which is a summary of what precedes.

Student: "There are three things which require special attention in regard to speech: first, the sources of proofs; secondly, style; and thirdly, the arrangements of the parts of the speech. We have already spoken of proofs and stated that they are three in number, what is their nature, and why there are only three; for in all cases persuasion is the result either of the judges themselves being affected in a certain manner or because they consider the speakers to be of a certain character . . .

Strauss: So the first is the effect on the passions. The second is the presentation of character, moral character. Yes.

Student: "or because something has been demonstrated."

Strauss: That's the enthymeme.

Student: "We have also stated the sources from which enthymemes should be derived, some of them being special, the others general commonplaces."

Strauss: So this is clear in principle. And now what remains, he goes on to say, is to speak about diction, or style as they translate it. Diction would be a more literal translation. Here, let us read that perhaps.

Student: We have, therefore, next to speak of diction; for it is not sufficient to know what one ought to say, but one must also know how to say it. And this largely contributes to making the speech appear of a certain character.

Strauss: Meaning the speech. He does not say here the speaker, although he implies that of course it will also reflect on the speaker.

Student: In the first place, following the natural order, we investigated that which first presented itself, what gives things themselves their persuasiveness; in the second place, their arrangement by diction; and in the third place, delivery, which is of the greatest importance but has not yet been treated of by anybody. In fact, it only made its appearance late in tragedy and rhapsody."

Strauss: Now let us stop here for one second. Averroes in his commentary makes this remark: "Therefore it is, of course, a part of logic, if not according to Aristotle, surely according to the

Aristotelian tradition. The logician considers those attributes of the speech which are common to all nations." Any error in reasoning is an error in all languages. But the speculation about that which is peculiar to individual nations belongs to the condition of the orator who lives in a particular nation. In other words, qua part of logic rhetoric is as universal as dialectics or the analytics are. But in the case of the orator there is something to be added which does not come in in the two other cases, namely what is proper in the language of the individual people. In 1407 a 20 there is a remark, at the beginning of the fifth chapter:

Student: "Such then are the elements of speech. But purity, which is the foundation of style . . .

Strauss: Let us stop here. The beginning, the principle, of diction is, literally translated, to speak Greek. And this has a double meaning of course because you say of someone that he doesn't speak English not only, say, if he is a Frenchman but also if he speaks English badly. That's not English, you would say. So (inaudible) has therefore the meaning a) simply speaking Greek and not another language, and b) also speaking proper Greek. Therefore you can speak of purity; that's the point. The fact that Aristotle uses here the word "HELLENIZEM" of course is a clear indication of that particular limitation. Aristotle did not know of any rhetoric exercised by people who were not Greek. There are no such remarks in the Politics to this effect. The problem of history, as it is now called, would of course start from such utterances, that while rhetoric may have principles which are universal, at least in Aristotle's opinion, it is not altogether accidental that rhetoric emerged in Greece and that the great orators proper whom we have are Greek orators in the first place or people who learned from the Greeks. Averroes makes occasionally remarks in his commentary on things which are of no use among Arabs while they were evidently very important for use in Aristotle's time. He quotes Farabi to the effect that quite a few things which Aristotle said are neither intelligible nor useful to us. But I mention this only in passing. This is, of course, a broad question. Now in the immediate sequel where we left off reading he says "acting," I believe. That's of course the root of the word "hypocrite."

Student: Yes, that was a very difficult thing to translate.

Strauss: Well I would translate it by "acting." A hypocrite is a man who acts the virtuous man. But (inaudible) has the lowest rank of all things to be considered in the book. Nevertheless, it is important. Why? Because rhetoric addresses low people. In other words, if the addressees were men of high intellectual and moral standing, acting would be wholly superfluous. Now let us go on. Where is this particular passage. Do you have it? Go on.

Student: "First the poets themselves acted their tragedies. It is clear therefore that there is something of the sort in rhetoric as well as in poetry and it has been dealt with by Glaucon of Teos among others. Now delivery is a matter of voice, as to the mode in which it should be used for each particular emotion, when it should be loud, when low, when intermediate, and how the tones;

that is, shrill, deep, and intermediate should be used; and what rhythms are adapted to each subject; for there are three qualities that are considered: volume, harmony, and rhythm. Those who use these properly nearly always carry off the prizes in dramatic contests and as in the present day actors have greater influence on the stage than the poets it is the same in political contests owing to the corruptness of our regime."

Strauss: Now let me see. Yes, "of the regimes." Yes.

Student: "But no treatise has yet been composed on delivery since the matter of style itself only lately came into notice, and rightly considered it is thought vulgar. But since the whole business of rhetoric is to influence opinion, we must pay attention to it not as being right but as necessary; for as a matter of right one should aim at nothing more in a speech than how to avoid exciting pain or pleasure, for justice should consist in fighting the case with the facts alone so that everything else besides demonstration is superfluous."

Strauss: Demonstration here in the broad sense where it means not only the reasonings but also the ethical, presenting a character, and the appeal to the passions. But the acting element is to be included. Now let us go on. Although de jure it is something despicable, de facto it is something very important.

Student: "Nevertheless, as we have just said, it is of great importance owing to the corruption of the hearer. However, in every system of instruction there is some slight necessity to pay attention to style; for it does make a difference for the purpose of making a thing clear to speak in this or that manner. Still, the difference is not so very great, but all these things are mere outward show for pleasing the hearer. Wherefore, no one teaches geometry in this way."

Strauss: In the most exact sciences rhetoric has no place. What we want in the way of diction there is demanded by the exactness and precision of the science itself, that you cannot use ambiguous words and do not make your proof unnecessarily complicated by referring to irrelevant things in the proof itself. This doesn't even have to be considered as a part of diction, because it's not really. So in this respect Aristotle is as strict here as Plato in the Gorgias. The importance of hypocracies, of play acting, increases with the decay of the regimes. Now what Aristotle has in mind is this. What is the decay of the regimes? Let us act according to a rule stated by Aristotle stated in this very chapter. Replace the general, which is confusing because of its generality, by the specific. Remember that rule, that you should never use the genus but the species, unless you want to be obscure. Now what does he mean by the defect, the poverty of the regimes? What does he mean by that? What regime was there when Aristotle wrote this?

Student: The Macedonian . . .

Strauss: Not yet. He's speaking prior to the Macedonian conquest.

Student: Democracy?

Strauss: Democracy, sure. And that is what Plato suggests all the time, that these meretricious arts, if they are arts, come to the fore with democracy. Whether this applies to modern democracy is a long question, but one thing is very striking, I believe: in the first place, the social position of the actors. I mean not only have the old and irrational taboos been taken away. You know, actors were generally regarded as the scum of the population. That has been completely taken away. They are truly artisans of manners, especially for the so called teenagers, I am given to understand. This is one thing which is quite remarkable. I think one can even speak, taking the broader Aristotelian view of regime where he does not merely mean the technically political but everything that gives character to society and forms character, whether the actors are not, the actors as actors disregarding all individual differences among them, are not as much giving a character to this society as say the politically leading men. But something much less ambiguous, I believe. And that is in the sanctuary of social science itself one of the key terms of present day social science is roles. You all have "n" roles. Simply stated, you are play acting all the time. You are never truly yourself. This is, I think, a very characteristic expression. In his role as citizen, in his role as father, etc. And the question is, what is the true man. And this, of course, is no longer a matter of sociology. Is it a matter of psychology? That would lead to a difficult question. Aristotle continues the theme. . Go on.

Student: "Now, when delivery comes into fashion it will have the same effect as acting. Some writers have attempted to say a few words about it, as Thrasyarchus in his Eleoi."

Strauss: This is of course our friend Thrasyarchus from the Republic. "Eleoi" means speeches of compassion. He was a master of arousing anger and compassion, these opposite things of which we have read quite a bit.

Student: "And in fact a gift for acting is a natural talent and depends less upon art, but in regard to style it is artificial."

Strauss: It is subject to be treated by an art. He says the gift for acting cannot be furthered very much by techne, by instruction. But as far as the diction is concerned, the influence of the art is very great.

Student: "Wherefore people who excell in this in their turn obtain prizes, just as orators who excell in delivery; for written speeches owe their effect not so much to the sense as to the style."

Strauss: You must have known the experience that if you read say a Shakespearean play carefully you see probably more things in it than you would see even if it were acted very well, because a certain stratum is very likely not to be understood by the actors or by the man in charge of the acting. In the immediate sequel Aristotle says somethings which we cannot read now about the difference between

poetic and rhetorical diction of which the principle is obvious. Something may be very good poetic diction and poor rhetoric, and vice versa. Let us rather turn to the next chapter. In the first part of this chapter he speaks of the two requirements of diction. It must be clear and it must be proper, appropriate. Appropriate means rather in the direction toward the stately, not to say pompous of course, than in the direction of the vulgar. And this is achieved if the speech has a certain strangeness, literally translated, but of course not like a stranger who speaks a different language. That would be a great defect. Instead it means a certain aloofness. Nevertheless, it must appear to be natural. If it sounds affected, then this is fatal. In other words, the orator must be able, as he puts it in 1404 b 24, to (inaudible) well. The audience must not for one moment have the impression that this is not a perfectly unrehearsed and natural utterance of the speaker. If any thought occurs that he figured out at home this particular joke would have this effect, then the effect is of course ruined. The only proper device for oratory is the metaphor as distinguished from homonyms or synonyms. This he develops in the sequel. Now since he recommends metaphors so highly, what are the virtues of metaphors, 1405 a 8.

Student: It has already been stated in the Poetics what each of these things is, how many kinds of metaphor there are, and that it is most important both in poetry and in prose. But the orator must devote greater attention to them in prose, since the latter has fewer resources than verse. It is metaphor above all that gives perspicuity, pleasure, and a foreign air, and it cannot be learned from anyone else."

Strauss: Now this is hard to understand. Why cannot it be learned? Literally, it cannot be taken from anyone else. Can one not take a metaphor from someone else? I think we do it all the time. But that is not the metaphor which he means. Then it becomes trite almost. At least it will not be regarded as any special merit of the speaker. But if they have never heard the metaphor, if it was made by the speaker, then alone would it have the full effect. Does this make sense? Now it is clear metaphors must be appropriate on the one hand to the subject matter and on the other hand to the speaker. As for the subject matter, in defending an inveterate drunk the metaphors must be chosen from a different sphere than if you speak, as Cicero puts it, the majesty of the people (inaudible). You can't use the same metaphors (inaudible). And also it must be fit to the speaker. A young man cannot very well use metaphors taken from the experiences of old age and to some extent it's also true the other way around. Good. Now the next chapter discusses, chapter 3, how does he translate that?

Student: Frigidity of style?

Strauss: Frigidity. I do not know whether I understand the meaning of this common American word well enough. A large part of what Aristotle discusses falls under the heading of the corny, c-o-r-n-y. I think the corny is only a part of what Aristotle means by frigidity but probably the most obnoxious part of it. I give you one example of a very corny thing which is explicitly called frigid in the context. That occurs in Xenophon's Banquet, chapter 6, paragraph 7. Now there

was some kind of actor around at the banquet and Socrates was not particularly impressed by his performance and so this fellow became annoyed, and he says, are you Socrates who is called the thinker? Now the Greek word could also mean the worrier. You know men who think about the (inaudible) of snats and similar things can be said to worry about things about which a sensible man does not. So Socrates replies, now is it not nicer than if I were called the thoughtless one? The actor; but you are supposed to be a thinker, a worrier, of the things aloft [which was regarded as somewhat impious]. Thereupon Socrates says, do you know anything that is more aloft than the gods [hence, that would be pious]. No, by Zeus, this fellow says, they don't say you care for these, the gods, but for the most useless things [meaning the motion of the sun and the moon and so on]. Socrates: but even so I would care for the gods. [And now there comes a joke.] Socrates: for they help us by giving rain from above and they give us light from above. If I talk frigidly you are responsible because you cause troubles to me. Now I will translate this. The useless is in Greek "*ANAPROS* ." (writing on the board, largely inaudible). "from above" and "helping" so that he interprets "useless" as helping from above. This is frigid. I thought I should mention this little example. Now the simple overall rule which Aristotle gives regarding the frigid is stated in 1406 a 15-17.

Student: "But one must aim at the mean; for neglect to do so does more harm than speaking at random, for a random style lacks merit but excess is vicious."

Strauss: I believe that is evidently sensible. A careless style is preferable to overwrought (?) and therefore frigid (inaudible). Toward the end of this chapter, 1406 b 5:

Student: "The fourth cause of frigidity of style is to be found in metaphors; for metaphors also are inappropriate, some because they are ridiculous -- for the comic poets also employ them . . .

Strauss: What does "for" mean here? How does Aristotle reason here? Some metaphors are improper because of their ridiculous character for the comic poets too use metaphors.

Student: Doesn't he mean they use them in order to get laughs?

Strauss: Yes, and this fact proves that metaphors can be . . . because this is one of Aristotle's characteristic insertions where one doesn't necessarily see what the connection is. Yes.

Student: "others because they are too dignified and somewhat tragic. And if they are farfetched they are obscure, as when Gorgias said, 'affairs pale and bloodless,' 'you have shown shame and reaped misfortune'; for this is too much like poetry. And as Alcidas calls philosophy 'a bulwark of the laws' . . .

Strauss: By the way there is a certain ambiguity. It may also mean (inaudible) against the nomos. So it is more subtle than it seems.

Student: "and the Odyssey 'a beautiful mirror of human life' and

'introducing no such play thing in poetry.' All these expressions fail to produce persuasion for the reasons stated. As for what Gorgias said to the swallow which flying over his head let fall her droppings upon him, it was in the best tragic style. He exclaimed, 'Why, for shame, Philomela.' For there would have been nothing in this act disgraceful for a bird, whereas it would have been for a young lady. The reproach therefore was appropriate, addressing her as she was, not as she is.

Strauss: I think we have no difficulty in understanding the last case, the last example, but otherwise Aristotle seems much too stern for our tastes. For example, what is wrong with this Gorgian saying, 'you have sown basely or disgracefully, and you have harvested badly?' What is so bad about that. Also the Odyssey is called a beautiful mirror of human life -- nothing is more common to us than this. Is Aristotle more strict, more classic in his tastes, or what is it? Why do we feel differently?

Student: He's taking a much simpler audience than . . . (inaudible).

Strauss: But still . . .

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: But on the other hand what I read about the Lincoln-Douglas debates, which were addressed primarily to a rural audience, they were on a very high level. I do not know whether this is sufficient.

Student: These phrases aren't as poetic to us as they may be to the Greeks. For example, the metaphor of the mirror, the beautiful mirror, I'm sure it's been used and reused since then whereas it may have been quite fresh to the Greeks and very poetic, also the other one by Gorgias . . . (inaudible).

Strauss: That may be.

Student: Sowing shame and reaping misfortune would be much too grandiose . . . (inaudible).

Strauss: Well, that depends. If it would be in the case of the drunkard we discussed before, it would be impossible. But if it were said about a great blunder say in foreign policy -- you have broken the treaty and I warned you at the time. Now you will get it.

Student: I have the impression that he is saying that the situation calls for something not so light as the metaphor. When dealing with a subject as shame and misfortune the metaphor is too light, too poetic to be appropriate.

Strauss: But he says explicitly, because of the stately and tragic, which is surely not light. He doesn't even give an example of a metaphor which is comical or ridiculous.

Student: I was only going to say that this would be precisely appropriate to Munich, sowing shame and reaping misfortune. It would

have been most appropriate to say in September of 1939.

Strauss: Yes.

Student: I have no answer except that others because they are too dignified and somehow tragic, maybe he's thinking of this tragic experience.

Another Student: One question: Was the context known to his audience at that time and which has escaped us now? Now the Odyssey, we know those two statements. But the first two -- could they have been applied by Gorgias to something which was much beneath the severity of the sentence?

Strauss: That we do not know. But he is here only concerned that expressions of this kind are not fit for public speech.

Student: Under any circumstances?

Strauss: He seems to have regarded them as particularly good examples. Otherwise he wouldn't have picked them. Now I believe some of you stated it already. For example, let us take sowing and harvesting. This is of course very well known to us from the Bible. And that's what Mr. Levi indicated in his speech. The Bible is the background of much of modern Western oratory. So, in other words, what stems from the Bible, regardless of how it would be judged from the point of view of rhetoric, ceases to have that extreme strangeness and farfetchedness which it would have if it did not come from the Bible. I believe that is the important point. Now regarding the mirror, that poetry is the mirror of life, we have been (inaudible) with this ad nauseam. That is also what one of you said. Once these expressions become a part of the heritage they are no longer in any way conspicuous and they could only be blamed sometimes for being used too often. But they can no longer be rejected as too stately. Needless to say, and this is the only point where I differ very much from Mr. Levi, the Bible was not read as poetry. I mean this was a modern invention of the eighteenth century, when Sir (inaudible) wrote a book on the sacred poetry of the Hebrews. But the Bible was not read as poetry, and therefore it wouldn't fall under this criticism.

Student: It has the same effect, a poetic effect upon the audience, like the Iliad had the effect on the Greeks of being their standard . .

Strauss: Yes but it was not a holy book. We must never forget that. We must never regard it as a holy book. It was regarded as their greatest book, but never as a holy book. And therefore it did not enter into the daily life as much as the Bible did. The incidents were very well known, of course, but it was something very different.

Student: I was just going to say that the Bible was (inaudible) poetry . . . (inaudible).

Strauss: But still, this did not belong to oratory. Hymns did not belong to oratory. And the question is whether the use of phrases taken from hymns and indirectly from the Bible in secular or political

oratory, whether there are not also some limits in that. Now if Lincoln made such a magnificent use of it this had also to do with an unusual situation in the Civil War. You know, if you used for a change in oil depletion laws, it would sound funny. It all depends on the subject. When Lincoln was simply compelled by the whole situation to fall back on the notion of the war as a punishment for slavery, and which could only be divine punishment, the magnitude of the theme justified that. This would have to be considered in each case.

Student: Lincoln also used the Bible for not so very high purposes. He wrote a satirical piece on a frontier wedding in which he made great fun at a mixup on which wife went to whom. And he created quite a bit of stir . . . (inaudible).

Strauss: What has this to do with the subject we are discussing, namely public oratory, being deliberative or forensic oratory in the first place. Analogous to that would be what might be said in a Greek banquet. Think of the speeches in Plato's Banquet, a subject which Aristotle doesn't take up here at all. That wouldn't contradict that.

Student: I meant to say that Biblical style is not only used for high purposes . . .

Strauss: That was a kind of parody being used, not offensive but a kind of parody. That's something different. But Aristotle here means that there is a strict line separating oratory from poetry and therefore there are limits on the use of metaphors in public speech. In the next chapter Aristotle discusses similes which differ very little he says from metaphors, because the simile simply makes explicit what the metaphor does not, that it is like something. Let us turn to 1406 b 17. No this we cannot possibly read. There are some beautiful examples here of proper similes. He also mentions Plato's Republic. Now what is particularly worthwhile? Well, let us read only the Platonic examples.

Student: "Again, Plato in the Republic compares those who strip the dead to crows 'which bite stones but do not touch those who throw them.' He also says that the people is like a ship's captain who is vigorous but rather deaf, that poets' verses those who are in the bloom of youth but lack beauty; for neither the one after they have lost their bloom nor the others after they have been broken up appear the same as before."

Strauss: I think they are well done, all three of them, as similes. Now let us turn to the next chapter, 1407 a 30, where he speaks first of the necessity of the connection so that you must know, well the simple case in Greek, men and death, that you must know the referent in each case and that must be made clear. The next point which he makes is then the second point, that one must use the peculiar names, or words.

Student: "The second to employ special, not generic, terms; the third consists in avoiding ambiguous terms unless you deliberately intend the opposite, like those who having nothing to say yet pretend

to say something. Such people accomplish this by the use of verse after the manner of Empedocles; for the long circumlocutions take in the hearers who find themselves affected like the majority of those who listen to the soothsayers, for when the latter utter their ambiguities they also assent. For example, 'Croesus by crossing the Halys shall ruin a mighty dominion.' And as there is less chance of making a mistake when speaking generally diviners express themselves in general terms on the question of fact; for in playing "odd or even" one is more likely to be right if he says "even" or "odd" than if he gives a definite number, and similarly, one who says it will be then if he states when. This is why soothsayers do not define the exact time. All such ambiguities are alike. Wherefore they should be avoided, except for some such reason."

Strauss: So, in other words, ambiguity or darkneses may be used if they serve a purpose, otherwise not. Yes, now circumlocution consists partly -- that is in a way a literal translation of the Greek word which means in this case the genus instead of the species, but it means also surrounding, what comprises it, circum, circumlocution. The simplest example which occurred to me from our age is the term "antisemitism," which means hatred or hostility to the Jews. But what is really meant is concealed by a generality, because Jews happen to be semites and therefore when I hear about such people I say, what he's an antisemite, what's wrong with Nasser. But of course no one thinks of that. This is the most well known example to me, but they are used all the time and it is interesting to see why it is used. That is the interesting question. Why, for example, this term was coined in the nineteenth century. Because this, like all politically used terms, has a function. And this is the interesting thing. Aristotle makes this clear, that if it done deliberately then it is not wrong. It is not against the primary rules of speech.

Student: Isn't it just that in most of the languages it is easier to say this than to go through circumlocutions . . .

Strauss: But people could have got along very well without this term. Once the term has become accepted, it is a bit of a hardship to avoid it. That's quite true. But this doesn't explain its original introduction. Quite a few inventions were not originally justified, but which are justified once they have been established. No example occurs to me at the moment, but I'm sure there are many. And therefore the phenomenon which was meant existed before the term was coined. You can say it at all times, but it was never called that way.

Student: Did the phenomenon exist before the nineteenth century. Before you could refer to these things as pogroms, but in the nineteenth century something new came about.

Strauss: Well if you look up the (inaudible), the dictionary of classical antiquity in German, there is an article "Antisemitism in Classical Antiquity." So this will simply prove that it existed, that something of this kind existed in Alexandria for example, in Rome too. But the term didn't exist. The term emerged by virtue of these reflections about the difference between the *ARYAN* and

Semitic race and this was due to the study of languages in the first place. You know, two different types of languages: Semitic and the Indo-Germanic, and (inaudible) and such famous scholars made a theory of it, about the Semitic mind, but here without any antisemitic intention. But then once the term was coined, it could be used in order to conceal the fact that the object of the (inaudible) were only the Jews. This is not quite uninteresting, but simply one case study among many of how such terms, what the motivation was. Now of course the men who are particularly concerned with propriety of scientific language, our social scientists, they use these terms without any reflection whatever. For example, the new nations. What's a new nation? Is India a new nation? Is China a new nation? Is Turkey a new nation? What does it mean? This of course also has a non-scientific reason, a purely political reason, namely in order not to hurt the feelings of these nations. In order not to call them underdeveloped, they are called new, or emerging, that is the most recent one.

Student: The expectant nations, I just saw.

Strauss: Expectant, wonderful. This, I believe, refers to those which have not yet acquired statehood. Angola would be an expectant nation. Fantastic, yes. The serious thing is that if science is to be severe and strict in its terminology and value free it must never use circumlocutions, of course. Is that not obvious. We can find sin wherever we look. Let us turn to the next chapter, 1408 a 16, or thereabouts, after the quote of the Lady Fig. It is pathetic, pathetic in the original sense of appealing to the passions and arousing passions. How pathetic speech, when it is a case of insolence then one must speak like an angry man.

Student: "Style expresses emotion when a man speaks with anger of wanton outrage with indignation and reserve." Did we skip a chapter, chapter 6?

Strauss: No, no. That was chapter 6. No we skipped chapter 6.

Student: "Style expresses emotion when a man speaks with anger of wanton outrage, with indignation and reserve even in mentioning them of things foul or impious."

Strauss: Is this not a beautiful distinction. In the one case there is nothing wrong in calling a spade a spade, a case of outrage. But in the case of impiety, even the mentioning of the crime is not proper. And of course the other cases are obvious which he mentions here. Go on where we left off.

Student: "with admiration of things praiseworthy, with lowliness of things pitiable, and so in all other cases. Appropriate style also makes the facts appear credible; for the mind of the hearer is imposed upon . . ."

Strauss: More literally, "for the soul makes a logical error." He does not speak of the mind here because (inaudible) the passions makes a perallogism.

Student: "for the soul of the hearer makes a logical error under the impression that the speaker is speaking the truth because in such circumstances his feelings are the same so that he thinks, even if it is not the case as the speaker puts it, that things are as he represents them. And the hearer always sympathizes with . . ."

Strauss: It is stronger. "And the hearer is affected together, in the same way . . ." The soul, the passions, not the mind, is here persuaded.

Student: "with one who speaks emotionally, even though he really says nothing."

Strauss: So pathetic, emotional diction deliberately creates a logical error conducive to the cause for which the speaker speaks. Yes, now he speaks about the ethical character.

Student: "Character also may be expressed by the proof from signs."

Strauss: Character is ethos.

Student: "because to each class and habit there is an appropriate style. I mean class in reference to age, child, man, or old man; to sex, man or woman; to country, Spartan or Thessalian. I call habits those moral states which form a man's character in life; for not all habits do this."

Strauss: That is not moral character. "I call habits according to which a man is of such and such a quality in regard to life, for what is life; for life is not of such and such a character by virtue of every habit." If a man has a habit of grammar, if he speaks correct English and writes it correctly, this does not by itself give a character to his life. Whereas other habits, like the habit of temperance, which gives a character to life. Yes.

Student: "If then anyone uses the language appropriate to each habit he will represent the character . . ."

Strauss: Literally, he will produce the character.

Student: "he will produce the character; for the uneducated man will not say the same things in the same way as the educated."

Strauss: So if he speaks like an educated man, then he will present himself as an educated man. And he will have the peculiar authority, advantage or disadvantage connected with it, because there are also audiences before which if he talked like an educated man it would do him harm. I believe Adlai Stevenson was sometimes accused on this score. I remember that.

Student: "But the hearers also are impressed in a . . ."

(first side of tape runs out)

Student: ". . . employed ad nauseam by writers of speeches. Who does not know? Everybody knows; for the hearer agrees because he

is ashamed to appear not to share what is a matter of common knowledge."

Strauss: I think the late Stalin was a master of this device, but this had something to do with the (inaudible) used. He used very frequently the expression "as is well known," all the time. And these things were of course well known only under certain premises. Good. Now finally the next few lines.

Student: "The opportune or inopportune use of these devices applies to all kinds of rhetoric. But whenever one has gone too far the remedy may be found in the common piece of advice that he should rebuke himself in advance, for then the excess seems true, since the orator is obviously aware of what he is doing."

Strauss: Well these are of course such phrases like "I almost said," but you have said it already; "one is tempted to say," and you imply that you resist the temptation but others don't; and this kind of thing. Well I think I should say a few words about the general question which we took up last time about the general problem of rhetoric and prudence. Now the first question which I would like to repeat on the basis of Roger Bacon, to whom I referred last time, is moral, political, prudential reasoning rhetorical reasoning? This is asserted by Roger Bacon. And I did not read perhaps with sufficient emphasis the key passage. He proves his assertion by reference to Aristotle. (reading?): "Aristotle in the First Book of the Ethics holds that moral science must not use demonstration but rhetorical arguments; for it is an error, as he says there, that moral science should use demonstration and that the mathematical sciences should use rhetorical arguments, since demonstration does not bend the practical intellect to its works but is referred by itself to the speculative intellect because it does not proceed beyond the proofs of science. And therefore also dialectics is of no value in moral things and in persuasion, since if demonstration has no place there the dialectical argument too can't have a place there because the end or purpose of dialectical argument is demonstration, in so far as the dialectical argument paves the way for demonstration." That, I think, is a very good and perfectly Aristotelian argument, but the main argument is of course not valid. You know Aristotle says very briefly in this passage, 1094 b 19-27, that it is absurd to demand from a rhetorician mathematical certainty as it would be to permit the mathematician the use of rhetorical arguments. This does not bear out Bacon's interpretation at all. The fundamental difficulty is the following. According to Bacon himself, in another part of the book, the orator, the man who has a habit of oratory, does not have to be a moral man. But prudence is inseparable from moral virtue. Now this alone would already settle the question regarding dialectics as well. Because the dialectician too does not as such require moral virtue, but prudential reasoning does. Still I would like to say a few words on the question of dialectics.

A book came out in German by a political scientist, WILHELM HENNIGS Politics and Practical Philosophy. Unfortunately it is in German. Well, I happen to read German with great ease so it is no difficulty. Now what does say? He uses practice synonymously with politics, which is not quite correct but we can let it pass. Practice

is based on premises which are true generally but not universally. In the field of theory there is only necessity, no probability or accident. The German word for accident could also mean chance. So you could also say chance. In the field of practice, however, actions are not necessary, not determined, but free. Now political science is possible only as a practical science. The organ of that organ, the intellectual organ, is phronesis, prudence, practical wisdom. This is perfectly correct. But then he goes on to say that dialectics is a method fundamental to all disciplines of practical thinking, for example, especially for jurisprudence, or legal reasoning. Dialectics has its place where questions permit more than one answer but where it is required that an answer be given. You know, you cannot suspend judgment as you could in theoretical questions. He refers to Burnet, the great English classical scholar who had said of the Nicomachean Ethics that it is dialectical throughout. But it was also another scholar who says that there are no stringent, apodictic proofs in the Physics or Metaphysics either, or if, very rarely. In other words, contrary to what he suggests, dialectical argument is in no way limited to practical science. Dialectical argument has its place everywhere where we start from opinions as opinions. And dialectic is distinguished from apodictic, not from theoretic. And to repeat the point which I made before: the habitus of the dialectician does not require moral virtue, whereas prudence in the Aristotelian sense does. So the thesis cannot be maintained as it stands. But there is of course a great difficulty here which is not disposed of by these remarks. Even if prudential reasoning is fundamentally different from dialectical reasoning, there is surely a certain overlapping. Now from the most superficial and external point of view, compare Book Five of the Politics with the Ethics. In the Ethics Aristotle addresses gentlemen, morally good men, explicitly. They alone are fit hearers. But when he gives counsel to a tyrant, by definition not a gentleman -- you remember these passages which are so well known and some people say, oh here is Aristotle so very close to our good old Machiavelli, by giving advice to tyrants. Here he argues to the tyrant from the tyrant's point of view. Let us avoid the word "prudential." Let us say he argues purely expedientially. You who want to be secure in your power, well then you must not be wholly wicked as you are in the habit of being but half wicked, as Aristotle put it. In other words, be sensible, don't murder everyone who thwarts you, but only when it is absolutely necessary. So this is a kind of argument which is not prudential in the strict sense. And the same applies of course to other things too. When he argues for example that you must make this kind of combination of election by lot and election by raising the hand in this kind of regime and another one in that kind of regime, this is of course also one which does not require moral purpose, but is, one can say, purely expediential. And here is of course also understood that these sound advices do not guarantee success. For example, when he states the case of this tyrant, he wants to be secure not to worry all the time that he will be assassinated by the many enemies he has made, and now he will stop it and become a bit more sensible. But it may be too late of course. In a given case the relaxation of tyrannical rule may even bring about his murder, which might not happen if he had gone on with his vicious career. You know, human things are very complicated. Now the question arises, is not much, if not all,

political reasoning of this expediential as distinguished from gentlemanly character, and is it not in all cases of qualified validity, meaning not apodictically certain?

Now let us take a few examples. A clear line of policy: anti-Communism, the West against the Communist East. A strong NATO is of course a very important part of it. But then there is, what some people would call, the defection of DeGaulle. And his notion was based on the peculiar situation of France, and he stated it already in his forties in his memoirs. The first requirement of France is an alliance with Russia, Soviet or not Soviet. The second circle takes in England. And the third circle only takes in the United States. And he acts on this as you can see. This creates a difficulty. Can you continue the clear line, the liberal democratic West versus the Communist East, under all circumstances? I believe that I am not guilty of any sympathy with Communism, therefore I have a greater right to speak about it than some others. But of course no one can exclude the possibility that at some time this country might be compelled to ally itself with one of the Red giants against the other. I think it's just common sense to say so. But it is only, however, an illustration of the impossibility of making universally valid judgments in that field. Incidentally, there is a great authority regarding these matters, it occurs to me. And that is Edmund Burke. You know what he thought about the French Revolution, and yet he said well if it has reached a certain amount of power we may have to accept it as a nuisance on the earth for some centuries. Then the crusade, as one could call it, which he propagandized revolutionary France would no longer be a field of policy.

Now when we speak it might be necessary to make this or that alliance, what do we mean by necessary here. Well I think on the politically most effective level it means nothing but necessary for the self-preservation of this country. Because if any additional considerations are concerned then it becomes already complicated and there cannot be expected the same degree of unanimity, the practical unanimity which you have if it is a matter of sheer self-preservation. Generally speaking, necessity means in such arguments the self-preservation of a country, the country we speak of and the addressees. But what is that to which all things refer, the country? What character does it have? (inaudible) part of Germany, it belongs to Germany. That's the question. Does it belong to Germany as the arm belongs to a man? There can be no doubt that the arm belongs to a man. And if it is taken away, his nature has been impaired. Do provinces of a country belong to that country in the same way? We take for granted in all such arguments that they are part of the country, as the members of the human body are part of the human body. But here is of course the opinion element, because what is due ultimately to historical accident is taken to be natural. And this leads to a rhetoric of its own, like natural frontiers. Natural frontiers are simply frontiers easy for defense, but for the country speaking. For the French in the nineteenth century the Rhine was the natural frontier, because the Rhine was easier to hold against the Germans than any other thing. But for the Germans it would have been a very unnatural frontier because quite a few Germans lived on the west bank of the Rhine. If you take DeGaulle's favorite

expression, the eternal France, this is obviously a rhetorical statement. Something eternal cannot have come into being. And France has admittedly come into being. One can even date it, 843. In order not to make the mistake of some people who speak of DeCaulle's rhetoric, let us not forget that the war against poverty is also a rhetorical expression. It would need a long defense.

Now another example, laws in general. Law is the dictate of right reason. That is true, if it is a good law. But do the laws owe their validity to the right reasons? Laws must be enacted, and they are enacted ordinarily on the basis of reasons which are not identical with the good reasons but with rhetorical reasons. And these rhetorical reasons affect of course then also the interpretation of the law, because . . . (inaudible). So here is another sphere where the dialectical oratory comes in. Now there are other cases in political argument of a very special kind. For example, if you are confronted by an adversary who claims that his whole position, his strategy plus tactics, to say nothing of his highest principles, are theoretically true, scientifically correct, as in the case of Communism, then of course in that case the refutation of these things would not be prudential, but would be itself theoretical or scientific. That is clear. But ordinarily I think we have to leave it at that, that logically speaking the arguments used in politics are surely mostly dialectical and rhetorical. I have a few passages here, but I will postpone this for the next meeting.

I just looked up the Federalist Papers from this point of view and I thought how good it would be if someone would write a Masters or Doctors thesis, I do not know what would be more practical, on the Federalist papers, on the arguments of the Federalist Papers from this point of view. It would be a logical analysis. The Federalist Papers are so interesting because they are already influenced by this new kind of political science, say started by Hobbes, which claimed to have theoretical certainty regarding the most crucial practical questions, practical political questions. But nevertheless the Federalist Papers is an eminently sober book. Still, to argue that out would be a very helpful study. And also by throwing light on the difficulties in present day political science which of course is very anxious to lead up to policy proposals and believes it can avoid all the difficulties by saying that everything is scientific with us except the end, or as they call it, the values. Assuming these and these ends, and this is a mere assumption which has no theoretical dignity, everything else is necessary. Is it truly necessary? To study that would be very interesting.

Student: I'd like to know if you, on the basis of the point you arrived at today on this question, then retract or would restate the conclusions that you arrived at earlier, a week ago, about Pericles' speech about Megara in Thucydides. You said then you didn't see any rhetorical reasoning . . .

Strauss: But rhetorical reasoning . . . I remember that distinctly. I said this. Aristotle takes it for granted, and naturally, that all public speech is rhetorical in the sense in which he defines it, consisting of enthymemes at the core. Now but if you read this speech, not the funeral speech, which is of course epideictic speech you

could say at its worst -- I mean the statement that we get the products from all countries to Athens, and this kind of thing, I've forgotten now the details -- this speech, the first speech at the end of the First Book, and when I read it I simply said it is in the Aristotelian sense barely rhetorical. It is almost as severe and strictly argued as a first rate state paper. The question was then, what is the kind of reasoning in a first rate state paper. Now Aristotle would of course say, if it is a first rate state paper it must be prudential reasoning. And prudence includes morality, morality on the part of the speaker and shown in the proposals. But there is a difficulty here. I mean not that I question the moral virtue of Pericles, but whether these proposals could not have been made under the circumstances by a man of a much lower character than Pericles but of equal cleverness, seeing the situation as it is. And therefore the question arises, what is the character of the reasoning of a first rate state paper. And it is safe to assume that not all first rate state papers are made by men of high moral virtue but of great competence, imagination, and other morally neutral qualities. This is then the question. Is such political reasoning, and what is its status. And I think, I may not have developed it as much as I did today, but what I intended surely was the same, that ultimately we come back to premises which are no longer evident but opinions. In this particular case Pericles presupposes of course that Athens must remain an empire. What is the basis for that?

Now Pericles would not for one moment say as in the German-English discussion prior to the First World War, we must expand, or in relation to the Second World War, the living space question, we must be imperial otherwise we will starve. No one said that, but the glory of empire and the grandeur of empire -- that was what . . . And the appearance of a purely quote objective unquote reasoning where no irrelevances like honor and glory enter has very much to do with the power of economic thought in modern times, which also claims to show that here there are necessities which have nothing whatever to do with with any questionable low or high goals. We must export or die. We must expand or die. In other words, in modern times people believed to have discovered a whole sphere which is strictly morally neutral and which by itself would give sufficient guidance to action.

Student: But isn't it also true that in your analysis of this speech, you were saying that Pericles did not use a (inaudible) form of reasoning such as one we would normally use before such a huge assembly of people?

Strauss: No, no.

Student: And if not, then what does this mean?

Strauss: Well I developed this, I believe, either at that time or last time that the premises which are implied, for example, in very strict language and radical language, the goals, the political goals are say almost universally not true felicity but some imagined felicity, wealth, power, whatever it may be. And therefore the ultimate premises are questionable on this ground, which does not mean that they can be questioned politically. You couldn't be elected dog-

catcher on the basis of your standing for true felicity. That goes without saying. But still from the highest point of view we must say that this is not the highest (inaudible). The other point of view is the unit for which these good things are claimed is fundamentally an accidental unit. That this place, Attica, these and these original villages settled together and became the polis of Athens. Well, why not the next village to the west which was left out? There is something arbitrary to that. And you know what people have tried to do. They thought they would find a wonderful criterion which is absolutely uncriticizable so that the society is truly natural: nationalism. Nationalism is simply defined by language. All people speaking German must form one political community. And we draw the lines regardless of any other consideration. I mean, there may be many German enclaves in France and vice versa. We don't care. This is simply not feasible. The German Swiss prefer absolutely the company of the Swiss French and Swiss Italians to that of the Germans of the (inaudible). Canada, you have the same problem. The case of Austria-Hungary is, I think, the most beautiful proof of the absurdity of nationalism as a theoretical dogma. As Churchill has wisely said, these people would be much better off if they had remained members of the Austrian-Hungarian monarchy. The whole misery of the Second World War and of the Russian occupation could have been avoided without that. And so nationalism is not . . . within limits, yes, but as a theoretical (inaudible), impossible. Well, the Nazis tried to be still more scientific and said not language but race. But then you come into other difficulties. There is no possibility in this sense, you do not find a natural basis which would entitle you to say this is as much part of a country or nation as an arm is of the human body. That simply does not exist. There are approximations to that, but these are caused by what Burke called prescription, which is surely nothing that would enter into an apodictic argument, because prescription cannot be universally valid. We would still be in those caves in which our beastlike ancestors lived if prescription alone prevailed, and not positive chance. The difficulties would come out in one way or the other.

Lecture XIV
Aristotle's Rhetoric, May 27, 1964

(in progress) Strauss: Now I don't have to ask you what is the relevance of all these things for political science after the discussion of last time. We don't have to go into that. If oratory is important to the political scene, then one should know something about oratory in order to distinguish between the good and the bad oratory, between the sophisticated and simple oratory, and so on. Someone must apply his mind to that. And if someone of the immense mental power of Aristotle has done it, we should only be grateful and not complain. You understand something of (inaudible), I believe, and of meter.

Student: A little

Strauss: I repeat to say that I neglect these things almost completely and therefore I cannot help you very much in these matters. What strikes one of course is Aristotle's amazing attention to all details. Although he said to begin with that Book Three is the least important subject of rhetoric, if it is an important ingredient of, an essential ingredient of rhetoric, delivery, then one has to study it. I mean this amazing (inaudible) character of Aristotle, that there is no field of human study, with the possible of mathematics, to which he has not applied his immense mind. But of course he applied his mind to mathematics in his Analytics and other logical writings, but he is, I believe, not counted among the heroes in the history of mathematics. Although I read in a very good study . . . You know much better than I, Mr. _____, what is Mr. Klein's thesis about Euclid's doctrine of proportion? Is this not based philosophically on Aristotle, on a break with the Platonic doctrine, the whole question of fractions?

Student: The way I've heard it Eudoxus was the first important (inaudible) the definition on which the theory of proportion rests. And I've heard that Eudoxus was a pupil of Plato's.

Strauss: But there is something else. I'm sorry I do not know this sufficiently. But still, Aristotle is not famous as a mathematician. Let us not make any bones about that. One has of course to consider all the time is that Aristotle is confronted with a radical change in rhetoric which has taken place in the last two generations and which is chiefly due to Gorgias. This is his style of immense preciousness and sophistication, and Aristotle reacts against that. But he does not simply wish to return to the simple, political rhetoric practiced say up to 450 (?) or so, but a mean: not as artless as say (inaudible) was or Themistocles may be, but on the other hand not so obtrusively artful as Gorgias. This is an important point to the general character of the argument. There is only one thing with which I would like to take issue with you. You say the many arguments which Aristotle uses in order to make a point -- what I call (inaudible), a good word for furthermore: furthermore, furthermore -- and you said Aristotle teaches us in this way the art of rhetoric. Is this what you said?

Student: Yes.

Strauss: This is, I believe, not tenable for a very simple reason: because Aristotle does exactly the same in the Physics and the Metaphysics. This is his way of arguing, and obviously he doesn't mean to teach rhetoric in these writings. That has a deeper reason. I do not believe that Aristotle wishes to teach rhetoric by his own quote rhetoric, by the way he talks in the Rhetoric. The style is (inaudible) his style. You could say rightly that the Nicomachean Ethics is much more rhetorical than the Rhetoric. The Rhetoric is a rather dry treatise. You know, there are not these moving and inspiring passages with which the Ethics abounds.

Student: My idea wasn't that Aristotle was rhetorical so much in the Rhetoric, but that his enumerations or examples include most of the possibilities so we can see when he divides them up into various categories that this is the natural way of going it. It makes it easier for us to learn.

Strauss: But if he tries to prove a point and says this and this assertion is absurd, furthermore, besides, in addition, and gives say eleven arguments against it, this has nothing to do with rhetoric nor has it to do anything with mere teaching purposes in any sense, but it has a much deeper reason. I mean, in a strict scientific argument only one proof is required. There may be two ways of proving some theory, but then the question arises which is the best. And then we don't (inaudible). But Aristotle's works are in this sense not scientific. Or to use a very frequent modern word, Aristotle does not proceed systematically. He looks around. He does not deduce whatever he asserts from something granted in advance in a straight line. He looks around. And that is the dialectical character of his whole fundamental reasoning. Starting from what is granted by opinion or in opinion, and a great variety of things are granted . . . Of course not all are relevant to the subject at hand, but quite a few are. (inaudible) in such a thing as his criticism of Zeno and Melissus in the First Book of the Physics, and you see this simple way, this natural way, of carrying conviction. By the way in all philosophic discussions, I believe, to the present day this is still understood, that you argue, take your arguments from the various (inaudible) pertinent to such a matter. Good. But I was very pleased with your paper.

First I would like to return the papers. I have only one point to note here. (inaudible) it is practical wisdom which governs propriety and keeps rhetoric on the point. It does not need to be accompanied by the possession of moral quality, but the orator must at least be able to command a reputation for moral virtue, create an appearance of moral quality. I understand how you arrive at this conclusion but it is open to objection on one simple ground. Practical wisdom keeps rhetoric on the point, but it does not need the possession of moral quality. You see the (inaudible)? Good character, moral quality, is inseparable from practical wisdom and vice versa. So it is easy to refute this assertion, but nevertheless there is a difficulty here which we may take up again.

Now there is one thing on Mr. _____ paper which I thought would be of some interest. Of the requirements for appropriate metaphors are that if we wish to adorn our subject the metaphor should be

chosen from the better species under the proper genus and vice versa. For example, the slogan, it is better red than dead, and the opposite, it is better dead than red, the word "red" in the first sentence is for some audiences the species of the same genus to which the word "dead" in the second sentence belongs. He speaks only in these general terms about it. What does he mean by that? What is the genus? After all, he should identify that. If someone is better red than dead, or vice versa, better dead than red, which is the genus to which the two things red and dead belong? Unfortunately he didn't make it clear. It is of some importance not for the understanding of the propositions for practical purposes but for our theoretical understanding.

Student: He means an unhappy situation.

Strauss: This is very circumlocutory. Both are evils. That is the genus. Red is an evil and dead is an evil and the question is what is the greater or less. This is the point. But it is not bad that he takes such contemporary rhetorical statements and tries to analyze them. Now let us turn to our assignment. Let us read a few passages. We cannot go into detail. Read the beginning of chapter 8.

Student: "The form of diction should be neither metrical nor without rhythm. If it is metrical it lacks persuasiveness, for it appears artificial, and at the same time it distracts the hearers' attention since it sets him on the watch for the recurrence of such and such a cadence. Just as when the public criers ask, 'Whom does the emancipated choose for his patron,' the children shout, 'Cleon.' If it is without rhythm, it is unlimited, whereas it ought to be limited but not by meter; for that which is unlimited is unpleasant and unknowable. Now all things are limited by number, and the number belonging to the forms of diction is rhythm of which the meters are divisions. Wherefore prose must be rhythmical but not metrical, otherwise it will be a poem. Nor must this rhythm be rigorously carried out, but only up to a certain point."

Strauss: Well that is obviously very sober and sound as he states it. No meter, or for that matter no rhyme, obviously because it (inaudible) the tension. (inaudible) how is he going to rhyme say Bobby Baker, or whatever, and this reflects the tension. And since the rhymes are not likely all to be good . . . (inaudible). So there cannot be meter, a poetic form of rhetoric, nor can it be unrhythmical. What does he mean? In a simple way without considering the diction or this kind of thing, what is unrhythmical, an operational definition?

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: Maybe, but not necessarily, but this is not the peculiarity. Well I made it clear to myself in my migrations through the world when I came from a very un-republican country, like Germany, to much more language conscious countries like France and England. You hear it almost immediately, that spoken French or an English sentence -- well I do not speak of the Italians because still more the Italians are people who enjoy every sentence they speak, which goes beyond

the French and the English. But the German (inaudible) does not have this rhythmic character, and I used this simile for my private orientation. The German sentence can be . . . (inaudible) rather like you know these beer wagons, these four (inaudible) horses. There is a kind of rhythm perhaps there too. Or another point which I observed after having undergone some French and English influence without having studied Cicero or Aristotle for that purpose, the German sentence in learned literature in which the Germans have been very successful, especially regarding the Americans -- I believe that American social science is stylistically deeply indebted to German (inaudible) and the Italians I saw -- and this is what I call the sausage. You know, just when you have a sausage there is always a question can you not put a bit more meat into it. You know, the line is hard to draw where it will burst at the seams. If you read Weberian (inaudible) you will easily find examples of that. Two or three relative clauses dependent on each other -- well if you read carefully you will see which is which, but it obviously has no form or shape. It cannot be taken in in one view, to use the expression which Aristotle uses here and he uses also in his Politics, surveyability, intelligibility while it is spoken. This is crucial. Good. If one wants to exaggerate, one could say, that is of course not what Aristotle means, that a rhythmic sentence resembles more a dance than this wagon with the four horses. That goes too far, but it is not entirely wrong. And so while this is necessary and especially because of the question of being taken in in one view, and this is of course affected by the musical character of the sentence also, not only by the number of clauses, etc. I think we leave it at that and turn to the next chapter. We don't have to begin at the beginning, 1409 a 34, where he makes the distinction between two kinds of diction.

Student: "Such is the continuous style. The other style consists of periods, and by periods I mean a sentence that has a beginning and end in itself and a magnitude that can be easily grasped."

Strauss: "Well taken in in one view" would be a somewhat better translation of this wonderful Greek word, well visible, overlookable, together. Aristotle says this of the polis. The polis must have this character of being taken in in one view, otherwise it is too large for human living together.

Student: "What is written in this style is pleasant and easy to learn, pleasant because it is the opposite of that which is unlimited, because the hearer at every moment thinks he is securing something for himself and that some conclusion has been reached. Whereas it is unpleasant neither to foresee nor to get to the end of anything. It is easy to learn because it can be easily retained in the memory. The reason is that the periodic style has number, which of all things is the easiest to remember. That explains why all learn verse with greater facility than prose; for it has number by which it can be measured . . .

Strauss: He means of course especially that it is easier to remember verse, which is I think a fact. It's easier to remember verse than to remember prose, which we all know from our school days, or am I wrong on this point? Because you have a considerable support

for memory by the metrical or rhyming character, which you do not have in prose. Yes, the period we can say is something like the strophe in poetry. It has a certain unity and can therefore be better remembered. The hearer or reader is kept in breath, as it were, by the foreseeable, in a way foreseeable end. Whereas if the instructor is not periodic, he doesn't know where it will lead to and some grasp of where it will lead to is required. Now some people of course take care of this difficulty by saying at the beginning, I am going to do this and this. Now it is perhaps not necessary for an attorney defending the defendant to say I'm going to defend the defendant, but he can perhaps say at the beginning, I am going to show you (inaudible). That is sometimes helpful. But it is not very artful, not very artistic, to give the plan of your speech at the beginning and if it comes out (inaudible) it is more gracious. Now a few more passages we can only consider and then turn to a more general discussion. In the next chapter, begin at the beginning.

Student: "Having settled these questions we must next state the sources of smart and popular sayings."

Strauss: Perhaps one could translate this a bit better. Smart is literally translated "urban" or "townish," a word which doesn't exist in English meaning not rustic, not rural. The usual translation, not clownish, not local yokel, or whatever the appropriate terms are. And the other, "popular," one can say, but popular has so many different connotations now. "In high repute" would be more literal, "which is famous." A cosmetic can be popular, and that simply means it is used by more people, or said to be used by more people, than another. But the deservedly popular is not implied in popular. But the Greek word has something of this "highly regarded." Let's keep this in mind. It may come in handy some time, that popular is not the same as highly regarded. Yes.

Student: "They are produced either by natural genius or by practice. To show what they are is the function of this inquiry. Let us therefore begin by giving a full list of them, and let our starting point be the following."

Strauss: This was the occasion for your general remark.

Student: "Easy learning is naturally pleasant to all, and words mean something, so that all words which make us learn something are most pleasant. Now we do not know the meaning of strange words, and proper terms we know already."

Strauss: By proper terms he means something like dog, words which properly designate within the sphere of the language in question the thing meant. So it is in no way a sign of an art if an orator speaks of dogs and cats if the subject matter are dogs and cats. Of course, if he would apply it to a certain political subject metaphorically then it would be different. Go on.

Student: "It is metaphor, therefore, that above all produces this effect; for when Homer calls 'stubble' he teaches and informs us through the genus, for both have lost their bloom. The similes of

the poets also have the same effect. Wherefore, if they are well constructed an impression of smartness is produced."

Strauss: I do not know whether . . . This is of course an Englishman who translated this, and it is possible that in England at that time, 50 years ago, "smart" had a somewhat different meaning than it has now. I think in present day America I would not translate the Greek word by smart, because today when you speak of smart you have no suggestions of grace. Do you?

Student: We talk about people being a smart dresser . . . (inaudible) of good taste.

Strauss: Smart has served this meaning? A smart dresser is not a sharp dresser?

Student: No, no.

Strauss: Well, I see. You see how important it is to know all this. Good. So in smart dresser there is a certain implication of graceful.

Student: Yes. Knowing how to do it, well done.

Strauss: Thank you. Go on.

Student: "for the simile, as we have said, is a metaphor differing only by the addition of a word. Wherefore it is less pleasant because it is longer. It does not say that this is that, so that the mind does not even examine this. Of necessity therefore . . .

Strauss: What is this for example? Socrates is said in Aristophanes' Clouds to have said 'heaven is a stone (?)' This is not a simile. A simile would be, heaven is like a stone. And therefore, according to Aristotle, the simile as such (inaudible) by emphasizing the dissimilarity also, does not give as much (inaudible) to thinking, to putting together, than the metaphor. Go on.

Student: "Of necessity therefore all style and enthymemes that give us rapid information are smart. This is the reason why superficial enthymemes, meaning those that are obvious to all and need no mental effort, and those which when stated are not understood are not popular, but only those which are understood the moment they are stated or those of which the meaning although not clear at first comes a little later; for from the latter a kind of knowledge results, from the former neither the one nor the other."

Strauss: Now let us stop here. What is the root in the nature of man to which Aristotle traces all these phenomena? What decides the preference of metaphor to simile and all other cases of this kind?

Student: A desire for acquisition of knowledge?

Strauss: Yes, well for learning is the term used by him here. Do you remember the first sentence of the Metaphysics?

Student: All men by nature desire to know.

Strauss: Yes, yes, which has been frequently ridiculed by people because Aristotle, they say, didn't know human beings. But what Aristotle means is something very simple which he constantly can confirm. When he speaks of all men, he uses a phenomena which we can find everywhere, that men are curious. All men are curious. When some strange sight occurs, the mere sight interests us, or the sound for that matter, without any concern for their well being. If someone is comically dressed, everyone would . . . Aristotle has in mind this. Of course they are only on the lowest level, and the desire to know on the highest level is something very different. But ordinary is the form in which desire for knowledge appears in everyday life among all people. Yes, but Aristotle makes here another assertion which is implied in the fact that this is a natural desire, that learning is by nature pleasant. No rebellion to this assertion on the basis of your own experience?

Student: (inaudible) it's a tedious thing to learn.

Strauss: Painful

Student: It's not child's play, I think we would agree.

Strauss: Painful, he says. It's in the Politics, I do not remember. At any rate he says it clearly. This we surely know. But how does resolve this seeming contradiction?

Student: Easily.

Strauss: Easily or quickly, that is pleasant. If it is difficult and slow, then it is of course painful. But this doesn't mean that if the difficult and slow process is conducted to an end it is not very pleasing. I mean, if finally after many years of being bothered by a problem you find a solution, then this is eminently pleasant. That's clear. So there is no difficulty here. We will perhaps take this up a little bit later. The fundamental issue is, must one have recurrence to this premise, that man by nature desires to learn, in order to understand the best way of talking to political multitudes. This is of course very much counter to the present day (inaudible) who goes to (inaudible) learn. Most people go there to applaud the candidate of their favor, or to heckle the other one. Read a bit of it later on, what he also must do, he must put things before the eyes, line 33 or 34.

Student: "We ought to see what is being done, rather than what is going to be done. We ought therefore to aim at three things: metaphore, antithesis, actuality."

Strauss: The word which is translated by "actuality" is *energeia*, which is grammatically, etymologically the root of energy rather than of actuality. While energy means something entirely different in modern physics than it means in Aristotelian physics, yet there is some connection here. The translation "actuality" is quite defensible. It is explained in the context. The things which are being done as distinguished from things that will or may be done in

the future. The orator, in other words, has to make the facts of the case present, actual. (inaudible) what is now, what is present, and of course not merely because it is present, but what is present on its peak. That is the primary meaning. (inaudible) means to be at one's work, and of course at that work in its fullness. Let us assume that the specific work of a horse is to run -- I say let us assume that -- then the *energeia* of the horse would be when the horse is running. And of course if it is an old decrepit mare or a colt newly born, so to speak, then it cannot be the true *energeia* because the horse is not at its peak. But a full-fledged, grown-up horse, healthy, in the act of running, that's the *energeia*, the being at work of the horse. That may suffice for the present time. The transition to the modern meaning was of course mediated by physics, by the change which the word energy underwent in physics on the way from Aristotle say to Leibniz. But there is also a less scientific change that can also be understood. Let us turn to 1411 b 22, when he takes up this question again.

Student: "We have said that smart sayings are derived from proportional metaphor and expressions which set things before the eyes. We must now explain the meaning of before the eyes and what must be done to produce this. I mean that things are set before the eyes by words that signify actuality."

Strauss: Which show things in their being at work.

Student: "For instance, to say that a good man is four square is a metaphor, for both these are complete."

Strauss: Both these, which both these? The (inaudible) and the good man.

Student: "But the phrase does not express actuality, whereas 'of one having the prime of his life in full bloom' does. Similarly 'thee like a sacred animal ranging at will' expresses actuality. And in 'Thereupon the Greeks shooting forward with their feet' the word 'shooting' contains both actuality and metaphor. And as Homer often by making use of metaphor speaks of inanimate things as if they were animate, and it is to creating actuality in all such cases that his popularity is due, as in the following examples: 'Again the ruthless stone rolled down to the plane,' 'the arrow flew,' 'the arrow eager to fly towards the crowd,' 'the spears were buried in the ground longing to take their fill of flesh,' 'the spear point spread eagerly through his breast.' In all these examples there is appearance of actuality, since the objects are represented as animate."

Strauss: So in other words what Aristotle means by actuality, by making things actual, is partly animation, to present the inanimate as animate. I think if one would develop this, one would see a connection between the term energy as now understood, the vividness of power. You know this term energy is now in very common use, and not only now. I think it came into common use in the late eighteenth century. I remember a Ph. D. thesis being written in the Committee on Social Thought on the use of energy by Stendhal where it plays a very great role. But it is of course very common in Rousseau.

This only in passing. Now let us read a few more passages in this chapter, 1412 a 24, after he has referred to Stesichorus.

Student: "And clever riddles are agreeable for the same reason; for something is learned and the expression is also metaphorical. And what Theodorus calls novel expressions arise when what follows is paradoxical and, as he puts it, not in accordance with our previous expectations, just as humorists make use of slight changes in words. The same effect is produced by jokes that turn on a change of letter, for they are deceptive."

Strauss: Here comes back again the question of learning. Now that in solving a riddle a kind of learning is involved, that is obvious. Whether we learn something profound, that is another question, but you learn something here. You have here the question say that's the river, if I remember my few looks at such things, and you have to find out which river meets the specifications (inaudible). Some problem solving as they say -- problem solving would probably be the present day equivalent to that. Cope gives this example from Cicero, for this kind of rhetorical effect. What does this man lack except property and virtue? This is one used by Cicero for illustrating a principle. And Cope questions that learning constitutes a pleasure. But what would Aristotle say in order to justify his interpretation that in such things we learn something. I mean here an orator speaks about a man who is notoriously defective. Everyone knows that. And then he says, this is a man without any flaws, except he's poor and lacks virtue. How would Aristotle justify his interpretation that we learn here? I think it could be justified. You see, learning means not only learning something which we have never known before. In this case we knew that this man lacked property and virtue. But learning means also relearning something of which we have become doubtful. Now in the moment this man makes a remark, this is a kind of questioning of all our knowledge. If he says of this particular individual, he is so perfect. And then to become reassured that we can trust our senses, so to speak, is a kind of learning. I believe that is what Aristotle would say about this. Now I have only two more passages, 1412 b 16, shortly before the quotation from Anaxandrides.

Student: "For example, in the phrase . . .

Strauss: No, a little bit later, immediately before the quote.

Student: "It is the same with the celebrated verse of Anaxandrides, 'It is noble to die before doing anything that deserves death,' for this is the same as saying that 'It is worthy to die when one does not deserve to die' or that 'It is worthy to die when one is not worthy of death' or when one does nothing that is worthy of death. Now the form of expression in these sayings is the same, but the more concisely and antithetically they are expressed the greater is their popularity. The reason is that antithesis . . .

Strauss: Popularity always in this sense of highly regarded.

Student: "The reason is that antithesis is more instructive and conciseness gives knowledge more rapidly."

Strauss: You see again, knowledge, knowledge or learning. He learns something. I must say, I may be entirely mistaken, I think the formulation which Aristotle himself gives, "It is worthy to die while not being worthy to die," seems to be more hard hitting, more concise, than the (inaudible). But I may be mistaken. How does the translator translate it.

Student: "It is worthy to die if one does not deserve to die."

Strauss: Well more pointedly, "if one is not worthy to die." This would be more neat, I believe. However this may be, why again learning? What do we learn here? Well it is hard to say here in this case, but let us take an alternative (inaudible). What does Hobbes say about (inaudible) things? Why do we enjoy them?

Student: They put somebody down by them for one thing.

Strauss: Why do we laugh?

Student: Because we see somebody put down.

Strauss: To laugh means to see someone fall. And if oneself falls, one cries. That's Hobbes simple explanation. In other words, we laugh when we feel ourself superior. That's the point. For example, children see another child who has a manifest bodily defect, whatever it may be, and they laugh at him. This kind of thing. Or if he speaks a foreign language, if he can't speak English . . . And every defect is laughable because it gives the other a feeling of superiority. Accepting it for the argument, how would Aristotle argue here? Well, what is the greatest defect?

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: All right, but still even this is controversial. Only ask the Syndicate. This is controversial, but one thing which is not controversial, and the Syndicate agrees with Aristotle, or Mr. Percy for that matter: stupidity. They claim to be very clever, the Syndicate. So, lack of understanding. So, the ridiculous par excellence would be that when another man reveals a defect of understanding, of course not every defect but some. But why that, why is this the greatest defect, the most generally admitted defect? Because knowing or learning is our natural desire, the highest natural desire. I will say a few questions later about this question of the ridiculous. Only one more passage, the immediate sequel, where you left off:

Student: "Now further, in order that what is said may be true and not superficial it must always either apply to a particular person or be suitably expressed; for it is possible for it to have one quality and not the other. For instance, 'One ought to die guiltless of any offense,' 'The worthy man should take a worthy woman . . .

Strauss: Notice these are trivial commonplaces. They are quite true, but this is very poor in rhetoric. There is an American colloquial expression for this kind of thing, one orator who does this. Well it has been . . .

Student: Corny?

Strauss: No, corny is, I believe, something . . .

Student: Platitudes?

Strauss: Platitudes. The most comprehensive presentation which I know is *SANCHE PANZA* in Cervantes, who quotes innumerable proverbs on every occasion and they never fit the occasion.

Student: They work sometimes though, like Coolidge for instance. He was very unpopular for these banalities. He would praise saving money or something like that, repeat some banality about thrift. And everyone hailed him as a wise man.

Strauss: But you see how important my little revision of the translation was. One shouldn't say popular, but renowned. Was Coolidge renowned as an orator? That would not settle it. Yes, go on.

Student: "There is no smartness in either of these expressions, but there will be if both conditions are fulfilled: 'It is worthy for a man to die when he is not worthy of death.'"

Strauss: So, I see, I agreed with Aristotle, that this is a better formulation than that of the poets (?). Yes.

Student: "The more special qualities the expression possesses, the smarter it appears. For instance, if the words contain a metaphor, and a metaphor of a special kind, antithesis, and equality of clauses, and actuality."

Strauss: Yes, vivacity one could almost say for the last. Aristotle does not mention it, but I'm sure he means it, that there is of course a great difference between saying smart things on the occasion for a man who deserves it and retelling the same story to a different audience after the meeting. That's clear. The true effect will be that in the assembly, and not when you retell it afterwards. Although there is still some vicarious enjoyment of the story when you are told it, but it cannot have the effectiveness than when it was at the same time. This Aristotelian emphasis on learning is naturally an ingredient of his understanding of man, the famous definition which you have all heard ad nauseam, that man is a rational animal. Aristotle does not exclude by this statement that the brutes have no desire to learn. They may be forced to quote learn unquote, the famous rat which learns how to get out of the cage, and this kind of thing. But this is not properly learning in Aristotle's point of view. But man is not only rational; he is also animal, which you must never forget. As such he has such peculiarities as crying and laughing, weeping and laughing, which are peculiar to man. The important question would be, and as far as I know Aristotle never answered it, how are these peculiarities, these two, related to man's rationality. In other words, why does laughing necessarily presuppose rationality, not reasonableness, a special virtue of reason, but rationality? Now these points have of course to be considered also when we speak of witty sayings. Apart from the examples which Cicero gives of witty sayings, there is a long

list in Coutegiano, who's the author of the Courtegiano, sixteenth century Italian writer?

Student: Castiglione.

Strauss: Castiglione. There is a long list of witty sayings which you might occasionally enjoy. Now the enjoyment we derive from them is not merely due to the fact directly that we are rational beings, but also to the fact that we have this peculiarity of laughing. What is the ridiculous? Aristotle referred to the Poetics when he spoke of it, only a brief remark later in a chapter. And in the Poetics the (inaudible) given is this. The ridiculous is a mistake as well as some ugliness, meaning it may be either and or, one could translate it, which is painless and not ruinous, not fatal. A simple, obvious example is look at the comical mask which is ugly and distorted but not by pain. Think of clowns in the circus and other places. The pain which they pretend by being spanked, spank being a major vehicle of course of course of vulgar comic. of course never maiming, still less killing, but spanking is funny, at least for most people, to see somebody else spanked, I mean. So in other words, the other fellow, his defect, must be of this way that he does not, is not pained by it. He's not pained by it. So a man with an inferiority complex would not be as such comic. Nor must we be pained by it. And of course it must not be ruinous fatal. A murderer is not a ridiculous figure, or for that matter a hold up man, unless we know that the gun is only a water pistol. I mean if we know it, but in most cases we do not know it, and that makes it sure that it is not ridiculous. Now why is this ridiculous, or laughable, pleasing? Hobbes, to whom I have referred before, says because we feel ourselves superior, and to enjoy to see someone fall is to laugh, as he puts it. But Hobbes' explanation is, I think, very narrow, because we laugh of course also about our own ineptitudes. I think it must have happened to all of you also, that you did something inept, saw the ineptness, and you laughed. Or we laugh about ineptitudes of others which we share. This would be rather forced then to say that we laugh because by seeing the ineptitude we are above that ineptitude and therefore superior. This would be rather forced. I do not believe this is the case. Now of course there is an infinite variety of laughable defects. Let us take a classic example: the Thracian maidservant who laughed about Thales who looked at the stars and while doing so fell in a ditch. It's undeniably laughable because he studies the highest things and he is not capable to take care of what every Thracian slavemaids can take care of. Plato develops this in the simile of the cave, and shows the complexity. These fellows in the cave laugh about the man who has left it and comes back because he doesn't know how to live in that sphere anymore, and yet he laughs about them because of the ridiculous character of their concerns. Now if one sees then that there is this immense variety of the ridiculous (inaudible) that the convention comes also in. Somethings which are laughable in America may not be laughable in India and vice versa. Obviously, because custom is one great criterion of what is defective and what is not defective. I mean in order to go beyond this immense variety we must therefore find out what is absolutely ridiculous without any special conditions. And I believe the clearest case of that is if someone is ridiculous ac-

according to his own standards. So he is self-condemned. And the clearest case of that is if a man pretends to have a quality which he lacks. A coward who pretends to be brave is infinitely more ridiculous than a plain coward. I think Fielding has once defined it this way quite rightly, that (inaudible) uses affectation, is affectation. Affectation of course always means that you affect something which you do not have, otherwise it's not affectation. And of course everything pompous is for this reason emphatically ridiculous. Now take another case, which is related to what I said just now. We have learned from Aristotle, if we don't know it more directly, that young people are more given to laughter than old ones. Old men usually do not engage in pranks, for example, whereas young people are known for indulging in that. But what is that? What is underlying that again if we take the most characteristic cases and the most interesting cases? The relief from the, what Aristotle would call, the stately, even to fool what is stately, for example toward a teacher. I remember this from my own experience very well, I was already a PhD, but younger than some of you who are not yet PhD's unfortunately, but at the same time a timely warning to some of you. And I remember that Edmund Husserl, a highly respectable man, in a way one of the greatest men of our century, and he invited his students at the end of the semester for a party, and riddles and other games of this kind were played. And of course somehow the younger people had the feeling we are much cleverer at that than this old man who was concerned with nothing, so to speak, except the phenomenonology of sense perception and was ridiculed because he was said in one seminar, let us discuss an everyday example of sense perception: let us assume this table here explodes. (inaudible) very intelligent but lacking something which young people believe they have to a higher degree. And then he showed us without any intention, simply because he had a marvellous mind, that he was much better at solving riddles than any of us were. This only in passing.

(first side of tape runs out)

. . . is the relief from that which one respects and perhaps even to fool it. This has a justification not only as relief but also for another reason, because the respectable and that which is looked up to is not respectable or stately from every point of view. It does have its defects. Now if we bring these two considerations together, namely that affectation, or boasting, is ridiculous par excellence and then that the stately is from another point of view ridiculous par excellence, all this of course presupposes logos, reason, the fact that man is a rational animal and learning is natural to man. There is a great variety of doctrines of the ridiculous, one by Bergson and one by Freud, but I do not remember them now sufficiently to restate them. But the Aristotelian explanation would necessarily, as he has indicated, trace it through man's rationality. Man could not be the rational animal if he were not also the laughing animal, and weeping too. But here he doesn't speak of weeping on this point.

Now I would like to make a few more remarks about the general question which we began to discuss last time, which we must continue lest we forget the wood for the tree. Now right at the beginning,

well read the beginning of chapter 1 in Book One, only the beginning.

Student: "Rhetoric is the counterpart of dialectic; for both have to do with matters that are in a manner within the cognizance of all men and not confined to any special science."

Strauss: Let us stop, and read the beginning of the second paragraph in the same chapter.

Student: "Now previous compilers of arts of rhetoric have provided us with only a small portion of this art; for proofs are the only thing in it that come within the province of art, everything else is merely an accessory. And yet they say nothing about enthymemes which are the body of proof . . .

Strauss: I'm sorry, I meant the beginning of the second chapter. I'm very sorry. I wanted to make it convenient to you and indicated the chapter.

Student: "Rhetoric then may be defined as the faculty of discovering the possible means of persuasion in reference to any subject whatever."

Strauss: So, in other words, rhetoric is universal. Let us never forget this emphatic assertion with which the work begins. Then, we have already seen this in chapter two of the first part, rhetoric is in fact concerned with politically effective speech on political matters, and not with everything. Some qualifications we recall in the case of epideictic rhetoric, which may treat any subject, Helen, the gods, etc. But fundamentally rhetoric is limited, and this is made clear by Aristotle in the second chapter. Rhetoric in contradistinction to dialectics has two roots. One foot it has in dialectics, so to speak, and the other in politics. This is the most obvious difficulty regarding the whole work. And now let us link this up with the other difficulty which came to our attention later. The beginning of paragraph twelve of the second chapter.

Student: "The function of rhetoric then is to deal with things about which we deliberate but for which we have no arts."

Strauss: That's all we need. Rhetoric is limited to objects about which we deliberate. That cannot be said about dialectics. What is the intellectual governing deliberation?

Student: Prudence.

Strauss: Prudence, *phronesis*. Therefore we must, although Aristotle does not say anything about it, or because he doesn't say anything about it, he forces us to raise the question, what is the relation of rhetoric to prudence. We did find an answer in Roger Bacon, who identifies rhetoric, with minor qualifications, with moral reasoning. This is not possible because rhetoric does not presuppose moral virtue. Or to use a convenient term, the rhetorician does not have to be a man of good will. Whereas a prudent man must be a man of good will. And therefore Roger Bacon's assertion is as such not tenable. This also decides another issue, that prudence, deliberative

reasoning, cannot be identical with dialectical reasoning, because dialectical reasoning as such also does not presuppose good will, whereas prudence does. Up to this point there can be no question. The difficulty arises from the following fact, that much of the Politics in particular has logically the character of dialectical reasoning. Burnet went so far, as I told you last time, as to say that the Ethics also is dialectical throughout. Incidentally, in the Politics the most glaring example of the rhetorical character of (inaudible) is the treatment of the issue of slavery in Book One on the one hand and in Book Seven on the other. Book One: only men by nature slaves may be enslaved; and Book Seven: implies that the slaves in the best society are not natural slaves. There must be an argument for both cases, and that is therefore dialectical reasoning. Now these questions I believe we must keep in mind for any further study we might wish to make regarding this field.

Let me bring up one question again which was discussed last time and on other occasions. Now what is the use of this observation regarding the fundamental and central problem of Rhetoric for us? For us today, you know, rhetoric doesn't have the intellectual status it had throughout the tradition. You can learn elocution, I've been told, at the University of Chicago I suppose as well as other places, but ordinarily I think the people who become orators, political orators, forensic orators, become it because they have a natural knack for it and in addition by practice, by observing others, but not by attending classes in rhetoric. Or am I mistaken?

Student: There are courses taught in forensics and debating in secondary schools.

Strauss: In secondary schools.

Student: Well also, (inaudible).

Strauss: I see, but still I take it this has nothing whatever to do with the instruction within political science departments. Let us see what our problem in political science is. Now I have said this so often: the fundamental theoretical question concerns today social science as a whole and common sense. I trust you know what I mean by this, that all scientific knowledge in the social sciences rests on knowledge which is not scientific. And it rests on it, not only that it starts from it, that would be uninteresting, but it rests on it, and that this knowledge we call loosely common sense knowledge. This is fundamentally the question, what is the character of reasoning in political science as distinguished from what is the character of reasoning in political life. They are obviously different. Now this concept of common sense as we use it seems to stem directly from Shaftesbury, end of the eighteenth century, the famous Lord Shaftesbury, who had been a kind of pupil of Locke, but turned against his teacher and returned in important ways to the tradition. The problem is, however, older than Shaftesbury and the classic statement, I think, occurs in Pascal, the famous physicist and mathematician, who when the new science had emerged, modern science, saw that there is a whole sphere, and the practically most important sphere, where this new science is wholly impotent, incompetent. And he made at this time the distinction between the spirit

of geometry and the spirit of finesse. We can translate it by "subtlety" or "perceptiveness" or whatever other words people have come to use, something which the geometer, i.e., the scientist, (inaudible) means of course every mathematician, and therefore everyone whose doctrine is based on mathematics. But the Shaftesburian expression "common sense" for the latter has become accepted. There was in the eighteenth century in Scotland, as you probably know, a common sense school of philosophy, which appealed from modern philosophy to common sense. That made it very popular. The term "common sense" occurs in Aristotle in the De Anima, but has there an entirely different meaning. It means simply the sense which unites the various senses. For example, if I know honey is yellow and sweet, that I do not know either by sight or by taste but by a common sense. The sense in which we use it is rather from the Roman authors, especially Cicero. Shaftesbury took it over from them. But there common sense means fundamentally what Aristotle understands by prudence, by phronesis. So we cannot clear up our fundamental theoretical problem, which even the most fanatical positivist must face sooner or later, the question of science and common sense, without reactivating for the purpose of that understanding this whole question of prudence and therefore in particular the crucial question of what is the relation of prudence to such things as dialectical and rhetorical reasoning. You can also say that fundamentally that's the same question as that of prudence and scientific reasoning. Because apodictic reasoning, as Aristotle calls it, dialectical reasoning, and rhetorical reasoning all do not as such require phronesis. And what is the relation of these say theoretical faculties, which are purely theoretical, to a theoretical virtue which is inseparably fused, according to Aristotle, with moral virtue?

So I think we do not wonder away too grievously from our sworn duty by studying Aristotle. And this, of course, is to say nothing of a still more general implication of what we are doing here in all social sciences concerned on all levels with understanding human beings as they understand themselves. It may tend to be more, but it's surely also concerned with that and if any proof were needed it would be supplied by the fact of questionnaires, because the questionnaires are meant to bring out what this questioned man thinks say about Robert Kennedy and not what the social scientist in question thinks about him. But the ordinary view of course prevailing in social science today is that all these attempts to understand human beings must have as their basis scientific psychology, which may be even psychoanalysis, or behavioralism, or whatever it may be. And this creates a great difficulty because the notion underlying this is that every, almost every science, is preceded by other sciences which logically precede it, just as theoretical physics is preceded by mathematics. But in the case of the theoretical physicist it is understood that he is at the same, he has to be a competent mathematician. But there is no question that the scientific political scientist does not even claim to be a competent psychologist. In other words, he must accept here an authority which he cannot properly check. To say nothing of the fact that conceivably this psychology is defective, and he would not be the one to know it. For this reason Max Weber, who has much to do with present day social science still held the view so (inaudible) to

common sense that the psychology required by the social scientist is that used by the bridge player. He didn't speak of bridge, because bridge is not so popular in Germany as another game, but this is the best translation I can offer. In other words, this kind of very simple observation and sizing up human beings which we know is needed for all handling for human beings. So, in other words, the question of whether scientific psychology gives this basis for the understanding of human beings is, to say the least, not self-evident.

What I would propose as an alternative, and which should be given at least a hearing in a liberal society, is that we might be helped as much in our attempt to understand other men by understanding the greatest minds that ever were. If we can understand them, or make some progress in understanding them, this will do no harm and can only help in our attempts to understand lesser men. This surely we try to do all the time, and that we are led by these attempts to all kinds of byways, which are strange, is of course no objection in the eyes of any man of science regardless of the philosophic school to which he belongs. There is no science in which you have not to do certain things which seem to be mere (inaudible). That can not be avoided. I believe I haven't made such a remark at the beginning of this course, I do not remember, but after we are a bit bogged down in details which even from Aristotle's own point of view are not crucial, this is appropriate. I would like to say a few . . . but I think I will postpone this till next time. I want to discuss a few passages of the Federalist Papers with a view to this question which has come to our attention, the relation of rhetoric, dialectics, and practical wisdom, and science. But since it is fairly early today, even according to my changes schedule, if there are any questions or objections I will be very glad to respond to them.

Student: You were speaking of the ridiculous and you mentioned Fielding. I think you could draw a line from Aristotle to Fielding and have a period in which the ridiculous was rather static, but after Fielding I think the ridiculous becomes something else.

Strauss: By static, you mean it was not changed?

Student: Yes, I think Fielding and Aristotle had more or less the same concept on the ridiculous. I'm thinking of the Preface to Tom Brown, I think it's Tom Brown, where he talks about comedy consisting of the low character or the ridiculous. But today I think we have to adjust that somehow because the low character is no longer ridiculous . . .

Strauss: Yes, but it all depends what low character . . . For example, let us say these famous men here in Chicago in the twenties especially you know whom they caught only by some tax, some slip he made in his tax declaration, what is his name?

Student: Al Capone?

Strauss: Yes, Capone. I think no one would say he was ridiculous, except from such a high point of view that it becomes practically

useless. Is not Bobby Baker to some extent ridiculous? I mean I have heard in a certain presentation over t.v. (inaudible) ridiculed it quite nicely, because after all he is not a murderer and so on, and he has a certain amusing cleverness but not clever enough. Now give me an example of a modern comedy where the hero is a man who is not disfigured by a defect, by a non-revolting defect. Give me an example. You may be right but I do not know.

Student: You mean in fiction? Immediately I think (inaudible).

Strauss: Because say Moliere's great comedies still would easily fall . . .

Student: were still in this period.

Strauss: I do not know. What is regarded as the greatest comedy of the twentieth century?

Student: Something by Shaw?

Strauss: Shaw, but are Shaw's simply comedies? They are very witty, but are they comedies? I think of Saint Joan, which I happen to know. After all these are much more something like traumatic satires than comedies, which is a different thing.

Student: Well I think that in the twentieth century comedy is so mixed in with what is serious that you really lose the sense of the ridiculous. You mentioned The Red and the Black by Stendahl. Well I can think of (inaudible) as being both a comic figure, a ridiculous figure, and also . . .

Strauss: But this is from such a high point of view. Well you know Socrates' famous assertion, that the true tragic poet must also be a comic poet and vice versa, which may very well mean that if you go deep enough you will find at the bottom of comedies tragedy and at the bottom of tragedy the comedy. That may be. But this is of course not sufficient because the audience which is directly addressed by the dramatist does not look at these things this way. They are either exhilarated or deeply moved in the other sense. Now as far as I can judge of this question at all, I believe the most striking phenomenon is Shakespeare, because these are wonderful comedies undeniably and yet they are not quite comedies in the old tradition. Take what is quite obvious for example. Theseus in A Midsummer Night's Dream is obviously not a ridiculous figure. And one cannot speak, is this really meant to hold up a mirror to the vices, the Shakespearean comedies. It seems to be something very different. I don't know.

Student: But usually the low people are comical, like the grave digger.

Strauss: But this is simply an imitation of life nobility (inaudible) the clowns in the original sense of the term . . .

Student: Today if you talk about a ditch digger, it's not funny at all. It's deadly serious.

Strauss: Well this is the old story that there is no longer any possible object of comedy in this country at least in the popular means of communication except (inaudible), because all others would protest. Do I have to labor that point? Do I have to prove my point?

Student: No.

Strauss: This has of course nothing to do with a value-free social science. I don't mean to suggest that it has reached Hollywood in any way, this sophistication. But it has to do with a certain consequence of democracy, and the line is very difficult to draw. For example, Shakespeare's Merchant of Venice was greatly resented by Jews in New York City as I read at the time. One can understand their feelings, because it can be exploited. But on the other hand, one can also say, where is then the end. Shall one simply prohibit great works of art because some part of the population might think it will be misused by their enemies. This is a very hard question.

Student: I was thinking of an egalitarian state where some of the things Aristotle . . .

Strauss: Very well, but this does not necessarily mean that Aristotle was wrong. It may be we have to learn something. Maybe it is no longer possible to have true comedy in this kind of democracy. But then there must be another outlet for this fundamental human need which led to comedy. And I believe the simple things to which I referred, like the ridiculous character of the pompous, is as true as it always was. The trouble is only, if you reach a point where everything above the average is as such regarded as pompous. Now this is by the way not a very new thing. When you study Aristophanes (?) with some care one sees one of his favorite epithets is "boaster." Now a general is of course a boaster, that goes without saying. But also the poets are boasters. I define it as follows. A boaster is a man who wants to be something special. Now every man who has any good qualities is quote something special. And it is very easy to say, he is not something special, he wants to be something special. Aristophanes knew that very well. And he deliberately took this perspective, deliberately as a comic poet, in order to be able to present everything also from the point of view of a relatively low sense of the ridiculous. And his mastery was that he satisfied other (inaudible). In other words, he gives one message to the people who like to see the boasters debunked with a maximum of slapstick. They get their fill. But there is also something more. Since I am not a comic poet I do not have the slightest notion of what could be done. But I remember seeing a few t.v. shows or movies which were very amusing. In one case I was rebuked (inaudible) because I thought holy matrimony with this bearded actor, (inaudible), I found very funny. But I was told I shouldn't really regard it as funny because it was (inaudible) a reflection on the institution of marriage. I do not know whether my levity or this man's severity is to be blamed. And again one thinks of (inaudible). Of course they are not strictly speaking comedies, but they are undoubtedly very exhilarating. I've forgotten the titles now. And there are some individual comedians who are quite amusing. There is no doubt about that. But this we cannot possibly call comedy, because the

unity of the plot is lacking, and the consistency of character, and all the other things which are needed. By the way I think what is true of comedies is also true of tragedies. I have never been able to bring myself to read Arthur Miller's Death of a Salesman, because someone told me that I shouldn't read it, which is of course not a very good reason. But it is surely not a tragedy old style. That seems to be the case. I was told it is a very sad and moving story, but it is not a tragedy in the Aristotelian sense. And the only thing which I could observe from my very crude knowledge of contemporary literature was the immense success of the detective story, and every thing going with that. And that is clearly not a tragic (inadmissible), obviously not. And the simple proof is that -- I have some rudiments of the poetics of the detective story, but I don't believe I will ever put them together -- the key point, one of the key rules, is that the murdered man must not be dear to the audience, because otherwise it would be too painful. And therefore I think the ideal solution was in one story by Dorothy Sayers which begins with a naked corpse in a bathroom. So the man is dead; you do not know him; and in addition the problem is infinite because his identity -- in a bathroom in someone else's apartment, of course. This I thought was from the point of view of this kind of art a very good beginning. But perhaps one would have to raise the question, why is there no longer a tragedy (inadmissible). Great changes have occurred in this respect because I believe that very generally speaking, up to the eighteenth century tragedy was of course meant to be edifying and then to show simply the terrible character of life, some people say the tragic character of life, without any edifying suggestion -- that is surely an innovation. I happen to know a bit about how this happened in German literature, but I don't know much about English literature. Well, we leave it at that and next time we will consider a few passages from the Federalist Papers.

Lecture XV
Aristotle's Rhetoric, June 1, 1964

Strauss: You took the trouble of looking at some of the speeches to which Aristotle refers and surely that is always good to do so. The trouble is only that in the best case one could not do it everywhere the speeches are lost. Now one little point. The Teucer is very simple. The kinship with Priam meant a presumption of disloyalty.

Student: Yes, I understood that. I just didn't understand what he meant by token (?).

Strauss: In other words, someone who has relatives say in Red China is more suspected of disloyalty than someone who has no relatives in Red China, other things being equal. It's that simple. Now you made a few points of criticism, and I believe if one reduces them to the principle it amounts to this. Take for example such a broad statement of Aristotle's which he qualifies considerably later, strictly speaking there is no need for an exordium or proemium. Now this is a special case of something Aristotle is doing all the time, namely stating rules. Rhetoric being an art, it must have rules. You know in another field where Aristotle was also a kind of legislator, namely regarding poetry, there was a secular fight against Aristotle. I mean the very simple things, the unity of space and time in the tragedy. This was taken very literally by the French classics in the seventeenth century, and then the big revolt in the name of Shakespeare. And the general (inaudible) was if a man can do something, the genius, that is what counts. There are no rules. And something of this kind is, I believe, in all of us, this kind of resistance. And there are many speeches, just as there are many tragedies which are not well constructed tragedies according to Aristotle and yet very powerful and in every other sense good tragedies. Something of this kind was, I believe, noticeable in your paper, or am I entirely mistaken, or did it only apply to particular rules? For example, in one point you said Aristotle implies that magnificence of a speech and pleasantness of a speech (inaudible).

Student: He didn't imply that. Oh yes, he did imply that. He wasn't specific on it because he elaborated on the pleasant but he didn't say anything about the magnificent. I didn't know why.

Strauss: Yes but you seem to suggest that a magnificent speech cannot be pleasant.

Student: Well his definition of pleasantness in that chapter, a sense of propriety, and a sense of the means, and I thought . . .

Strauss: Well this has nothing to do with that. But obviously a magnificent speech is also a very pleasant speech. A speech may be pleasant without being magnificent, but it cannot be a good speech, magnificent, without being pleasant. Think of the greatest speeches, for example the Gettysburg Address. I mean you have to take a very narrow notion of pleasure to deny that it is a

pleasure to read it. Good. Then you have a certain criticism regarding what Aristotle says in chapter 12. It was toward the end of your statement on chapter 12. I do not remember it, because you are also one of these fast readers and it's very hard to follow.

Student: Well at the end of chapter 12 I made that remark about magnificence and pleasantness.

Strauss: It was shortly before.

Student: I was critical about his lack of . . . (inaudible) a different sort of forensic case that would give him the opportunity to demonstrate some of these rhetorical devices, because the forensic case he deals with is that before one judge.

Strauss: And what is the peculiarity of this case?

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: In other words, a minimum of frills (?). And Aristotle seems to regard this as higher. Is that the point?

Student: Yes, he doesn't give the rhetorician much room here to use his art.

Strauss: But is this not on the other hand a good situation for him?

Student: For the rhetorician? If he has a good case.

Strauss: All right. Let us postpone the discussion until we come to that. I believe the difficulty which you sense is connected with the fact that Aristotle is of course concerned with showing what the perfect orator is. But since the perfect orator is still something very low, he has also a reservation against him. I believe that's the reason underlying the difficulty which attracted your attention. Mr. ___ has written a paper on the same subject, unfortunately I haven't read it carefully enough. You took an entirely different approach, much more speculative. But on the other hand, this side, the philosophic side of Aristotle, and what this part of the Rhetoric means as the work of the philosopher Aristotle, that was fundamentally your question.

Student: Yes.

Strauss: Well perhaps I will say something about it when I have read it again more carefully. Good. Now in the meantime I have given some thought by sheer accident to the question we have been discussing earlier: why is there no provision made by Aristotle for exhortation to virtue, for sermons, as we could say, a thing which existed prior to Aristotle if only in a (inaudible) manner, as is sufficiently shown by Xenophon's Memorabilia. But when I read today's assignment about epideictic speech I began to see an answer to the question, a very simple one. I forgot something very obvious. There is a very famous epideictic speech in praise of

virtue prior to Aristotle of which many of you will know. Some of you will have read it even. And that is Prodicus' speech, allegedly Prodicus. Xenophon writes it in Memorabilia, II, i. Xenophon gives the credit to Prodicus. I regard it as absolutely impossible that Xenophon would take over verbatim a speech written by Prodicus. But this doesn't make any difference. Apparently Prodicus had written on Hercules at the crossroads. When he finished his elementary education as a boy he was confronted by two women of more than life size, Virtue and Vice, but she doesn't call herself Vice of course, but Pleasure. Who would call himself, or herself, Vice? And this is of course an epideictic speech. And this was surely known to Aristotle, and there were other things of this kind. But why does this fall under Aristotle's definition of the epideictic speech and not under that heading which I proposed, exhortation to virtue. This statement is of course a praise of Hercules. Hercules made the right choice. He chose virtue and not pleasure. So, in other words, the question would then be this. What I felt was missing in Aristotle is provided for, because epideictic speech by definition is a praise of virtuous men and blame of vicious men. What Aristotle tacitly excludes is a praise of virtue impersonally, of virtue which is not the virtue of this or that man. And the question is, would be reduced. So I would say this example of, the greatest example of pre-Aristotelian exhortation to virtue falls absolutely under Aristotle's division, and is epideictic speech. But why not a praise of virtue impersonally?

Student: (inaudible) he prepares to do that.

Strauss: Very good, why?

Student: He need not know true virtue . . .

Strauss: Even if he knew it. Is this possible, rhetorically?

Student: He has to use things that are common to his audience. And to speak about general principles wouldn't be as common to his audience as . . .

Strauss: Well, can we not say generally that rhetoric as understood by Aristotle deals with individuals. It can of course also be an individual city, an individual collective, something with a proper name. And the universals come in only in the service of the discussion of the individual. In the forensic case it is very clear. Did "x" commit murder? Is "x" guilty or innocent. And the considerations of justice and so on come in only as subservient to the decision of the question is "x" . . . The same applies in deliberative speech. Should we now wage war against this other city, proper name. And even in epideictic speech, it may very well be that Aristotle took it for granted epideictic speech which he would take seriously, not just mere show speeches like a praise of (inaudible), but it would be a praise of an individual or of an individual city.

Student: In the measure that epideictic is associated with writing, and applying what he says, that whereas speech requires us to know (inaudible), writing frees us from silence when we have something

to say to the others . . .

Strauss: That's what you wrote in . . .

Student: The epideictic can be universal.

Strauss: Can be that?

Student: That the epideictic may tend to the universal.

Strauss: But let me first give another point. So we have this exhortation to virtue. Let us assume that. I mean your special thesis about this remark in the Rhetoric we postpone. How would this exhortation look like. Now precisely if you would turn to the chapter in the Memorabilia, Book One, chapter 5, "Praise of Continence," you would see it is fundamentally a utilitarian argument. Why is it prudent, expedient, to be continent? More generally stated, why should one be decent? But for reasons which I indicated on another occasion, to raise the question, why I should be decent, means already having broken with decency. What could be justified in this way can only be a kind of low class utilitarian virtue. It can never be virtue proper. I submit this as an additional consideration, why this point was missing. This leads of course to further questions as I am fully aware. Let us turn to chapter 12 and let us read first the beginning.

Student: "But we must not lose sight of the fact . . .

Strauss: Oh I'm sorry, just one question. In the quotation from Demosthenes you spoke of conscience. What was the term used for conscience?

Student: You mean the Greek term? I'll have to check on that.

Strauss: Well of course one should never say "surely" if one hasn't looked it up. Well you know this is what we always do when we say, or any writer says, "undoubtedly." It means he has no proof. Good. Go on.

Student: "We must not lose sight of the fact that a different style is suitable to each kind of rhetoric. That of written compositions is not the same as that of debate; nor in the latter is that of public speaking the same as that of the law courts. But it is necessary to be acquainted with both; for the one requires a knowledge of good Greek, while the other prevents the necessity of keeping silent when we wish to communicate something to others, which happens to those who do not know how to write. The style of written compositions most precise, that of debate is most suitable for delivery. Of the latter there are two kinds: ethical and emotional."

Strauss: Now let us stop here. Now this is the passage which you in mind. Now here Aristotle gives a new consideration which as far as I remember he never had alluded to before. And this is a kind of polarity, writing on the one pole and debating on the other. And writing calls for the highest exactitudes, the highest degree

of finishness. And on the other hand, to exaggerate a bit, the histrionic element is at the other pole. So the writing is completely free from the histrionic, if it is good, and on the other hand the good delivered speech meant for delivery lacks the finishness, and should lack it because that would be just a waste of energy. Because these subtleties could never be grasped in a hearing. Now there is one point which Mr. _____ well understood. We have to think also of the question of writing in general, prose writing in general. And since Aristotle himself was a prose writer of some merit, his own awareness and of course his study of Plato, this has to be considered. In other words, from the point of view of rhetoric is all prose writing which is done with any care, not like a mere enumeration of the parts of an animal and this kind of thing, is epideictic from a rhetorical point of view. This you have well seen, I know that. But repeat now the point you made before, because it refers to what he says here.

Student: I was merely trying to put the case for a possible epideictic which praised virtue at least not of any particular real man. Your argument was that spoken rhetoric was always to particular circumstances. My claim was that the noblest epideictic is addressed to men as such.

Strauss: All right, but you cannot draw any conclusion from the word for "speaking Greek."

Student: (inaudible) is in contradistinction to "speaking Greek."

Strauss: I do not think so. I do not believe that it has this meaning. Meaning that the other (inaudible) non-Greek? That's surely wrong. We have this simple evidence for that, for this kind of epideictic, if we take this in the broad sense, that every careful, non-scientific prose writing can be called epideictic speech and that one can use that for exhorting to virtue. Proof: Aristotle's Ethics, the Nicomachean Ethics. I mean if this is not first rate and finished writing, then I don't know what it is. And that it is obvious when you read the description of the temperate man, and the courageous man, and the others, this surely has an appeal to your virtuous intentions. How effective it is, that depends on other considerations. But that it has this appeal and that it was meant to have this appeal, I believe there can be no doubt. If you mean this, that's all right. Well we have then made some headway in understanding the question of exhortation to virtue and its relation to rhetoric. So we cannot read everything here because many things are truly too technical for our purposes. Let us turn to 1414 a 8, after the quotation from Homer about Nireus.

Student: "The deliberative style is exactly like a rough sketch; for the greater the crowd, the further off is the point of view. Therefore in both too much refinement is a superfluity and even a disadvantage. But the forensic style is more finished."

Strauss: So, in other words, we have now a perfectly clear ranking of the three parts of rhetoric from the point of view of exactness and finishedness. Now exactness of course very different -- I mean think primarily of the exact sciences, where of course the

same term was used. But Aristotle, I believe, while not denying that the mathematical sciences are exact, thinks of a much broader range of phenomena. For example, the exact working, say at the Pantheon, generally speaking of the works of art, finishness, the immense care for every detail, the love of toil invested in making something -- this is primarily what exactness means. I mean nothing slipshod. Exactness is the opposite of slipshod.

What is then the ranking from the point of view exactness thus understood?

Student: Epideictic, forensic before one judge rather than before many, and finally deliberative.

Strauss: And the reason is what?

Student: Strife and contention lead to . . .

Strauss: But the more immediate, more direct reason, which he indicates here: the greater the crowd, the less finished. Because you must not forget that the crowd is meant to be the judge, to vote afterward on what you say. And if you make a very finished speech, you act foolishly perhaps, because they may not get your refinement and vote against you.

Student: There is a passage in the Politics where he thinks that hoi polloi will make the best judges. This seems to be in contradiction.

Strauss: But does he say that?

Student: Doesn't he in one passage of the Politics.

Another student: It has to be an uncorrupted hoi polloi, and then it's not the hoi polloi any more.

Strauss: That's one point, but the other thing . . . That's quite true. It must be not corrupted. That's quite true. So you see how difficult it is to read Aristotle sometimes. This is part of an argument that goes on. Aristotle has there a certain pro-democratic argument. But this is part of a much larger argument. And within limits Aristotle is of course of the opinion that the many are the best judges. (inaudible). I mean, whether there is a famine or not, surely a multitude can much better determine than an emperor or a queen who said, if they don't have bread let them eat cake. So, there is no doubt that there are many subjects on which the many are the best judges. But the question is whether this would apply for example to a tragedy and comedy (inaudible). Aristotle refers here, he says, well on the whole the judgments of the Athenian multitude regarding comedies and tragedies were not so bad. After all, that's quite true. But maybe it wouldn't be the same in other cities. But here the principle is very clearly stated. The smaller the number of the direct addressees, the greater is the necessity of the speech being finished. Now let us apply this to the epideictic speech. I mean that the deliberative speech is addressed to the whole citizen body is clear; whereas

only a part of the citizen body is in each case the jury. But who would then be the addressee of the epideictic speech? Is this not also a crowd in Olympia or wherever it may be where a speaker like Isocrates or Gorgias addressed, or are these not the true addressees of epideictic speech? We have read somewhere about that.

Student: At the end of the Ethics we were told that the man . . . (inaudible).

Strauss: But there he didn't speak about rhetoric. He spoke of logos and (inaudible). But what we read today at the beginning of this chapter. The one extreme we call the diction characteristic of writing. Now the diction characteristic of writing is the most finished. We know now that the most finished diction is that fit in an epideictic speech. And this may suggest that the epideictic speech is for reading purposes, for the man sitting alone or with a few other people, but surely not a crowd. This I believe is implied. The single reader, the single judge . . . Let us read the immediate sequel.

Student: "and more so before a single judge, because there is least opportunity of employing rhetorical devices, since the mind more readily takes in at a glance what belongs to the subject and what is foreign to it. There is no discussion, so the judgment is clear."

Strauss: Yes, no debate, no contest.

Student: "This is why the same orators do not excell in all these styles. Where action is most effective there the style is least finished. And this is the case in which voice, especially a loud one, is needed."

Strauss: What is this action? Action means here of course in Greek hypocrisy. It means of course the actor's action. I exaggerate in translating it to make it quite clear, histrionics. Histrionics are necessary to the extent to which there is contest and the need for histrionics increases with the crowd. So before a single judge there is no possibility of histrionics. Yes, but on the other hand before the single judge you also do need that refinement, that refinement of writing, which belongs to epideictic speech. Now the immediate following sentence:

Student: "The epideictic style is especially suited to written compositions; for its function is reading. And next to it comes the forensic style."

Strauss: This, I think, settles the issue. I mean this ranking. The epideictic speech is that which is at home, as it were, in writing. This must be properly understood. Not every writing (inaudible). The deliberative is the least. By the way, from here we can get an inkling of the achievement of Thucydides, of the deliberative speeches which he wrote which are at the peak of finishness. In the light of Aristotle I would suggest that they could not have been delivered this way in order to be politically effective. They are extremely concise. The highest kind of rhetoric is the least quite rhetorical. I mean rhetorical in the vulgar

sense. Does this make sense? And this highest kind is the epideictic, which calls for the greatest attention regarding the diction, for the greatest concentration. A good speech which is for oral consumption must have a certain looseness. Because you cannot interrupt and say, say that again. You cannot do it. Whereas when you read a speech you can always go back, therefore the finishness is out of this. The epideictic speech, one could suggest, is the most finished and in a way the most businesslike. If we draw any inference from this part of the order -- deliberative speech, for the whole polis; forensic speech, before a jury; then the speech, the very businesslike speech before the single judge; and then the epideictic speech to the higher -- if this is a legitimate way of reasoning, one could say that the epideictic speech is the most finished and the most businesslike: no carelessness of the kind which passes easily in public speech, and of course no histrionics, absolutely out of place. Something of this kind may have been the intention of Isocrates, in a way the competitor of Plato one could say. At least this is a popular view of that. Isocrates is praised at the end of Plato's *Phaedrus*, Plato's dialogue on rhetoric, when he was still young. (inaudible) a prose, do in prose what hitherto had been done in the poetic element by the poets, and especially of course epideictic. In epideictic speech the appropriate judgment does not consist, as in the case of the deliberative and forensic speech, in voting as the speaker wants you to vote. That is the test of his success, whether you vote as he wants you to vote. There is no equivalent to that in the epideictic speech. You do not vote.

Student: If something written like the Communist Manifesto convinces people of a certain way, would this be epideictic . . .

Strauss: No. If one tries to pigeonhole it as a kind of rhetoric here then it would be deliberative, because it is a suggestion regarding what communities, in this case the community of the proletarians, should do. I mean that it is not a deliberative speech in the Aristotelian sense is because it abounds with narrative and Aristotle says there is no place generally speaking for narrative in a deliberative speech. Well, this kind of propaganda statements allegedly based on science, this didn't exist, because this kind of political doctrine didn't exist. That's clear. Aristotle cannot be blamed for not having provided for the Communist Manifesto. But the question is of course, and a very necessary one, what kind of writing is that. Manifestos, are there such things like manifestos (inaudible)? Certain kinds of historians would I suppose say of course when some ancient conqueror gave a certain interpretation of his campaigns and conquests, say Cyrus when conquering the Babylonian empire, that's also a manifesto. But one would have to see, assuming that such things happened, that a kind of rumors are spread favorable to the conqueror, whether this has a character of a manifesto like the Communist manifesto. I mean for example . . . (inaudible). Well this is not, it doesn't presuppose any theoretical reflection, does it? Well this is a simple question: the beginning of the Declaration of Independence compared with the preamble to the statements made in England at the time of the Glorious Revolution in 1688 and by the Dutch in their fight against the Spaniards, and such preambles, here you have from the eighteenth

CENTURY

on statements in universal terms, in theoretical terms, which you did not find in earlier statements of this kind. One has to compare that. Well this subject has come up in other connections more than once I believe. Or were there any other points?

Student: This seems to be a helpful time to recall (inaudible) Aristotle suggested that it was in deliberative rhetoric rather than forensic that the least amount of rhetorical shenanigans could take place, because the interest of the judges themselves is involved.

Strauss: It was their own business.

Student: It was their own business, yes. Now the major argument from this point is from the standpoint of exactness, yet he does make this statement that forensic rhetoric before a single judge involves the least opportunity of employing rhetorical devices. So it would seem that perhaps we have to take rather seriously the distinction of a single judge and (inaudible) when we rank forensic rhetoric compared with deliberative rhetoric.

Strauss: Yes but I would be at a loss without any further ado to solve this difficulty to which you drew our attention. But is it not possible that the point of view is different?

Student: It is fundamentally, I think. At the beginning he is simply suggesting that deliberative rhetoric has been ignored and that most of the teachers of arts of rhetoric build their arts while simply considering forensic rhetoric. Now the arguments do meet in this respect, that he suggests in the beginning that there would be less opportunity for them to concentrate on arousing emotions if they consider the problems that deliberative poses, because here the judges do not permit experience . . . (inaudible). Here he seems to suggest . . . (inaudible).

Strauss: Well may I suggest that, can you elaborate this in writing, a brief statement, and hand it in by Wednesday? Good. But I'm very grateful that you did that. Now let us turn to chapter 13. Now he comes now to the next subject. He has now completed the subject of diction and turns now to the question of order or arrangement. We begin here. "It remains to speak about arrangement and order."

Student: "A speech has two parts. It is necessary to state the subject and then to prove it. Therefore it is impossible to make a statement without proving it, or to prove it without first putting it forward; for both he who proves proves something, and he who puts something forward does so in order to prove it. The first of these parts is the statement of the case, the second the proof. A similar division is that of problem and demonstration."

Strauss: Namely in mathematics. Good. So these are the simply necessary parts of a speech, the statement of the subject and the proof. And the proof is of course the bulk. In the sequel Aristotle rejects another arrangement which, as he says, would be necessary at best in forensic rhetoric and not elsewhere. And this statement here implies of course that a proemium or exortium in

addition to a statement of the subject -- and subject does not mean of course merely, I shall speak about the Sicilian expedition, because that is on the agenda, so I will speak about it, but this statement of the intention would be, I am in favor of the expedition, or I am against the expedition, to make clear from the beginning what your position is, and then you give your reasons. Good. Now let us turn a little bit later in 1414 b 7, when he repeats that and where he says the necessary parts are statement and the proofs.

Student: "So then the necessary parts of the speech are the statement of the case and proof. These divisions are appropriate to every speech. And of most the parts are four in number: exordium, statement, proof, epilogue; for refutation of the opponent is part of the proof, and comparison is an amplification of one's own case and therefore also part of the proof, for he who does this proves something. Whereas the exordium and the epilogue are merely aids to memory."

Strauss: So in other words the maximum which Aristotle will grant is that you may need in addition to the statement of subject and the proofs a proemium and epilogue, and therefore he turns then to the question of the epilogue and that is in the next chapter. Now let us read the beginning of chapter 14.

Student: "The exordium is the beginning of a speech, as the prologue in poetry and the prelude in flute playing; for all these are beginnings, as it were paving the way for what follows. A prelude resembles the exordium of epideictic speech; for as the flute begins by playing whatever they can execute skillfully and attach it to the key note, so also in epideictic speeches should be the composition of the exordium. The speaker should say it once whatever he likes if the key note and then attach the main subject. And all do this, an example being the exordium of the Helen of Isocrates; for the (inaudible) and Helen have nothing in common. At the same time even if the speaker wanders from the point this is more appropriate than that the speech should be monotonous."

Strauss: Now let us stop here for one moment. The exordium, in other words, does not introduce the subject. The subject is stated in what he calls the (inaudible). But the speaker, or his art -- just as the flute player introduces not the theme but his art by his prelude; and this is true in epideictic speech. This is the reason why an exordium, or proemium, is not simply necessary, because it does not introduce the subject. Now let us see a few more things in this chapter, 1415 a 8, shortly after the quotation from Choerilus.

Student: "As for the exordia of forensic speeches, it must be noted that they produce the . . ."

Strauss: No, where is that, of the epideictic speeches.

Student: "These then are the sources of epideictic exordia: praise, blame, exhortation, dissuasion, appeals to the hearers. And these exordia may be either foreign or intimately connected with the speech. As for the exordia of the forensic speech it must be noted

that they produce the same effect as dramatic prologues and epic exordia; for those of dithyrambs resemble epideictic exordia, 'For thee -- for thy gifts, for thy spoils of war,' But in speeches and epic poems the exordia provide a sample of the subject in order that the hearers may know beforehand what it is about and that the mind may not be kept in suspense; for that which is undefined leads astray. So then he who puts the beginning, so to say, into the hearer's hand enables him if he holds fast to it to follow the story; hence the following exordia: 'Sing, goddess, the wrath . . .', 'Tell me, Muse, of that man . . .', 'Inspire me with another theme, how from the land of Asia a great war crossed into Europe.' Similarly, tragic poets make clear the subjects of their dramas, if not at the outset, like Euripides, at least somewhere in the prologue like Sophocles, 'My father was Polybus.'"

Strauss: Which occurs after the middle. And comedy is the same. Go on.

Student: "So then the most essential and special function of the exordium is to make clear what is the end or purpose of the speech. Wherefore, it should not be employed if the subject is quite clear or unimportant. All the other forms of exordia in use are only remedies . . .

Strauss: Please stop for one moment. In forensic oratory the proemium must show forth the subject matter. Good. Now we come to some more subtle points.

Student: "The other forms of exordia in use are only remedies and are common to all three branches of rhetoric. These are derived from the speaker, the hearer, the subject, and the opponent: from the speaker and the opponent all that helps to destroy or create prejudice. But this must not be done in the same way; for the defense must deal with this at the beginning, the accuser in the epilogue. The reason is obvious. The defendant, when about to introduce himself, must remove all obstacles, so that he must first clear away all prejudice. The accuser must create prejudice in the epilogue, that his hearers may have a livelier recollection of it."

Strauss: Is this clear? If there is a prejudice you must gain the benevolence of the audience obviously right at the beginning. But what about the other? Why not repenting after you have gained the confidence of the audience against the prejudice why not restate it in the epilogue? After all, that's very important. And the other way around?

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: Exactly. After this has been disposed of for good it would be the most foolish thing you could do. And of course it is very effective on the other hand to bring in the slander of the opponent in the epilogue because that will stick, at least for the immediate future. Good. These are very unpleasant things, but true things. Now go on.

Student: "The object of an appeal to the hearer is to make him

well disposed or to arouse his indignation, and sometimes to engage his attention or the opposite; for it is not always expedient to engage his attention, which is the reason why many speakers try to make their hearers laugh. As for making the hearers tractable, everything will lead up to it if a person wishes, including the appearance of respectability, because respectable persons command more attention. Hearers pay most attention to things that are important, that concern their own interest, that are astonishing, that are agreeable. Wherefore one should put the idea into their heads that the speech deals with such subjects. To make the hearers inattentive the speaker must persuade them that the matter is unimportant, that it does not concern them, that it is painful."

Strauss: I think that is easy to understand.

Student: Just one question: why the painful? Usually we are drawn by pain.

Strauss: Have you never heard what happens to bringers of bad messages to kings, particularly powerful people. The kings do what we cannot afford to do.

Student: But they are interested in the news. They are very attentive.

Strauss: Well surely it is important for him to know that his army was defeated and maybe destroyed, but nevertheless it is painful for him to hear it. Normally people like to hear good things and not bad things. That it is sometimes very important to know the bad things is undeniable. But other things being equal, let someone else.

Student: But the question of attentiveness . . .

Strauss: No, no. We are attentive to what we like to hear. We are attentive to important things, obviously, and the things which concern us and not say -- I almost said the Vietnamese, but these things do not work anymore -- say some, some, I do not know.

Student: Think of the assassination of the President. That was painful for most people and all three channels covered it continuously.

Strauss: Surely, but why? Not because it was painful but because it was important. When these four things . . . Aristotle here in his way enumerates the things to which we attend. Now they may all fall together. Now in the case of the assassination all four things came together. It was important; it was of concern; it was astonishing -- no, only three, it was unpleasant. But this news media is of course not rhetoric. I mean these are things meant to inform everyone of what is going on in the world. This is not meant to lead up to practical decisions as in deliberative speech, to say nothing of forensic. I mean how one should call this kind of speech which is done over the t.v., radio, and the newspaper, that would be an interesting question, but surely not (inaudible) for Aristotle. That's clear. I mean what is it? A kind of insipient (inaudible),

or what? I do not know. But it is surely not public speech. The mere infinitude of (inaudible), the end being imposed entirely accidentally -- this paper must be out by that time, and we must not have more than sixteen, or thirty-two, or whatever number of pages -- but there is no true beginning, middle, or end, obviously. If you look at any newspaper. It never has a single broad story. It has numerous stories, wholly unrelated. That's not speech. It is in the best case a great variety of speeches. But that best case probably never exists.

Student: You just mentioned the modern media. Do you think that in deliberative, for instance, that the physical effect had anything to do with Aristotle suggesting just a sketch, that you couldn't really make yourself heard on all the fine points say to several thousand people say without modern media?

Strauss: Well say you heard something over the t.v. about Japan, or something else, I mean how people live there, or how the economy works, or whatever it may be. This of course is not a speech, say a chapter from a geography book . . .

Student: I'm speaking specifically of a speech. Say we have the President speaking directly to us.

Strauss: Well this is not (inaudible) for Aristotle, but I'm sure he must have thought of it, that it is necessary in a given case to give a brief survey of say, how did the war come. How did the war come. That is of course possible. And I'm sure that Aristotle has provided for that. But Aristotle would say, it may be that if the causes of the war are dark, then it's necessary for say Pericles to (inaudible). But if everyone knows the causes from previous discussions, why is it necessary to review the whole story with the build up of the Athenian empire, and the conflicts with Sparta, and what not. It's wholly unnecessary. Now there is one speech in Thucydides in which . . . yes the Athenians in Sparta give a brief survey of the genesis of the Athenian empire. But one cannot very well call it an historical survey. They remind them only of the things which have been forgotten, namely that it was Athens that saved Greece from the Persians by her navy at Salamis. It's not strictly speaking a narrative. Now under which category to put . . . the t.v. is of course impossible because it has all kinds and conditions of speech and incipient speech is (inaudible) part of it. Well perhaps one should say, they are media through which all kinds of things can come, among others also some of these what Aristotle would call speeches.

Now where were we? Laughter is one of these things which creates benevolence. I think that's a common experience. I mean if the audience hates a man they will not laugh at his jokes, obviously, to say nothing of the fact that laughing as such is helpful in forensic speech because if people are in a state of indignation -- they want the head of that man -- in the moment they are brought to laugh this irrational indignation is on its way out, because it's impossible to be indignant and to laugh at the same time, at least on the same subject. Now the other points which Aristotle makes against an overestimation of the proemium is that many things which people

say the proemium should do should be done by the whole speech. For example, to establish the character of the speaker, you know that cannot be done by five minutes at the beginning where he declares I am an honest man. This is much less impressive than if the whole speech conveys the impression of his integrity. Good. Now one more thing only in chapter, in the next chapter, 15. Begin at the beginning.

Student: "One way of removing prejudice is to make use of the arguments by which one may clear oneself from disagreeable suspicion."

Strauss: Aristotle does not of course . . . "prejudice" is not there, is not in Aristotle. What he has to do is remove calumny or slander. A man is suspected of something, not necessarily a legal crime, and he has to get rid of that. Yes.

Student: "for it makes no difference whether this . . .

(first side of tape runs out)

. . . openly expressed or not. And so this may be taken as a general rule. Another way consists in contesting the disputed points either by denying the fact or its harmfulness at least to the plaintiff, or by asserting that its importance is exaggerated, or that it is not unjust at all or only slightly so, or neither disgraceful nor important. These are the possible points of dispute, as Iphicrates in answer to Nausicrates admitted that he had done what the prosecutor alleged and inflicted damage but denied that he had been guilty of wrong doing."

Strauss: Now let us stop here. You see here for example that it is . . . what is implied here of course is that although it may be unjust it may not be base, ignoble, disgraceful. And also you see that it is impossible to do this with any consciousness or clarity without having these lists of the just things, of the noble things, of the good things, which Aristotle gave you in Book One without having articulated this for this purpose. So here you see the practical use of it as well. One more passage, 1416 b, after the remark about Teucer and Priam.

Student: "Another method suitable to the accuser is to praise something unimportant at great length and to condemn something important consicely, or putting forward several things that are praiseworthy of the opponent to condemn the one thing that has an important bearing about the case. Such methods are most artful and most unfair."

Strauss: And most ____? What is the word?

Student: Unfair.

Strauss: Unjust.

Student: "for by their use men endeavor to make what is good in a man injurious to him by mixing it up with what is bad."

Strauss: Yes, they are most artful, but not in the sense that . . . most artistic we could have said. That's the ordinary Greek term. It doesn't have this nasty meaning which artful, as distinguished from artistic, is likely to have. So, most in accordance with the art, and yet most unjust. So you see clearly, that's a further proof, that the rhetorical art is as such not prudential because the most prudential could not possibly be the most unjust. It is a faculty, a cleverness, like boxing, or any other thing which can be misused and which in itself does not have a guarantee against misuse. It has to be guided by something higher. And that is (inaudible) prudence. You remember the connection in which we discussed the question, a question which Aristotle doesn't discuss, namely the relation of rhetoric or dialectics to prudence. And without having an answer to this question we are in the dark regarding the most fundamental question which is perfectly compatible fortunately with getting some clarity about less fundamental questions. Generally speaking we would be in a very hopeless situation regarding knowledge if we would require full clarity about the fundamental things before we can have clarity about derivative things. That is our strange situation, that we know our way reasonably well in derivative things of this kind or another, and not on the fundamental things. We have somehow to live with that.

I would like to bring up another question which, regarding rhetoric in general. Now we have seen that rhetoric belongs together Aristotle's point of view with dialectics, and dialectics with what we can call apodictics, the doctrine of the true syllogism. And this discipline as a whole, dealing with rhetoric, dialectics, and apodictics, is . . . what's the name for that discipline?

Student: Logic.

Strauss: Logic. Now logic as you know is still a part of philosophy or science, perhaps even more so than it was in Aristotle's schema. Now what I would like to do now I have done probably hundreds of times, a slight exaggeration, so that there will be some of you who will be simply bored. (writing at the board, in parts barely audible); I believe this is one of the simplest helps one can give (inaudible) to remind him of the radical change which has taken place in the world in a way which is accessible to every administrator of the most superficial kind. How do you call him, who simply pigeonhole things? (inaudible). Good. Now all right, what is the Aristotelian division of the sciences, of philosophy? The fundamental division is theoretical and practical. (lists under the theoretical column): mathematics, physics, and metaphysics, although this is not Aristotle's name for it. And over here? (under the practical column):

Student: Ethics, economics, . . .

Strauss: And where is logic? (inaudible), a prelude. This was the traditional scheme. I do not go into any refinements now. And now what's the scheme today, the schema today now generally accepted? To simplify matters I will say let us forget about science and speak only of the parts of philosophy which are today universally

recognized. I'm not speaking of those that are recognized by parts of the professional philosophers. Now begin, and no farfetched things. (the following exchange largely inaudible). Logic. And since one of these people wrote a book about ethics, I believe they also say they speak about ethics. Next?

Student: I still think of metaphysics.

Strauss: I'm sorry. If there would be a poll.

Student: How about the root of metaphysics (inaudible)?

Strauss: There is a fellow in Yale and there are some other people in (inaudible), but the majority of all logical positivists, all people stemming from Kant, reject that, the large majority. Now let's go on. What is still recognized?

Student: Philosophy of science.

Strauss: Well that is epistemology, more or less. I believe one can also say this, that philosophy of religion would be recognized. It may take the form of a mere psychology of religion, but still. And I believe there is much talk today of philosophy of history. So let us lead it at that. So there is a radical change. And the comparison of that, if you put these two lists together and give a reasoned account of the difference that really is the best introduction to our present day problem. At least to that extent, then we know what is the air that we breathe. That (hitting the board) is the air that we breathe not that, but we can articulate it. You understand? That is a most difficult thing, to become aware first of all that there is air -- men did not always know that there was air -- and then the particular air which you breathe. But you can never know properly -- there is a vulgar but very telling German, especially Berlinian, proverb, one does not taste one's own saliva. Now if you look at this schema, I will mention only three points because we don't have too much time now. The first striking thing is this, that physics, and that is perhaps the most important, which was part of philosophy is no longer part of philosophy. The distinction between philosophy and science, which we take for granted, is one of the greatest intellectual events of modern times. That this little thing, economics, has now disappeared entirely from practical philosophy and is left to the science called economics is only a consequence of this fundamental change that physics is no . . . economics is a kind of physics, a social physics. So this is only a secondary development. But the distinction between philosophy and science is absolutely. And of course also what is implied in the whole thing: the abolition of the difference between theory and practice, theoretical and practical sciences. Now one can say something like the following. If you go through this list here and see what these (inaudible) disciplines have in common . . . In an earlier stage, say forty or fifty years ago, when the German idealistic and the British (inaudible) tradition were still stronger, there was a word in common use for all these (inaudible): human consciousness. But this word has somehow expired, at least has lost its central significance for a variety of reasons, the most popular one being Freud. But there are other more important ones too. But

now one can use a much simpler term. They all deal in various ways with man. Man is the sole theme of philosophy (inaudible), but not in every respect, not the human body -- that is understood to be a matter of anatomy and physiology -- but what makes man man. No longer God or nature are the things, according to the prevailing view. I don't say universally accepted.

Let us now return to our question of rhetoric. What has this change to do with rhetoric? Logic is now the most important part of philosophy according to the most powerful view. Whereas for Aristotle it was only a prelude, or to the Aristotelian tradition, a prelude to philosophy. The true philosophic studies were substantive, not formal. Yet one obvious change, and particularly important to us in this class: rhetoric is no longer a part of philosophy or science. From time to time a man writes a book on rhetoric. I think the late Weaver wrote a book on rhetoric, and there is someone else who wrote a book on rhetoric whose name I forgot. But these are the more or less literary people. There is no place for it in the organization of the sciences as a whole. Now what does this disappearance of rhetoric mean. Now from the traditional Aristotelian point of view, which is not necessarily the Aristotelian view itself, there was a kindred to rhetoric which did survive, and I'm not speaking now of apodictics, poetics. Now in which form does poetics survive today?

Student: Aesthetics.

Strauss: Aesthetics. Yes, which means a very profound change, namely the difference between poetry, and music, and painting, and sculptor is no longer as important as it was for Aristotle. For these people it was understood, poetry is the tops, the tops. Whatever good the other things might do, they were not comparable, because poetry is of course the speaking art and the others do not speak. Music is not speech, and painting and sculptor still less. So what prevented the inclusion of rhetoric in the aesthetics? After all if aesthetics is such a large and general thing, why should not it accept rhetoric. I addressed this question to a man of the greatest competence and authority in these matters, Hegel in his Aesthetics does discuss it still, why not rhetoric. And he gives roughly this answer. Poetics works are free, It will become later on what that means. Prose is not free. Hence, even the highest historical works, say Thucydides, are quote prosaic, not only in the obvious sense that it doesn't use meter, but he is bound, he cannot pick his events. Whereas the poet of course can disregard all merely irrelevant and chance events. The historian is not entitled to do so. If these chance events have some importance for the cause of the war, he has to mention them. Now Hegel says, eloquence is apparently closer than historiography to art which is free. The orator pronounces his own free judgment. He does not merely reproduce a sequel of events as the historian does. He's perfectly free in handling his subject. For example, he is in no way bound by the temporal order by which the historian is more or less bound. He does not merely appeal to our reason and understanding as the historian does but much more to our convictions, as Hegel calls it. He must affect the whole man, the passions and so on. In this respect rhetoric

is much closer to art than is historiography. Yet, nevertheless, rhetoric does not belong to art because it stands under the law of practical utilities. The speeches are means towards an end. They are not ends in themselves, for artistic enjoyment. Or, as he puts it from another angle, there is no true unity of the universal and the individual. Say the Antigone, the Antigone is much more than this particular woman. She stands for something. And nevertheless, she is this individual. Whereas such a complete fusion of the universal and the individual cannot possibly take place in rhetoric because we mean it. We mean that this individual, John Smith, is guilty or innocent. And you cannot replace him and say this kind of man (inaudible). This is only in a very derivative and metaphorical sense true.

To come back to the point: The modern conception of art led to the expulsion of rhetoric. This is not the whole story. It has also to do with the change regarding science. The older view was stated common sensically and in perfect beauty by Horace, "The poets wish to be useful and to delight." This is now regarded as philistine. I believe that no up to date critic would for one moment stoop to consider that maybe Horace had a point. That's out of the question. In other words, the older view was however free the poet may be in certain respects, poetry is in the service of something else, just as rhetoric is. We can call that in the service of which, very generally but not meaninglessly, in the service of life. But, of what life? That is the question. Some of our contemporaries wholeheartedly agree with that, that art must be in the service of life. Do you know who they are? Marxists. This of course is not what Horace or Aristotle (inaudible) social causes. They thought the life of moral or theoretical excellence. Rhetoric is not art in the sense of art for art's sake. That is perfectly true. But the question is, is poetry art for art's sake. We must not accept without examination the now accepted pigeonholes. We cannot do that. Nor must we -- and this is against the possible misunderstanding of what I propose -- nor can we accept without any further ado the pigeonholes of Aristotle. I mean the distinctions which he makes. Nor can we do that. Aristotle's pigeonholes, to repeat this expression, have only one very great advantage. They are not our pigeonholes. And by considering them, by entering into their spirit, we achieve some liberation from the pigeonholes which otherwise would keep us under control. That is what I meant by the atmosphere, the air. We become aware of the air in which we live if we wonder into a different air. And maybe when we have a sufficient familiarity with Aristotle we would feel that they are, come to think of it, preferable to ours. Well, all right, we must be openminded and also not apprehensive and fearful. But let us wait for that.

So this I believe is one point. And of course the other point we have discussed all the time, or thought of it, especially since we read in the last quarter Hobbes' Leviathan, that one reason why rhetoric decayed -- I mean not necessarily the art of speaking, but the respect for the art of speaking -- has to do with the notion that science is, can be, ought to be, all comprehensive. And therefore there would be no place for a non-scientific utterance. (inaudible), so I thought I should bring your attention to that. Yes.

Student: (inaudible) whether poetry is art for art's sake in terms of the way we looked at poetry today. I know we could give a perfect argument by starting with Plato's view of poetry. But anything he would make on those grounds I think would be denied as a valid premise by a staunch advocate of poetry today.

Strauss: Well sure, I agree with that. One would go into that. And I suppose part of the argument -- I mean this is a long, long story; these are all long stories -- would be to consider the work of Shakespeare. You know this is a perfectly legitimate dialectical, oratorical procedure in an Anglo-Saxon country to say, well since the greatest poet in this Anglo-Saxon world is Shakespeare, what did he think of poetry. Let's check on that. And then we see whether Shakespeare regarded, believed in art for art's sake. I mean absolutely, simply. Let us see that. And of course then we would have to go through certain stages. I remember one point which is ultimately quite wrong, but even errors can be helpful on the way to non-error. This point was recently criticized by Allan Bloom in his study of Shakespeare, the point which Nietzsche makes. Nietzsche says how did Shakespeare -- there's an aphorism of Nietzsche -- how did Shakespeare think of poets. And the clearest proof is the poet in Julius Caesar, (inaudible) a kind of louse here compared with Brutus, the Roman. I always was sure that Nietzsche misinterpreted this. I'm now more sure after having read Bloom's interpretation. But still, why did Shakespeare present the poet . . . Take the case of the extreme opposite end of the spectrum, the self-advertisement of the advertisers, as they call it, the show business, advertising show business. I mean that is going on all the time. For example, the prizes which they get. These celebrations are done in a big way, and no prizes for journalists for example, to say nothing of teachers at the University of Chicago college would be presented from coast to coast over the t.v. You know there is a self-glorification of the show business, which is of course perfectly all right. Now the question of the meaningfulness of whether there are criteria by which to judge it does not even arise. Something similar happens of course to us. There are some people when they hear the word art they go down on their knees without any further consideration of what is presented as art. You know the cases in which the question of obscenity, when it was discussed . . . An absolutely dirty thing, if a critic can be found who says it is a piece of art, that settles it. And after all, it can't be as simple as that. It cannot be. I mean if this were the case, why did not for example Shakespeare, just a serious of obscene works? Why did he not do it? And why did he keep this kind of thing, which he does not deny, in its proper place, very rare and in very small doses. In other words, one would have to begin, Shakespeare would be the most practical example to see what did he understand by (inaudible). After all Shakespeare has said, although he is generally speaking a dramatic poet, but the epilogue to Tempest is a direct utterance of Shakespeare. And one would show that Shakespeare knew of something beyond not only the theater, that goes without saying, but beyond art, beyond his poetry. This would not settle the issue because Shakespeare had other prejudices as we know -- he was also (inaudible) a democrat -- and therefore he might be as mistaken regarding art as he was regarding democracy.

But it is still just to get the stone rolling, to get it moving. It's a good beginning.

Student: Would you rule out any examination from something that's very close to us, for instance Allen Ginsberg?

Strauss: Well I never heard the name.

Student: Well what used to be the new school of (inaudible) poetry.

Strauss: I do not know. I cannot speak about things which I do not know. First I would make a poll of this class whether the majority here thinks that this is a great poet. And if this is settled then we would . . .

Student: I'm trying to make the hard case for what would seem to be a very weak side. And if I'm not mistaken . . .

Strauss: If this is the best you can do, I would be very apprehensive.

Student: No, it wouldn't be fair to ask, to take a poll whether people thought this was a great poet or not because great poets have a unique tendency of not being recognized.

Strauss: Not universally, I believe, not universally. It is well known, to use a favorite phrase of Stalin, that Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, and Aristophanes were recognized immediately. That is a very interesting phenomenon itself, that in modern times with the great change of fashions, also in painting, there is always the resistance of the old generation like Eisenhower and Khrushchev, you remember that one point where they agree against new painting. The impressionists were regarded as absolutely impossible and today that's old hat. I do not know what they call it now. And this has happened in generation after generation. I am sure that this was not always the case. There is even some evidence for that apart from the external statistical facts, that these great poets were recognized immediately. There is even, I found somewhere, a statement in Plutarch to this effect, that when this beauty and this perfection appeared the only reaction was that people didn't know that things could be so beautiful. It was obvious that it was so beautiful. Apparently beauty is no longer this criterion in the clear common sensical manner that it was in the past. To say nothing of the fact that even granted that the novel is not recognized in its own generation -- I grant it for argument's sake -- it does not mean of course that every novel poet is a good poet. That's clear. That would be too simple.

Student: Is it possible that the decline of rhetoric is not due primarily to the science of Hobbes and the people who came after him, but more to what Tocqueville described when he said that historians in this country for instance don't look at the individual as the mover of history. They look at the broad, mass movement because of the influence of democracy upon them. And therefore any (inaudible) of a President in the New York Times, for instance, by

any of its reporters very rarely dwells on what the man said, except for Kennedy very recently and how it says it, but more not on the rhetoric so much as on his achievements, the broad courses of history. The decline of the individual means the decline of rhetoric.

Strauss: I believe there are two different things. I think it has very much to do that the mere enjoyment of the perfection of diction and so on probably has not grown to the same degree as literacy has grown. I believe people are reasonably much more interested whether the policy announcement of the speech is sound or unsound than how well turned the phrases and well chosen the individual words are. But still, perhaps the attention to this . . . It is very rare if I read a scholarly book today which is also written with some concern for language. I believe I do not exaggerate. When I have to read a book or manuscript where I see the author has taken some care and has not just, how should I say, vomited, if I may say so, the individual words, but has thought about it, I am quite amazed. I think it is quite rare. But one thing is eloquence, rhetoric, the actual rhetoric, and another is the theoretical concern with that. And we are speaking now of course about the theoretical concern. I'm sure there are today some very good speakers. I mean we had the big example of Churchill of course, an amazing (inaudible), but there are some others.

Student: Did the theoretical concern come more from the fact that they're democrats, living in a democratic society, and therefore not talking about the individual and the leader, but they are concerned with what they call broad social forces and things like that?

Strauss: No, I believe that is not so true, because the veneration for individuals is very great in a democracy too. I mean in other words this philosophy of history is by no means the operative philosophy in the democracies. I always remember this book title of a book on Henry Wallace who was probably the most liberal candidate for Vice Presidency and for sometimes he was in fact the Vice President. I believe he was much more revered by the simon-pure liberals, the non political, the non wheeling and dealing liberals, than any other man since. His biography had the title -- he's praised for the common man, the age of the common man -- had the title, Henry Wallace: An Uncommon Man. Democracy knows very well, if it is in a sense the rule of the common man, it requires also uncommon men. And I think the worship for individuals, both sensible and (inaudible), is very strong in this country too. I think we can see it in the daily occurrences. I do not believe it is true that philosophy of history has other than relatively little importance.

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: Yes, I mean if it were thought of as part of art it would share that veneration which art today generally enjoys, obviously. And it is not thought of as art in this sense quite correctly, because rhetoric cannot be separated, surely not deliberative and forensic rhetoric, from the end or purpose which it serves. But men have said that you can separate a poem from the end. In other words,

it has no end, art for art's sake. In other way in which I would handle these things just to get things moving is to take some of the greatest and most dedicated artists of the nineteenth or twentieth century and see whether he . . . The example closest to me for some accidental reasons is Gustave Flaubert. I mean if he was not a fanatic of art, I do not know who was. And it is perfectly clear when you read his works that this was in the service not of a party line, or such nonsense, but of something which ultimately justifies art. And this kind of thing.

Lecture XVI
Aristotle's Rhetoric, June 3, 1964

(in progress) Strauss: . . . the man who gave Churchill the Nicomachean Ethics to read, which Churchill who had neglected his education in certain respects had never read before. And do you remember what the exchange was. Churchill said, well this is more or less what I always thought. Thank you for your very fine paper. You refer to Churchill, and quite wisely in such a context, of course. There is another remark more simple, because Churchill is of course also master of the very homely expression. One of the things you quoted from him, it reminded me of another statement. When the question came up, war, say around 48, and then he simply said, I do not feel a war in my bones, whereas I felt a war in my bones say in the 30's. This kind of devining, which I'm sure Churchill would have been able to spell out, but the key point was this, that the certainty was the feeling in his bones. But that was very good that you brought in this. Churchill is a very fitting conclusion to this course, because then we are immediately back to political science, our most immediate concern, and Mr. _____ who has written his Masters thesis on Churchill acts on the view that in order to understand political things one might as well look first at the highest than at the lowest. One must also study the lowest. That goes without saying. What is no going on regarding the West side block is of course political. But to see it properly one must also see (inaudible). And you acted again on this sound principle.

In the main what you said was absolutely sound. There were a few points which you perhaps misunderstood. "Demonstrative" in this passage does not mean demonstrative strictly speaking. It means only the demonstration characteristic of rhetoric. Aristotle always, he is never pedantic in his usage. There is a demonstration in human matters, in rhetoric, and he calls it (inaudible). That's unimportant. When you wondered that he doesn't make a statement about the statement, that I believe is not a great difficulty. It is really very simple. You stand up and say, I will speak in favor of going to war, or against going to war. That's the statement. And the clearer you state that and with a minimum of rhetorical frills, the better. People can follow you better.

Student: What I thought about was say if we're deliberating about Cuba, the statement would also include establishing the facts of the situation.

Strauss: No, no. That's not the statement. The statement is, for example, you accuse or you defend. And this is ordinarily not even necessary, because one man is counsel for the defense and another is the accuser, so it goes without saying. You noted the fact that Aristotle concludes the Rhetoric with a chapter on the peroration. And this last chapter is itself a peroration. And this is quite obvious and quite true, You infer from this that although this is technical book, not a rhetorical book, it is nevertheless to some extent at least a rhetorical treatment of rhetoric. There is something to this, and especially the point which you mentioned that

he speaks here more frequently in the last chapters of "thou," to make it quite clear.

Student: Is that the familiar you?

Strauss: Yes, yes, well the second person singular, which is so impossible to do in English. There is something to that, but still I believe fundamentally it is nevertheless a technical word and not a rhetorical word. And how Aristotle combines rhetorical means, in other words that is a question of Aristotle's style, his way of speaking which is not always purely technical as we have seen. But this was not the key issue. The key issue was the problem which was stated last time already and restated by you in a different way in your paper. It concerns the status of deliberative rhetoric. Can you state again, because you also have to learn something about enunciation or elocution and the proper speed of delivery. It should not be too slow, nor should it be too fast, but in the mean. Now what is the difficulty as you saw it?

Student: In one sense, deliberative rhetoric is a lower thing than forensic rhetoric. It's less finished. And also it doesn't employ as many enthymemes and therefore in many cases it is less demonstrative. But in another sense, the end with which it is concerned and the type of man it takes to give a great deliberative speech it is higher than forensic. And broader than that, it seemed that at the beginning of the Rhetoric Aristotle suggested that one of the reasons he was writing the Rhetoric, one of the things that prompted him, was an attempt to come to the aid of political rhetoric. Other rhetoricians had not written about political rhetoric, had said nothing about it. He felt it was a noble thing, an important thing, and he should write about the rhetoric which tells deliberative rhetoricians how to make their arguments better.

Strauss: Well, let me restate it. First there is a difficulty -- that I think is what Aristotle means by the difference between the statement and the argument (inaudible). You must first state the difficulty by itself, and then you bring in your solution. You must not begin with your solution. I mean not only because it is more effective -- if you present a great difficulty . . . (inaudible) -- but for the simple sake clarity. Now there seems to be a contradiction between the remarks about the relative rank of deliberative and forensic rhetoric made in the first two chapters and what is said in the last Book. And you solved it by, in the way in which one has to solve these things, by making a distinction. Now is this solution acceptable to you, Mr. _____?

Student: Well for the most part I would say yes. It's as far as . . . (inaudible). However, I think the difficulty remains in so far as . . . Aristotle gives the impression that deliberative rhetoric shares less in what we might call the rhetorical, the lower rhetorical things. In the very beginning, he somehow associated at the start of the Rhetoric the return to concern with the enthymeme with the restoration of deliberative rhetoric. Yet in Book Three there is one point where Aristotle specifically says that forensic rhetoric shares less in the rhetorical . . .

Strauss: And in the enthymeme in particular.

Student: He says forensic rhetoric shares less in the rhetorical than does deliberative. In this passage about exactness he says it has less to do with (inaudible) of rhetoric. Also, he says then that forensic rhetoric is generally more associated with . . . the enthymeme is more suitable for forensic rhetoric than for deliberative.

Strauss: Yes, but if the enthymeme is the crown of rhetoric, then forensic rhetoric would seem to be higher qua rhetoric than deliberative rhetoric. What is the principle underlying the distinction?

Student: From the narrow viewpoint of the heart of rhetoric you might have to say that forensic is higher because it uses the enthymeme, but in the broader consideration of the subject of rhetoric you would have to say that deliberative rhetoric is higher.

Strauss: In other words, from a narrowly technical, i.e. rhetorical, point of view forensic rhetoric would be higher; but if you take a broader view, if you take into consideration also the subject matter, deliberative rhetoric is higher. So this would be (inaudible) the solution. Now if this is true, we see how artful Aristotle proceeds at the beginning of the work. And we all went into the trap. The previous rhetoricians neglected deliberative rhetoric, and they neglected the enthymeme; hence, we inferred incautiously, the enthymeme is at home in deliberative rhetoric. And now we see why the two complaints are perfectly justified, the defects of previous rhetoric: a) neglect of deliberative rhetoric, b) neglect of enthymeme. These are independent considerations. They are not, you can't put them together and simply say, that would be a simple and in an external way elegant solution. But in interesting matters the solutions are never so elegant. Can we leave at that?

Student: Just a small addendum, that is that in so far as deliberative rhetoric addresses itself to . . . (inaudible), we should all along have expected that deliberative rhetoric would share more in the lower aspects of rhetoric, and yet we tended to be led along another path, to associate the higher part of rhetoric, namely the enthymeme with deliberative rhetoric.

Strauss: Well I think we have no particular reason for (inaudible) but this is simply one of our most common human vices, thoughtlessness. We should have thought of it, but we didn't. And so we had to learn it the hard way from Aristotle. So he had to spell it out explicitly. But now we will never forget it. Good. I have to say a few words about Mr. ___ paper on last time's assignment. I can only mention a few points. I'll read to you a few sentences to give you some taste of what he does. (reading): The assignment covers a remarkable descent from mere (?) philosophic calm and reason to wrangling, deceit, and particulars. We may be guided in our understanding of rhetoric and its relation to politics if we say that just as politics is a compromising embodiment of justice in material circumstances, so rhetoric is a compromising embodiment

of logos in material circumstances. [That is very neatly said, only the question, what is material. The adjective material is perhaps somewhat misapplied.] Also it is noted regarding epideictic speech that there will be a single writer and reader in any act of reading, for the (inaudible) is associated with strife and (inaudible). The acme of rhetoric then is found in carefully written, precise, and detailed works in praise of the truly noble addressed to no particular people, meaning not to this demos or that jury. They will achieve the effect upon the reader by his attention, not (inaudible). The (inaudible) difference between speech and writing most dwelled upon are the presence of repetitions and (inaudible). Both these have the effect of giving us multiplicity instead of unity. More seems to be said than is in fact said, the illusion being supplied by the arts of delivery. If we reverse this, we may conjecture that in writings such as Aristotle's with its urbane and laconic reticences and (inaudible) the contrary illusion may be created of less having been written than is in fact written. [That is a very reasonable suggestion. And one more point, I can not read the whole thing.] The central means of accusation which alone is not said to be available the defense and is said to be most artful and most unjust is to praise our adversary for what is irrelevant and come down very hard on what is relevant. The power of this method can at least be apprehended in Anthony's funeral oration, so were they all honorable men. That's this kind of praise. That this is a matter of the greatest injustice is due to the fact that it rests on the perversion of good to evil. Herein Aristotle is at one with the Christian theologians against the utilitarians.

I would like to have an explanation of the last sentence.

Student: The question is whether . . . The greatest injustice according to the utilitarians would be the infliction of the maximum damage.

Strauss: But is this not here, well Aristotle does not say that this is the greatest injustice simply. He says only that of these devices this is the most unjust. And does it not inflict the maximum damage by creating the chance that this man will be more severely punished than he otherwise would, or perhaps that he wouldn't be punished at all? I mean I agree with you that Aristotle is no utilitarian but I would like to understand how you meant that and what you see as the common point between Christian moral theology and Aristotle versus the utilitarians. This seemed to me not sufficiently prepared.

Student: No.

Strauss: All right, then we don't have to go on. Now let us then turn to our last assignment. Is there any point someone wants to raise before we enter? We come to chapter 16 of the Third Book. That deals with the narrative. Now what do we have to say about narrative. First Aristotle discusses the question why there is no need for a narrative proper, meaning a consecutive narrative, in epideictic speech. It can be done. For example, in Xenophon's Agesilaus, which is an epideictic speech in praise of Spartan King, Agesilaus, you have first a long narrative of Agesilaus' life and

then afterward the praise proper. But one can say this was not meant for oral delivery. Now what is the reason why this should not be done. Let us read the beginning of chapter 16.

Student: In the epideictic style the narrative should not be consecutive but disjointed; for it is necessary to go through the actions which form the subject of the speech, for a speech is made up of one part that is inartificial, the speaker being in no way the author of the actions which he (inaudible) and of another that does depend upon art."

Strauss: By the way, from this it follows that epideictic rhetoric is higher than historiography, history writing. Do you see that? Because the historian is bound by the sequence. He does not control his material and cannot throw it around in the way in which the rhetorician can. He is not master of his materials, strictly speaking, a point to which I referred last time in a somewhat different context. Now go on.

Student: The latter consists in showing that the action did take place if it be incredible, or that it is of a certain kind, or of a certain importance, or all three altogether. This is why it is sometimes right not to narrate all the facts consecutively, because a demonstration of this kind is difficult to remember. From some facts a man may be shown to be courageous, from others wise or just. Besides, a speech of this kind is simpler, whereas the other is intricate and not plain. It is only necessary to recall famous actions. Wherefore most people have no need of narrative. For instance, if you wish to praise Achilles, everybody knows what he did and it is only necessary to make use of it. But if you want to praise Critias, narrative is necessary, for not many people know what he did."

Strauss: Now, ^{THAT} was well explained by Mr. ____, the example of Truman. You would not address a praise of Truman to people who do not know these massive facts. That would not be praise. It would be information, a biography, or what have you, but not proper praise. And you get here an idea of what Aristotle understands by a praise. And Xenophon's Agesilaus is truly a good example, where the various are praised, courage, intelligence, temperance, and so on. This would be the plan of the praise. Now it is obvious that a mere narrative, where here is a wise action, a proof of his wisdom, here a proof of his temperance, would come in accidentally, would be very disorderly. It is much better to bring the pertinent facts together when you discuss the virtue in question. Yes?

Student: Is there any significance to the fact that he says praising Achilles here and has reference to, in the Symposium (inaudible)?

Strauss: No, but Achilles after all is the most famous of all heroes.

Student: You don't think that it's a reference to the Symposium?

Strauss: No. The only question is why he mentions Critias as the other pole. You know who Critias was, one of the worst of the

Thirty Tyrants and it would be quite a tour de force to write in praise of Critias, but perhaps for this reason a great rhetorical achievement if you can bring it off. It's possible that he means that by that. We come now to narrative in forensic speech.

Student: "But at the present day it is absurdly laid down that the narrative should be rapid."

Strauss: Yes "at the present day" is too narrow a translation of the Greek word which means now. I would translate it "as it is." Aristotle uses it in this sense quite frequently. It can also mean now, but it can have this looser sense.

Student: "And yet, as the man said to the baker when he asked whether he was to make bread hard or soft, 'What, is it impossible to make it well?' So it is in this case; for the narrative must not be long, nor the exordium, nor the proofs either, for in this case also propriety does not consist either in rapidity or conciseness but in a due mean. That is, one must say all that will make the facts clear, or create the belief that they have happened, or have done injury or wrong, or that they are as important as you wish to make them. The opposite party must do the opposite. And you should incidentally narrate anything that tends to show your own virtue, for instance, 'I always recommended him to act rightly, not to forsake his children'; or the wickedness of your opponent, for instance, 'But he answered that wherever he might be, he would always find other children,' an answer attributed by Herodotus to the Egyptian rebels; or anything which is likely to please the judges."

Strauss: Now let us stop here for one moment. This subject, how long or how short, should it be long or should it be short -- the simple, wise answer, appropriate, neither long nor short but appropriate, was given by a famous rhetorician, or sophist, Prodicus, and Socrates quotes it in the name of Prodicus somewhere, I've forgotten where. Now it is very strange that Aristotle doesn't quote Prodicus but the customer of a baker, an anonymous man and (inadmissible). That is also some rhetorical trick, but I could not explain why he does it, because everyone knew that, everyone who was likely to read that book knew that it was the famous Prodicus. Perhaps he wanted to make clear the kinship between rhetoric and these very lowly arts. I do not know. This example seems also to show that there is properly a mean, the key word for prudence, but it is also the key word for art. And therefore there is a kinship, no identity, between art, therefore also the art of rhetoric, and prudence. They are not identical, but they can look identical, and the chief sophism employed by Socrates in the First Book of the Republic in trying to refute Thrasymachus consists in the identification of art with prudence, with practical wisdom. And on the basis of this rhetorical principle, if a resembles b, then a is b; and then of course since there is a resemblance of art and prudence in so far as both aim at the mean, one can identify them, but this however does not work out in the long run.

Now the next point which Aristotle makes is that the defender does not need narrative, or to a lesser degree. Why is this so?

Student: "In defense the narrative need not be so long . . .

Strauss: Why, why, why. The reason is very obvious, but it didn't occur to me. I had to look up Cope. Because the accuser spoke first. At least a considerable part of the data has been transmitted by the accuser, and therefore the defender must limit himself to those parts of the *res gestae* which he interprets differently. Let us go on a bit later, after he has spoken of the prologue in the Oeneus, yes afterward. The narrative must be ethical.

Student: "And the narrative should be of a moral character; and in fact it will be so if we know what effects this. One thing is to make clear our moral purpose; for as is the moral purpose so is the character, and as is the end so is the moral purpose. For this reason mathematical treatises have no moral character, because neither have they moral purpose, for they have no moral end. But the Socratic dialogues have . . .

Strauss: The mathematical speeches have no characters, but the Socratic speeches have. The translation is unnecessarily complicated because the word moral occurs much less here in the original. He doesn't say moral purpose but simply choice, *proairesis*. And he doesn't say that the mathematical things do not have a moral end, but they do not an end. Obviously, the quantitative value of the angles has nothing to do with any (inaudible) good, that it should be equal to two rights, you know. No ends enter. In the First Book of the *Ethics* near the beginning Aristotle had spoken of the opposition between mathematics and rhetoric. They are, as it were, at opposite poles. Here you have the maximum of demonstration. And in rhetoric, so to speak, you have the minimum of demonstration in the strict sense of the term. Now here Aristotle uses the examples not of mathematics and rhetoric but of mathematics and Socratic speeches. And the Socratic speeches are of course in a sense, which is not the simply Aristotelian sense, rhetorical. What Aristotle says here is you cannot speak of choice without revealing your own choice, and therewith without revealing what kind of person you are. This is of course the controversial issue at the present time. The value-free social science says you can speak about choices without revealing your choice. And how shall I say it, I have Aristotle on my side, to put it very immodestly. Now one could say of course against Aristotle that mathematics and Socratic speeches, meaning Socratic dialogues dealing with moral matters, are extreme examples. There are some in between which are not as exact as mathematics and yet have to do with ends, and these are physical speeches, speeches about nature. Not from the point of view of present day physics but from the point of view of Aristotle's physics, of course physics deals with ends, with things tending toward ends. That complicates matters a bit. But why can Aristotle disregard that? What's the difference between the end pursued by a growing puppy, namely to become a full grown dog, and the end of which he is speaking here?

Student: We don't deliberate about dogs' ends.

Strauss: Yes, it's not a deliberative end. It's a natural end. But ends are there too. Go on where we left off.

Student: Other ethical indications are the accompanying peculiarities of each individual character, for instance, 'He was talking and walking on at the same time,' which indicated effrontery and boorishness. Nor should we speak as if from the intellect after the manner of present day orators but from choice: 'But I wished it, and I preferred it, and even if I profited nothing it is better.' The first statement indicates prudence, the second virtue; for prudence consists in the pursuit of what is useful, virtue in that of what is honorable. If anything of the kind seems incredible, then the reason must be added."

Strauss: Now let us stop for a moment. This is very difficult, this passage, is it not? The prudent man is concerned with the useful. And the good man is concerned with the noble.

Student: Only in the endoxa, that's the important thing. You're talking to the many. You're not talking to the gentleman. What the many will think of you when you give a speech is that if you're prudent you (inaudible) the useful.

Strauss: In other words, you mean to say that here he uses prudence in a vulgar sense, in the sense in which we use it ordinarily when we say prudential considerations as distinguished from moral considerations. This is not sufficient, while I think it is true. Here he clearly implies one can be prudent without being good, and vice versa. That's the view which Aristotle of course rejects in the Ethics. This in itself would show the lower level of the Rhetoric of which we had other signs. Remember the discussion of the virtues. But something of this distinction is preserved in the Ethics, some element of it. What is the object of prudence? What is prudence concerned with?

Student: The object of prudence is (inaudible) choose the good.

Strauss: No, no. He has chosen the good, so to speak. But what is his theme? What does he deliberate about?

Student: The choice of the right means.

Strauss: Means, not about the ends. But the point is that he is constituted as a prudent man by the fact that he is dedicated to the noble otherwise he would only be clever. Good. Now let us go on.

Student: "Of this Sophocles gives an example; for his Antigone says that she cared more for her brother than for her husband or children, for the latter can be replaced after they are gone but when father and mother are in the grave no brother can ever be born. If you have no reason, you should at least say that you are aware that what you assert is incredible, but that it is your nature; for no one believes that a man ever does anything of his own free will except for motives of self interest."

Strauss: Except the useful. So in other words, if someone says like this one here, I chose the noble and disregarded gain, that's untrustworthy, unbelievable. True morality is incredible. But is

it simply incredible according to Aristotle, that someone should not be concerned with profit? What does Aristotle imply?

Student: Perhaps it's connected with this, that true morality is incredible if the man is trying to persuade you that he is being truly good.

Strauss: For this reason Aristotle said one should show one's own decency not be affirming that one is decent but by the way in which one (inaudible). That is not the point.

Student: Wouldn't the ultimate argument be that the truest self interest is virtue, that the man who believes in the virtuous life really pursues his self-interest.

Strauss: I see, in other words a utilitarian presentation of virtue would be appropriate. But still, why? Not necessarily, because Aristotle believes in true virtue. But why is it incredible? Aristotle expresses himself more unqualifiedly than he means it.

Student: Isn't that really a true statement?

Strauss: Pardon.

Student: Depending on how you take self-interest, all the way from a thief up to a philosopher, all men do act in their self-interest.

Strauss: Well this is very simple. I will first give you my answer. Aristotle again indicates the level of rhetorical argument in these public debates, public discussion. This doesn't tell the man that he asserts he is virtuous. You know the joke made about the speaker whom they said he is against sin. This would never carry any conviction. What Aristotle implies I believe is this. If you have to speak of a decent quality of yours . . . Either you must be silent about your own virtues, because the other is always offensive, Or else you must reduce it to a noble nature, that you cannot help doing that, as in a way Antigone does. I believe that is the point. Now how did I come to that? He says this is so. If you do not have a reason, but you know that what you say is incredible, let us assume you have done something showing outstanding nobility and you know that no one will believe you that you did it without any concern for your interest, but then you must state that you are by nature such a man, that you cannot help doing that, that you have no choice in it. By the way this passage in the Antigone has given rise to -- which most of you may remember when Antigone says this that she cares more for her brother than for her parents or children or husband because only brothers, or perhaps also sisters, are irreplaceable. If a woman loses her husband she can marry another husband, and she can get other children, other things being equal, but brothers or sisters are irreplaceable -- Goethe, no mean judge on such matters, found this absolutely unbearable, and I think there are quite a few classical scholars who say this is an insertion by another hand based on some story in Herodotus. I must say it makes perfect sense to me in the play, and reveals the character of Antigone very beautifully. She is not only a very spirited girl

and a very noble girl, but she is also a very intelligent girl. She cannot stand the notion that she would take this extreme step for anything that is not the most important matter. And the (inaudible) of passion, she is of course under the influence of a passion, gives her a reason. If it had been a case of a mother or child, she would also have found a reason, no doubt. But she can not leave it at saying I feel that way. She must give a reason. You doubt that?

Student: Well hers is not such a normal family.

Strauss: But still, granting that, you mean to say you would connect it up with the fact that since . . . but it wasn't only that time.

Student: (inaudible)

Strauss: Yes, sure, of course, you are quite right. I see, in other words, you would link it up with that, with the incestuous origin. But surely no explicit reference to that is made. Yes?

Student: May I muddy the waters? It strikes me that Antigone's argument is the same one which he just lifted from Herodotus back at the beginning of 1417 a, when that argument when used by the Egyptian rebels was 'wherever he might be, he would always find other children.' The replacability has been given us as the height of wickedness in character.

Strauss: Yes but that is in a very different context. The man deserted his children, which is a very unjust act, and then he replies to that that he can get children also elsewhere, which no one questions. In a much nobler context this argument occurs in Machiavelli's Discourses somewhere of this Countess, an Italian Countess, I forget her name, her children had been taken by the enemy and she was in a fort and safe and could resist and they said we will kill your children if you do not surrender. And then with an indecent gesture she said I have the wherewithal to get other children. But this was a different context. No I think there is no connection between these two other examples. Good. Now in the next chapter Aristotle takes up the question of proofs again. But he had spoken of proofs already before. Why does he take up the subject again? Well, because now he discusses proofs from the point of view of the arrangement of the speech and not with a view to the intrinsic character. Now when he says in the first sentence of chapter 17, the proofs must be apodictic, this is here understood in a loose sense, in contradistinction to the emotional and ethical and not in contradistinction to the dialectical and rhetorical. That's the only way in which I think it makes sense. Now will you read the beginning?

Student: "Proofs should be demonstrative . . .

Strauss: They are demonstrative of the kind we have in rhetoric. That must be understood.

Student: "and as the disputed points are four, the demonstration

should bear on the particular point disputed. For instance, if the fact is disputed proof of this must be brought at the trial before anything else, or if it is maintained that no injury has been done, or that the act was not so important as asserted, or was just, then this must be proved."

Strauss: This is clear. He speaks very laconic but it's obvious. In the later cases he admits that harm was done, but the harm was inflicted justly. We must simply supply these missing parts. Yes?

Student: "The three last questions being matters of dispute, just as the question of fact. But do not forget that it is only in the case of a dispute as to this question of fact that one of the two parties must necessarily be a rogue; for ignorance is not the cause as it might be if a question of right or wrong were the issue. So that in this case one should spend time on this topic but not in the others."

Strauss: So, in other words, what Aristotle demands is special attention to the fact that only in certain cases is the disparagement of the adversary absolutely essential. Only in certain cases because if the opponent's character is not disparaged, the character of the other one is necessarily disparaged. It does not come quite clearly out by the formulation, but I think that is what he means. And what he implies I think is this. The disparagement of your opponent will do you harm if it is not necessary to disparage him, which obviously makes sense. I mean if in a given case it is perfectly sufficient to disparage his knowledge of the facts, then it would be very foolish to aggravate matters by disparaging his character in addition. That is I think what he means here. One other point a bit later on, we don't have to read it all, later on when he speaks about deliberative speeches a few lines later:

Student: "In deliberative oratory it may be maintained either that certain consequences will not happen, or that what the adversary recommends will happen but that it will be unjust, inexpedient, or not so important as supposed."

Strauss: Unjust -- so justice and injustice do enter deliberative oratory. You know, in the definition which he gave in 1358 b 20ff he spoke only of the expedient and inexpedient as the theme of the deliberative orator and just and unjust as the theme of the forensic orator. Now this becomes perfectly clear, how Aristotle means it. Justice and injustice necessarily arises in forensic oratory, whereas not necessarily expediency or in expediency. And in deliberative, political speech expediency and in expediency necessarily arises, and not necessarily justice. But of course a question of justice might also arise. This we have to add to our earlier discussion of the subject. Now let us then go on where we left off.

Student: "But one must also look to see whether he makes any false statements as to things outside the issue; for these look like evidence that he makes misstatements about the issue itself as well. Examples are best suited to deliberative oratory, and enthymemes to forensic. The first is concerned with the future, so that its

examples must be derived from the past; the second with the question of the existence or non-existence of facts in which demonstrative and necessary proofs are more in place, for the past involves a kind of necessity."

Strauss: In other words, (inaudible) cannot be unscrambled. That is the kind of necessity which he means. They cannot be unscrambled. Here we have a kind of necessity regarding facts, whereas regarding the future there is no necessity. It may or may not happen. If you say this man is bound to have done this in a forensic speech, and we are bound to win this war, this bound has a very different meaning in the two cases, and the demands for proof differ accordingly. He is bound to have done this. This issue is already settled, although we may not know how it was settled. As regards the future the issue is not yet settled in any way, so there is no necessity here. We cannot read everything. Let us read a bit later on after when he says in line 21 that political speech is more difficult than forensic speech.

Student: "Deliberative speech is more difficult than forensic and naturally so because it has to do with the future, whereas forensic speaking has to do with the past, which is already known even by diviners."

Strauss: Which is a nasty remark. You see, this shows the rhetorical element of which you spoke here. It would be interesting to put -- well of course that can only be done by studying all the works of Aristotle -- to see whether the rhetorical devices used by Aristotle are not much more frequent, such as (inaudible), more frequent in the Rhetoric than in the others. My overall impression is that this is the case. But overall impressions are at best beginnings of a study and not results. Yes?

Student: "as Epimenides of Crete has said; for he used to divine not the future but only things that were past but obscure. Further . . .

Strauss: In the early nineteenth century someone said that the historian is a soothsayer turned toward the past, the diviner of the past. There is something to that.

Student: "Further the law is the subject in forensic speaking and when one has a starting point . . .

Strauss: The subject (inaudible), the assumption, that which you presuppose.

Student: "is the assumption in forensic speaking, and when one has a starting point it is easier to find a demonstrative proof."

Strauss: The (inaudible) increase. That is a starting point, that which you can presuppose.

Student: "Deliberative speaking does not allow many opportunities for lingering, for instance, attacks on the adversary, remarks about oneself, or attempts to arouse emotion. In this branch of rhetoric

there is less room for these than in any other unless the speaker wanders from the subject."

Strauss: So the forensic speeches from this point of view are intellectually higher, because it has a clear starting point, principle, arche, and that's the law. But there is some starting point of course also in deliberative speech, and what is that?

Student: The issue.

Strauss: No, no. What is ultimately the (inaudible) of the political speaker?

Student: The course of action.

Another student: The city.

Strauss: Yes but not simply the city, the well-being of the city, the common good. Now the common good is much less clearly defined than the law. There is always the possibility of questioning this or that interpretation, and therefore from this point of view it is lower. Deliberative rhetoric is lower.

Student: But isn't it a more difficult thing for the deliberative rhetorician to correctly see what the end is? In other words, the forensic orator^(s) a law, has an easy starting point . . .

Strauss: But the question is whether the more difficult is necessarily the higher. That's a question. Take a simple example. From Aristotle's point of view there would be no question that geometry is much than (inaudible). And it is much more difficult to make a universal statement in (inaudible) than in geometry. The intellectual rank . . . it is extremely difficult to do tight-rope walking, very difficult, but this does not necessarily prove that it is a very high art. The rank of deliberative rhetoric cannot be determined on the basis of its peculiar difficulty. Its subject matter, its importance, and this kind of thing, has to be taken into account.

Student: What about, the most difficult kind of rhetoric takes the most gifted man to do it, therefore it's a higher thing because . . .

Strauss: If the theme were not so much higher -- freedom and empire -- than the guilt or innocence of this or that individual, or in a civil suit even less grand, this is the reason why deliberative rhetoric is higher. And since in addition it is also more difficult, it requires much greater art than forensic rhetoric. But the mere difficulty alone would not make it higher. Now a little bit later, shortly before 1418 b.

Student: "If you have proofs then, your language must be both ethical and demonstrative. If you have no enthymemes, ethical only. In fact, it is more fitting should show himself good than that his speech should be painfully examined."

Strauss: Now is there not a difficulty here? This seems to contradict what he said earlier in 1417 a 35-36 that people think that no one chooses (inaudible) anything except what is useful to him. And here he says now the opposite that the enthymemes are less important than that the speaker shows himself to be a virtuous man. Yes.

Student: Isn't there a difference between showing yourself to be a virtuous man, and saying that you are a virtuous man?

Strauss: That is true. That is quite true. But still, you remember the enthymemes . . .

(first side of tape runs out)

. . . the enthymeme. I suggested to you, but I'm not satisfied with it, that Aristotle is speaking here still of the epideictic speeches of which he has spoken before. And this would not necessarily be relevant to the forensic and political speeches. But come to think of it, it is of course true, as you imply, that if he is a first rate orator of amazing cleverness and yet creates the impression that he cannot be trusted, then the whole speech is useless. That is surely true. I think we have to leave it at that. Another point, later on towards the end of the chapter, after he has given this quotation from a poet, who is it, Callistratus. Begin here.

Student: "So much concerning proofs. In regard to moral character, since sometimes in speaking of ourselves we render ourselves liable to envy, to the charge of prolixity, or contradiction, or when speaking of another we may be accused of abuse of boorishness, we must make another speak in our place, as Isocrates does on the Philippus . . .

Strauss: We do not need the examples, but there are quite a few at a more dignified level in the Platonic dialogues. Of course very frequently there is a dialogue within a dialogue, and Socrates says, now let us assume someone would say this, then what would we say. And this man might very well say, this artificial person created for the purpose and for the occasion by Socrates, you are very great fools if you say that. Whereas Socrates could never say to his interlocutor you are a great fool. With this we are all familiar. Now a few more things about, first of all, chapter 18. Let us read the beginning.

Student: "In regard to interrogation, its employment is especially opportune when the opponent has already the opposite, so that the addition of a question makes the result an absurdity."

Strauss: Of a single, the addition of a single question. That I think is the point, the effective thing. And then he gives some examples of that. And then (inaudible) the famous example of Socrates which we know from Plato's Apology, how Socrates with a single question finishes off Meletus. Meletus says Socrates doesn't believe in God, and he says also Socrates introduces new daemonic thing. And Socrates says, how can there be daemonic things if there are no daemons. And what is a daemon, either a god or a half-god, let us assume offspring of a god and a human being. Hence, if I

believe, if I admit daemonic things, if I admit daemons, I admit gods. This simple question here settles the issue. Now after that, the fourth example, immediately after he has spoken of Socrates.

Student: "Further, when the opponent can do nothing else but answer the question by a sophistical solution; for if he answers 'partly yes and partly no,' 'some are but some are not,' 'in one sense it is so in another not' the hearers cry out against him as being in a difficulty. In other cases interrogation should not be attempted."

Strauss: Now this case I believe underlies the downfall of Gorgias in the Gorgias. I never thought of that before. When Socrates says, you must answer briefly, and he says, yes I'm a master of brief answers, and then he's through him because he gets every kind of "did you beat, did you stop beating your wife" questions, and if he says yes or no, in both cases he is finished. He cannot say I must make a distinction. But this I believe, it is really more than a mere boast of Gorgias that he can give brief answers. It is his awareness of this rule, that the interrogated man must as such be able to give brief answers. And the bad impression it makes if someone questioned says, well there is no simple answer possible, we must make a distinction, there is something fishy. This I think is underlying that. And of course the wise point which he makes immediately afterward, well we do not have to read that: The great question is where you must stop with your questions. In other words you must have very good tactics where to make this preferably single question which finishes your adversary off, rather than complications where the audience simply cannot follow and the whole thing becomes obscure to them to your great disadvantage. The next brief remark at the end of this chapter is about jests.

Student: "As for jests, since they may sometimes be useful in debate . . .

Strauss: That is not true. Since it is thought . . . You see Aristotle is very dignified. One can say he is the Jane Austen among the philosophers. He is infinitely more, but he is also that. He would not say simply, but is thought to be. Then he says as little as he can about it. Now what is that?

Student: "The advice of Gorgias was good: to confound the opponents' earnest with jest and their jest with earnest. We have stated in the Poetics how many kinds of jests there are, some of them becoming the gentleman, others not. You should therefore choose the kind that suits you. Irony is more gentle than buffoonery; for the first is employed in one's own account, the second in that of another."

Strauss: Yes, so in other words, the ironical man jokes not for the sake of gain, that is what he means, not in a serving manner. The buffoon jokes in order to become acceptable to others, that's something serving. And the ironical jokes for the sake of the joke, as it were. And of course not every kind of joke is possible. That goes without saying. Now the last chapter deals with the peroration, and this truly is the peroration, as has been pointed out. There is only one little point of curiosity which I would like to mention. In about the middle of the chapter, when he comes to speak

of the passions to which one might profitably appeal in the peroration, he mentions seven of them and he makes a peculiar selection. He omits such nice things like friendship and gracefulness, and also fear and shame. I do not know how to explain this. In other words, either you are right, and there is much reason for saying what you say, that this is very well worked out. The peroration is a peroration; so he does what he speaks about. And if this should be true generally, I really could not (inaudible) on the basis of what I've understood (inaudible), then these little things would also have to be interpreted. I have no reply to that.

So, I would like to bring up a more general question in conclusion of this course, but is there any other point here in what we have read today which someone would like to bring up?

Well we have discussed a few times the question, what has happened to rhetoric in the last generation. I disregard now such interesting questions, but very limited ones, for example, the alleged or real decay of parliamentary. Some people trace it to the importance of party discipline, especially in Britain. In other words, the chances that a conservative speaker might persuade labor members, or vice versa, have become zero, and therefore there is no longer a premium on parliamentary debate. There may be something to that, but this is not the fundamental issue. The fundamental issue is rather this: that if we take rhetoric in the broadest and deepest sense, as it was understood by Plato and Aristotle, then it bridges somehow the gulf between philosophy and the polis. And this is much clearer in Plato than in Aristotle, but it is of course also noticeable in Aristotle. Now this gulf is bridged in modern times by an entirely different means: in the first place by the popularization of philosophy, or science, and secondly by technology. Philosophy, or science, is productive of good things which everyone, however non-philosophic, can see to be a good thing, like the disappearance of some man-killing diseases. Everyone can see that it is better to have no plagues. There is no question. So that technology and the popularization of science makes a solution. The second point of which I spoke last time was the modern concept of art, where art is divorced completely from utility, political or otherwise, and therefore the artful character and the connection between poetry and rhetoric is no longer truly intelligible. But there is implied in what I said before, but I would still like to spell it out again explicitly, this: The modern notion of science which implies the omniscience of science at least de jure, de facto there is of course no question, but there is no theme which is not subject to scientific treatment in the sense of modern science, and this scientific treatment if achieved will make superfluous any other treatment. Ideally what we call the common sense understanding of political things can be replaced by a scientific understanding. All common sense understanding is only provisional. Now there is however one admitted difficulty. This omniscient science can not validate or invalidate value judgments. This is wholly outside the sphere of science. And here one could say, well here is where rhetoric comes in. Rhetoric substantiates the value judgments. But the implication of the now prevailing view is this: value judgments cannot be supported by any reasoning, scientific or rhetorical, because they are radically emotional. In other words

the possibility that value judgments might be supported by a certain kind of reasoning, namely rhetorical reasoning, is not taken seriously. That is an additional reason.

Now I said on an earlier occasion, and perhaps I can do this today, it would be a very interesting and worthwhile study to analyze the character of the reasoning employed in the Federalist Papers. This is a state paper of the first order, and it is surely not a scientific book in the present day sense of science. It is high class reasoning. What kind of reasoning is that? The Federalist Papers are so interesting from this point of view because the modern notion of science existed already to some extent at that time of course, after Newton (inaudible), but it is, so to say, somewhere in between the classical, pre-modern view and the view now prevailing. There are a few passages which I thought I should read to you. From #9: "The science of politics, like most other sciences, has received great improvement. The efficacy of various principles is now well understood which were either not known at all or imperfectly known to the ancients. The regular distribution of power into distinct departments . . ." Meaning separation of powers, and some others. So in other words, there is a political science, and this political science has progressed in important points in the last century or so just as natural science has progressed. And this typical premise of modern thought is here (inaudible). Now the main statement about science occurs at the beginning of #31. I will read to you a few points: "In disquisitions of every kind there are certain primary truths or first principles upon which all subsequent reasonings must depend. These contain an internal evidence which, antecedent to all reflection or combination, commands the assent of the mind." Self-evident truth. "Where it produces not this effect, it must proceed either from some defect or disorder in the organs of perception, or from the influence of some strong interest, or passion, or prejudice. Of this nature are the maxims in geometry that the whole is greater than its parts; that things equal to the same are equal to one another; that two straight lines cannot enclose a space; and that all right angles are equal to each other. Of the same nature [of these mathematical principles] are these other maxims in ethics and politics, that there cannot be an effect without a cause; that the means ought to be proportioned to the ends [you see that I made a distinction]; that every power ought to be commensurate with its object; that there ought to be no limitation of a power destined to effect a purpose which is itself incapable of limitation. And there are other truths in the two latter sciences [meaning ethics and politics] which, if they cannot pretend to the rank in the class of axioms, are yet such direct inferences from them, and so obvious in themselves, and so agreeable to the natural and unsophisticated dictates of common sense that they challenge the assent of a sound and unbiased mind with a degree of force and conviction almost equally irresistible." I think that is the most important statement about this question of (inaudible). Did you notice here something? Here there is no place for rhetoric obviously. This is science. But there is one little irregularity in this statement. Yes?

Student: Common sense (inaudible)?

Strauss: No, no. Common sense means here simply the unspoiled, natural understanding. He speaks here of maxims in ethics and politics. There is nothing peculiarly ethical here. These are rules of prudence in the morally neutral sense of the term, because that goes without saying. Machiavelli would absolutely that, that there cannot be an effect without a cause; that the means ought to be proportioned to the ends -- if you want to conquer the world you have to have a proper military superiority, and so on. So here this is one statement of (inaudible). Immediately following he says, "Though it cannot be pretended that the principles of moral and political knowledge have, in general, the same degree of certainty with those of the mathematics, yet they have much better claims in this respect than . . . we should be disposed to allow them." In other words, here there comes this slight qualification: for one reason or the other the evidence and the scientific character is not quite as great in moral and political matters than in mathematics. Let me see a few more passages. Yes?

Student: You seemed to be making something of that "ought." It seems to be significant. When you went to the first ought statement . . .

Strauss: Only in contradiction to present day view, because there it sounds so strange that an ought statement comes . . . But of course one could easily satisfy our contemporaries saying what he means is this: if you want the end, you ought as a sensible man wish also the means.

(From #34): "Admitting that we ought to try the novel and absurd experiment in politics of tying up the hands of government from offensive war founded upon reasons of state, yet certainly we ought not to disable it from guarding the community against the ambition or enmity of other nations. . . . To judge from the history of mankind [a rhetorical argument], we shall be compelled to conclude that the fiery and destructive passions of war reign in the human breast with much more powerful sway than the mild and beneficent sentiments of peace; and that to model our political systems upon speculations of lasting tranquility is to calculate on the weaker springs of the human character." In other words, it is not wholly baseless because these springs exist. There is a kind of calculation going on on the other side, but an unreasonable one, because you must calculate on the strongest springs. And then he comes to the question, "What are the chief sources of expense in every government." And the answer is of course, all other expenses are insignificant in comparison with those which relate to the national defense. Now this is here one of these axiomatic presuppositions on which . . . (inaudible). The basis of the argument is the history of mankind, what Aristotle would call examples -- but a bit more than examples, because he means of course that there are no examples to the contrary. There was never a period of say fifty years in any country without war. Good.

Now here we have another most important truth. Well I have not (inaudible) everything, a few more points. (From #47): "No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value, or is stamped

with the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty [you see, the one is intrinsic, the other is from authority, i.e., rhetorical] than that on which the objection is founded. The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny. . . . In order to form correct ideas on this important subject it will be proper to investigate the sense in which the preservation of liberty requires that the three great departments of power should be separate and distinct." This in other words is a most important truth, the separation of power, but it is not of mathematical clarity. There is some qualification needed. A complete separation would be even fatal, as is shown in the next number. Later on in #49 they stress the necessity of political arrangements having their basis in opinion as distinguished from knowledge or science. "If it be true that all governments rest on opinion, it is no less true that the strength of opinion in each individual, and its practical influence on his conduct, depend much on the number which he supposes to have entertained the same opinion." Here is obviously a rhetorical argument. In a scientific argument the number of people who agree with it is utterly irrelevant, although in certain kinds of scholarly discussions questions seem to be settled at the present time by this method. Then he goes on: "A nation of philosophers is as little to be expected as the philosophical race of kings wished for by Plato. And in every other nation, the most rational government [i.e., men of science] will not find it a superfluous advantage to have the prejudices of the community on its side." Here, therefore, naturally this applies to the authors of the Federalist themselves. And these remarks in #51: "Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place." And so on. The wise men, the scientists, use the opinions and the passions which can never be replaced by knowledge. You will never have a community of knowers who act from knowledge. The result of the deliberations of all collective bodies must necessarily be a compound as well of the errors and prejudices as of the good sense and wisdom on the individuals of whom they are composed. How can perfection spring from such materials? In #80 a sentence begins as follows, "If there are such things as political axioms...." You know he seemed to say before that there are such axioms in political science as in mathematics. This is now questioned. Yes there are a few more. Let me see. Here a statement in #68: "This process of election affords a moral certainty [now moral certainty was always understood in contradistinction to mathematical certainty] that the office of President will never fall [though Strauss reads "never," the Rossiter edition reads "seldom."] to the lot of any man who is not in an eminent degree endowed with the requisite qualifications. . . . It will not be too strong to say that there will be a constant probability of seeing the station filled by characters pre-eminent for ability and virtue." Probability does not mean here of course something which you could figure out mathematically, or the figuring out of which in mathematical terms would be of any use. Moral certainty is theoretically speaking a probability. Now in the main I would say, although there are surely quite a few things which are straight from modern political thought, peculiarly modern

[remainder missing]